Gronseth v. Bauman et al
Filing
71
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT, denying Defendants' renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 58 Motion to Amend/Correct Complaint. Plaintiff shall file a clean original of the amended pl eading with the Clerk of court within seven days of the date of this Order. The Court will issue a new Order for Form 52 Report and Scheduling Information after Defedants file an Answer to the Amended Complaint. Signed by U. S. District Judge Lawrence L. Piersol on 3/2/11. (DJP)
FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MAR 03 2011
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
~~
SOUTHERN DIVISION
******************************************************************************
MANDl LEIGH GRONSETH,
Plaintiff,
-vsCHESTER RURAL FIRE PROTECTION
DISTRICT and CHESTER FIRE
DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
*
CIV 07-4163
*
*
*
*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
* AND ORDER ON SUMMARY
*
JUDGMENT AND
* MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
*
*
*
*
*
******************************************************************************
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint, doc. 58, and
Defendants' renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs Motion
to Amend the Complaint will be granted and Defendants' Motion will be denied.
BACKGROUND
The background of this case was set forth in the Court's Memorandum Opinion and order
issued on April 9, 2009. (Doc. 50.) It is a diversity action arising out of a two-vehicle accident that
occurred north of Chester, South Dakota, on Lake County Road 15 in rural Lake County. Plaintiff,
Mandi Leigh Gronseth, was a passenger in her vehicle driven by Raymond Gabriel when it was
involved in an accident with a vehicle driven by Tim Bauman. Bauman is a volunteer firefighter for
Defendants ("Chester Fire"). On July 4,2007, Bauman received a page informing him that there was
a trailer house fire involving children with no adults present. In response to the page, Bauman was
driving his personal vehicle, a pickup, to the fire hall in Chester. Bauman had the flashers on as he
drove south on Lake County Road 15. Plaintiff and Gabriel were traveling north on Lake County
Road 15, and Gabriel made a left turn in front of Bauman's pickup. The pickup collided with
Plaintiff's car, seriously injuring Plaintiffwho has incurred more than $750,000 in medical expenses.
Plaintiff agreed that she will not seek to recover more than the applicable liability insurance limits.
Plaintiff named Bauman and Chester Fire as defendants in the Complaint. One count of
negligence was alleged against Bauman, and Plaintiff asserted that Chester Fire is vicariously liable
for Bauman's conduct under the theory of respondeat superior. As a result of communications
between the lawyers, in October of2008, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claim against Bauman
with prejudice through a stipulation of all parties. This Court entered a Judgment of Dismissal of
Bauman, with prejudice and on the merits.
Defendants sought summary judgment based in part on claimed immunity from liability
pursuant to South Dakota's emergency statute, SDCL § 20-9-4.1, which provides:
20-9-4.1. General immunity from liability for emergency care--Exceptions
No peace officer, conservation officer, member of any fire department, police
department and their first aid, rescue or emergency squad, or any citizen acting as
such as a volunteer, or any other person is liable for any civil damages as a result of
their acts of commission or omission arising out of and in the course of their
rendering in good faith, any emergency care and services during an emergency which
is in their judgment indicated and necessary at the time. Such relief from liability for
civil damages shall extend to the operation of any motor vehicle in connection with
any such care or services.
Nothing in this section grants any such relief to any person causing any damage by
his willful, wanton or reckless act of commission or omission.
SDCL § 20-9-4.1. Given the lack of South Dakota law interpreting the statute, this Court certified
the following question to the South Dakota Supreme Court: "The Defendant driver was driving his
own vehicle to the fire hall from which the firemen would then drive an emergency vehicle to the
scene of the fire. Is the driving to the fire hall 'any emergency care and services during an
emergency....' so that SDCL § 20-9-4.1 would preclude liability to Plaintiff passenger unless
Plaintiff showed the causing of 'any damage by [Defendant's] willful, wanton or reckless act of
commission or omission'?" The South Dakota Supreme Court issued its opinion on February 17,
2010, holding that the driver is immune from liability unless Plaintiff shows willful, wanton or
reckless conduct.
2
Subsequently, Defendants renewed their motion for summary judgment, arguing they are
entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw because the conduct of Bauman was not willful, wanton or
reckless within the meaning of SDCL § 20-9-4.1.
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to drop the negligence count and
add a recklessness count against Bauman, and asserting that Chester Fire is liable for Bauman's
conduct under the theory of respondeat superior. Plaintiff also seeks leave to add a count of
negligence against Defendants directly for negligently failing to provide adequate emergency
equipment, including lights and radios, and negligently failing to provide adequate training and
supervision to their volunteer firefighters. Defendants object to the amendment.
DISCUSSION
A.
Summruy Judgment
Rule 56(a) ofthe Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be
entered "ifthe movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, the Court is required to view the facts in the light most favorable to the non
moving party and must give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
underlyingfacts. AgriStor Leasingv. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732, 734 (8th Cir. 1987). Themovingparty
bears the burden ofshowing both the absence ofa genuine issue ofmaterial fact and its entitlement
to judgment as a matter oflaw. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(I); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 257 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party may not rest on
the allegations of its pleadings but must set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence,
showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 257; City ofMt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268,273-74 (8th Cir. 1988).
Defendants argue that it is undisputed Bauman did not act recklessly because he could not
have realized Mr. Gabriel would unexpectedly and negligently turn in front of Bauman's pickup.
