Rindahl v. Webber

Filing 276

ORDER denying 270 Motion to Amend/Correct; denying 271 Motion to Amend/Correct; denying as moot 272 Motion for preliminary injunction. Signed by U.S. District Judge Karen E. Schreier on 2/4/2013. (KC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RANDY RINDAHL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
S.C.O. MCCLOUD; and
SGT. LAUSON,
Defendants.

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Civ. 08-4041-KES

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
AMEND COMPLAINT AND
DISMISSING CASE

Plaintiff, Randy Rindahl, moves this court for leave to file an amended
complaint. Docket 271. This motion represents Rindahl’s seventh attempt to
amend his complaint. Rindahl commenced this action on March 25, 2008,
alleging that he had been raped by prison guards. Docket 1. More specifically,
Rindahl alleged that Douglas Weber, the warden at the South Dakota State
Penitentiary, was responsible for having allowed prison guards to violate his
constitutional rights. Id. On July 21, 2008, the complaint was dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Docket
29. On September 22, 2008, Rindahl filed a motion to amend the complaint.
Docket 43. The court granted that motion on November 20, 2008. Docket 58.
After reviewing the amended complaint, however, the court found that Rindahl
was seeking relief which the court could not grant—court-initiated prosecution of
two prison guards. Id. Consequently, the amended complaint was dismissed
without prejudice. Id.

Rindahl filed another motion to amend the complaint on January 20, 2009.
Docket 73. Because the amended complaint proposed by Rindahl still sought
relief which the court could not grant, the court denied Rindahl’s motion to
amend the complaint on May 7, 2009. Docket 126. On May 15, 2009, Rindahl
filed yet another motion to amend the complaint (Docket 130), and the court
granted the motion on June 12, 2009 (Docket 138). Rindahl’s amended complaint
was dismissed without prejudice, however, because he persisted in seeking relief
which the court could not grant—criminal prosecution of the prison guards that
he alleged raped him—and because he failed to allege sufficient facts to warrant
service of process upon defendants. Docket 138.
Rindahl filed a fourth motion to amend the complaint on June 29, 2009
(Docket 141), but because he neither modified his request for relief nor added
additional facts, the court dismissed his amended complaint without prejudice on
August 11, 2009 (Docket 152). Rindahl filed a notice of appeal on July 31, 2009.
Docket 146. On September 28, 2009, the Eighth Circuit dismissed Rindahl’s
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Docket 176.
On January 4, 2010, Rindahl filed a motion for leave to move for injunctive
relief. Docket 206. Shortly thereafter, Rindahl filed another motion to add
defendants. Docket 208. The court denied both requests on June 24, 2010,
finding that Rindahl had failed to set forth sufficient grounds for the issuance of
injunctive relief, and that Rindahl could not add defendants to a closed action.
Docket 232. Rindahl appealed the court’s determination to the Eighth Circuit
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(Docket 235), and on September 10,2010, the Eighth Circuit summarily affirmed
the judgment of the district court (Docket 246).
On November 19, 2010, Rindahl filed a sixth motion to amend the
complaint. Docket 248. Although Rindahl had included plausible requests for
relief, he maintained his request for the criminal prosecution of his alleged
assailants. Docket 255. Furthermore, Rindahl failed to state sufficient facts to set
forth claims upon which relief could be granted. Id. Accordingly, the court denied
Rindahl’s motion to amend. Id. Now, almost two years later, Rindahl moves the
court to amend his complaint yet again, this time to add additional defendants
and claims. For the reasons set forth herein, Rindahl’s motions are denied.
DISCUSSION
A motion for leave to amend is committed to the sound discretion of the
district court. Bell v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 452, 454 (8th Cir. 1998)
(citations omitted). Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) dictates that
“[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires,” the court may deny
such requests for “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the
movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,
undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,
[or] futility of the amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Here, justice does not require the court to grant Rindahl another
opportunity to amend or correct the complaint. In fact, in light of Rindahl’s
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments, his undue delay in

