Carter v. Beaufort County

Filing 26

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The Court adopts and specifically incorporates the Magistrate Judge's Report (ECF No. 18); the Court overrules Plaintiff's objections (ECF No. 24); and the Court grants Defendant's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 11) and dismisses Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim with prejudice. Signed by Honorable Bruce Howe Hendricks on 3/10/2025. (agaz, )

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
BEAUFORT DIVISION
Cindy Carter,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
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Beaufort County,
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)
Defendant.
)
________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 9:24-527-BHH
ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff Cindy Carter’s (“Plaintiff” or “Carter”)
complaint alleging the following causes of action against her former employer: (1) retaliation
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”)
and (2) age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (“ADEA”). (ECF No. 1-1.) On July 24, 2024, Defendant Beaufort
County (“Defendant”) filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule
12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B) (D.S.C.). On November 8, 2024, the Magistrate
Judge filed a report and recommendation (“Report”), outlining the issues and
recommending that the Court grant Defendant’s motion and dismiss with prejudice
Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim. (ECF No. 18.) Plaintiff filed objections to the Magistrate
Judge’s Report; Defendant filed a reply; and the matter is ripe for review. (ECF Nos. 24,
25.) For the reasons set forth herein, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objections and adopts
the Magistrate Judge’s Report.

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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born in 1958 and was highly qualified for her job with prior experience
in solid waste and recycling management. (ECF No. 1-1 at ¶¶ 6-8.) Plaintiff began her
employment with Defendant Beaufort County on August 4, 2014, as an Information
Coordinator and Data Analyst. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff was promoted during her employment,
and her last position was the Solid Waste and Recycling (“SW&R”) Director. (Id. ¶ 10.)
Plaintiff’s work performance was excellent. (Id. ¶ 11.)
Plaintiff had ben SW&R Director for one year when Defendant hired Victoria
Hoffman (“Hoffman”) on or about March 22, 2021, and Hoffman reported to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶
13, 15.) Hoffman’s background was in geology, but she had done some internship work
with recycling. (Id.) Initially, Hoffman was housed in the SW&R trailer in Beaufort, while
Plaintiff’s office was in Bluffton. (Id.)
On April 9, 2021, Dave Wilhelm (“Wilhelm”) became Capital Projects Director. (Id.
¶ 14.) Both Wilhelm and Plaintiff reported to Assistant County Administrator Jared Fralix
(“Fralix”). (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.)
Plaintiff asserts that during her employment, she opposed what she described as
a “quid pro quo relationship” between Hoffman and Wilhelm. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff does not
know the extent of any sexual or romantic relationship, but Plaintiff personally observed that
they were spending a “bizarrely high amount of time together” and that Wilhelm was
engaging in a concerted effort to advance Hoffman’s career, seemingly at the request of,
or with the encouragement of, Hoffman, and Plaintiff sets forth a number of allegations
regarding Wilhelm and Hoffman. (Id. ¶¶ 15-23.) According to Plaintiff, she was concerned
about the relationship between Hoffman and Wilhelm and “reported program disruption to
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Fralix during several one-on-one meetings.” (Id. ¶ 24.) Also according to Plaintiff, she
advised Fralix that Wilhelm was meddling in the program and providing inappropriately
favorable treatment to Hoffman. (Id. ¶ 25.)
A reorganization was announced on March 1, 2022, and a new position was posted
in Public Works for a Deputy Director. (Id. ¶ 26.) Wilhelm was the only applicant, and he
accepted the position on or around May 9, 2022. (Id.) Another position was soon
announced for Public Works Special Projects Coordinator, and Hoffman applied and was
promoted into the position. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that although she was Hoffman’s
supervisor, she was not informed that Hoffman had applied for the job or was being
considered for it until after Hoffman was promoted. (Id.) Plaintiff also asserts that she had
previously inquired about the position but was told that it required the employee to be an
engineer. (Id.) Hoffman is not an engineer, and Plaintiff asserts that once Hoffman
applied, the engineer requirement was removed. (Id.)
According to Plaintiff, Hoffman advanced in her career in a way Plaintiff viewed as
some level of quid pro quo with male managers, particularly Wilhelm, and Plaintiff asserts
that after her termination, Hoffman was assigned the bulk of her job duties, such that it was
“obvious to Plaintiff that Hoffman was working with male managers to angle for Plaintiff’s
job.” (Id.)
On February 1, 2023, Plaintiff overheard a conversation between Business Manager
