Nguyen v. Berryhill

Filing 16

ORDER denying 13 MOTION TO MODIFY OR REVERSE OR REMAND filed by Minh-Dung Thi Nguyen. Signed by U.S. District Judge Charles B. Kornmann on 5/1/18. (SKK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MAY Ut

DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
NORTHERN DIVISION

MING-DUNG THI NGUYEN,

1:17-CV-01020-CBK

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security, Office of
General Counsel, Social Security
Administration,
Defendants.
'

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g)to obtain judicial review ofthe final decision denying plaintiffs claim for Supplemental
Security Income("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. This is plaintiffs third claim
for disability benefits, and the second time that she has requested judicial review of the denial of

her disability benefits. This Court upholds the Commissioner's decision to deny plaintiff benefits
as the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
Plaintiff, bom in 1966, arrived in Aberdeen, South Dakota, from Vietnam in 1992. She
worked in and around Aberdeen from 1992 through 1998 and completed degrees from Northem

State University and the University ofMaryland (online). Plaintiff later pursued a PhD program in
Florida at Nova Southeastem University and worked at the university from 2001 to 2002. Plaintiff
was dismissed fi-oin the PhD program for what she states were false claims of plagiarism. Plaintiff
moved to Califomia in 2005 but states that she retumed to Aberdeen after her work hours were

reduced, although the record does not indicate that plaintiff worked in California. This Court notes

that during plaintiffs work history, she has never earned more than $10,000 per year, and typically
significantly less.

Plaintiff previously filed for disability benefits in 2004 and 2008. Both claims were denied,
and plaintiffultimately requested judicial review ofthe denial ofher 2008 claim. This Court upheld
the denial ofplaintiffs benefits in that claim. Nguyen v. Colvin.2014 WL 1053033(D.S.D. 2014).
Plaintiff filed the current claim for SSI on March 26, 2014 for disability stemming from "severe
osteoarthritis." Plaintiffs claim was denied by the Social Security Administration on September

5, 2014 and again, upon reconsideration, on December 5,2014, on the following basis:
There is no indication of nerve or muscle damage which would
result in severe weakness or loss of function. There is no indication

ofjoint damage which would result in severe weakness or loss of
function. Exam and medical evidence revealed normal range of
motion ofjoints. XRays [sic] of knees, hips and lumbar spine did
not reveal a severe impairment. The medical evidence reviewed
does not reveal that your condition causes marked and severe
functional limitations that prevents [sic] you from doing all types of
work. The reports do not show any other condition that would
severely limit the ability to work.
Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, and ALJ Denzel Busick
reaffirmed the denial of plaintiffs claim for benefits on May 3,2016. Plaintiffthen filed a request
for review by the Appeals Council on June 27, 2016, which adopted the ALJ's denial of plaintiffs
application for benefits on June 23,2017. Plaintiffhas thus exhausted administrative review of her
claim.

, On August 18,2017, plaintifffiled the current request for judicial review before this Court,
claiming that (1) the ALJ's decision contains errors of law, because the ALJ refused to compel
plaintiffs interrogatories of her physicians, and that (2) the ALJ's decision is hot based upon

substantial evidence because it relies upon the "malicious report" of plaintiffs treating physician,
Dr. Steven Redmond,which plaintiffstates is based on "Dr. Redmond's total lie ofno degenerative
disease at all." Plaintiff supports her disagreement with the Social Security Administration's
disability determination largely via self-diagnosis of ailments that are not corroborated by medical
opinion contained in the record: including that plaintiff has macular degeneration, that her
diagnosis of a vestibular disorder is the result of brain damage, and that the impairment to her
spine, which plaintiff characterizes as spinal arachnoiditis, requires surgery.
In response to plaintiffs appeal for judicial review, defendants request that the Court
uphold the Commissioner's disability determination, stating that(1)substantial evidence supports
the ALJ's findings,(2) the ALJ properly evaluated the opinions of plaintiffs treating physician,
and (3) substantial evidence supported the AU's determination of plaintiffs credibility. Noting

both the similarity of the issues in the current request for review to those raised in plaintiffs
previous claim before this Court and that the new evidence submitted by plaintiff continues to fail
to support her claims, this Court upholds the Commissioner's decision denying plaintiffs claim
for disability benefits.
DECISION
I. Standard of Review