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proposing amendments to the complaint, the undue prejudice that additional
amendments would have on the opposing parties, and the futility of the proposed
amendments, justice requires just the opposite.
Rindahl filed the instant motion to amend or correct the complaint more
than four years after he filed his original complaint. See Docket 1. After the
original complaint was filed, the court gave Rindahl several opportunities to
amend or correct the complaint to plead sufficient facts to state a claim, to add
appropriate defendants, and to make requests for available relief. Each time,
however, Rindahl failed to cure the deficiencies of his original complaint. This
repeated failure supports the denial of Rindahl’s motion to amend or correct the
complaint. See Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 620 (8th Cir. 1995)
(“A district court may refuse to grant leave to amend if the plaintiff had an earlier
opportunity to cure a defect in her complaint but failed to do so.”); see also
Moses.com Sec., Inc. v. Comprehensive Software Sys., Inc., 406 F.3d 1052,
1065–66 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming district court’s denial of permission to amend
complaint where “[t]he district court had already twice granted leave to amend”
and plaintiff repeatedly failed to cure defects).
Second, the attempted amendment is not based on newly discovered
information. Rather, Rindahl cites to information that was available to him either
at the time he filed his original complaint or at the time he filed previous motions
to amend or correct. Because Rindahl makes no effort to explain or excuse his
delay in presenting this information, the court finds that Rindahl’s motion is
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delayed. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cuyler, 511 F. Supp. 161, 165 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(finding that a motion filed three years after the complaint and containing
information known at the time of the complaint was “delayed”).
Third, because Rindahl has repeatedly failed to plead facts sufficient to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, defendants have not yet been
served with notice of this action. In other words, if the court were to grant
Rindahl his delayed motion to amend or correct, defendants would suddenly be
required to defend an action that allegedly occurred more than four years ago.
Given the amount of time that has passed since Rindahl first filed a complaint in
this matter, the court finds that defendants would be substantially prejudiced if
the court granted Rindahl another opportunity to amend the complaint. See
6 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1488,
at 781–82 (2010) (“As a general rule, the risk of substantial prejudice increases
with the passage of time.”). This prejudice, coupled with the delayed nature of
Rindahl’s motion to amend or correct, further supports the denial of Rindahl’s
motion. See Buder v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Feiner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 690, 694
(8th Cir. 1981) (“Delay alone is an insufficient justification for denying a motion to
amend; prejudice to the nonmoving must also be shown.”); see also Kinked v. Sw.
Bell Tel. Co., 49 F.3d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming district court’s denial of
permission to amend complaint where “[t]he passage of nearly two years between
the filing of the complaint and the motion to amend suggests that the delay and
prejudice to [defendant] outweighed [plaintiff]’s interests”).
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Finally, Rindahl’s motion to amend or correct the complaint raises an issue
of futility. During the passage of the last four years, the applicable statute of
limitations1 on Rindahl’s action has expired. Thus, even if the court were to grant
Rindahl’s motion to amend or correct the complaint, plaintiff’s amended
complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss. Rindahl’s proposed
amendments are therefore futile. The futility of Rindahl’s proposed amendments,
along with his repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments, his undue
delay in proposing amendments to the complaint, and the undue prejudice that
additional amendments would have on the opposing parties, support the denial of
Rindahl’s motion to amend or correct the complaint. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Rindahl’s motion to amend complaint (Docket 271) is
denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Rindahl’s motion to add defendants
(Docket 270) is denied as moot.

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“Section 1983 contains no statute of limitations, and no federal statute
of limitations governs such actions.” Barkley v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 874 F.
Supp. 2d 759, 769 (N.D. Iowa 2012) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280
(1985); Board of Regents, Univ. of New York v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484
(1980); Carr v. Aubuchon, 969 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1992)). “When such a
void in federal statutory law occurs, federal courts have repeatedly ‘borrowed’
the state laws governing an analogous cause of action.” Id. (citing Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975)). “Thus, courts have applied
the personal injury statute of limitations of the state in which the court sits to
constitutional claims brought pursuant to § 1983.” Id. (citing Owens v. Okure,
488 U.S. 235, 236 (1989); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280; Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d
983, 984 (8th Cir. 1985)). The statute of limitations on personal injury claims
in South Dakota is three years. Robinson v. Ewalt, 808 N.W.2d 123, 127 (S.D.
2012).
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Rindahl’s motion for preliminary
injunction (Docket 272) is denied as moot.
Dated February 4, 2013.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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