Plaintiff points out that Bauman was speeding and that he should have known vehicles might turn
3
where Mr. Gabriel turned. Bauman had driven the road hundreds oftimes and knew the speed limit.
He knew oncoming traffic turned west into the area known as Horizon Heights, yet he traveled up
the hill at 81 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone. Plaintiffs expert report indicates that
Bauman was traveling almost 70 miles per hour at the point of impact, which was in a 40 mile per
hour zone. Summary judgment is proper only if the facts, and all reasonable inferences flowing
therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, will lead a reasonable mind to only one
possible conclusion. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff for purposes of
this motion, genuine issues of material fact exist concerning whether Bauman's conduct rose to the
level of recklessness. Thus, Defendants' motion for summary judgment must be denied.
B.
Motion to Amend Complaint
"The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure liberally permit amendments to pleadings." Dennis
v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 207 F.3d 523,525 (8th Cir. 2000); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
Leave to amend should normally be granted absent good reasons to the contrary. See Popp Telcom
v. American Sharecom, Inc., 210 F.3d 928, 943 (8th Cir. 2000). "A district court can refuse to grant
leave to amend a pleading only where it will result in 'undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on
the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,
undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of
amendment. '" Dennis, 207 F.3d at 525 (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
Prior to the motion to amend the complaint, Plaintiffs claim against Defendants was that
they are vicariously liable for Bauman's conduct under the doctrine ofrespondeat superior. 1 Plaintiff
wants to add a negligence claim directly against Defendants for negligently failing to provide
adequate emergency equipment, including lights and radios, and negligently failing to provide
adequate training and supervision to their volunteer firefighters. Defendants argue the motion to
amend is untimely because Plaintiff had the evidence supporting the claim two years ago, before the
Ipresumably due to the South Dakota Supreme Court's recent interpretation of SDCL § 20
9.4.1, Defendants raise no specific objections to Plaintiff dropping the negligence count against
Bauman and adding the recklessness count. The Court will allow that amendment.
4
deadline for amendment and before the close of discovery. According to Plaintiff, a change in the
law and circumstances make the direct negligence claim against Defendants timely. At the time the
scheduling deadline expired, the South Dakota Supreme Court had never interpreted SDCL § 20-9
4.1, and Plaintiff did not expect the Supreme Court to rule that speeding to the fire hall was
"rendering emergency care or services." Plaintiff did not feel the need to file the direct negligence
claim prior to the Supreme Court's ruling that SDCL § 20-9-4.1 applied to these facts because
Plaintiff believed Defendants were liable in negligence for the actions of their employee. The
Supreme Court's ruling requires Plaintiff to prove reckJess conduct by Bauman in order to prevail
under the respondeat superior doctrine, and Defendants agree that this is a very high burden in a
motor vehicle case. The Court finds good cause for the Plaintiffs amendment in light of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the immunity statute.
Defendants maintain that they will be prejudiced by the untimely new theory of liability
because it will require more discovery and potential expert testimony. Plaintiff argues Defendants
will not be unduly prejudiced because they were aware ofBauman' s deposition testimony regarding
the lack of training, problems with radios, and absence of emergency lights, and any additional
information Defendants seek regarding this claim could be obtained from their own clients. The trial
in this case was indefinitely postponed in order to certify the question to the South Dakota Supreme
Court, and a new trial date has not yet been set. The Defendants will be accorded sufficient time to
conduct the necessary discovery. Weighing the potential prejudice to Defendants against the
hardship to Plaintiff who has suffered extensive damages as a result of the accident, the balance
weighs in favor of allowing her to seek recovery from Defendants under the direct negligence cause
of action. See Bell v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 160 F .3d 452, 454 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Any prejudice to
the nonmovant must be weighed against the prejudice to the moving party by not allowing the
amendment. ")
Finally, Defendants claim that the amendment would be futile because they believe the direct
negligence claim against them is barred by the immunity statute discussed above, SDCL § 20-9-4.1,
which provides immunity for damages arising out of negligent rendering of emergency services
5
including the operation of a motor vehicle in connection with providing such services. Plaintiff
counters that the amendment would not be futile because Defendants' negligence did not occur
during the emergency, and thus SDCL § 20-9-4.1 does not immunize them from liability. A motion
to amend a complaint should be denied on the merits only if it asserts clearly frivolous claims, and the
likelihood ofsuccess on the new claim is not a consideration for denying leave to amend to add a claim
unless the claim is clearly frivolous. See Becker v. University ofNebraska, at Omaha, 191 F.3d 904,
908 (8th Cir.1999). Without deciding the question of immunity, the Court does not believe
Plaintiff's direct negligence claim is clearly frivolous and the Court rejects Defendants' futility
argument, as well as the other arguments in opposition to amending the complaint. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
(I)
That Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
(2)
That Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, doc. 58, is granted
and Plaintiff shall file a clean original of the amended pleading with the Clerk of
court within 7 days of the date of this Order.
(3)
That the Court will issue a new Order for Form 52 Report and Scheduling
Information after Defendants file an Answer to the Amended Complaint.
Datedthis~daYOf ~
,2011.
BY THE COURT:
i reit[r7h
awrence L. Piersol
nited States District Judge
ATTEST:
JOSEPH
BY:
Cf1'RK
(AL)
DEPUTY
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?