Kroupa v. 4-H et al
Filing
85
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 53 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by U.S. District Judge Karen E. Schreier on 12/18/2013. (KC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
B.K., a minor, through Greg
Kroupa, her guardian ad litem,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PETER A. NIELSEN, individually
and in his official capacity as
Assistant Director of 4-H Youth
Development;
ROD GEPPERT, individually and
in his official capacity as Brule
County Extension 4-H
representative;
JOHN DOES, of the South
Dakota 4-H Livestock Ethics
Committee unidentified in any
communication from the other
Defendants or in the 2011 South
Dakota 4-H Division Handbook of
the South Dakota Cooperative
Extension Service in their
individual and official capacities;
and
MARY DOES, of the South
Dakota 4-H Livestock Ethics
Committee unidentified in any
communication from the other
Defendants or in the 2011 South
Dakota 4-H Division Handbook of
the South Dakota Cooperative
Extension Service in their
individual and official capacities,
Defendants.
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CIV. 12-4046-KES
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants Peter Nielsen and Rod Geppert move for summary
judgment on the remaining claims against them. Plaintiff, B.K., through her
father and guardian ad litem Greg Kroupa, resists that motion. For the
reasons below, the court grants in part and denies in part the motion for
summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to B.K., the nonmoving
party, are as follows:
B.K. is a high school student who lives with her family in Brule
County, South Dakota. B.K. has participated in 4-H since she was eight
years old and has won substantial monetary awards in various
competitions.1 Greg owns and operates a farm and livestock breeding
business, and all four of Greg’s children have participated in 4-H. Nielsen is
the Assistant Director of 4-H Youth Development. In 2011, Geppert was the
4-H Livestock Project Leader, and he is currently the Extension Field
Specialist I-4-H Livestock Show Manager.
The South Dakota 4-H program requires that all animals exhibited
must be in the possession of the exhibitor by the enrollment date for each
competition season. The enrollment date for the 2011 season was June 1,
1
4-H is a national organization with a wide variety of youth
programming. The South Dakota 4-H program is run by the South Dakota
State University Extension Service at the direction of the Board of Regents. 4-H
is open to all youth between the ages of eight and eighteen. In 2011, South
Dakota had over 8,000 enrolled members, and Brule County had 63 enrolled
members.
2
2011. Additionally, the South Dakota 4-H code of ethics requires each
participant to affirm that he or she has owned and cared for each project
animal throughout the season.
On August 11, 2011, B.K. entered Moe, a crossbred belted barrow
swine, in the 4-H Achievement Days at the Brule County Fair. She qualified
to compete with Moe at the South Dakota State Fair, which was held from
September 1, 2011, to September 6, 2011. At the state fair, B.K. won a
reserve champion award with Moe and received $500 plus the market value
of Moe’s carcass. Because the state fair is a terminal event, Moe was sent
directly to slaughter from the fair.
Following the state fair, other 4-H members claimed that B.K. showed
a different swine at the state fair than she had shown at the Brule County
Fair. Those members claimed B.K.’s state fair entry was actually a swine
previously owned by Parker Henley for which Mr. Henley had won an award
at the Missouri State Fair on August 13, 2011. According to the allegations,
Henley sold his swine to Jeff Grings, who sold the swine to Greg Kroupa,
and B.K. entered and won the South Dakota state fair with the imposter
swine rather than her original swine.
As the cheating allegations against B.K. mounted, B.K. received
harassing text messages, e-mails, and Facebook posts. To stem the
allegations, B.K. deleted her Facebook account and reported the messages
to her parents. B.K.’s parents contacted 4-H in an effort to stop the
harassment.
3
On September 8, 2011, the 4-H Livestock Ethics Committee met to
discuss the allegations surrounding B.K.’s swine. Nielsen and Geppert were
both at the meeting. The next day, Greg met with Geppert about the
allegations of cheating and the harassment. Nielsen and Geppert both
contend that Greg admitted B.K. had not owned or cared for B.K.’s entry in
the state fair. Greg denies making any such admission.
