Jackson v. Hollingworth

Filing 8

ORDER denying 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (28:2241) filed by Andre Jackson. Signed by Chief Judge Karen E. Schreier on 09/27/2010. (KC)

Jackson v. Hollingworth

Doc. 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT D I S T R I C T OF SOUTH DAKOTA S O U T H E R N DIVISION A N D R E JACKSON, Petitioner, vs. J . HOLLINGSWORTH, Warden, Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) C iv . 10-4070-KES

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CO RPU S

P e tit io n e r , Andre Jackson, is an inmate at the federal prison camp in Y a n k t o n , South Dakota. He brings this pro se petition for a writ of habeas c o r p u s under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 against respondent, J. Hollingsworth, W a r d e n , claiming that his due process rights were violated when he was d is c ip lin e d and lost thirteen days of good time credits. Jackson argues that t h e finding he was guilty of a disciplinary violation was not supported by the " g r e a t e r weight of the evidence" as required by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) r e g u la t io n s set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 541.15. Hollingsworth argues the d is c ip lin a r y action was supported by "some evidence," thus satisfying the r e q u ir e m e n t s of due process. FACTUAL BACKGROUND T h e disciplinary action in question arises from an incident in the p r is o n camp cafeteria on July 13, 2009. While Jackson proceeded through t h e serving line, he questioned the inmate serving the meal, asking if

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separate utensils were being used to serve the pork and non-pork entrees. T h e prison staff member told Jackson the meal was being served correctly a n d asked him to move on. According to the staff member, Jackson r e s p o n d e d by yelling that the same utensils were being used. The staff m e m b e r again attempted to ask Jackson to move on, but Jackson continued t o argue, making the staff member feel threatened. Jackson disputes these a s s e r tio n s . T h e incident report cites Jackson for "conduct that disrupts the o r d e r ly running of the institution" in violation of Code 229 and "conduct t h r e a t e n in g another with bodily harm" in violation of Code 203. Docket 7-4. Jackson was given a copy of the report at 9:25 p.m. Id. The report was in v e s t ig a t e d and referred to the Unit Disciplinary Committee (UDC), with a r e c o m m e n d a t io n that the violation be reduced to a violation of Code 312, w h ic h prohibits insolence. Id. On July 16, 2009, the UDC held an initial h e a r in g ; Jackson again denied the allegations. The UDC referred the incident r e p o r t to the Discipline Hearing Officer (DHO) for a further hearing, and a g a in recommended that the violation be reduced to a charge of insolence. T h e UDC also advised Jackson of his rights during the hearing and gave him a n opportunity to request witnesses and a staff representative. Jackson d e c lin e d a staff representative, but did request three inmate witnesses. O n July 22, 2009, the DHO held a hearing. Jackson denied the c h a r g e , stating:

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I was in the food service line and asked the server if he was s e r v in g pork and no pork with the same spoon as they were b e s id e each other and it looked like he was sharing utensils. [T h e reporting staff member] said: "just give him the tray." I told h im to hold on as I can't have any pork. [The staff member] said: " T a k e it up with Region." I asked what he meant because if I eat p o r k and get sick, Region has nothing to do with it. [The r e p o r t in g staff member] asked me if I wanted to come behind the lin e and see that different utensils are being used and I told him I would if he would let me. He then hit his button, twice. I had t h e tray in my hand and was taking the food. When he hit his a la r m the second time, I was asking a server for some soy sauce. A t no time did I threaten him. D o c k e t 7-7. Three inmate witnesses also provided statements on Jackson's b e h a lf. Their testimony was consistent with Jackson's account, noting that h e did get excited and raised his voice at the end of the exchange. Based on t h is evidence, the incident report, a memo from the staff member, and the in v e s t ig a t in g officer's report, the DHO found sufficient evidence to support a v io la tio n of Code 312, which prohibits insolence towards a staff member. J a c k s o n received a sanction of the loss of thirteen days good conduct time a n d thirty days of commissary privileges. Jackson received a copy of the DHO report on July 27, 2009. H o llin g s w o r t h concedes Jackson has exhausted his administrative remedies. J a c k s o n filed this petition on June 16, 2010, challenging the loss of thirteen d a y s good time.

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DISCUSSION P u r s u a n t to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a federal prisoner may attack the e x e c u t io n of his sentence in the district where he is incarcerated. Matheny v. M o r r is o n , 307 F.3d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 2002). A petition challenging the loss o f good time credits is a challenge to the administration of the petitioner's s e n t e n c e . Kruger v. Erickson, 77 F.3d 1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 1996) (c h a r a c t e r iz in g a challenge to the loss of good time credit as a challenge to t h e length, rather than the validity, of a prisoner's sentence). As such, J a c k s o n 's challenge to the disciplinary procedures that deprived him of good t im e credits is within this court's § 2241 jurisdiction. N e x t , the court must determine the standard of review that applies to t h e disciplinary board's decision. Jackson asserts that because he presented c o n flic t in g evidence to the disciplinary board, the proper evidentiary s t a n d a r d is the "greater weight of the evidence," as set forth in the BOP r e g u la t io n s . 28 C.F.R. § 541.15(f). He argues that the evidence presented d u r in g the disciplinary hearing did not meet this standard and as a result h is constitutional due process rights were violated. T h e deprivation of good conduct time as a disciplinary sanction im p lic a t e s a liberty interest; thus, an inmate must be afforded minimum p r o c e d u r a l due process. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 4 4 5 , 453 (1985). A prisoner must receive "(1) advance written notice of the

