Goldsmith v. Dooley et al

Filing 16

ORDER denying 15 Motion to Vacate. Signed by Chief Judge Karen E. Schreier on 2/27/12. (KC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHARLES KYLE GOLDSMITH, The
People of the Republic of the
Republic State of South Dakota ex
rel., relator for Charles Goldsmith,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT DOOLEY, Warden at Mike
Durfee State Prison;
JENNIFER STANWICK, Associate
Warden at Mike Durfee State Prison;
SUE JACOB, Associate Warden at
Mike Durfee State Prison; and
JOHN DOE, The New Staff Attorney
at Mike Durfee State Prison,
Defendants.

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Civ. 11-4181-KES

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
VACATE ORDER DISMISSING
CASE

Plaintiff, Charles Kyle Goldsmith, moves to vacate this court’s order
dismissing his case. Goldsmith is incarcerated at Mike Durfee State Prison in
Springfield, South Dakota. Goldsmith filed a pro se civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in which he asserted that his right of access to the courts was
violated by prison policies regarding the law library. This court dismissed
Goldsmith’s pro se complaint on January 20, 2012, for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court
ordered Mike Durfee State Prison to collect the court’s filing fee installments
whenever the amount in Goldsmith’s trust account exceeds $10, monthly
payments that equal 20 percent of the funds credited to the account the
preceding month to be forwarded to the United States District Court Clerk’s

office pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2), until the filing fee of $350 is paid in
full. Goldsmith now contends that this order was improper.
DISCUSSION
Goldsmith categorized his motion as a motion to “vacate” this court’s
order, but did not identify the rule under which he moves to vacate the order.
When the moving party fails to specify the rule under which it makes a postjudgment motion, that party leaves the characterization of the motion to the
court. Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1988). Federal
courts have construed this type of motion as a motion to alter or amend the
judgment under Rule 59(e) or as a motion for relief from judgment under Rule
60(b). Spinar v. S.D. Bd. of Regents, 796 F.2d 1060, 1062 (8th Cir. 1986).
A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed “no later than 28 days after the entry of the
judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). This court dismissed Goldsmith’s complaint on
January 20, 2012. Goldsmith did not file his motion to vacate until March 23,
2012, well beyond the 28-day threshold. Thus, his motion is untimely under
Rule 59(e). Rule 60(b) motions, conversely, “must be made within a reasonable
time” or if based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly
discovered evidence, or fraud by an opposing party, “no more than a year after
the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(c). Thus, Goldsmith’s motion is timely under Rule 60(b) and this court will
consider Goldsmith’s motion to vacate as a motion for relief from judgment
under Rule 60(b).

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Rule 60(b) provides that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment
and reopen his case for the following reasons:
(1)

mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2)

newly discovered evidence, that, with reasonable diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b);

(3)

fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

(4)

the judgment is void;

(5)

the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based
on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or
applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or

(6)

any other reason that justifies relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Goldsmith claims that he has “obtained legal evidence from
an attorney by the name of, Dr. Edward Rivera from California, who disclosed to
me that the U.S. District Court of South Dakota has never been ordained or
established under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Therefore the Justice who
goes by the name, KAREN E. SCHREIER, is Not an Article III Justice. Yet issued
an Order in Case No. 11-4181-KES.” Docket 15. Goldsmith also asserts that
because Judge Schreier failed to answer a letter he sent to her on February 17,
2012, within 10 days, she has admitted to each question under Rule 8(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Goldsmith argues that because of this
“evidence,” this court does not have the right to collect any payment from him
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). Id. Thus, it appears that Goldsmith may be

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arguing that the judgment is void and the court will analyze his motion under
Rule 60(b)(4) and under the catch-all exception contained in Rule 60(b)(6).
A judgment is void “only if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction
of the subject matter, or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent
with due process of law.” 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay
Kane & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2862 (2d ed. 2012).
Goldsmith does not contend that this court acted in a manner inconsistent with
due process of law. Rather, he contends that Judge Schreier is not an Article III
Judge and, therefore, she lacked the power to dismiss the case. Judge Schreier
has been confirmed by the U.S. Senate, and President William Jefferson Clinton
signed her commission. Goldsmith’s unsupported arguments that this court and
Judge Schreier are not “established and ordained” under Article III of the United
States Constitution do not justify relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Nor does the catch-all provision of Rule 60(b) justify relief. “Relief is
available under Rule 60(b)(6) only where exceptional circumstances have denied
the moving party a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim and have
prevented the moving party from receiving adequate redress.” Harley v. Zoesch,
413 F.3d 866, 871 (8th Cir. 2005). Relief under this rule is “exceedingly rare as
relief requires an ‘intrusion into the sanctity of a final judgment.’ ” In re: Guidant
Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 496 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir.
2007) (quoting Watkins v. Lundell, 169 F.3d 540, 544 (8th Cir. 1999)).
“Exceptional circumstances are not present every time a party is subject to
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potentially unfavorable consequences as the result of an adverse judgment
properly arrived at.” Atkinson v. Prudential Prop. Co., Inc., 43 F.3d 367, 373 (8th
Cir. 1994). Although Goldsmith’s complaint was dismissed pursuant to the
“screening” procedures for prisoner complaints contained in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2), exceptional circumstances did not deprive Goldsmith of a full and
fair opportunity to litigate his claim. Therefore, it is
ORDERED that Goldsmith’s motion to vacate (Docket 15) is denied
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dated April 27, 2012.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
CHIEF JUDGE

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