The livestock ethics committee met again on September 20, 2011. At
that meeting, the committee determined that B.K. misrepresented the
ownership of her winning swine at the state fair in violation of 4-H’s rules
and ethics. B.K. was not given a chance to present any evidence or
argument at this meeting—in fact, B.K. was not even informed of the
meeting. The committee decided to permanently ban B.K. from showing
livestock at 4-H exhibitions. The committee sent B.K. a letter on October 3,
2011, which stated:
This letter is to inform you that you will no longer be allowed to
participate in South Dakota 4-H exhibition programs. . . . After
being shown pictures on September 9, 2011, your father,
Mr. Greg Kroupa, admitted to Mr. Rod Geppert and then, to
Mr. Peter Nielsen that you have not owned or cared for your
recent swine entry for the project season. He also admitted that
your swine entry had been submitted and competed in this
year’s Missouri State Fair. The South Dakota 4-H Livestock
Ethics Committee met on September 20, 2011 and concluded
that you misrepresented the ownership of this animal and
violated the code of ethics.
Based on the events surrounding the misrepresentation of
ownership of your Reserve Champion Overall 4-H Market Swine
Entry, the State 4-H Office has permanently removed you from
the South Dakota 4-H exhibition program and any future
4
eligibility or participation in such programs. In addition, you are
ineligible to receive any awards or premium monies from the 4H Swine Project or 4-H Beef Project areas of the 2011 South
Dakota State Fair. The South Dakota 4-H program takes the
Behavioral Expectations and Code of Conduct . . . very seriously
and does not take this action lightly.
Docket 25-1. After receiving the letter, Greg traveled to Brookings, South
Dakota, to request an appeal of the committee’s decision, but Nielsen told
him that no appeal was available.
Subsequently, B.K. filed this suit, alleging various constitutional
violations and seeking both monetary and injunctive relief. The court
dismissed 4-H as an entity defendant and dismissed the damages claims
against Nielsen and Geppert in their official capacities. The court granted
B.K.’s request for a preliminary injunction, which was affirmed by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant “shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party must
present admissible evidence that there is no dispute of material fact or show
that the nonmoving party has not presented evidence to support an element
of the case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “The nonmoving
party may not ‘rest on mere allegations or denials, but must demonstrate on
the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue for
5
trial.’ ” Mosley v. City of Northwoods, Mo., 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995)).
Summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a dispute about a
material fact that could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). For purposes of a summary judgment
motion, the court views the facts and the inferences drawn from such facts
“in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
DISCUSSION
At oral argument on the motion for summary judgment, counsel for
B.K. clarified that B.K. is only pursuing her claims based on her First
Amendment right to association and Fourteenth Amendment right to
procedural due process. B.K. requests monetary relief from Nielsen and
Geppert in their individual capacities, and she also seeks injunctive relief
against Nielsen and Geppert in both their individual and official capacities.
I.
Monetary Relief
Nielsen and Geppert argue that the doctrine of qualified immunity
shields them from any personal liability for monetary relief.2 “Qualified
immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a
2
In deciding the motion to dismiss, the court determined that Nielsen
and Geppert were state employees and were therefore entitled to sovereign
immunity with respect to B.K.’s claim for monetary damages against them in
their official capacities. Kroupa v. 4-H, 877 F. Supp. 2d 804, 813-14 (D.S.D.
2012).
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plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or
constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the
time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080
(2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see also
Small v. McCrystal, 708 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Qualified immunity
protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ”) (quoting Harlow,
457 U.S. at 818). “ ‘Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense for which
the defendant carries the burden of proof. The plaintiff[s], however, must
demonstrate that the law is clearly established.’ ” Harrington v. City of
Council Bluffs, 678 F.3d 676, 679 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Sparr v. Ward,
306 F.3d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 2002)). The court may “exercise [its] sound
discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity
analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the
particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)
(receding from the mandatory two-step sequence imposed by Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194 (2001)).
A. Fourteenth Amendment Right to Procedural Due Process
1. Does Procedural Due Process Apply to 4-H Participation
B.K. asserts that her right to due process was violated when the
livestock ethics committee deprived B.K. of her interest in her reputation for
honesty and integrity when she was publicly banned from government7
sponsored 4-H activities for cheating. Nielsen and Geppert contend that B.K.
had no protected interest, and even if she did, the contours of the law were
not clearly established at the time of the livestock ethics committee’s
decision.
“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental
decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within
the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). “The
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Id. at 333 (quoting
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
“To establish a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that [s]he has a protected property or liberty interest at stake
and that [s]he was deprived of that interest without due process of law.”
Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 975 (8th Cir. 1999). “[D]ue process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). The only issue at
dispute here is whether B.K. was deprived of a “liberty” or “property”
interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
8
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that “participation in a
state-sponsored 4-H organization and its livestock competitions is a
sufficient ‘right or status’ under state law to be protected by the Due
Process Clause.” Kroupa v. Nielsen, 731 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 2013). The
“right or status” arises from a participant’s “interests in protecting [their]
reputation for honesty, [their] immediate interest in training livestock and
competing for cash prizes and awards, and [their] future economic interest
in a career in agriculture.” Id. at 820. Thus, B.K. has established that
procedural due process applies to 4-H participation.
2. Is the Right Clearly Established
The court turns next to whether B.K.’s right to procedural due process
was clearly established at the time of the alleged deprivation. B.K. does not
need to provide “a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have
placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011). But the Supreme Court also has
“repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high
level of generality.” Id. at 2084. Therefore, B.K. cannot merely assert that
her clearly established right was a right to receive due process. Instead, she
must show a particular liberty or property interest that is beyond debate
and entitles her to due process.
B.K. cites Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (holding that an injury to
one’s reputation alone is not sufficient to assert a due process interest, but
that defamation or stigma stemming from a government action such as
9
employment termination or school suspension can invoke due process
rights), Mercer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 308 F.3d 840 (8th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that an employee can be entitled to due process when accused of
dishonesty, immorality, criminality, or racism due to the stigma of those
accusations), and Marchand v. Grant Cnty., No. CV-07-182-RHW, 2009 WL
2998184 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 15, 2009) (finding a possible liberty interest in
attending a county fair), for the proposition that the denial of a state benefit
such as 4-H livestock exhibition participation, coupled with allegations of
dishonesty or cheating and the associated harm to her reputation,
constitute a liberty interest sufficient to invoke procedural due process. B.K.
also points out that Nielsen and Geppert recognized B.K.’s right to a hearing
in various notes from a meeting on September 8, 2011. See Docket 69 at 11.
Nielsen and Geppert argue that the most analogous cases are those
holding that students do not have a liberty or property interest in
participation in school sports. See Docket 55 at 7-8 (collecting cases). Based
on those cases, Nielsen and Geppert contend that B.K. has no liberty or
property interest in 4-H competition, even if she has the possibility of
earning income in the future. Additionally, they state that her reputation is
not a protected property interest.
Prior to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Kroupa, the
Eighth Circuit had not addressed the issue of whether a 4-H participant had
a protected liberty or property interest in continued participation in 4-H.
And while both this court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found a
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protected liberty or property interest, the complexity of those opinions
demonstrates that the law was not settled. A reasonable official in the
position of Nielsen or Geppert in September 2011 could not be expected to
predict the evolution of the law or to know beyond debate that B.K. was
entitled to due process. Accordingly, even if B.K. can show a violation of her
right to procedural due process, that right was not clearly established at the
time of the challenged action, and Nielsen and Geppert are entitled to
summary judgment based on qualified immunity with respect to B.K.’s
procedural due process claim for monetary relief.
B. First Amendment Right to Association
B.K. alleges that she was entitled to associate with her family3 without
interference from the state or state actors, and Nielsen and Geppert
infringed on that right because they deprived her of a benefit, at least in
part, “based on the repetitive nature of this incident with [B.K.’s] family.”
Docket 67 at 8 (Nielsen Depo. 29:5-10); see also Docket 69 at 12-13.
3
Subheading B(2)(b) in B.K.’s brief in opposition to summary judgment
states that “B.K. has . . . a privilege . . . under the first amendment to associate
with the 4-H Livestock Exhibition Program . . . .” Docket 69 at 12. The rest of
B.K.’s argument makes clear that, in contrast to the subsection’s title, B.K.’s
First Amendment claim is based on her relationship with her father, not her
right to associate with other members of 4-H. To the extent that B.K. is
asserting a violation of her right to associate with other 4-H members, that
relationship does not meet the criteria for an intimate relationship and
therefore is not entitled to protection. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 620-21 (1984) (finding that the Jaycees was not an intimate group due to
its large number of members and the fact that the group was open to new
members on a unselective basis).
