Weeks v. City of Lake Norden et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re re 28 MOTION to DISMISS for Failure to State a Claim Signed by U.S. District Judge Charles B. Kornmann on 10/7/2021. (SLT)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
NORTHERN DIVISION

Nikolas Weeks,

OCT 0 1 2021

1:20-CV-01029-CBK

Plaintiff,

vs.

City of Lake Norden and Jimmy Murphy,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Defendants.

L

BACKGROUND

For a third time, the Court addresses a motion to dismiss against plaintiff Nikolas
Weeks ("plaintiff) brought in this suit. Here, the City of Lake Norden ("defendant,"

"the City") moves to dismiss plaintiffs claim against it for a failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Defendant City of Lake Norden's Motion to Dismiss, doc. 28. Lake Norden is

within Hamlin County, South Dakota. Mr. Weeks filed suit, pro se, against the City as
well as former Lake Norden Police Chief Jimmy Murphy,Lake Norden City Attorney
Todd Boyd, Lake Norden Mayor Jason Aho, Mr. Dan Koistinen, a maintenance worker

for the City, and South Dakota DCI on November 18, 2020. Doc. 1. The Court has
already granted motions to dismiss pertaining to Mr. Boyd, Mr. Aho, Mr. Koistinen, and
South Dakota DCI. Docs. 33 & 34.

Plaintiff brings a wide host of claims against all defendants spanning several

incidents and years. Relevant to this motion is that Mr. Weeks alleges the City violated
his rights under the United States Constitution, brought via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including
excessive force, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and defamation through its
employees. COMPLAINT, doc. 1. The plaintiffs pro se complaint also targets the City
and its town council for "fully support[ing] all of[defendant] Jimmy Murphy's actions

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and this attempt on [his] life even to this day." Id at 3. The gravamen of plaintiffs

claims, when construing the allegations liberally for Mr. Weeks, against Lake Norden
revolve around whether the City can be found liable under Monell v. Department of
Social Services. 436 U.S. 658(1978).

For purposes of deciding defendant's motion to dismiss, the Court examines
plaintiffs assertions, taking all feasible claims as true.
I.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court assumes that all facts in the complaint are true and
construes any reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp.. 517 F.3d 544, 549(8th Cir.
2008). To decide the motion, the court may consider the complaint, materials that are
part of the public record, or materials necessarily embraced by the complaint. Porous
Media Corp. v. Pall Corp.. 186 F.3d 1077, 1079(8th Cir. 1999). The complaint must
contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" to survive the
motion to dismiss. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twomblv. 550 U.S. 544, 570(2007). "Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level..." Id at
555. In addition, the factual contents ofthe complaint must "allow the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Braden v.
Walmart Stores. 588 F.3d 585, 594(8th Cir. 2009)(quotins Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 556 U.S.
662,678(2009)).

Nevertheless, courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as

a factual allegation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678(quotins Twomblv, 550 U.S. at 555). When
assessing the merits of a complaint challenged under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), a court should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are
no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id at 679.

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It requires noting that complaints by pro se plaintiffs' must "be given liberal
construction." Solomon v. Petrav. 795 F.3d 777, 787(8th Cir. 2015); accord Stone v.

Harry. 364 F.3d 912,914 (8th Cir. 2004). "[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus. 551 U.S. 89, 94(2007).
That said, pro se litigants must still present cognizable legal claims to this Court.

Although the Court must accept as true any well-pleaded facts, the Court need not accept
"threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements." Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 556 U.S. 662,678(2009). "When we say that

a pro se complaint should be given liberal construction, we mean that if the essence of an
allegation is discernible . . . then the district court should construe the complaint in a way
that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper legal

framework." Solomon. 795 F.3d at 787 {quoting Stone v. Harry. 364 F.3d 912,914(8th
Cir. 2004)). But "the court need not act as a clairvoyant, trying to read the tea leaves of a
pro se motion to determine what the movant actually seeks. A litigant, even a pro se one,
bears some responsibility for advocating for himself." In re Hevl. 609 B.R. 194, 202
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2019).

