Waldrup v. Mueller et al
Filing
149
OPINION AND ORDER denying 141 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Honorable Sherri A Lydon on 10/07/2020.(cpeg, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
BEAUFORT DIVISION
Richard Douglas Waldrup, #20170291
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Sheriff Steve Mueller and Captain Robert )
Padgett,
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Defendants. )
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Case No. 9:18-0354-SAL
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Reconsider filed by Defendants Sheriff Steve
Mueller and Captain Robert Padgett (“Defendants”) on September 8, 2020. [ECF No. 141.] This
motion asks the Court to reconsider its August 11, 2020 Opinion and Order adopting the Report
and Recommendation and denying Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. [ECF
No. 132]. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion on September 21, 2020. [ECF No.
142.] The motion is now ripe for ruling by this Court.
Motions to reconsider are governed by Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to allow the court to alter or amend an earlier judgment: “(1) to accommodate an intervening
change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a
clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Becker v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co.,
305 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Pacific Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d
396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998)). “Rule 59(e) motions may not be used, however, to raise arguments
which could have been raised prior to the issuance of judgment, nor may they be used to argue a
case under a novel theory that the party had the ability to address in the first instance.” Pacific
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Insurance, 148 F.3d at 403. Relief under Rule 59(e) is “an extraordinary remedy which should be
used sparingly.” Id. (internal marks omitted). “Mere disagreement does not support a Rule 59(e)
motion.” Becker, 305 F.3d at 290 (quoting Hutchinson v. Stanton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1082 (4th Cir.
1993)).
DEFENDANTS’ ARGUMENTS
In their Motion to Reconsider, ECF No. 141, Defendants identify what they perceive as clear
errors of law in the prior Order. [ECF No. 132]. Specifically, Defendants argue: (1) the
Constitution does not prohibit Defendants from requiring detainees pay for medical services; (2)
the Court erred in failing to identify actions that violate the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate
indifference standard; and (3) the Court erred in crediting Plaintiff’s lay opinion on the necessity
and effect of his medical care. [ECF No. 141]. The Court will address each argument in turn.
I. Defendant argues the Court committed a clear error of law in concluding that refusing
to pay for Plaintiff’s medical care violated the Constitution
Defendants argue that the Order, ECF No. 132, and Report, ECF No. 124, “suggest that
Defendants were constitutionally obligated to pay for Plaintiff’s MRI.” [ECF No. 141 p.3].
Defendants contend the Court bases this suggestion on a misreading of Cannon v. Mason. 340 F.
App'x 495 (10th Cir. 2009). Id. Defendants argue that a county jail is not constitutionally obligated
to provide a pre-trial detainee with medical care at no cost to the detainee. [ECF No. 141 pp.1-2].
Jails may constitutionally impose co-payments for medical services, but they cannot deny
treatment based on inability to pay. Sims v. Lexington Cty. Det. Ctr., No. C.A.3:06-3490PMD,
2008 WL 216345, at *7 (D.S.C. Jan. 24, 2008) (“Although Plaintiff complains of having to pay a
fee for medical services, he has not shown that he was denied treatment for any inability to pay.
Further, jails are allowed to impose co-payments for medical services.”). This is the important
distinction: charging for medical services is constitutional; denying treatment based on inability to
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pay is not. Clayton v. Ozmint, No. 2:10-CV-00190-RBH, 2010 WL 4510912, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov.
2, 2010), opinion vacated in part on reconsideration on other grounds, No. 2:10-CV-00190-RBH,
2010 WL 5798740 (D.S.C. Dec. 7, 2010) (“[P]risons are allowed to impose co-payments for
services if they actually provide medical care to the prisoner.” (emphasis added)).
In Cannon v. Mason, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he Eighth Amendment
prohibits prison officials from denying an inmate medical treatment due to lack of funds or
conditioning the provision of needed medical services upon an inmate’s ability to pay.” 340 F.
App'x 495, 498 (10th Cir. 2009). As Defendants correctly point out, Cannon does not hold that
charging for medical services is unconstitutional. Neither the Report 1, ECF No. 124, nor the Order
ECF No. 132, interprets Cannon to stand for that proposition. Instead, the Court cites Cannon to
support the proposition that prison officials may not deny medical services based on an inmate’s
ability to pay: a proposition that Cannon states directly. 340 F. App'x at 498.