11
The Constitution protects an individual’s freedom of association to
both intimate association and expressive association. Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984). Freedom of intimate association
requires that “choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human
relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because
of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that
is central to our constitutional scheme.” Id. Freedom of expressive
association, on the other hand, is “a right to associate for the purpose of
engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech,
assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.”
Id. at 618.
Whether a relationship or association is intimate enough to trigger
constitutional protection “entails a careful assessment of where that
relationship’s objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most
intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments.” Id. at 620.
Intimate associations are distinguished by “such attributes as relative
smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the
affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship.”
Id. Marital and nuclear family relationships are “an intrinsic element of
personal liberty” and are protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 619-20.
Although the freedom to form intimate relationships enjoys constitutional
protection, it is not an absolute right, and “even a significant interference
with an individual’s freedom of association may be sustained if there exists
12
a sufficiently important state interest, and the means employed are
narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational
freedoms.” Wingate v. Gage County Sch. Dist., No. 34, 528 F.3d 1074, 1081
(8th Cir. 2008) (citing Norbeck v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 545 F.2d 63, 67
(8th Cir. 1976)).
“ ‘A defendant can be held liable for violating a right of intimate
association only if the plaintiff shows an intent to interfere with the
relationship.’ ” Reasonover v. St. Louis Cnty., Mo., 447 F.3d 569, 585 (8th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Singleton v. Cecil, 133 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir. 1998)
vacated on other grounds by Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419 (8th Cir. 1999)
(en banc)). Similarly, in a case alleging denial of state employment based on
an intimate relationship, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiff was required to produce some “evidence proving that [the]
relationship . . . was a substantial and motivating factor” in the challenged
action. Wingate, 528 F.3d at 1082 (affirming the grant of summary
judgment).
Even if B.K. could establish that her nuclear family qualifies as an
intimate relationship and that Nielsen and Geppert acted with the requisite
intent to interfere with a protected relationship, B.K. has not shown that a
reasonable official would have known, based on clearly established law, that
banning B.K. from 4-H would constitute state interference with that
protected relationship. The court is unable to conclude that every
reasonable official would have understood, at that time, that such action
13
would violate a constitutional right. See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083 (quoting
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)) (“A Government official’s
conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged
conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every
‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates
that right.’ ”). Therefore, B.K. has not shown that her First Amendment right
was so clearly established that any reasonable official would have known
the challenged actions were unlawful. Accordingly, Nielsen and Geppert are
entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity with respect to
B.K.’s claims for monetary damages alleging a violation of her First
Amendment right to familial association.
II.
Injunctive Relief
B.K. seeks injunctive relief against Nielsen and Geppert in both their
individual and official capacities based on her First Amendment right to
association and her Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due
process.
Nielsen and Geppert contend that qualified immunity relieves them of
all liability—even for prospective injunctive relief. Nielsen and Geppert have
not provided any authority to support their position.
A. Official Capacity Claims
“Ex parte Young [209 U.S. 123 (1908)] and its progeny teach that a
private party may seek prospective injunctive relief in federal court against a
state official, even if the state is otherwise protected by Eleventh
14
Amendment immunity.” Randolph v. Rodgers, 253 F.3d 342, 345 (8th Cir.
2001) (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)); Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308, 314 n.6 (1975) (“[I]mmunity from damages does not ordinarily
bar equitable relief as well.”); Monroe v. Ark. State Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 594
(8th Cir. 2007) (“[S]tate officials may be sued in their official capacities for
prospective injunctive relief without violating the Eleventh
Amendment . . . .”); Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, (8th Cir. 1999)
(“Qualified immunity insulates a defendant from all claims for legal
damages, but it does not shield a defendant from claims for equitable relief);
Pace v. Moriarty, 83 F.3d 261, 263 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Grantham v.
Trickey, 21 F.3d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 1994)) (“[Q]ualified immunity does not
shield the officials from Pace’s claim for reinstatement or other equitable
remedies.”); Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 432 (8th Cir. 1989) quoting
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment
bars suits by private parties ‘seeking to impose a liability which must be
paid from public funds in the state treasury,’ [but] courts may order
injunctions to prevent or to remedy a state officer’s conduct.”) B.K’s
requested injunctive relief against Nielsen and Geppert in their official
capacities is an equitable remedy, and Nielsen and Geppert have provided
the court with no reason why the above cases should not control.4
4
Nielsen and Geppert contend that B.K. must also prove that the
constitutional right was clearly established to succeed on her claims seeking
injunctive relief. They cite no cases to support this contention. While showing
that a right is clearly established is necessary to obtain monetary damages, no
15
To succeed on her First Amendment right to association argument,
B.K. must show undue state intrusion into a protected relationship.