B. Whether the City can be Held Liable Under Monell

Municipalities are not liable under Section 1983 "solely because it employs a
tortfeasor." Bolderson v. City of Wentzville. Missouri. 840 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 2016)

(citinz Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.. 436 U.S. 658,691 (1978)). Instead, "[l]iability for
a constitutional violation will attach to a municipality only if the violation resulted from
an official municipal policy, an unofficial custom, or a deliberately indifferent failure to
train or supervise an official or employee." Id {citing Atkinson v. City of Mountain
View. 709 F.d 1201, 1214 (8th Cir. 2013)). Each ofthese three routes of municipal

liability are examined.
The gravamen of plaintiffs claims against the City derive from, as best the Court
can tell from the pro se pleadings, is the(1)actions of its municipal employees, defendant
Murphy and Mr. Koistinen, purportedly attacking him in February 2016;(2)the City's
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supposed continued support of attempts on Mr. Weeks' life; and (3) malicious
prosecution on the part of the City's employee, Mr. Boyd. Before delving into the

possible avenues to municipal liability, the Court disposes of the malicious prosecution
claim raised against the City. As the Court has previously held, claims derived from the
first bout of litigation that Mr. Weeks was engaged with concerning his February 2016
encounter with defendants Murphy and Koistinen are time-barred. See MEMORANDUM
AND Order Granting Motion to Dismiss(Boyd, Abo,& Koistinen), doc. 33.
When construing claims liberally for the pro se plaintiff, the Court assumes that

the (1) actions of defendants Murphy and Koistinen in February 2016 are directly tied to
the City's(2)ongoing supposed support of attempts on his life, and for sake of
defendant's motion to dismiss, the Court will analyze the time-barred actions by former
Chief Murphy and Mr. Koistinen as within the statute of limitations under a theory of one
continued constitutional tort.

First, construing the pro se plaintiffs allegations liberally. Weeks fails to identify
an official municipal policy that gives rise to the claims raised against the City's former
employee, defendant Murphy. While plaintiff states that "[t]he city of[L]ake Norden the
mayor and the city council fully support all of Jimmy Murphy's actions and this attempt
on my life even to this day," he fails to identify an actual official policy that would lead
to liability under Monell. COMPLAINT, doc. 1 at 3. First, Mr. Weeks does not identify an

actual directive voted on, agreed to, or released by Lake Norden's city council. While
"[n]o one has ever doubted ... that a municipality may be liable under § 1983 for a single
decision by its properly constituted legislative body," there must be an actual decision to
give way to a claim for municipal liability. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,

480(1986). Instead of providing specific policies promulgated by the city council or
some other arm of Lake Norden's municipal government. Weeks rests on conclusory
allegations.

Further, the alleged conduct by defendant Murphy and Mr. Koistinen was not
conducted by individuals with final decision-making authority. See id. at 483(holding
for municipal liability to be found because of official policy, the official in question must
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be "responsible for establishing final government policy respecting such activity.").
Here, there is no evidence provided to the Court that defendant Murphy would have had
the authority, on his own,to be the final decision-maker when taking actions that Mr.
Weeks alleges constituted "attempted murder." COMPLAINT, doc. 1 at 2. Because

plaintiff fails to identify any official policy by the City, it cannot be held liable under
such a theory of municipal liability derived from official policies by a final decisionmaker.

Next, the Court turns to whether there was an unofficial custom on the part of

defendant that would give rise to municipal liability for the actions pursued by Mr.
Murphy. While a municipal policy is a "'deliberate choice to follow a course of action,'"
custom is less rigidly defined. Jane Doe A v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis Cntv,901
F.2d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1990)(quotins Pembaur v. Citv of Cincinnati. 475 U.S. 469,483

(1986)). Instead, custom relates to a "pattern of'persistent and widespread'
unconstitutional practices which become so 'permanent and well settled' as to have the
effect and force oflaw." Id. at 646 {quoting Monell. 436 U.S. at 691). This unofficial
custom must be "so pervasive among non-policymaking employees of the municipality
that it effectively has the force of law." Bolderson v. Citv of Wentzville. Missouri. 840
F.3d 982, 986(8th Cir. 2016)(citins Ware v. Jackson Cntv.. Missouri. 150 F.3d 873, 880

(8th Cir. 1998)). Crucially,"[a]n unconstitutional custom or usage cannot arise from a
single act." Id {citing McGautha v. Jackson Cntv.. Missouri Collections Dep't. 36 F.3d
53, 57(8th Cir. 1994)).

Detrimental to Mr. Weeks' case is the fact that the alleged hook for municipal

liability under an unofficial custom theory is that the City's supposed pattern of
unconstitutional practices ultimately boils down to a single act. See Wedemeier v. Citv
of Ballwin. Missouri. 931 F.2d 24, 26(8th Cir. 1994)("[A] single deviation from a

written, official policy does not prove a conflicting custom or usage."){citing WilliamsEl V. Johnson. 872 F.2d 224, 230(8th Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 824(1989)).
Here, there is only one instance of municipal employees, defendants Murphy and
Koistinen, supposedly violating his constitutional rights. Without more, there can be no
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pattern of pervasive conduct to impose municipal liability on Lake Norden for an
unofficial custom or policy.

Finally, the Court turns to whether the City can be found liable under a
failure to train or supervise theory. Municipal agencies may be found liable for a failure
to train under § 1983 "where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the

rights of persons with whom [the agency] came into contact." Citv of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 388(1989). Weeks must "establish that [the City] had notice that its
procedures were inadequate and likely to result in a violation of constitutional rights."
Thelma D. v. Bd of Educ. of Citv of St. Louis. 934 F.2d 929, 934(8th Cir. 1991). See

also Harris. 489 U.S. at 396(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Larkin v. St. Louis Hous. Auth. Dev. Corp., 355 F.3d 1114, 1117-18 (8th Cir. 2004).

The United States Supreme Court has made clear that such a theory of
"municipal" liability may only apply in "limited circumstances." Harris. 489 U.S. at 387
(Majority Opinion). To do otherwise would be to "go forward under § 1983 on a lesser
standard of fault would result in defacto respondeat superior liability on municipalities,"
which was firmly rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Monell. Id. at 392.

Further,"[i]t would also engage the federal courts in an endless exercise ofsecondguessing municipal employee-training programs. This is an exercise we believe the
federal courts are ill suited to undertake, as well as one that would implicate serious
questions of federalism." Id.
The requisite showing of deliberate indifference through sufficient notice may be

implied through two separate avenues:(1)"where failure to train ... employees is so
likely to result in a violation of constitutional rights that the need for training is patently
obvious;" or(2)"where the need for additional training may not be obvious from the
outset, but a pattern of constitutional violations could put the municipality on notice that
its employees' responses to a regularly recurring situation are insufficient to protect the
constitutional rights of its citizens." Thelma P.. 929 F.2d at 934 {citing jd. at 390 & n.lO,
397).

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Here, plaintiff fails to plead a failure to train or supervise claim against defendant.
Municipal liability for failure to train or supervise only applies in "limited
circumstances." Harris. 489 U.S. at 387. But Weeks asks this Court to turn § 1983 into a

facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities," a notion firmly rejected in

Monell. Id. at 392. There is no indicia that the City (1)failed to properly train its law
enforcement personnel, such as defendant Murphy, which could result in a violation of
constitutional rights when plaintiff does not even contend there was an inadequacy of
training for the Lake Norden Police Department; and (2)there is simply no pattern of
constitutional violations when the only allegation against the City -through its former
police chief- is a single act, meaning there can be no ''pattern of constitutional
violations" so obvious as to imply deliberate indifference. Thelma D. v. Bd of Educ. of

Citv of St. Louis. 934 F.2d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 1991)(emphasis added). Even when the
"pro se pleadings are [] construed liberally," plaintiff has failed to plead municipal
liability under deliberate indifference. Burgs v. Sissel. 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984).
Because the Court finds plaintiff failed to state a custom, policy, or practice that

could extend liability to the City for the alleged actions of defendant Murphy and Mr.
Koistinen, defendant's second argument concerning whether there was an appropriate
nexus between a Lake Norden policy and the alleged harm is moot.
C. Plaintiffs Malicious Prosecution Claim is Time-Barred

As the Court has previously held in this matter, plaintiffs malicious prosecution
claim is time-barred. Memorandum and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss

(Boyd, Aho,& Koistinen), doc. 33 at 4-5.

II.

CONCLUSION

Because plaintiff fails to pierce the City's municipal immunity, his claims against
Lake Norden should be dismissed.

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim, doc. 29, is granted and this action is dismissed as to the City of Lake Norden,
with costs to be taxed by the clerk.

DATED this '
,^.^dav of October, 2021.
BY THE COURT:

CHARLES B. KORNMANN

United States District Judge