Anderson v. Astrue
Filing
16
ORDER denying 12 Motion for Summary Judgment and Affirming Decision of Commissioner. Signed by Chief Judge Karen E. Schreier on 9/4/2012. (KC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
YVETTE R. ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
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CIV. 11-4064-KES
ORDER AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF COMMISSIONER
Plaintiff, Yvette R. Anderson, moves for reversal of the Commissioner of
Social Security’s decision denying her application for supplemental security
income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The Commissioner opposes
this motion. The court affirms.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 3, 2007, Anderson applied for SSI and alleged an onset date of
April 1, 2007. AR 122, 149.1 On March 27, 2008, the Social Security
Administration denied Anderson’s application. AR 69. On April 21, 2008, Anderson
requested reconsideration, which was denied on July 16, 2008. AR 72, 76.
Anderson then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). AR
79. The ALJ held a hearing on January 28, 2010, after which the ALJ determined
that Anderson was not disabled, and, thus, was not entitled to SSI benefits. AR 14-
1
record.
All citations to “AR” refer to the appropriate page of the administrative
24. On May 3, 2010, Anderson requested that the Appeals Council review the
decision. AR 8-9.
On April 1, 2011, the Appeals Council denied Anderson’s request for review.
AR 1. Anderson commenced this action on May 11, 2011, seeking judicial review of
the Commissioner’s determination that she is not disabled. Docket 1.
FACTS
Anderson was born July 12, 1965. AR 200. At the time of the hearing before
the ALJ, Anderson was 44 years old. AR 34. Anderson went to the tenth grade in
school and attended special education classes;2 she has not received her GED.
AR 34-35, 56. Anderson has alleged problems with vision, depression, anxiety, and
mental retardation.3
Anderson has worked as a housekeeper, laborer, and clothes sorter. AR 155.
She has been unable to generate a significant amount of income in any particular
year, with $5,110.68 in 1993 being her largest year’s income.4 AR 145. Anderson’s
two most recent jobs include working as a housekeeper at a motel and as a clothes
sorter, holding each position in 2007. AR 148. When asked why she no longer
2
Anderson testified that she attended special education classes. AR 34-35.
But in the Function Report that she filled out on February 6, 2008, she noted
that she did not attend special education classes. AR 158.
3
Because Anderson does not dispute any of the ALJ’s findings regarding
her depression and anxiety, the court will limit its discussion of those topics.
4
This is the year in which Anderson worked as a laborer. AR 155.
Following 1993, the highest income Anderson received was in 1996 when she
earned $1,520.82. AR 145. She did not receive any income in 1998, 2001, 2002,
2005, or 2006. Id.
2
worked as a housekeeper, Anderson testified, “Because they said I wasn’t doing a
proper cleaning job because I didn’t have these glasses then.” AR 37. Anderson
also testified that she left her clothes sorter position “because of stress, anxiety,
and also [she] was getting sexually harassed.” AR 37. Anderson currently cleans
her elderly neighbor’s home once a week for around $20. AR 46.
I.
Vision Problems
On March 29, 2007, at Shopko Optical, just prior to Anderson’s alleged
onset date, Anderson received medical attention for her eyes for the first time since
her childhood. AR 38-39, 206-207.5 Anderson was prescribed glasses at this
appointment. AR 39.
On March 4, 2008, Anderson saw Dr. Richard T. Tschetter pursuant to a
referral by the Disability Determination Services. AR 208-09. Dr. Tschetter noted
that Anderson “apparently has gotten along well without glasses until two or three
years ago when she found that she needs them.” AR 209. Anderson was diagnosed
with small angle esotropia6 and suppression amblyopia7 in her right eye. AR 210.
Dr. Tschetter determined that Anderson’s visual acuity was 20/400 in her right
5
The notes from Anderson’s appointment at Shopko Optical note that
Anderson’s previous vision exam took place when she was in the fifth grade. AR
206.
