Mathison v. United States Sentencing Commission et al

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL Ronald Parsons. Signed by U. S. District Judge Lawrence L. Piersol on 5/21/12. (DJP)

FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MAY 2 1 2012

DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA

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SOUTHERN DIVISION

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EUGENE MATHISON,
Plaintiff,

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

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CR 96-40048
CV 00-4055
CV 11-4111
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL

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EUGENE MATHISON,
Plaintiff,
- vs ­

UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION,
Defendant.

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On June 9,1997, a jury convicted Eugene Mathison of38 counts of mail fraud, five counts
of wire fraud, fifteen counts of money laundering, one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud,
wire fraud, money laundering and engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from
specified unlawful activity, and two counts ofengaging in monetary transactions in property derived
from specified unlawful activity. On September 18, 1997, Mathison was sentenced to a total term
of imprisonment of 246 months. Mathison's conviction was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals on September 2, 1998. Since his conviction was affirmed, Mathison has filed a number

ofpost-trial motions and petitions. A number of motions are pending in the cases listed in the caption
to this Order.
After Mathison's conviction had become final and after the denial of his motion to vacate,
set aside or correct his sentence had been affirmed, the United States Supreme Court issued its
decision in United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008). In Santos, a defendant who was found
guilty of running and conspiring to run an illegal gambling business, was also found guilty of one
count of conspiracy to launder money (§ 1956(a)( 1)(A)(i) and § 1956(h)), and two counts of money
laundering (§ 1956(a)(l)(A)(i)). In affirming the reversal of the money laundering convictions, the
Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, held that the "proceeds" in the money-laundering statute was
ambiguous, making the rule of lenity applicable, and further held that "proceeds" referred to
"profits," not "receipts," in that prosecution.
The application of United States v. Santos has evolved and expanded. In United States v.

Rubashkin, 655 F.3d 849, 865 (8th Cir. 2011), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
government's argument that the holding in United States v. Santos was restricted to the illegal
gambling context. In Wooten v. Cauley, 2012 WL 1216288 (6th Cir. April 12,2012), the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently observed that immediately following Santos, many district courts
concluded that Santos was not retroactively applicable, but that now several circuit courts have held
that Santos is retroactively applicable because its interpretation ofthe definition of "proceeds" in 18
U.S.C. § 1956 constitutes a substantive change in the law which places the burden on the prosecution
to prove the use of profits, not mere gross receipts, in money laundering cases. 2012 WL 1216288
at *5 (citing United States v. Halstead, 634 F.3d 270,271 (4th Cir. 2011); Garland v. Roy, 615 F.3d
391,396 (5th Cir.2010); King v. Keller, 372 Fed.Appx. 70, 73 (l1th Cir. 2010). The Sixth Circuit
also noted that in at least one instance the government has conceded that the holding in Santos
applies retroactively. Id. (citing Santana v. United States, No. 08-1493-JLR, 2009 WL 1228556,
at *1 n. 2 (W.D.Wash. May 4, 2009)).
In Garland v. Roy, 615 F3d 391 (5th Cir. 2010), a pro se petitioner brought a habeas corpus
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that he was entitled to be released under the holding of

United States v. Santos. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal ofthe action after
recognizing that if a retroactively applicable decision establishes that a habeas petitioner may have

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been convicted of a nonexistent offense, the habeas statute may be utilized to challenge the legality
of the petitioner's sentence.615 F.3d at 404.
Mathison ended his formal education in the 11th grade. He is a 74-year-old unrepresented
inmate serving a 246-month sentence. In light of Mathison's circumstances and the complexity of
the law applicable to money laundering, the Court has determined that the interests ofjustice require
that counsel be appointed I to consider whether a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
based on Santos should be brought on Mathison's behalf, and to draft and file such a petition if the
facts and law warrant taking such action. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Ronald Parsons is appointed to represent Mathison as set forth in this
Memorandum Opinion and Order.
Dated this

a.lb: day of May, 2012.
BY THE COURT:

e.~~-United States District Judge

ATTEST:
JOSEP

ISee Battle v. Armantrout, 902 F.2d 701, 702 (8th Cir. 1990) (interests ofjustice may
require appointment of counsel when "factual and legal issues are sufficiently complex and
numerous that appointment of counsel would benefit both [petitioner] and the court.").

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