Christensen et al v. Quinn et al

Filing 648

ORDER denying 628 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by U.S. District Judge Karen E. Schreier on 11/18/2014. (KC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DANIEL REED CHRISTENSEN,

CIV. 10-4128-KES

Plaintiff,
vs.
ROSIE QUINN;
SECOND CHANCE RESCUE CENTER;
and
TIFFANI LANDEEN-HOEKE,
individually,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

Defendants.
Pending is defendant Tiffani Landeen-Hoeke’s motion to reconsider the
partial denial of her summary judgment motion. Docket 628. Plaintiff, Daniel
Reed Christensen, opposes the motion to reconsider. Docket 644. For the
following reasons, the motion to reconsider is denied.
BACKGROUND
This case began in September 2010 when Christensen filed suit against
various state and county officials, animal rights organizations, and volunteers
alleging numerous constitutional violations. All defendants filed motions for
summary judgment, and Christensen also moved for summary judgment
against most, but not all, defendants. On September 10, 2014, the court
entered an order denying all of Christensen’s motions for summary judgment
and granting summary judgment to all defendants except Rosie Quinn in her

individual capacity, Second Chance Rescue Center, and Landeen-Hoeke in her
individual capacity. Docket 598.
The court granted summary judgment to Landeen-Hoeke on all claims
brought against her in her official capacity because Christensen had not
demonstrated that any alleged constitutional violations stemmed from an
unconstitutional policy or custom of Turner County.1 Id. at 12-15. The court
granted summary judgment to Landeen-Hoeke in her individual capacity on
Count I, which asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because she was
entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity under federal law. Docket 598 at
70-78. Landeen-Hoeke was not named as a defendant in Count II, which also
asserted a § 1983 claim. Id. at 17 n.11.
The remaining claims asserted against Landeen-Hoeke were state-law
claims. The court granted summary judgment to all defendants on Count III,
which alleged malicious prosecution, because Christensen failed to establish
the second and third elements of that claim. Id. at 78-80. Similarly, the court
granted summary judgment to all defendants on Count IV, which alleged
intentional infliction of emotional distress, because no defendant acted in a
way that went beyond all possible bounds of decency. Id. at 81-82. The court
also granted summary judgment to all defendants on Count V, which alleged
Landeen-Hoeke was the Turner County State’s Attorney at all relevant
times. Because she was not a state employee, she did not share the state’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Docket 598 at 12 n.9; see also Miener v.
State of Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 980 (8th Cir. 1982) (“Controlling case law
holds that a county . . . does not occupy the same position as a state for
eleventh amendment purposes.”).
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violations of the Animal Enterprise Protection Act,2 based on the court’s finding
that the South Dakota Supreme Court would require a conviction under that
statute as a predicate to civil liability and the fact that no defendant had been
charged or convicted under that statute. Id. at 82-88.
Counts VI and VII alleged state-law trespass and conversion,
respectively. The court held that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether Landeen-Hoeke conspired with Quinn to commit those torts. Id. at
92 (trespass); id. at 95-96 (conversion). In doing so, the court found that
Landeen-Hoeke failed to raise a state-law immunity defense. Id. at 93-94.
Landeen-Hoeke’s motion for reconsideration centers on whether she is entitled
to immunity on those claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally do not recognize uniform
standards for a court to analyze a motion to reconsider. In this case, LandeenHoeke brings her motion to reconsider under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b), which provides that “any order or other decision . . . that adjudicates
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment
adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” Under
Rule 54(b), district courts have “the inherent power to reconsider and modify
an interlocutory order any time prior to the entry of judgment.” K.C. 1986 Ltd.

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SDCL 40-38-2.
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P’ship v. Reade Mfg., 472 F.3d 1009, 1117 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation and
citation omitted). While the specific standard for a motion made under Rule
54(b) is unclear, generally courts have found the standard “to be less exacting
than would be a motion under Federal Rule of Procedure 59(e), which in turn is
less exacting than the standards enunciated in Federal Rule of Procedure
60(b).” Colombe v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 835 F. Supp. 2d 736, 750 (D.S.D.
2011) (quotation and citation omitted); see also Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of
Sioux City, Ia., 438 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1027 (N.D. Iowa 2006).
Although the court’s reconsideration of interlocutory orders might be less
rigorous than that of final orders for Rule 59(e) or 60(b), courts “should look to
the kinds of consideration under those rules for guidance.” Doctor John’s, 438
F. Supp. 2d at 1027 (quotation and citation omitted). Like other motions to
reconsider, “[i]t is generally held that a court may amend or reconsider any
ruling under Rule 54(b) to correct any clearly or manifestly erroneous findings
of facts or conclusions of law.” Jones v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, 551 F. Supp. 2d
848, 854 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (quotations and citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Landeen-Hoeke argues that she did plead state-law immunity, that it is
not required to be pleaded as an affirmative defense, that it cannot be waived
because it is jurisdictional, and that she is entitled to absolute judicial
immunity on the state-law claims because those claims are based on the same
underlying actions as Count I, where the court found that Landeen-Hoeke was