6
Esotropia, or “crossed eyes,” is a form of strabismus “in which one eye
turns inward, toward the nose, instead of looking straight ahead.” WebMD,
http://www.webmd.com/eye-health/tc/types-of-strabismus-topic-overview (last
visited September 4, 2012).
7
Amblyopia, or “lazy eye,” occurs when one eye does not develop proper
vision. WebMD, http://www.webmd.com/eye-health/amblyopia-directory (last
visited September 4, 2012).
3
eye and 20/200 in her left eye without correction, and her visual acuity was 20/60
in her right eye and 20/30 in her left eye with correction. AR 209. Dr. Tschetter
told Anderson that “she will simply have to wear the glasses to get used to them as
all farsighted people, particularly with a prescription as high as she has, will get a
moderate amount of magnification of all images[.]” AR 210.
Anderson was also examined by Dr. Paul Greenfield on January 7, 2009. AR
273. Dr. Greenfield’s impression was that Anderson had glaucoma8 and
amblyopia, and he gave Anderson a new prescription for glasses. AR 273.
Dr. Greenfield noted that Anderson “should do well with these devices.” AR 273. In
fact, Dr. Greenfield opined that with a new prescription, Anderson’s visual acuity
would be 20/30 in her right eye and 20/20 in her left eye. AR 273.
Dr. Kevin Whittle completed Anderson’s residual functional capacity (RFC)
assessment. AR 218. In completing the RFC assessment, Dr. Whittle noted that
Anderson “does have [a] medically determinable vision impairment. However,
symptomology can be improved with correction.” AR 218. He also found that
Anderson’s near acuity is limited. AR 216. Dr. Whittle further opined that
Anderson should not work in hazardous environments. AR 220.
During her ALJ hearing, Anderson testified that she can see pretty well
when wearing her glasses, stating that she can read newspaper print and
directions on a pizza box. AR 39-41. Anderson also testified that she has trouble
8
Glaucoma “is the name for a group of eye diseases that damage the optic
nerve,” sometimes resulting in a loss of vision. WebMD, http://www.webmd.com
/eye-health/tc/glaucoma-topic-overview (last visited September 4, 2012).
4
with depth perception and that she gets headaches and sick to her stomach when
she wears her glasses. AR 39-40, 48-49.
II.
Mental Functioning
Anderson was referred to Dr. Elwin Unruh, a psychologist, for psychological
evaluation through the Disability Determination Services of the South Dakota
Department of Human Service. AR 239. Dr. Unruh performed the evaluation on
July 10, 2008. AR 239.
Dr. Unruh determined that Anderson had a verbal IQ score of 71, a
performance IQ score of 69, and a full scale IQ score of 67. AR 226. Dr. Unruh
observed that Anderson experienced difficulties with “affect and/or motivation”
because she easily became frustrated, agitated, or impulsive during the testing
session and such difficulties “may warrant caution in the interpretation of her
scores.” AR 233-34.
Dr. Unruh diagnosed Anderson with depressive disorder, generalized anxiety
disorder, and mild mental retardation. AR 243. Specifically, Dr. Unruh stated that
Anderson “is currently functioning at a mildly retarded level cognitively[.]” AR 242.
Anderson stated that her emotional difficulties stem from early childhood abuse by
her grandfather9 and her difficulties with her vision. AR 239. At the time of her
9
Anderson indicated that her grandfather sexually molested her when she
was a child and that he recently had died prior to her appointment with
Dr. Unruh, causing an “increased amount of anxiety and depression for her at
[that] time.” AR 240.
5
meeting with Dr. Unruh, Anderson was taking Zoloft10 and Diazepam11 to help
manage the depression and anxiety. AR 239.
On July 15, 2008, Jerry Buchkoski, Ph.D., reviewed Anderson’s mental
health records to complete a mental RFC assessment. AR 244-46. Dr. Buchkoski
opined that Anderson is moderately limited in her ability to understand and
remember detailed instructions, her ability to carry out detailed instructions, and
her ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods. AR 244.