Defendants argue that the Court committed a clear error of law in concluding that refusing to
pay for medical care violated the Constitution. The Court reached no such conclusion. The Court
held that the denial of care based on an inmate’s inability to pay violates the Eighth Amendment.
Because this holding is clearly supported by the authority, the Court is not persuaded by
Defendants’ argument and declines to alter or amend its previous judgement on these grounds.
Defendants also point to clear error in the Court’s finding that the record permits an inference
that Defendants prevented Plaintiff from obtaining the MRI as ordered due to his inability to pay.
[ECF No. 141 pp.3-4]. According to Defendants, this was clearly erroneous because the Plaintiff
The Report states, “This evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Defendants
(through their jail policy) refused to pay for medical procedures that medical professionals said needed to be done
because Plaintiff could not himself pay for those procedures (an MRI and/or biopsy).” [ECF No. 124 p.11]. A better
wording of this statement would have read, “…Defendants (through their jail policy) refused to provide access to
medical procedures…” This does not undermine the fact that the Magistrate Judge properly interpreted Cannon as
prohibiting the denial of medical treatment based on inability to pay.
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never alleges that he was unable to pay. Id. at 4. Defendants assert that the Court fails to credit
the record evidence undermining this inference. Id.
In the Report, the Magistrate Judge noted the evidence in the record that undermines the
Court’s finding:
The exhibits provided (including the Defendants’ own exhibits) confirm that
Plaintiff had a growing mass on his shoulder which (Plaintiff alleged) was causing
him significant pain, that Plaintiff’s complaint had been “qualified as a certified
emergency”, but that a recommended MRI on the mass to make sure they were not
dealing with any “atypical issue” was not performed because the Detention Center
refused to pay for it. Cody v. Hillard, 599 F. Supp. 1025, 1041 (D.S.D. 1984) [“It
is improper to deny an inmate medical treatment based solely on the cost of
treatment”]. The inmate grievance forms provided as exhibits also confirm that the
reason these recommended medical procedures were not performed was because
the Detention Center (per responses signed by the Defendant Captain Padgett)
refused to pay for any such procedures, with Plaintiff being advised that his
condition “is something that your family will have to make the arrangements to pay
the bill up front and then call the medical department to make the arrangements to
take you for the treatment”. See Complaint (Court docket No. 1-1), pp. 3-4; see
also Plaintiff’s Response (Court Docket No. 48-1), pp. 1-2.
[ECF No. 124 pp.10-11].
This record permits an inference that Defendants prevented Plaintiff from obtaining the
MRI as ordered because Plaintiff was unable to pay. Accordingly, the Court declines to
alter or amend its previous judgement on these grounds.
II. Defendant argues the Court’s Order errs because it fails to identify actions in violation
of the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard.
Defendants argue the Court’s Order errs by conflating “the necessity of receiving an MRI with
the risk imposed by a delay in obtaining that test.” [ECF No. 141 pp.4-5]. Defendants agree with
the Court’s identification of the central issue: whether denying Plaintiff the ordered MRI for
approximately seven months can constitute deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s need for same. Id.
at 4. However, Defendants disagree with the Court’s finding that Plaintiff provided sufficient
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants unjustifiably denied or
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delayed medical treatment for Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Id. at 5. Defendants contend that
“[t]he deliberate indifference standard mandates the Court find not only that a seven-month delay
in accommodating Plaintiff’s MRI amounted to a serious risk of harm, but that the delay was both
objectively unreasonable, and that Defendants were deliberately and intentionally indifferent to
those needs of which they was [sic] aware.” Id. at 4. Defendants argue that the Court’s denial of
summary judgement amounts to an error of law because “Plaintiff has not provided competent
evidence that a seven-month delay in arranging for an MRI amounts [sic] posed any risk of serious
injury or violates any constitutional standard.” Id. at 5. According to Defendants, the Order fails
to show that Defendants knew of any risk to Plaintiff in delaying the MRI and that, in spite of that
knowledge, they deliberately denied such care to Plaintiff. Id. at 4.
