Sparks v. Davis et al

Filing 18

ORDER granting 7 Motion to Remand to State Court. Clerk's Notice: Attorneys are responsible for supplementing the State Record with all documents filed in Federal Court. Signed by Honorable David C Norton on January 11, 2019.(cban, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
CRYSTAL MICHELLE SPARKS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
EDWARD DAVIS, BEST ASSET
GROUP LLC,
Defendants.

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No. 9:18-cv-00427-DCN
ORDER

This matter comes before the court on plaintiff Crystal Michelle Sparks’s
(“Crystal”) motion to remand, ECF No. 7. For the reasons set forth below, the court
grants the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
This action arises out of a tractor-trailer collision that occurred on November 23,
2016 in Orangeburg County, South Carolina. On that day, Crystal’s husband, Wilbur
Dean Sparks (“Dean”), was traveling west on Interstate 26. Defendant Edward Davis
(“Davis”) was also travelling west while operating a tractor trailer in the right lane of the
interstate, parallel to Dean. Davis allegedly changed lanes and collided with Dean’s
vehicle, causing Dean to suffer various injuries.
On August 25, 2017, Dean filed an action in the Hampton County Court of
Common Pleas, requesting damages not to exceed $74,999. On February 2, 2018, Dean
filed an amended complaint in county court, removing the $74,999 damages cap. On
September 17, 2017, Crystal filed a loss of consortium case in the Hampton County Court
of Common Pleas, limiting her damages to no more than $74,999. Defendants removed
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both cases on February 14, 2018. Defendants have moved in Dean’s case to consolidate
Crystal’s and Dean’s cases. See Wilbur Dean Sparks v. Edward Davis, et. al., 2:18-cv00428, ECF No. 6. However, on March 15, 2018, Crystal filed a motion to remand her
case. ECF No. 7. Defendants filed their response in opposition on March 21, 2018. ECF
No. 8. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for the court’s review.
II. STANDARD
As the party seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction, defendants have the burden
of proving jurisdiction upon motion to remand. Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d
811, 816 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Mulcahy v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148,
151 (4th Cir. 1994)); see Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 73 (1996) (stating that
the party seeking to remove a case from state court to federal court bears the burden of
demonstrating that jurisdiction is proper at the time the petition for removal is filed). In
deciding a motion to remand, the federal court should construe removal jurisdiction
strictly in favor of state court jurisdiction. Id. “If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a
remand is necessary.” Mulcahy, 29 F.3d at 151 (citations omitted), Pohto v. Allstate Ins.
Co., No. 10-2654, 2011 WL 2670000, at *1 (D.S.C. July 7, 2011) (“Because federal
courts are forums of limited jurisdiction, any doubt as to whether a case belongs in
federal or state court should be resolved in favor of state court.”).
III. DISCUSSION
Federal district courts have jurisdiction of “all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is between . . . citizens of a
State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). Defendants
argue that removal of Crystal’s case was proper because, even though her amount in
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controversy does not exceed $75,000, her case is substantially related to her husband’s
case, and thus the court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her case pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The court disagrees.
Section 1367 provides that “the district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III
of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367. This statute empowers the court to
exercise jurisdiction over other claims that are brought within an action, if those claims
are sufficiently related to the case or controversy. It does not empower the court to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over independent state-court actions, even if they do
involve the same facts. The situation before this court does not involve a single action in
which separate claims have been brought by different plaintiffs. Rather, it involves two
distinct actions that were filed separately in state court and which have been individually
removed. As Crystal has noted, “[u]nder South Carolina law, unlike that of some other
states, loss of consortium is an independent action, not derivative.” Stewart v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 533 S.E.2d 597, 604 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000). Thus, the court finds that
it may not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Crystal’s entirely separate state action.
Having found that the court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Crystal’s action, the court next considers whether it may otherwise exercise subjectmatter jurisdiction over the matter due to diversity. Because Crystal’s complaint does not
allege an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000, the court finds that the matter does
not meet the requirements of § 1332. Accordingly, the court grants Crystal’s motion to
remand.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the court GRANTS the motion to remand.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
January 11, 2019
Charleston, South Carolina

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