He also noted that Anderson has the following impairments: borderline intellectual
functioning, depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder.12 AR 249, 251, 253.
Dr. Buchkoski further determined that Anderson “has the ability to perform simple
work-related tasks on a sustained basis, assuming she could stop drinking.” AR
246.
At her ALJ hearing, Anderson testified that she had been getting treatment
for her depression and anxiety at Community Falls Health13 for about four months.
10
Zoloft is “used to treat depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic
disorder, anxiety disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and
premenstrual dysphoric disorder[.]” Drugs.com, http://www.drugs.com/
zoloft.html (last visited September 4, 2012).
11
Diazepam is “used to treat anxiety disorders, alcohol withdrawal
symptoms, or muscle spasms.” Drugs.com, http://www.drugs.com/
diazepam.html (last visited September 4, 2012).
12
Dr. Buchkoski did not note that Anderson suffered from any impairment
regarding mental retardation under 12.05. AR 252.
13
Community Falls Health was also referred to as “Fall River Community
Health” and “Falls Community Health” in the transcript. AR 54.
6
AR 43. Anderson noted that she was taking Zoloft, Diazepam, and Ambien.14 AR
44. She stated that the medications helped her with her moods and her ability to
sleep, but Anderson also noted that she still suffers from stress, anxiety, and
depression. AR 45.
ALJ DECISION
On April 5, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision denying Anderson’s applications
for SSI benefits. AR 24. The ALJ used the sequential five-step evaluation process.15
At the first step, the ALJ determined that Anderson never engaged in substantial
gainful activity. AR 16. At step two, the ALJ found that Anderson has the following
severe impairments: “borderline intellectual functioning, depression, anxiety
disorder, small angle esotropia in the right eye, mild suppression amblyopia in the
right eye, suspected glaucoma, 20/60- visual acuity in the right eye with
correction and 20/30- visual acuity in left eye with correction[.]” AR 16. The ALJ
also determined that Anderson’s alcohol use “is not a medically determinable
impairment.” AR 17. At step three, the ALJ found that Anderson does not have an
impairment or a combination of impairments that meet or equal a listed
14
Ambien is “used to treat insomnia.” Drugs.com, http://www.drugs.com
/ambien.html (last visited September 4, 2012).
15
An ALJ must follow “ ‘the familiar five-step process’ ” to determine
whether an individual is disabled: “(1) the claimant was employed; (2) she was
severely impaired; (3) her impairment was, or was comparable to, a listed
impairment; (4) she could perform past relevant work; and if not, (5) whether she
could perform any other kind of work.” Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 921 (8th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 929 (8th Cir. 2010)); see
also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (detailing the five-step process).
7
impairment. AR 17-18. At step four, the ALJ concluded that Anderson has the
RFC “to perform medium work . . . except that she cannot perform tasks requiring
attention to fine visual detail nor can she work around hazards. Mentally,
[Anderson] is limited to simple routine work.” AR 19. The ALJ further noted that
Anderson should have limited contact with the public. AR 19. At step five, the ALJ
determined that while Anderson does not have any past relevant work, she is able
to perform some jobs that exist in the national economy. AR 22, 23. Thus, the ALJ
concluded that Anderson was not disabled.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An ALJ’s decision must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence
in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is ‘less than a
preponderance, but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner's conclusion.’ ” Pate-Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 942
(8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Maresh v. Barnhart, 438 F.3d 897, 898 (8th Cir. 2006)). In
determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, the court
considers evidence that both supports and detracts from the ALJ’s decision. Moore
v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 599, 605 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). As long as
substantial evidence supports the decision, the court may not reverse it merely
because substantial evidence exists in the record that would support a contrary
outcome or because the court would have determined the case differently.
Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Woolf v. Shalala,
3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993)).