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disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, consistent with correctional goals a n d safety to call witnesses and present a defense; and (3) a written s t a t e m e n t of the evidence relied upon by the fact finder and the reasons for t h e disciplinary action." Dible v. Scholl, 506 F.3d 1106, 1110 (8th Cir. 2007). " S o m e evidence" must support the decision of the prison disciplinary board t o revoke good time credits. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. "[T]he relevant question is w h e t h e r there is any evidence in the record that could support the c o n c lu s io n reached by the disciplinary board." Id. at 455-56. Habeas corpus relief is only available for a violation of the C o n s t it u t io n , laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). " T h e r e is no federal due process liberty interest in having . . . prison officials fo llo w prison regulations." Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2 0 0 3 ). Prison guidelines, such as those set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 541.15, "are n o t set forth solely to benefit the prisoner." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 4 8 3 (1995). Rather, they "aspire to instruct subordinate employees how to e x e r c is e discretion vested by the State in the warden, and to confine the a u t h o r it y of prison personnel in order to avoid widely different treatment of s im ila r incidents." Id. While the BOP regulations "may provide more p r o t e c t io n than the Constitution requires . . . they cannot raise the standard o f due process under the Constitution." Goff v. Dailey, 991 F.2d 1437, 1442

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n.9 (8th Cir. 1993).1 Thus, prison officials were required to meet the "some e v id e n c e " standard of Hill, not the "greater weight of the evidence" standard o f the BOP regulations, to satisfy the Constitution's due process r e q u ir e m e n ts . J a c k s o n also argues that the disciplinary finding was based on in s u ffic ie n t evidence. At the hearing, he presented the testimony of three d is in t e r e s t e d inmates. Jackson characterizes their testimony as showing " t h a t [he] was in no way insolent, belligerent, or aggressive" towards the staff m e m b e r ." Docket 2 at 4-5. He argues the disciplinary finding was supported o n ly by the unsworn statement of the staff member. Hollingsworth disputes t h e s e contentions. A c c o r d in g to Jackson, under Moore v. Plaster, 266 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2 0 0 1 ), the unsworn statement of a prison officer is not sufficient evidence to s u p p o r t a disciplinary violation). Hollingsworth correctly argues that Moore is

Other courts have consistently rejected arguments that the violation of t h e BOP regulations on disciplinary hearings constitutes a deprivation of due p r o c e s s . See, e.g., Barner v. Williamson, 233 F. App'x 197, 199-200 (3d Cir. 2 0 0 7 ) (violation of BOP regulation providing that ordinarily inmate should r e c e iv e 24-hour notice of charge did not violate due process); Brown v. Rios, 196 F . App'x 681, 683 (5th Cir. 2006) (violation of BOP regulations not c o n s tit u tio n a l violation); Gracia v. Outlaw, No. 2:09-cv-00046, 2009 WL 5 1 7 4 1 8 5 at *4-5 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 22, 2009) (violation of BOP regulation providing t h a t ordinarily inmate should receive 24-hour notice of charge did not violate d u e process); Stanko v. Rios, No. 08-3102, 2009 WL 1066021 at *6 (D. Minn. A p r . 20, 2009) (violation of various BOP regulations did not create constitutional d u e process violation).

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distinguishable from Jackson's case. In Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 8 3 0 (8th Cir. 2008), the Eighth Circuit distinguished the situation presented in Moore. There, the disciplinary report relied on was conclusory and not b a s e d on the officer's personal knowledge, whereas the facts presented in H ar ts f ie ld involved a report reciting specific facts, based on what the officer o b s e r v e d . Id. On the latter facts, the court held a "report from a correctional o ffic e r , even if disputed by the inmate and supported by no other evidence, le g a lly suffices as `some evidence,' upon which to base a prison disciplinary v io la tio n , if the violation is found by an impartial decisionmaker." Id. at 831. S e e also Bandy-Bey v. Crist, 578 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding a c o r r e c tio n a l officer's report was "some evidence" to support discipline even t h o u g h inmate denied contents of report). Here, the staff member's report was based on personal knowledge and s e t forth specific facts describing the incident. Thus, even if the DHO relied o n no other evidence, the report would have been enough to support the d is c ip lin a r y finding that he was insolent to a staff member. Contrary to J a c k s o n 's contentions, however, the staff member's report and the inmate t e s tim o n y were not the only evidence considered by the DHO. The DHO also c o n s id e r e d memoranda from the reporting staff member and the in v e s t ig a t in g lieutenant. Docket 7-7. The investigating lieutenant's report s u m m a r iz e d interviews of the inmate-server, another inmate witness, and

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the three inmates Jackson requested to testify at the hearing. Docket 7-8. All p a r t ie s involved indicated both Jackson and the reporting staff member were y e llin g . Id. They also stated that when the staff member told Jackson it was n o n e of his business, that Jackson asserted it was, and continued to ask q u e s t io n s . Id. Furthermore, Jackson's actions occurred in front of other in m a te s . His conduct was disruptive and challenged the staff member's a u t h o r it y . Docket 7. This evidence demonstrates conduct that can r e a s o n a b ly be interpreted as insolence. Accordingly, some evidence existed to s u p p o r t the DHO's findings. Therefore, the sanction disallowing thirteen days g o o d time did not violate Jackson's due process rights. CONCLUSION B e c a u s e the disciplinary sanction was supported by some evidence, J a c k s o n 's due process rights were not violated and his petition for writ of h a b e a s corpus is denied. Accordingly, it is O R D E R E D that petitioner's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus is d e n ie d . D a t e d September 27, 2010. BY THE COURT:

/s/

Karen E. Schreier

K A R E N E. SCHREIER C H I E F JUDGE

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