LaBatte v. Gangle et al

Filing 32

OPINION and ORDER granting #26 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and denying #2 and #20 Motions for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by U.S. District Judge Eric C. Schulte on 08/30/2024. (KLE)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
NORTHERN DIVISION

BRENDAN LABATTE,

1:24-CV-010I4-ECS

Plaintiff,
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING

vs.

KAREN GANGLE, PROSECUTOR FOR THE
SWO, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
GARY GAIKOWSKI, CHIEF OF POLICE FOR
SWO,IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY;HON.
RUTH BURNS, JUDGE FOR THE SWO
TRIBAL COURT, IN THEIR OFFICIAL
CAPACITY;
AND
HON.
MICHAEL
SWALLOW,JUDGE FOR THE SWO TRIBAL
COURT,IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY;

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

Defendants.

This case is about whether Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate ("SWO"), a federally recognized
Indian Tribe, has inherent sovereign authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over an enrolled
tribal member for conduct committed on fee land located within the original boundaries of the
Lake Traverse Reservation, a reservation the United States Supreme Court recognized as having
been terminated in DeCoteau v. District Countv Court for the Tenth Judicial District. 420 U.S.425

(1975). In its present posture, this Court cannot address the merits of Plaintiffs claim.
Accordingly, for the reasons explained below, this Court grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
I.

Factual and Procedural Background

In October 2022, Officer Megan Lively, an officer for the Sisseton Police Department,
observed a red Dodge Durango driving erratically within the city limits of Sisseton, South Dakota.
1

Doc. 1-4 at 2. Officer Lively followed the Durango until it stopped in a driveway a few blocks
later. Id

The driver of the red Durango,later identified as the plaintiff, Brendan LaBatte, fled from
the Durango and ran towards Sisseton Housing,a housing project recognized as a dependent Indian
community. Because the Sisseton housing project is a dependent Indian community, it is

considered Indian country^ for purposes of state and tribal criminal jurisdiction.^ Id Lacking
jurisdiction over the housing project, Sisseton police called SWO tribal police to help apprehend
LaBatte. Id Before tribal police arrived on scene, LaBatte returned to his Durango. Id Officer
Lively approached LaBatte and ordered him out of the vehicle. Id As he exited the car. Officer

Lively attempted to restrain him by gaining control of his wrists, but LaBatte pushed her away and
ran back to the Sisseton housing project. Id Tribal police ultimately arrested LaBatte after finding
him seeking refuge in the basement of a unit within the housing complex. Id SWO charged him
with one count driving under the influence ("DUI") and one count resisting arrest. Doc. 1-5. In

January 2024, LaBatte moved to dismiss his tribal charges. Doc. 1-7. The tribal court denied
LaBatte's motion. The tribal court did, however, dismiss the DUI charge, albeit without prejudice,

after LaBatte initiated the present case.^

^ "The term 'Indian country' . . . means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation
under the jurisdiction ofthe United States Government,notwithstanding the issuance ofany patent,
and, including rights-of-way rurming through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently
acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way rurming
through the same." 18U.S.C. 1151(b).

^ Doc. 19 at 5 n.5; United States v. South Dakota. 665 F.2d 837(8th Cir. 1981). But cf. Owen v.
Weber. 464 F.3d 1105, 1105 n.3 (8th Cir. 2011)(recognizing the analysis to determine dependent
Indian communities has changed slightly since South Dakota but finding no reason to revisit South
Dakota's holding).