8
In determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence, the court reviews the entire administrative record and
considers six factors: (1) the ALJ’s credibility determinations; (2) the claimant’s
vocational factors; (3) medical evidence from treating and consulting physicians;
(4) the claimant’s subjective complaints relating to activities and impairments;
(5) any third-party corroboration of claimant’s impairments; and (6) a vocational
expert’s testimony based on proper hypothetical questions setting forth the
claimant’s impairment(s). Stewart v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 581,
585-86 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1184-85 (8th Cir.
1989)).
The court also reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine if an error
of law has been committed, which may be a procedural error, the use of an
erroneous legal standard, or an incorrect application of the law. Collins v. Astrue,
648 F.3d 869, 871 (8th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Issues of law are reviewed de
novo with deference accorded to the Commission’s construction of the Social
Security Act. Id. (citing Juszczyk v. Astrue, 542 F.3d 626, 633 (8th Cir. 2008)).
DISCUSSION
Anderson argues that the ALJ made three reversible errors: (1) the ALJ failed
to include severe impairments at step two; (2) the ALJ erred in ruling that
Anderson’s mental impairment did not meet Listing 12.05C at step three; and (3)
the ALJ erred in ruling that Anderson can work at step five.
9
I.
Severe Impairments
Anderson argues that the ALJ erred when she failed to include mild mental
retardation as a severe impairment at step two. At step two of the sequential
evaluation process, Anderson must establish that she has a medically
determinable physical or mental impairment that is severe. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii); Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 2007) (“It is the
claimant’s burden to establish that [her] impairment or combination of
impairments are severe.” (citation omitted)). A severe impairment must
“significantly” limit the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities, 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c), such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting,
pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, handling, understanding, remembering
simple instructions, using judgment, responding appropriately to usual work
situations, and dealing with changes in a routine work setting. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 416.921(b)(1)-(6). Basic work activities relate to the abilities and aptitudes
necessary to perform most jobs. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b).
At step two, the ALJ determined that Anderson is of borderline intellectual
functioning and not mildly mentally retarded, despite Anderson’s full scale IQ
score of 67. “Borderline intellectual functioning is a condition defined as an IQ
score within the 71-84 range, while mental retardation is a score of about 70 or
below.” Hutsell v. Massanari, 259 F.3d 707, 709 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing American
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 3940, 684 (4th ed. 1994)); see also Moore v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 599, 601 (8th Cir. 2010)
(noting that an IQ score in the high 60s is a range associated with mild
10
retardation). An ALJ is not required to accept proffered IQ scores and may reject
scores that are inconsistent with the claimant’s daily activities, medical history,
educational background, and behavior. Miles v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 694, 699 (8th
Cir. 2004); Bailey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 1063, 1065-66 (8th Cir. 2000).
Substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s decision to discredit
Anderson’s IQ score. As an initial matter, the psychologist who administered the
IQ examination, Dr. Unruh, was not Anderson’s treating psychologist and only met
with Anderson on one occasion. See Clark v. Apfel, 141 F.3d 1253, 1256 (8th Cir.
1998) (“A one-time evaluation by a non-treating psychologist is not entitled to
controlling weight.”). Dr. Unruh cautioned that Anderson’s “affect and/or
motivation difficulties may have affected her performance which may warrant
caution in the interpretation of her scores.” AR 21, 234. Further, Anderson has not
introduced any additional medical records that illustrate her cognitive difficulties;
she relies solely on Dr. Unruh’s IQ determination. See McGee v. Astrue, 291 Fed.
App’x 783, 787 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that an IQ determination was inconsistent
with claimant’s medical history when there was no other evidence of cognitive
difficulties in claimant’s medical records); see also Kirby, 500 F.3d at 707 (“It is the
claimant’s burden to establish that [her] impairment or combination of
impairments are severe.”).