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18. B.K. also must show that Nielsen and Geppert
intended to interfere with a protected relationship. See Reasonover, 447
F.3d at 585. B.K. introduced evidence that the livestock ethics committee’s
decision was motivated by her relationship to her father. The committee’s
motivation or intent is a factual question. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S.
541, 552 (1999) (“[I]t was error in this case for the District Court to resolve
the disputed fact of motivation at the summary judgment stage.”). A jury
could reasonably find that Nielsen and Geppert intentionally interfered with
B.K.’s protected right to associate with her nuclear family. Because this is a
genuine dispute of material fact, the court denies summary judgment with
respect to B.K.’s First Amendment freedom of association claim against
Nielsen and Geppert for injunctive relief in their official capacities.
To succeed on her Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process
argument, B.K. must show that she had a protected interest entitling her to
some process, and that she did not receive that process. Hopkins v.
Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 975 (8th Cir. 1999). The Eighth Circuit Court of
such showing is necessary on a claim for prospective or declaratory relief. See,
e.g., Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 669 (8th Cir. 1992) (court
found officers’ conduct may have constituted a taking under the Fifth
Amendment and denied summary judgment to officers on plaintiff’s claim for
prospective injunctive relief but granted summary judgment to officers on
plaintiff’s claim for damages because the right was not clearly established when
deprivation occurred).
16
Appeals has recognized that participation in 4-H and its livestock
competitions is a sufficient “right or status” under state law to be protected
by the Due Process Clause and that B.K. was entitled to due process
protections before her right to participate could be terminated. Kroupa, 731
F.3d at 820. Nielsen and Geppert have not presented undisputed facts to
support a judgment in their favor. Therefore, the court denies Nielsen and
Geppert’s motion for summary judgment with respect to B.K.’s Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process claim for injunctive relief in their
official capacities.
B. Individual Capacity Claims
It is unclear whether B.K. is still pursuing injunctive relief against
Nielsen and Geppert in their individual capacities. The parties do not
address this issue in their pleadings or briefs. B.K. has not alleged any
actions taken by Nielsen or Geppert in their individual capacities, and she
has failed to set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial
with regard to injunctive relief from Nielsen and Geppert in their individual
capacities. See Cantrell v. Beebe, No. 2:09cv00184 BSM/HLJ, 2010 WL
2232221, at *1 (E.D. Ark. June 2, 2010) (“Additionally, Cantrell has failed to
state a claim for injunctive relief against Beebe and Cantrell [sic] in their
individual capacities because he fails to allege any specific actions taken by
Beebe and McDaniel in their individual capacities.”); see also Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (requiring a party resisting
summary judgment to introduce specific facts that show a genuine issue for
17
trial). Furthermore, any injunctive relief granted would be ordered against
Nielsen and Geppert in their official capacities. Therefore, Nielsen and
Geppert are entitled to summary judgment with respect to B.K.’s request for
injunctive relief against them in their individual capacities.
CONCLUSION
Nielsen and Geppert are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to
B.K.’s claims for monetary relief. B.K. has failed to carry her burden of proof
that her right to association was clearly established and that her right to
procedural due process was clearly established. Therefore, Nielsen and
Geppert are entitled to summary judgment on those claims. Nielsen and
Geppert, however, are not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to
B.K.’s claims for injunctive relief in their official capacities. B.K. has failed to
show a genuine issue for trial with respect to her requested injunctive relief
against Nielsen and Geppert in their individual capacities.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Nielsen and Geppert’s motion for summary judgment
is granted with respect to B.K.’s claims against them in their individual
capacities for monetary relief based on violations of her First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Nielsen and Geppert’s motion for
summary judgment is granted with respect to B.K.’s claims for injunctive
relief against them in their individual capacities.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Nielsen and Geppert’s motion for
summary judgment is denied with respect to B.K.’s claims against them in
their official capacities for injunctive relief based on violations of her First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Dated December 18, 2013.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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