A court reviewing a disability benefits determination must "neither consider a claim de
novo, nor abdicate is function to carefully analyze the entire record." Mittlestedt v. Anfel. 204 F.3d

847, 851 (8th Cir. 2000). Rather, the reviewing court must consider both evidence that detracts
from the Commissioner's decision along with evidence that supports it. Minor v. Astrue. 574 F.3d
625,627(8th Cir. 2009). Such review "is more than a search ofthe record for evidence supporting
the [Commissioner's] findings" and "requires a scrutinizing analysis, not merely a 'rubber stamp'

of the [Commissioner's] action." Scott ex rel. Scott v. Astrue. 529 F.3d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 2008)
(internal citations omitted). A Commissioner's findings must be upheld so long as they are

'supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Choate v. Bamhart.
457 F.3d 865, 869 (8th Cir. 2006); Howard v. Massanari. 255 F.3d 577, 580 (8th Cir. 2001).

Substantial evidence is that which "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the
Commissioner's conclusion." Klug v. Weinberger. 514 F.2d 423, 425 (8th Cir. 1975) (internal
citations omitted). The reviewing court may not reverse a Commissioner's decision "merely

because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision." Reed v. Bamhart. 399
F.3d 917, 920(8th Cir. 2005). Instead,"[i]f, after reviewing the record, the court find it is possible

to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
[ALJ's] findings, the court must affirm the [ALJ's] decision." Pearsall v. Massanari. 274 F.3d
.1211, 1217(8th Cir. 2001).

The reviewing court must also review the ALJ's decision to determine if the ALJ

committed an error oflaw or applied an enoneous legal standard. Smith v. Sullivan. 982 F.2d 308,
311 (8th Cir. 1992); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Deference is given to the Commissioner's construction
of the Social Security Act. Smith v. Sullivan, 982 F.2d at 311. However, the Commissioner's
conclusions of law are persuasive, not binding, on the reviewing court. Id.\ see also Miller v.
Colvin. 114 F.Supp.3d 741, 760(D.S.D. 2015).
II. The Five Step Procedure for Disability Determination
Social Security law establishes a mandatory five step procedure for determining whether
an applicant is disabled and entitled to SSI benefits under Title XVI. Smith v. Shalala. 987 F.2d
1371, 1373 (8th Cir. 1993); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The five-step sequential evaluation process may
be summarized as follows:

(1) whether the claimant is presently engaged in a "substantial
gainful activity"; (2) whether the claimant has a severe
impairment—one that significantly limits the claimant's physical or
mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the
claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively
disabling impairment listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is
disabled without regard to age, education, and work experience);(4)
whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform
. . . past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the
past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove there are
other jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform. Baker
V. Apfel. 159 F.3d 1140, 1143^4(8th Gin-1998).

The plaintiff bears the burden of proof for steps one through four of the five step inquiry, while
the Commissioner bears the burden ofshowing, at stage five,that"jobs exist in significant numbers
which a person with the claimant's residual functional capacity can perform." Sultan v. Bamhart.
368 F.3d 857, 864 (8th Cir. 2004); Mittlestedt. 204 F.3d at 852.

in. The ALJ's opinion was based upon substantial evidence considering the record as a
whole and in accordance with the five step process

This Court finds that the ALJ's.opinion was based upon substantial evidence taking into
account the record as a whole and in accordance with the five-step sequential evaluation of
plaintiffs claims. The AU's sequential evaluation findings and plaintiffs dispute as to these
findings are set forth in what follows.