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entitled to absolute immunity. Docket 630. Christensen resists the motion on
the basis that Landeen-Hoeke did not raise a state-law immunity defense at the
summary judgment stage. Docket 644.
I.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Landeen-Hoeke asserts that state-law immunity is synonymous with

sovereign immunity, which is jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Docket 630
at 5 (asserting that “state-law immunity is generally synonymous with
sovereign immunity”). This contention is not correct. Landeen-Hoeke was not a
state employee and thus does not share the state’s immunity. See, e.g., Miener,
673 F.2d at 980. Landeen-Hoeke does not claim she was a state employee or
dispute the court’s finding that she was a county employee. See Docket 598 at
12 n.9. Because Landeen-Hoeke was not a state employee, she does not enjoy
the state’s sovereign immunity protections.3
II.

OFFICIAL-CAPACITY CLAIMS
County employees are not subject to liability under § 1983 in their

official capacities unless a plaintiff shows that the constitutional violation in
question stemmed from an unconstitutional policy or custom of the
government entity itself. See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). This
Landeen-Hoeke makes the related arguments that sovereign immunity
presents a jurisdictional issue, cannot be waived, and bars state-law claims
brought in federal court when a state has not waived sovereign immunity.
While these statements may be true with respect to claims against a state or
state employees in their official capacities, they do not apply in this situation
because Landeen-Hoeke was not a state employee. Landeen-Hoeke does not
address that factual issue or its significance. Additionally, even if LandeenHoeke were a state employee, the court dismissed all claims against her in her
official capacity.
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defense applies to official-capacity claims only because the government entity is
the real party in interest. Id. All the authority cited by Landeen-Hoeke relates
to official-capacity claims, a distinction that Landeen-Hoeke does not address.
The court granted summary judgment to Landeen-Hoeke on all claims against
her in her official capacity. See Docket 598 at 12-15. Because the court
dismissed all claims against Landeen-Hoeke in her official capacity, the
relevant question is whether she is entitled to immunity in her individual
capacity.
III.

SDCL 21-32A-2
South Dakota has extended immunity to public entity employees in their

individual capacities in certain situations. SDCL 21-32A-2.4 Paragraph 33 of
Landeen-Hoeke’s answer to the amended complaint—the only reference to
SDCL 21-32A-2 in Landeen-Hoeke’s pleading—states that “[a]s a further
affirmative defense . . . [Christensen’s] claims for punitive damages is barred by
Article III, Section 27 of the South Dakota Constitution, by the terms of SDCL
21-3-2, 21-32-17, 21-32A-2, 21-1-4.1, and by the Doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity.” Docket 145 at 5. Landeen-Hoeke specifically limited application of
that defense to punitive damages in her pleading.
SDCL 21-32A-2 reads in full: “Except insofar as a public entity,
including the state, participates in a risk sharing pool or insurance is
purchased pursuant to § 21-32A-1, any employee, officer, or agent of the public
entity, including the state, while acting within the scope of his employment or
agency, whether such acts are ministerial or discretionary, is immune from
suit or liability for damages brought against him in either his individual or
official capacity. The immunity recognized herein may be raised by way of
affirmative defense.”
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Even if the court construes Landeen-Hoeke’s answer liberally to apply to
all claims, she failed to raise an immunity defense under SDCL 21-32A-2 at the
summary judgment stage. Parties are allowed to plead numerous alternative
affirmative defenses, but the court only considers those defenses actually
raised and argued on summary judgment. Landeen-Hoeke’s brief in support of
her motion for summary judgment does not cite or discuss SDCL 21-32A-2.5
Thus, the court did not consider this unraised argument. Docket 598 at 93-94.
IV.

ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
Immunity is a substantive issue. Counts VI and VII are state-law claims.