Angel Marcinkoski (“Marcinkoski”) and the Solid Waste Recycling Manager Randy Boehme
(“Boehme”), which made Plaintiff inquire about the future of her employment. (Id. ¶ 28.)
Plaintiff alleges that “[s]everal things were said that seemed odd about the need to ‘lay low’
because ‘there are big changes coming in two weeks.’” (Id.)
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On February 13, 2023, Plaintiff met with Katherine Mead (“Mead”), Defendant’s
Human Resources Director. (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff had asked to meet with Mead to discuss
her concerns stemming from the conversation she overheard on February 1, 2023. (Id.)
During the meeting, Mead informed Plaintiff that another Beaufort County employee had
made a complaint against Plaintiff, alleging that Plaintiff had advised a staff member to
Google that employee. (Id. ¶ 30.) “Plaintiff confirmed that she did recall suggesting a
Google search, but Plaintiff was unsure whom she said it to.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that she
had read a 2014 news article about fellow employee Matthew Rausch’s arrest on criminal
domestic violence charges, and she was concerned he was a danger to women in the
workplace. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that she “cannot remember the person she spoke
with about it, but she intended it to be a Title VII protected activity on her part and the
person who Plaintiff was speaking could read the article and do what research they needed
to make their own conclusions.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, “Rausch’s complaint against
Plaintiff for telling someone that they can Google his name is baseless and retaliatory,” and
she claims that Defendant’s termination of her thereafter was in violation of her rights for
opposing an unsafe workplace for women. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that she “engaged in Title VII protected activities with Human
Resources on February 13, 2023[,] when Plaintiff responded to this baseless complaint
from Rausch (or someone on his behalf) and by expressing that Plaintiff felt Rausch
created an unsafe workplace for women.” (Id. ¶ 31.) She further alleges that “Mead told
Plaintiff that telling staff they could Google another County employee was gossiping and
that was not a leadership trait moving forward.” (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that Mead told
her “we take these things seriously” and “we are going to act swiftly,” and Plaintiff feared
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for her job. (Id.)
Ten days later, on February 23, 2023, Mead terminated Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 32.)
Following Plaintiff’s termination, three younger participants of the Emerging Leaders
program assumed multiple management positions that covered many of Plaintiff’s duties.
(Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff was 64 years old at the time of her termination, and all of the individuals
acquiring her duties were in their 30's. Plaintiff contends that none of them had knowledge
or experience to handle the duties and that Hoffman, who is less qualified than Plaintiff,
also has taken over some duties Plaintiff was performing prior to her termination. (Id.)
According to Plaintiff, she was dismissed because of her age and was replaced with
younger individuals.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

The Magistrate Judge’s Report
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court.

The

recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making the final
determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 US. 261, 269 (1976). The
Court reviews de novo those portions of the Report to which a specific objection is made,
and the Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation, or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
II.

Rule 12(c)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are

closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the
pleadings.” Ultimately, “a defendant may not prevail on a motion for judgment on the
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pleadings if there are pleadings that, if proved, would permit recovery for the plaintiff.” BET
Plant Servs., Inc. v. W.D. Robinson Elec. Co., 941 F. Supp. 54, 55 (D.S.C. 1996).
“[A] Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is decided under the same
standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v.
IRS, 361 F. App'x 527, 529 (4th Cir. 2010); see Burbach Broad. Co. v. Elkins Radio, 278
F.3d 401, 405 (4th Cir. 2002). Thus, to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the
complaint must contain sufficient facts “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”
and “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007). In reviewing the complaint, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations
as true and construes the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir.
2005). However, the Court “need not accept allegations that ‘contradict matters properly
subject to judicial notice or [by] exhibit.’ ” Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 529 (4th
Cir. 2006).
DISCUSSION
In its motion for partial judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation
claim, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law because she did not
engage in opposition activity protected by Title VII.