Step One: The ALJ found that the claimant has not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity
since the filing of the application. Although plaintiff disputes the weighing of her work history in
the AU's credibility determination, the Step One finding itself is not disputed.
Step Two: The ALJ found that plaintiff has the following severe impairments:

arthritis/degenerative disk disease ofthe lumbosacral spine, degenerative joint disease ofthe upper
and lower extremities, and a vestibular disorder. The ALJ determined that the above impairments

were severe in accordance with 20 CFR 416.909 because they lasted for a continuous period of at
least 12 months. While plaintiff states that her dizziness is so severe that it could cause death, this
assertion is not supported by the evidence, nor is it required for the ALJ's determination that she
has severe impairments.
Step Three; The ALJ found that plaintiff does not have any impairment or combination of
impairments that is found in the list of disabling impairments established by the Social Security
Administration in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Plaintiff objects to the ALJ's findings
and claims that the ALJ should have found her disabled at this step. The ALJ, having "considered
all listings" specifically focused on Listings 1.02 (Major dysfunction of a joint(s) (due to any

cause)), 1.04 (Disorders of the spine) and 2.07 (Disturbance of labyrinthine-vestibular function).
Listing 1.02 requires both "gross anatomical deformity" and "chronic joint pain and
stiffness with signs of limitation of motion or other abnormal motion of the affected joint(s)."

Gross anatomical deformity is described as "subluxation, contracture, bony or fibrous ankylosis,
instability." Plaintiff claims that she should satisfy the requirements of Listing 1.02 in light of
examinations from 2006 stating that plaintiff had "minimal medial compartment narrowing" and

"bony sclerosis," as well as later examinations that indicated plaintiff walked slowly. However,
plaintiff provides no evidence to suggest that bony sclerosis, an increase in density and hardening
of bone, is identical or medically equivalent to bony ankylosis, the union of bones of a joint by
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articular cartilage resulting in complete immobility. Moreover,the medical opinion plaintiff points

to predates her claim by eight years and is not relevant to the period at issue. Luckenbach v.
Bamhart. 36 Fed.Appx. 872, 873 (8th Cir. 2002). Nor has plaintiff provided any other evidence of
a gross anatomical deformity as required by this listing. Plaintiff has then not met the threshold

requirement that a gross anatomical deformity be present for a finding of disability under Listing
1.02.

Even if plaintiff were found to have a gross anatomical deformity as required under Listing
1.02, this Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that plaintiff has not

demonstrated that her impairment A) involve[s] one major weight-bearing joint, resulting in
inability to ambulate effectively; or B) involve[s] one major peripheral joint in each upper
extremity, resulting in inability to perform fine and gross motor movements effectively. Although
plaintiff claims that her record demonstrates that she is unable to ambulate effectively, given that

she walks slowly, it is not clear that this would satisfy the requirements of Listing 1.02. The
"inability to ambulate effectively" is defined as

an extreme limitation of the ability to walk; i.e., an impairment(s)
that interferes very seriously with the individual's ability to
independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. Ineffective
ambulation is defined generally as having insufficient lower
extremity functioning... to permit independent ambulation without
the use of a hand-held assistive device(s) that limits the functioning
of both upper extremities. 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1
§ 100(B)(2)(b)(l).
Ineffective ambulation is further described as the inability to

walk a block at a reasonable pace on rough or uneven surfaces, the
inability to use standard public transportation, the inability to carry
out routine ambulatory activities, such as shopping and banking, and
the inability to climb a few steps at a reasonable pace with the use
of a single hand rail. 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,-Appendix 1 §
100(B)(2)(b)(2).
Plaintiff claims that because she walks slowly, she is unable to walk at a reasonable place on rough
or uneven surfaces, or to use standard public transportation. However, there is no evidence in the

record, beyond plaintiffs subjective complaints, to support her claims. Indeed, plaintiffs medical
records repeatedly indicate that her joint function is normal: "knee x-rays are nearly normal" and

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"hip xrays [sic] are normal"(Tr. 416); that plaintiff has "flill range of motion" in her knees and
that, according to Dr. Redmond,"she is telling me she really does not have pain and she does not
have stiffness"(Tr. 320); and further, that x-rays of the hips and knees are "normal" and that "no
degenerative changes" are evident in the shoulders (Tr. 348-9, 356-7). As discussed below, the
ALJ's determination with respect to plaintiffs credibility support the finding that she is not
disabled as provided in Listing 1.02.
Listing 1.04 addresses disorders of the spine that result in "compromise of a nerve root..