As to the Defendants’ attempt to distinguish the risk imposed by delay from the necessity of
receiving an MRI, the Court is not persuaded. In the Order, the Court explained the relationship
between the necessity of the MRI and the risk imposed by a delay in obtaining that test:
In this case, however, the ordered procedure appears to have been for the purpose
of determining whether Plaintiff’s condition was a benign growth or not. The
stated purpose of the MRI was “to evaluate this mass and make sure we are not
dealing with any atypical issue.” [ECF No. 102-1 p.6]. Where the record contains
a physician’s recommendation to perform a procedure and no other evidence
capable of supplanting Dr. Phillips’ judgement at the time, the Court is unable to
conclude, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff’s condition was not objectively serious
enough to maintain his claim.
[ECF No. 132 pp.5-6] (internal footnote omitted).
The Plaintiff’s condition in this case was well within the parameter of a condition that has
been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment. Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241
(4th Cir. 2008). The stated purpose of the MRI would permit a reasonable juror to find the
risk of delay in performing the test was serious enough to maintain Plaintiff’s claim.
Accordingly, the Court declines to alter or amend its previous judgement on these grounds.
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As to Defendants argument that the Order fails to show that Defendants acted in violation of
the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard, the Court finds that this is a
misstatement of Plaintiff’s burden. A dispute of material fact is “genuine” if sufficient evidence
favoring the non-moving party exists for the trier of fact to return a verdict for that party. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). To carry his burden at this stage, the Plaintiff
must adduce sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to find that his medical need was sufficiently
serious, and that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to those needs. Iko, 353 F.3d at
241.
Defendants assert that the Court erred in denying summary judgment because it failed to show
that Defendants actions violated the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard. This
misstates the standard at summary judgment. The Court found that “Plaintiff has adduced
sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants unjustifiably
denied or delayed medical treatment for Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.” [ECF No. 132 p.4].
Because a denial of summary judgment does not require the showing Defendants suggest, the
Court declines to alter or amend its previous judgement on these grounds.
III. Defendant argues the Court’s Order errs in crediting Plaintiff’s lay opinion as to the
necessity and effect of his medical care.
Defendants argue that the Court’s Order erroneously relies on Plaintiff’s lay opinion as to his
medical needs and ignores the only competent medical evidence in the record. [ECF No. 141 p.5].
Defendants state that Plaintiff’s claim is based solely on his lay opinion that only a biopsy can
conclusively determine whether his subcutaneous growth is cancerous. Id. at 7. Defendants also
argue that the Court erred in crediting Plaintiff’s argument that the “certified emergency” justifying
a visit to the emergency room also evidences that a delay in providing an MRI amounts to a serious
medical need. Id. at 8.
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Plaintiff’s claim is not based solely on his lay opinion that only a biopsy can conclusively
determine whether his subcutaneous growth is cancerous. Defendants cite Plaintiff’s response to
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in support of this proposition. [ECF No. 121].
However, Plaintiff states in this document “[a]fter plaintiff’s condition continued to worsen,
almost 1 year after physician at Hospital ordered plaintiff to have M.R.I. and biopsy defendants
did have M.R.I. done but that was all.” [ECF No. 121 p.2] (emphasis added). In his response to
this motion, Plaintiff states, “[p]laintiff’s litigation was based on Defendants’ denial – delay of the
MRI.” [ECF No. 142 p.4]. Evidence in the record is sufficient to show that the denial or delay of
the ordered MRI forms at least part of the basis of the claim. With this in mind, the Defendants’
argument that the Court’s Order relies only on Plaintiff’s lay opinion as to his medical needs is
unpersuasive. The Court’s Order explicitly relies on Dr. Phillips recommendation that an MRI be
performed. [ECF No. 102-1 p.6]. Accordingly, the Court declines to alter or amend its previous
judgement on these grounds.
Finally, the Court turns to Defendants’ argument that the Court erred in concluding that the
“certified emergency” justifying a trip to the emergency room evidences that a delay in providing
an MRI amounts to a serious medical need. Defendants argue that if a true emergency then existed,
Dr. Flood would not likely have discharged Plaintiff without more definitive care. [ECF No. 141
p.8]. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, evidence that Plaintiff’s condition in
October of 2017 constituted a medical emergency is evidence upon which a reasonable jury could
conclude that a delay in providing an MRI amounts to a serious medical need. Accordingly, the
Court declines to alter or amend its previous judgement on these grounds.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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/s/ Sherri A. Lydon
United States District Judge
October 7, 2020
Florence, South Carolina
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