Additionally, the ALJ noted that Anderson can read and understand a short
newspaper or magazine article, count out change, and feed and care for her cat
and dog. See Clark v. Apfel, 141 F.3d 1253, 1256 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that an
ALJ properly rejected IQ scores where scores were inconsistent with claimant’s
11
daily activities of reading, writing, counting money, driving, cooking, cleaning, and
shopping). The record also shows that Anderson once had a driver’s license and
that she is capable of cooking, cleaning, and shopping. AR 46, 162-63. Moreover,
Anderson’s testimony does not indicate that her poor work record was a result of
her mental impairment, but instead she alleges that it was caused by her vision
problems and harassment. See Miles v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 694, 699 (8th Cir.
2004) (finding that an ALJ properly discredited claimant’s IQ score because
claimant “had never been terminated from a job for lack of mental ability”). Indeed,
when asked about her past jobs, Anderson testified that she could “learn them real
well.” AR 38.
In her brief, Anderson argues that her education is proof of her mental
impairment. She points out that she only made it to the tenth grade and received
special education services throughout her academic career. But evidence in the
record weakens her argument. The record suggests that Anderson discontinued
school because she was pregnant, not because of mental difficulties. AR 239-40.
Also, Dr. Unruh noted that Anderson “does have goals of completing a GED[.]” AR
242.
After examining the record as a whole, the court finds that there is
substantial evidence that supports the ALJ’s determination to discredit Anderson’s
IQ score. See McGee, 291 Fed. App’x at 786 (“We must affirm if the ALJ’s decision
is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.”) (citation omitted).
12
II.
Step 3 and Listing 12.05C
Anderson next argues that the ALJ erred at Step 3 when she failed to
address Listing 12.05C. To meet Listing 12.05C, a claimant must show: (1) that
she suffered deficits in adaptive functioning; (2) a valid verbal, performance, or full
scale IQ of 60 through 70; (3) an onset of the impairment before age 22; and (4) a
physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant workrelated limitation of function. Maresh v. Barnhart, 438 F.3d 897, 899 (8th Cir.
2006); Cheatum v. Astrue, 388 Fed. App’x 574, 576 (8th Cir. 2010); 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, App’x 1, § 12.05. As determined above, the ALJ relied on
substantial evidence when she discredited Anderson’s IQ scores and found that
she was of borderline intellectual functioning, implying that she has an IQ greater
than 70. Absent a valid IQ score between 60 and 70, Anderson cannot meet Listing
12.05C, and the ALJ was not required to address it in her findings.
Even if the court were to find that the ALJ erred when she discredited
Anderson’s IQ scores, Anderson still does not qualify for SSI under Listing 12.05C
because she failed to show deficits in adaptive functioning. When considering
whether a claimant has deficits in adaptive functioning, courts review whether the
claimant has successful social relationships, has physical problems, exhibits selfsufficient behavior, or has limitations in her concentration, persistence, or pace.
See Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 618 (8th Cir. 2007). The ALJ addressed these
areas in her findings even though she did not explicitly do so under the veil of a
12.05C analysis. The following is a summary of the ALJ’s findings.
13
With regard to social relationships, Anderson testified that she has lived
with her roommate for two years and has other friends in addition to her
roommate. AR 36, 45. She also cleans her neighbor’s house once a week.
Anderson’s self-sufficient behavior includes her abilities to shop, clean, cook,
count out change, take walks, and care for pets. The only physical problem
Anderson alleged was her poor vision. The ALJ, however, found that “her treatment
and prescription for glasses has generally been successful in correcting her vision.”
AR 21.16 The ALJ found that Anderson has moderate difficulties with her
concentration, persistence, or pace. The only evidence to support a finding that
Anderson has more than just a “moderate” difficulty is her IQ score and her
education history. As discussed above, there is substantial evidence in the record
to discredit the IQ score and call into question the relevance of the education
history. In light of these determinations by the ALJ which were supported by
substantial evidence in the record, the court finds that Anderson failed to show
deficits in adaptive functioning as required under 12.05C.
III.