. or the spinal cord." Such disorders must be accompanied by a diagnosis of spinal arachnoiditis
or lumbar spinal stenosis, confirmed by operative notes, pathology reports, or medically acceptable
imaging, or evidence of a nerve root compression characterized by neuro-anatomic distribution of

pain, limitation of the spine, and motor loss. Plaintiff contends that she has both spinal
arachnoiditis and lumbar spinal stenosis based on her research of these disorders online, current
diagnosis of disc degenerative disease, and analysis by Dr. Wolgin that "[t]here is evidence of
some arthritis of the facet joints" in the lumbar spine x-rays. This Court notes that it appears Dr.

Wolgin, based in Albany, Georgia, has never met plaintiff, but rather reviewed her records
remotely, entitling this opinion to less weight than those of physicians who have seen plaintiff.
20 CFR § 416.927(c)(1). Regardless, Dr. Wolgin's findings that plaintiff has "some arthritis" do
not rise to the level of spinal arachnoiditis or lumbar spinal stenosis absent a diagnosis or other
evidence of these impairments. Plaintiff appears to misread Dr. Wolgin's statement that "[sjince
you have disc degeneration . .. at some point in your life, you may also choose to have surgery,
but this recommendation could not be made without a formal clinic visit," as stating that plaintiff

requires surgery, without appreciating Dr. Wolgin's caveat that such determination cannot be made
on the basis of x-rays alone.

The ALJ also found that plaintiffs vestibular disorder did not meet or medically equal the
requirements of Listing 2.07. While plaintiff appears not to dispute the ALJ's finding regarding

this listing, this Court agrees that the record does not support such a finding, as there is no evidence
that plaintiff has suffered "[h]earing loss established by audiometry" as required by 2.07(B).
As in her prior claim reviewed by this Court, plaintiff has not presented medical evidence

to contradict the medical findings in her record; rather,,she has chosen to repeatedly refer to the
doctors conducting her evaluations as liars and-their reports as "malicious." Nguven v. Colvin.
2014 WL 1053033, *11 (D.S.D. 2014). However, the ALJ properly accorded the August 2014

opinion of plaintiffs treating physician, Dr. Redmond, "great weight" as this opinion was
supported by medical evidence, is consistent with the record as a wholie, and was given by a

physician who has had a treatment relationship with the plaintiff since 20,04. 20 CFR

§ 416.927(c)(2)-(4). Although not automatically entitled to controlling weight, a treating
physician's opinion will be given such weight where, as here, "it is well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic, techniques and is not inconsistent with other
substantial evidence." House v. Astrue. 500 F.3d 741, 744 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal citations

omitted). The ALJ's determination that Dr. Redmond's 2004 medical opinion be given "limited
weight" was also proper; an ALJ is under "no obligation" to give a treating physician's opinion
controlling weight where it does not pertain to the claimant's condition during the relevant period.
Freeman v. Apfel. 208 F.3d,697,691 (8th Cir. 2000). Moreover,it is unclear that the 2004 medical

opinion would assist plaintiffs claim, as Dr. Redmond diagnosed plaintiff with "chronic low back
pain and chronic knee pain which comes and goes" and which "will probably not improve but stay

the same"—^hardly ailments that rise to the level of disability as required by the listings discussed
above.

Stqj Four: The ALJ found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a
range of sedentary work. The ALJ found that plaintiff can lift and carry 10 pounds, and, in an 8hour work day, can sit for 5 to 6 hours and can stand and walk for 2-4 hours. She is also able to

climb stairs, albeit slowly, and can crouch, kneel, stoop, and crawl slowly. The ALJ found that

plaintiff must avoid unprotected heights and fast and dangerous machinery, and that she cannot
climb ladders, scaffolds, or similar devices. Plaintiff disputes the ALJ's findings based on her
subjective complaints. However, as discussed in detail below, this Court finds that the ALJ's

determination of plaintiffs credibility is supported by substantial evidence.
Step Five: The ALJ found that there are jobs existing in significant numbers in the national

economy that the plaintiff could perform: namely, addresser, sorter, and optical goods assembler,
of which there are approximately 1,400jobs in South Dakota and 76,000 jobs nationally. Plaintiff
does not dispute this finding.

IV. Substantial evidence supported the ALJ's determination of plaintiffs credibility

Although plaintiff does not explicitly challenge the ALJ's finding as to her credibility, this

is clearly at the crux of her claim. An ALJ may not discount a claimant's subjective complaints
unless such complaints are inconsistent with the record as a whole and the ALJ has explained the
inconsistencies that support his or her findings regarding the plaintiffs credibility. Dolph v.
Bamhart. 308 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir. 2002). However, a reviewing court should "not disturb the
decision of an ALJ who considers, but for good cause expressly discredits, a claimant's subjective
complaints of pain." Haggard v. Apfel. 175 F.3d 591, 594(8th Cir. 1999). Further,"the mere fact
that working may cause pain or discomfort does not mandate a finding of disability." Perkins v.
Astme,648 F.3d 892,900(8th Cir. 1996). The factors that the ALJ must consider when evaluating
credibility are as follows(the "Polaski factors"):

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1. the claimant's daily activities;
2. the duration, frequency and intensity of the pain;
3. precipitating and aggravating factors;
4. dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication;
5. functional restrictions. Polaski v. Heckler. 739 F.2d 1320, 1322(8th Cir. 1984).

In evaluating a claimant's subjective complaints, "the ALJ must consider all of the evidence,
including objective medical evidence, the claimant's work history, and evidence relating to the
Polaski factors." Julin v. Colvin. 826 F.3d 1082, 1086(8th Cir. 2016).
This Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination as to plaintiffs
credibility. The ALJ followed a two-step process in evaluating plaintiffs symptoms, first
determining whether there was any medical impairment that could produce plaintiffs symptoms,
then evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of such underlying symptoms and
the extent to which they would limit work-related activity. The ALJ found that plaintiffs medically
determinable impairments could cause the symptoms she alleged, but that plaintiffs statements
concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms were not consistent
with the evidence in the record. The ALJ noted that during plaintiffs May 2014 evaluation she

displayed "no signs of distress and exhibited intact coordination and range of motion." In an
August 2014 exam, plaintiff "demonstrated slow ambulation but otherwise had an independent
gait, full grip strength and coordination, no signs of swelling, and a full range of motion of her

back, elbows, shoulders, wrists, hips, and knees." X-rays of plaintiffs joints at this time were
benign and the "examiner remarked that her function was on par with that of other women at that
age." In a May 2015 evaluation of plaintiffs x-rays, an orthopedic specialist similarly agreed that
plaintiffs hips and knees were normal.
The ALJ noted that plaintiffs claim that she can stand for only half an hour and walk for

only one hour lack evidentiary support. Moreover,-plaintiffs activities of daily living contradict

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her allegations: she lives alone, maintaining her personal care,including preparing meals,cleaning,

doing laundry, using a computer, driving a car, and shopping and attending church. Although

plaintiffs record does support some functional restrictions, these would not preclude her
performing sedentary work. While the ALJ did not directly consider dosage, effectiveness, or side
effects of medication, an ALJ is not required to explicitly discuss each factor in the credibility
determination, and this Court notes that there is no evidence in plaintiffs file nor any claim made

by plaintiff that the medication she takes inhibits her ability to perform work-related functions.
Ford V. Astrue. 518 F.3d 979, 982(8th Cir. 2008); Goff v. Bamhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790(8th Cir.

2005). Indeed, plaintiff concedes that she has not been prescribed medication to treat her
osteoarthritis—the result of, she alleges, her doctors "denying plaintiffs severe impairments."

Similarly, although plaintiff indicates potentially aggravating factors—specifically, limitations to
working at a computer because of her alleged "macular degeneration"—which the ALJ does not
explicitly address, this Court notes that the record does not include a diagnosis for or otherwise
support plaintiffs allegations that she has macular degeneration, nor is it clear that plaintiff is
limited in her ability to work on a computer; notably, plaintiff submitted her social security claim
via computer. Working at a computer is not required for the gainful employment available to
plaintiff as indicated in the ALJ's decision.
Plaintiff objects to the ALJ's finding that she has "a very poor work history" that "calls
into question claimant's motivation to work and casts doubt as to whether her impairments are the
actual cause of her unemployment." However, the ALJ must consider the plaintiffs work history
when evaluating her subjective complaints. As decided in Julin. supra, this Court finds that the
ALJ reasonably concluded that plaintiffs work history raises questions as to whether her current
unemployment is truly the result of medical problems. Julin. 826 F.3d at 1087.