^ All parties agreed on the record at the motion hearing that SWO's exercise ofjurisdiction over
count two, the count charging LaBatte with resisting arrest, is proper. Therefore, the dispute in

The State of South Dakota also charged LaBatte with resisting arrest, reckless driving, and

simple assault against a law enforcement officer. Doc. 19 Tf 25; s^ Doc. 1-6. In February 2024,
LaBatte pled guilty to simple assault against a law enforcement officer in the state-court action.
Doc. 1-6 at 1. The state court sentenced LaBatte to two years' imprisonment with one year

suspended. Id. at 2.
On July II, 2024, LaBatte filed suit in this Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief

against Karen Gangle, prosecutor for SWO; Gary Gaikowski, chief of police for SWO; and the
Honorable Ruth Bams and Michael Swallow,judges for SWO's tribal court. Doc. I. LaBatte

sued each defendant in their official capacity only. Id LaBatte contends that Defendants, by
having charged him with the DUI offense, exceeded the limits of SWO's criminal jurisdiction and
violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
as well as his rights under the Indian Civil Rights Act("ICRA"), 25 U.S.C. § 1302. Doc. I at 13.
II.

Discussion

LaBatte's argument is straight forward. He contends that SWO's criminaljurisdiction over
tribal members is limited to criminal acts that occur, at least in part, on Indian country. Even

though the conduct giving rise to the DUI charges occurred within the original boundaries of the
Lake Traverse Indian Reservation, LaBatte asserts SWO lacks jurisdiction to prosecute him

tribally because the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation was terminated by "the Act of March 3,
1891, c. 543, 26 Stat. 1035," DeCoteau. 420 U.S. at 427-28, and the conduct relating to his DUI

charges occurred entirely on fee land, therefore outside Indian country. Accordingly, LaBatte

this case hinges on the now dismissed DUI charge, raising issues of standing and mootness. But
this Court need not address those issues given the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction here.

seeks a declaration that SWO has no criminal jurisdiction over himself or any other tribal member
for criminal conduct committed on fee land within the exterior boundaries of the now terminated

Lake Traverse Reservation. Doc. 19 at 9. LaBatte also requests an injimction prohibiting

Defendants from prosecuting "LaBatte or any other tribal member" for crimes committed on fee
land within the old exterior boundaries ofthe Lake Traverse Reservation. Id.
Defendants moved to dismiss LaBatte's suit imder Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7), arguing that (1) the case is moot,(2) he failed to exhaust tribal
remedies,(3) he failed to join a required party,(4) SWO officials are immune from suit, and (5)

he failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Because subject-matter jurisdiction is
a threshold question in every federal case, this Court addresses Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(1) first.
a. Standard of Review

Rule 12(b)(1) permits a court to dismiss a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On
a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the standard of review depends on whether Defendants are
making a facial or factual attack on subject-matter jurisdiction. Stallev v. Cath. Health Initiatives.
509 F.3d 517, 520-21 (8th Cir. 2007). When a "defendant makes a facial attack to challenge
whether the facts alleged in the complaint establish subject matterjurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1),
the plaintiff is afforded similar safeguards as in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Nveaard v. Tavlor. 563
F. Supp. 3d 992, 1010(D.S.D. 2021)(citing Osbom v. United States. 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th
Cir. 1990)). That is,"the Court must'accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, giving

On August 14, 2024, this Court held a hearing on the parties' motions. In an Order Regarding
Motion Hearing, Doc. 29, this Court informed the parties that it questioned whether it had
jurisdiction to hear this case as postured and that it would hear argument on the merits ofLaBatte's
motions only after it was satisfied subject-matter jurisdiction existed.

no effect to conclusory allegations of law,' and determine whether the plaintiffs alleged facts
'affirmatively and plausibly suggest' that jurisdiction exists." Id (quoting Stalley. 509 F.3d at
521). When reviewing a facial attack,"[t]he Court's review is limited to the face ofthe pleadings."
Id.(citing Branson Label. Inc. V. Citv of Branson. 793 F.3d 910, 914(8th Cir. 2015)).
Conversely, when "the defendant attacks the factual basis for subject matter jurisdietion,

the eourt ean consider matters outside the pleadings, and the nonmoving party does not have the
benefit of 12(b)(6) safeguards." Id (citing Branson. 793 F.3d 914-15). "A factual attack occurs
when the defendant challenges the veracity ofthe faets underpinning subjeet matter jurisdiction."
Id (quoting Davis v. Anthonv. Inc.. 886 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 2018)). In such cases, "no
presumptive truthfulness attaches to the plaintiffs allegations," and a "eourt is free to weigh the
evidence and satisfy itself as to the existenee of its power to hear the case." Id (quoting Osbom.
918F.2dat730).