Step 5—Ability to Work
Anderson’s final argument alleges that the ALJ erred when she found that
there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that
Anderson can perform. Specifically, Anderson argues that the ALJ erred by not
16
There is substantial evidence in the record that supports the ALJ’s
finding. Anderson’s most recent eye appointment with Dr. Greenfield shows that
Anderson’s visual acuity with her glasses is 20/30 in her right eye and 20/20 in
her left eye. AR 273. Also, Anderson’s testimony indicates that she sees well with
her glasses but has problems with depth perception.
14
including additional limitations in her hypothetical questions to the vocational
expert. Further, Anderson argues that the ALJ’s finding conflicts with the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT).
A. Sufficiency of Hypothetical Questions Posed to Vocational Expert
Anderson argues that the ALJ’s hypothetical questions should have included
Anderson’s difficulties with depth perception and reaching.17 “The ALJ’s
hypothetical question to the vocational expert needs to include only those
impairments that the ALJ finds are substantially supported by the record as a
whole.” Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 881, 889 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
“[T]he hypothetical question need not frame the claimant’s impairments in the
specific diagnostic terms used in medical reports, but instead should capture the
concrete consequences of those impairments.” Id. (citation omitted). The transcript
shows that the ALJ’s hypothetical questions and the vocational expert’s answers
each mention Anderson’s depth perception. When questioning the vocational
expert, the ALJ specifically said Anderson has “a bigger problem with depth
perception” than visual acuity. AR 62. Likewise, the vocational expert discusses
the role depth perception plays in performing the duties of a motel maid. AR 61-62.
Thus, the hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert captured the
concrete consequences of Anderson’s impairments.
17
It is necessary to point out that Anderson does not allege that she has
physical difficulties in reaching. Her argument is that her depth perception
causes her to have problems reaching for objects. Thus, her sole objection to the
ALJ’s hypothetical question is that it did not address her difficulties with depth
perception.
15
B. ALJ’s Findings and DOT
Lastly, Anderson argues that the ALJ’s conclusion that Anderson can work
as a hand packager or motel maid conflicts with the descriptions of those positions
in the DOT. “A claimant’s reliance on the DOT as a definitive authority on job
requirements is misplaced because DOT definitions are simply generic job
descriptions that offer the approximate maximum requirements for each
position[.]” Moore v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 599, 604 (8th Cir. 2010). “The DOT itself
cautions that its descriptions may not coincide in every respect with the content of
jobs as performed in particular establishments or at certain localities.” Wheeler v.
Apfel, 224 F.3d 891, 897 (8th Cir. 2000). Therefore, as a general matter, the ALJ
was not required to strictly comply with the language in the DOT when she
considered jobs that Anderson was capable of performing.
Even though strict compliance with the DOT is unnecessary in this instance,
the ALJ did fully comply with the DOT’s description of motel maid when she found
that Anderson could perform such work. Anderson argues that pursuant to the
DOT, working as a maid requires frequent reaching. As noted above, Anderson
does not allege that she has physical difficulties while reaching. Rather, she claims
that her depth perception is the problem. The vocational expert noted in his
testimony that the DOT does not indicate that depth perception is required for
performing the position of a motel maid. Dictionary of Occupational Titles, 323.687014 (cleaner, housekeeping) (4th ed. 1991) (available at 1991 WL 672783). Thus,
16
the ALJ’s determination that Anderson could work as a motel maid complied with
the DOT’s description of the position.18
In summary, the record and the vocational expert’s testimony support the
ALJ’s conclusion that Anderson could perform certain available jobs in the
national economy.
CONCLUSION
Following review of the record, the court finds that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s finding that Anderson is not disabled. The ALJ relied on
substantial evidence in the record to discredit Anderson’s IQ scores. Without a
valid IQ score, Anderson was not able to show a listing level impairment. Further,
the ALJ properly concluded that Anderson could perform jobs that exist in the
national economy. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Anderson’s motion for summary judgment (Docket 12) is
denied, and the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
Dated September 4, 2012.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
CHIEF JUDGE
18
Indeed, Anderson’s daily activity also supports the ALJ’s conclusion.
Anderson testified that she cleans her neighbor’s house once a week.
17
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