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For the reasons stated here, this Court finds that substantial evidence supports the AU's
determination-of plaintiffs credibility. The ALJ has articulated how plaintiffs complaints are

inconsistent with the record in light , of the Polaski factors. The ALJ's consideration of the
plaintiffs work history in addition to the objective medical evidence and her subjective complaints
was not improper.

V. The ALJ did not err in refusing to deny the plaintiffs request to compel interrogatories
Plaintiff sought to compel responses to interrogatories that she submitted to the radiologist
examining her x-rays and her treating physician. These interrogatories included questions
challenging these doctors' evaluations and parsing common.terms,such as "does bone touch bone
at the medial side ofthe left knee?" and "What does it mean by the phrase 'one foot in front of the

other?"' The ALJ stated that it denied plaintiffs request to pursue requested interrogatories from
her treating physicians as "the physicians already supplied their opinions and treatment notes on
the subject, and are not likely to respond further, without a payment for their time" and that "the
record is already adequately developed for making a determination herein." A similar request to

subpoena treating physicians was denied by the ALJ adjudicating plaintiffs 2011 claim and upheld
by this Court.

Presumably, plaintiff seeks to confront the specialists reviewing her record with her own
medical analyses; however, plaintiff has not credibly demonstrated that there is a crucial issue in
her claim that remains undeveloped, nor, as this Court noted in.its previous opinion regarding
plaintiffs same request, is she a medical specialist. Neuven v. Colvin. 2014 WL 1053033, *4
(D.S.D. 2014). The record indicates that at least four medical specialists have reviewed plaintiffs
x-rays during the relevant period: Dr. Redmond (treating physician), Dr. Wolgin (orthopaedic
specialist). Dr. Famestad (radiologist), and Dr. Duffek (radiologist). While the duty to develop the

13

record is independent of the plaintiffs burden to prove disability, the ALJ is not required to "seek
additional clarifying statements . . . unless a crucial issue is undeveloped." Stormo v. Bamhart.

377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004). Moreover, an ALJ does "not err by refusing to recontact. . .

treating physicians or to order new consultative evaluations" where a claim contains "ample basis

upon which the ALJ could make an informed determination ofthe merits of[a] disability claim."
Sultan. 368 F.3d at 863. The current claim presents no issue of authenticity that could otherwise

justify plaintiffs request to develop the record. Vossen v. Astrue. 612 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir.
2010).

Plaintiff appears to misread language in the Fifth Judicial Circuit's decision regarding her

request to compel interrogatories that the proper forum for such a request is through the social
security disability administration process, rather than through the South Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure. Neuven v. Famestod, Civ. 15-380 (5th Judicial Cir. S. D., Sept. 28, 2015). Although

the ALJ's hearing was indeed the appropriate forum in which to bring the request for

interrogatories, the ALJ is not required to grant plaintiffs request. This Court therefore finds that
the ALJ did not err in refusing to deny the plaintiffs request to compel interrogatories.
VI. Conclusion

The ALJ's opinion was based upon substantial evidence in consideration of the record as
a whole. A reasonable mind would accept the ALJ's findings as adequate to support his decision.
The ALJ has not applied an erroneous legal standard or otherwise committed an error of law. As

this Court has previously opined, plaintiff, alike most plaintiffs submitting disability claims, is
experiencing physical pain that causes her some difficulty; however, the issue is not whether

plaintiff experiences pain, but whether her medical condition prevents her from gainful
employment such that she qualifies for disability under the Social Security Administration's

14

regulations. Her condition, as determined by the ALJ, is not disabling within the meaning of the
Social Security Act. Plaintiffs motion to reverse the decision ofthe Social Security Commissioner
or remand should therefore be denied.
ORDER

Now,therefore,
IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs motion to reverse the decision of the Social Security Commissioner or
remand, Doc. 13, is denied,

lis /

Dated this J_

day of May,2018.
BY THE COURT:

CHARLES B. KORNMANN

United States District Judge

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