Here, Defendants' arguments appear to be a faeial attack on this Court's subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear LaBatte's request for declaratory and injunctive relief. Defendants are not
disputing the facts as LaBatte alleged. Rather, Defendants argue that LaBatte's elaim, as alleged,
fails to establish subjeet-matter jurisdietion. Thus,this Court aceepts LaBatte's allegations as true
while undertaking its jurisdictional inquiry.
b. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

"In every federal ease, the threshold requirement is jurisdietion ...." Wagstaff &
Cartmell. LLP v. Lewis. 40 F.4th 830, 838 (8th Cir. 2022). "Federal Courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and Statute." Great Lakes Gas
Trans. Ltd. v. Essar Steel Minn. LLC.843 F.3d 325,328(8th Cir. 2016)(quoting Gurm v. Minton.

568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013)). "Subjeet-matter jurisdiction can never be waived or forfeited."

Wagstaff. 40 F.4th at 838 (quoting Gonzalez v. Thaler. 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012)). LaBatte
invokes jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331—^federal question jurisdiction,"which grants district

courts 'original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.'" Great Lakes Gas Trans. Ltd.. 843 F.3d at 329 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
"Federal question jurisdiction exists if the well-pleaded complaint establishes . . . that
federal law creates the cause ofaction," be it express or implied. Id (quoting Williams v. Ragnone.

147 F.3d 700, 702(8th Cir. 1998)). "A claim arises under federal law 'when federal law creates a

private right of action and furnishes the substantive rules of decision.'" Cross v. Fox. 23 F.4th
797, 800 (8th Cir. 2022)(quoting Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs.. 565 U.S. 368, 378 (2012)). "If the

plaintiff brings a claim under a federal statute that does not authorize a private right of action, the
statute will not supportjurisdiction under § 1331." Id. Cciting Anthonv v. Cattle Nat'l Bank & Tr..
684 F.3d 738, 739 (8th Cir. 2012)); Lakes & Park All, of Minneapolis, v. Fed. Transit Admin..
928 F.3d 759, 761-63 (8th Cir. 2019)(stating that an absence of a private right of action is fatal
to jurisdiction). "Without jurisdiction [a] court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is
power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is
that ofannouncing the fact and dismissing the cause." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't. 523
U.S. 83,94(1998)(citations omitted). Indeed,if a court decides "at any time" that it lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction, "it must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
1. Constitutional Claim

As made clear at the August 14, 2024 hearing, LaBatte principally brought suit under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, arguing that SWO violated

his right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures by charging him for a DUI offense that
allegedly occurred wholly on fee land. However, Indian tribes are "separate sovereigns pre-

existing the Constitution." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez. 436 U.S. 49. 56('1978h And"[t]ribal
sovereignty ... is 'a sovereignty outside the basic structure of the Constitution.'" Plains Com.
Rank v. T.ong Fam. Land & Cattle Co.. 554 U.S. 316, 337(2008)(quoting United States v. Lara.
541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Indian tribes "have historically been
regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on

federal or state authority."^ Santa Clara Pueblo. 436 U.S. at 56. Thus,"[t]he Bill of Rights does
not apply to Indian tribes." Plains Com. Bank. 554 U.S. at 337 (citation omitted); Twin Cities
Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minn. Chippewa Tribe. 370 F.2d 529, 533 (8th Cir. 1967)("The
guarantees of the Due Process clause relate solely to action by a state government and have no
application to actions of Indian Tribes, acting as such.").
To be sure, "Indians are citizens of the United States entitled to the same constitutional

protections against federal and state action as all citizens," but "the Constitution does not apply to
restrict the actions of Indian tribes as separate, quasi-sovereign bodies." United States v.
Cavanaugh.643 F.3d 592,595(8th Cir. 2011)(citing Santa Clara Pueblo.436 U.S. at 56). "Indian
tribes are 'distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights' in
matters of local self-government." Santa Clara Pueblo. 436 U.S. at 55 (quoting Worcester v.