(ECF No. 11-1.)

Specifically,

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s alleged opposition of a quid pro quo relationship “is not
protected activity because neither Hoffman’s alleged, unsubstantiated conduct, nor that of
the male supervisors, violates Title VII.” (Id. at 5.) And Defendant contends that Plaintiff
could not reasonably have believed otherwise. Additionally, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff
telling a co-worker to Google Rausch and telling the Human Resources Director that she
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had done so does not constitute protected activity because Plaintiff cannot show that she
was opposing an unlawful employment practice under Title VII. (Id. at 8.)
After review, the Magistrate Judge agreed with Defendant and issued a Report
outlining the applicable law and recommending that the Court grant Defendant’s motion.
(ECF No. 18.)
In her objections to the Report, Plaintiff asserts that the Magistrate Judge erred by
finding that all three of her alleged protected activities fail as a matter of law: (1) opposing
an unsafe workplace for women created by Rausch; (2) opposing the quid pro quo
relationship between Hoffman and male managers; and (3) reporting her protected
activities to the Human Resources Director on February 13, 2023. (ECF No. 24.)
Specifically, as to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Plaintiff did not engage in
protected activity when she opposed an unsafe workplace created by Rausch, Plaintiff
contends that the Magistrate Judge’s analysis “disregards the purpose of the opposition
clause of Title VII, which protects employees who oppose conduct they reasonably and in
good faith believe violates Title VII.” (Id. at 3.) According to Plaintiff, the Report’s
erroneous conclusion that no reasonable person could believe that Rausch’s employment
violated Title VII impermissibly narrows the scope of Title VII’s protections. (Id.)
After de novo review, the Court finds Plaintiff’s objection unavailing.

As the

Magistrate Judge properly pointed out, nowhere in her complaint does Plaintiff make any
factual allegations regarding incidents involving Rausch in the workplace; nor does she
allege that he was even convicted of the alleged crime. Furthermore, the arrest referenced
in the news article that Plaintiff points to is from roughly a decade before her termination,
and she does not allege any additional arrests or conduct occurring since that arrest. As
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the Magistrate Judge explained, the fact of an arrest does not establish guilt, and the Court
agrees with the Magistrate Judge that no reasonable person could believe that Beaufort
County’s mere employment of someone who was accused of a crime nearly a decade
earlier constituted a violation of Title VII to which Plaintiff could reasonably object.
Furthermore, because Plaintiff only asserts that she believed Rausch’s presence in the
workplace could contribute to a hostile work environment, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
activity simply does not constitute protected activity under Title VII.

See Jordan v.

Alternative Res. Corp., 467 F.3d 378, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he law has never protected
employees in connection with their complaints about potential or future violations that they
feared might occur.”)
Plaintiff next objects that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that Plaintiff’s
communications to the Human Resources Director on February 13, 2023, are not
opposition activities.

According to Plaintiff, even in the Court finds that Plaintiff’s

statements to a coworker about Rausch do not constitute Title VII protected activity, the
Court still should conclude that Plaintiff’s communications with Human Resources on
February 13, 2023, do constitute protected activity because Title VII broadly protects
employees who oppose workplace conduct they reasonably and in good faith believe
violates the statute. (ECF No. 24 at 5.) Plaintiff asserts that such opposition activity
includes informal complaints, and she contends that reporting her concerns to Human
Resources regarding the alleged unsafe environment for women created by Rausch aligns
with Title VII’s objectives. Plaintiff also asserts that the Magistrate Judge failed to consider
the [temporal] connection between Plaintiff’s alleged protected activity on February 13,
2023, and her termination ten days later. (Id. at 6.)
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Here again, after de novo review, the Court finds Plaintiff’s objection unavailing, and
the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff’s conduct related to Rausch is not
sufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate that she engaged in protected activity. As the
Magistrate Judge properly concluded, and as noted above, no reasonable person could
believe that the County’s mere employment of an individual like Rausch, who had been
accused of a crime nearly a decade earlier, constituted an employment action that was
unlawful under Title VII, to which Plaintiff could reasonably object. Furthermore, by her own
allegations, Plaintiff was opposing what she believed could be the potential for an unlawful
employment practice, but she does not include any other allegations or incidents regarding
Rausch’s actual conduct in the workplace to support an actual hostile work environment.
(See, e.g., ECF No. 24 at 7 (“Plaintiff was concerned that he would have other violent
outbursts toward women in the workplace if events were triggering toward him.”). Thus,
the Court fully agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff’s comments to Human
Resources, even though temporally close in time to her termination, simply do not
constitute protected activity to support a retaliation claim, and Plaintiff’s objections do not
point to any cases that lead this Court to conclude otherwise. Accordingly, the Court
overrules Plaintiff’s objection.
Next, Plaintiff objects that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that Plaintiff did not
engage in protected activity when she vocalized concerns about the relationship between
Hoffman and Wilhelm. (ECF No. 24 at 10.) According to Plaintiff, voicing her concerns
about the relationship between Hoffman and Wilhelm was protected activity “because
Plaintiff was opposing the way that Ms. Hoffman was being treated in comparison to other
employees based on sex.”

(Id. at 11.)

Plaintiff asserts that the Magistrate Judge
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incorrectly applied the Fourth Circuit case of Dugan v. Albemarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 293 F.3d
716, 723 (4th Cir. 2002), because that case involved a motion for summary judgment and
not a Rule 12 motion. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that the Magistrate Judge erred by
applying the “paramour preference” theory to preclude Title VII retaliation claims. (Id. at
13.) According to Plaintiff, the paramour preference theory application is different for Title
VII sex discrimination and Title VII retaliation claims, and she contends that the pleadings
here allege sufficient facts for her retaliation claim to proceed.
After de novo review, the Court finds no merit to Plaintiff’s objection. As the
Magistrate Judge properly explained, by Plaintiff’s own allegations, Hoffman was not the
victim of harassment, and Plaintiff’s alleged opposition to a consensual relationship
between Hoffman and Wilhelm simply does not constitute opposition to an activity that
violates Title VII. See Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 825-26 (4th Cir. 1989) (“To
hold that favoritism toward friends and relatives is per se violative of Title VII would be, in
effect, to rewrite federal law.”); Jones v. Cecil Cnty., Maryland, No. CV RDB-23-2076, 2024
WL 1329269, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2024) (“However unfair the payment practices may be,
favoritism towards family and friends is not an actionable violation without the existence of
improper discriminatory intent—even if there were a sexual relationship.”); Scott v. Cnty.
of Orangeburg, No. 5:07-3571-MBS, 2009 WL 2970145, at *12 (D.S.C. Sept. 14, 2009)
(“An adverse employment decision motivated by a non-merit based reason—such as
friendship, nepotism, or romantic relationship—is not protected under Title VII.”); Becerra
v. Dalton, 94 F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that “an employer who promotes his
lover or paramour, or otherwise accords the lover or paramour preferential treatment, . . .
does not violate Title VII”); and Doyle v. Advanced Fraud Sols., LLC, No. 1:18CV885, 2020
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WL 1305162, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 19, 2020) (granting motion to dismiss retaliation claim).
Here, after careful consideration of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court fully agrees with
the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff’s allegations related to her opposition to alleged
favoritism towards Hoffman (based on Hoffman’s alleged quid pro quo relationship with
Wilhelm and other male supervisors) do not plausibly allege, as a matter of law, that she
opposed employment action that is actually unlawful under Title VII. Furthermore, the
Court finds that nothing in Plaintiff’s objections supports a contrary conclusion.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objections are overruled.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court adopts and specifically incorporates the
Magistrate Judge’s Report (ECF No. 18); the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objections (ECF No.
24); and the Court grants Defendant’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings (ECF
No. 11) and dismisses Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Bruce H. Hendricks
United States District Judge
March 10, 2025
Charleston, South Carolina

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