Thus, on the state-law claims, immunity must be shown under state law, not
under federal law. Docket 598 at 93 (citing Reasonover v. St. Louis Cnty., Mo.,
447 F.3d 569, 585 (8th Cir. 2006)). Although the caselaw from the South
Dakota Supreme Court on the topic of judicial immunity is limited, South
Dakota does recognize that defense. See Hansen v. Kjellsen, 638 N.W.2d 548,
550 & n.* (discussing whether a court services officer is entitled to judicial
immunity under a functional approach and noting in a footnote that judicial
immunity has been extended to attorneys acting in a way intimately connected
with the judicial process based on Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430
(1976)).
Similarly, the court is unaware of any evidence in the record relating to
a risk-sharing pool or insurance. The absence of this information, which is the
sole condition included in SDCL 21-32A-2, confirms that Landeen-Hoeke did
not raise SDCL 21-32A-2 as a defense at the summary judgment stage.
Without such information, the court would be unable to evaluate whether or to
what extent the statute applied in this situation.
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Although Landeen-Hoeke argued for immunity under federal law, she did
not discuss, or even cite, South Dakota law at the summary judgment stage:
If the Court finds that absolute immunity applies to Landeen’s
conduct as the Turner County State’s Attorney, then the immunity
not only protects Landeen from Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim,
but it also provides immunity from the remaining state law claims.
See Abbot v. Oller, 2012 WL 1465091 at *8 FN24 (E.D. Mo.), citing
Reasonover v. St. Louis County, Mo., 447 F.3d 569, 585 (8th Cir.
2006). As such, Landeen should be absolutely immune from suit
on all of Plaintiff’s claims against Landeen.
Docket 414 at 16. Thus, the court did not examine whether Landeen-Hoeke
was entitled to judicial immunity under South Dakota law on Christensen’s
state-law claims.6 See Docket 598 at 93-94.
Additionally, the court is unable to conclude that Landeen-Hoeke would
automatically be entitled to judicial immunity on the state-law claims to the
same extent she was immune from suit on Count I. The court’s decision on
Count I was based in part on the fact that some the actions Christensen
attributed to Landeen-Hoeke were intimately connected with her role as
prosecutor in the judicial process. Docket 598 at 70-78 (finding that LandenHoeke’s request for an arrest warrant, actions related to the search warrant
affidavit, and her decision to continue prosecution were connected to her role
as prosecutor). In addressing Count I, however, the court did not resolve
Landeen-Hoeke responds to the fact that she did not raise state-law
immunity at summary judgment by contending that “state law immunity is
considered sovereign immunity” and “Landeen’s summary judgment briefs
properly assert sovereign immunity.” Docket 645 at 2. As discussed above, a
state’s sovereign immunity is not available to county employees, nor does it
apply to individual capacity claims. Thus, the fact that Landeen-Hoeke
discussed sovereign immunity has no bearing on whether she is entitled to
judicial immunity under South Dakota state law.
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whether some of Landeen-Hoeke’s actions were tied to her role as prosecutor
because even if they were not, she would still be entitled to qualified immunity
under federal caselaw. Id. (discussing Landeen-Hoeke’s actions in passing
along the suspected sales tax violation for investigation to Cunningham,
Landeen-Hoeke’s statement that Quinn should use the opportunity to look
around Christensen’s property, and other acts alleged by Christensen).
Because the question of state-law immunity was not argued at the summary
judgment stage,7 the court is unable to determine if the same underlying
conduct would have been at issue or whether South Dakota caselaw is
coextensive with federal caselaw on the scope of immunity. Had evidence and
authority been presented, Landeen-Hoeke would have had “ ‘the burden of
showing that such an exemption is justified by overriding considerations of
public policy[.]’ ” Hansen, 638 N.W.2d at 550 (quoting Forrester v. White, 484
U.S. 219, 224 (1988)).
CONCLUSION
Landeen-Hoeke’s motion for reconsideration conflates the immunity of a
state employee sued in his or her official capacity with the immunity potentially
available to Landeen-Hoeke, a county employee defending claims brought
against her in her individual capacity. In her motion for reconsideration,
In her brief in support of her motion to reconsider, Landeen-Hoeke
suggests that she incorporated South Dakota precedent into her brief in
support of her summary judgment motion via her reference to Reasonover. See
Docket 630 at 15-16 & n.5. Even if the reference to Reasonover is construed as
a reference to state law, that conclusory statement without any citation to state
law is insufficient to properly raise the issue.
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Landeen-Hoeke presents two possible grounds for immunity in her individual
capacity: SDCL 21-32A-2 and absolute judicial immunity under South Dakota
state law. Neither issue was raised on summary judgment. Thus, the court will
not take them up on a motion to reconsider. It is
ORDERED that Landeen-Hoeke’s motion to reconsider (Docket 628) is
denied.
Dated November 18, 2014.
BY THE COURT:

/s/Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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