Georgia,31 U.S. 515,559(1832)). Accordingly,the Bill ofRights does not apply to SWO or their
tribal court proceedings against LaBatte, an enrolled tribal member. Thus, on the facts before this
Court,the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments provide no cause of action that invokes this Court's

subject-matter jurisdiction.

^ "Indian nations exercising governmental powers are not bound by federal constitutional
limitations protecting individual rights against state or federal infringement.... Indian tribes are
not states of the union within the meaning of the Constitution, and the constitutional limitations
on states do not apply to tribes." 1 Cohen's Handbook ofFederal Indian Law § 14.03 (LexisNexis
2024).

ii. Indian Civil Rights Act

Alternatively, LaBatte argues SWO violated certain protected rights under the Indian Civil
Rights Act("ICRA"), 25 U.S.C. § 1302. Doc. 19 19; but cf. Doc. 30 at 14 (stating that LaBatte
cites to ICRA "as the corollary to the Bill of Rights for purposes of possible interpretation").
Through ICRA "Congress accorded a range of procedural safeguards to tribal-court defendants
'similar, but not identical, to those contained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth

Amendment.'" United States v. Bryant. 579 U.S. 140, 149(2016)(citation omitted); Santa Clara
Pueblo. 436 U.S. at 62-63 (noting how ICRA "modified the safeguards ofthe Bill of Rights to fit

the unique political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments").
This Court also lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear LaBatte's claims under the ICRA.
Congress authorized a writ of habeas corpus as the exclusive remedy for ICRA violations. Cross.
23 F.4th at 802-03;^25 U.S.C. § 1303. "[T]he ICRA does not contain a private right of action

to seek injunctive or declaratory relief in federal court... ." Cross. 23 F.4th at 802; Santa Clara

Pueblo. 436 U.S. at 51-52 (holding the same).^ "Absent a private right of action to enforce the
ICRA in federal court for the relief sought, there can be no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331."
Cross. 23 F.4th at 803 (citing Anthonv. 684 F.3d at 739; Lakes & Parks. 928 F.3d at 762). Here,
LaBatte is not seeking a writ of habeas corpus under the ICRA and is seeking only injunctive and

declaratory relief. Thus, this Court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear
Plaintiffs case and grants Defendants' motion to dismiss. Doc. 26, accordingly.

^ "[T]he operation ofthe Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only." Skellv Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co.. 339 U.S. 667,671 (1950)(citation omitted). Through the Act,"Congress enlarged
the range of remedies available in the federal courts but did not extend their jurisdiction." Id
"[AJctions seeking [relief other than a writ of habeas corpus] for tribal deprivations of rights must
be resolved through tribal forums." Cross. 23 F.4th at 803 (quoting Goodface v. Grassrope. 708
F.2d 335, 338 n.4 (8th Cir. 1983)).
8

III.

Conclusion

For the above reasons, this Court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over
LaBatte's claims and must therefore dismiss his suit against Defendants. In so doing, this Court
does not speak to the merits of LaBatte's claims; it speaks solely to the procedural mechanism by
which he brought those claims before this Court. Moreover, this Court refrains from addressing
the remaining arguments raised by Defendants (i.e., standing and mootness, tribal exhaustion,
failure to join an indispensable party, failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
and whether SWO officials are immune from suit. Doc. 27), which are not necessary to resolve
this case as presented. Thus, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 26, is granted. It is further
ORDERED that Brendan LaBatte's Motions for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Docs.
20 and 2, are denied.

DATED this

day of August, 2024.
BY

OURT:

C. SCHULTE
IITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE