Manna Ministry Center v. Myers et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 4 Motion to Remand to State Court. Certified copy of Order mailed to State Court Clerk. Signed by Chief Judge Karen E. Schreier on 5/31/2012. (KC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MANNA MINISTRY CENTER, a
South Dakota nonprofit
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KEVIN AND ESTHER MYERS,
Defendants.
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Civ. 12-4052-KES
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY REMAND
Defendants, Kevin and Esther Myers (the Myerses), filed a pro se notice of
removal of a state court action to federal court on March 23, 2012. Plaintiff,
Manna Ministry Center (Manna Ministry), moves for summary remand of the
action to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(4) or in the alternative for
a remand order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Manna Ministry also asks this
court to take judicial notice pursuant to Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence of the file in a related state court action in the Second Judicial Circuit,
Lincoln County, bearing the caption Manna Ministry Center v. Jerry and Sonja
Adrian, Civ. 11-647. This court previously remanded that action to state court.
See Manna Ministry Center v. Adrian, 2012 WL 195522 (D.S.D. January 23,
2012).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The present action is related to a forcible entry and detainer suit filed
pursuant to South Dakota law that arose in the wake of a dispute over a parcel
of property in Lincoln County, South Dakota. Manna Ministry filed suit against
Jerry and Sonja Adrian. After a judgment was entered in state court, the
Adrians attempted to remove the action to federal court. See Manna Ministry,
2012 WL 195522.
During the pendency of the Adrian removal proceedings, and while
Manna Ministry was thereby stayed from enforcing the judgment, the Adrians
allowed Kevin and Esther Myers to have possession of a house on Manna
Ministry’s property. Manna Ministry commenced a new state court action to
evict the Myerses on February 29, 2012. The Myerses filed their answer on
March 5, 2012. Manna Ministry moved for judgment on the pleadings or
alternatively for summary judgment, request for judicial notice and for
expedited special execution. On March 22, 2012, after the state court heard
argument on the motion from both parties, it entered an order and judgment
granting Manna Ministry’s motion. See Docket 4-1, 4-2, 4-3. On March 23,
2012, the day after final judgment had been entered in state court, the Myerses
removed the suit to this court on the basis of federal jurisdiction purportedly
based on the original U.S. Land Patent grant.
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JUDICIAL NOTICE
Manna Ministry requests that this court take judicial notice pursuant to
Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence of the file in the related state court
action in the Second Judicial Circuit, Lincoln County, bearing the caption
Manna Ministry Center v. Jerry and Sonja Adrian, Civ. 11-647. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that it is appropriate for federal district
courts to take judicial notice of state court files when they are relevant to issues
in federal court. See Knutson v. City of Fargo, 600 F.3d 992, 1000 (8th Cir.
2010).
The state court file is relevant for several reasons. During the
pendency of that removal proceeding, Manna Ministry was stayed from evicting
the Adrians. That created an opportunity for the Myerses to take possession of
the subject property with the assistance of the Adrians. Further, various
defenses the Myerses invoked in the underlying state action are predicated on
theories of title and ownership that were refuted in the prior state action. The
Myerses essentially regurgitate arguments made by Adrians in the previous
proceeding. Thus, the Adrians’ removal proceeding is relevant to the current
proceeding because it places this dispute in its appropriate factual context.
Consequently, Manna Ministry’s request for this court to take judicial notice of
the state court action is granted.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Analysis of the propriety of removal requires interpretation of the removal
statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq., in order to determine whether the case could
have originally been filed in federal court. See City of Chicago v. Int’l College of
Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997). The right to remove a case from a state
court to a federal court is purely statutory. See 14B Charles Alan Wright et. al,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3721 (4th ed. 1998). Many federal
courts strictly construe a motion to remove and resolve all doubts in favor of
remand. See, e.g., Cotton v. South Dakota by and through the S.D. Dep’t of Social
Servs., 843 F. Supp. 564, 568 (D.S.D 1994) (“If the propriety of removal is
doubtful, the case is to be remanded.”). The subject matter jurisdiction of this
court may derive from the citizenship of the parties, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a
federal question posed by the underlying lawsuit, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or
special circumstances covered by federal statute. Because the parties are both
citizens of South Dakota and none of the statutory grounds for removal apply,
this action is removable only upon a showing that “federal question” jurisdiction
exists, as set forth in § 1441(b).
DISCUSSION
Manna Ministry seeks a summary remand to state court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1446(c)(4) or a remand order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Section
1446(c)(4) directs this court to examine a notice of removal and “[i]f it appears
on the face of the notice and any exhibits annexed thereto that removal should
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not be permitted, the court shall make an order for summary remand.” Manna
Ministry argues that remand to state court is appropriate under this section
because removal to federal court after a judgment has been issued in state
court is improper. Section 1447(c) requires a district court to remand a case to
state court “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” Manna Ministry argues that remand is
required under this section because the Myerses’ stated basis for removal does
not “arise under” federal law.
I.
Removal After Judgment has been Issued is Improper.
Manna Ministry argues that the case should be remanded pursuant to
§ 1446(c)(4) because removal to federal court after a judgment has been issued
in state court is improper. The entry of judgment in state court precludes
removal to federal court. See Ohio v. Doe, 433 F.3d 502, 506 (6th Cir. 2006)
(holding district court erred in denying motion to remand because final
judgment had been entered in state court and issuance of a new subpoena was
not a second action that was removable); Mestice v. McShea, 201 F.2d 363 (3d
Cir. 1953) (holding that removal to federal court after the entry of final
judgment in a state court action was improper); see also Thorp Finance Corp. v.
Lehrer, 587 F. Supp. 533, 534 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (“[A] case may not be removed
from a state court to a federal court after the state court enters a final judgment
that terminates the litigation.”) (citing Mestice, 201 F.2d at 364); 14B Charles
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Alan Wright et. al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 37221 (4th ed.
2012) (“[D]efendants may not remove a case from a state court to a federal court
after the state court has entered a final judgment that terminates the
litigation.”). As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed in Four
Keys Leasing & Maintenance Corp. v. Simithis, 849 F.2d 770, 774 (2d Cir. 1988),
“it would be a perversion of the removal process to allow a litigant who is
subject to a final judgment to remove that final judgment to the federal courts
for further litigation.”
Although this is an issue of first impression in the Eighth Circuit, the
court considered a similar sequence of events, albeit under much different
circumstances, in Dewey v. Lutz, 930 F.2d 597 (8th Cir. 1991). There, the FDIC
took over a failed bank and attempted to remove a suit in which the bank was
listed as one of three defendants after the suit had gone to trial and plaintiffs
had obtained a judgment. The case was on appeal before the North Dakota
Supreme Court when the FDIC sought removal pursuant to 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1819(b)(1), (b)(2)(A), and (b)(2)(B). The district court denied removal and
remanded the case back to state court. The Eighth Circuit affirmed on other
grounds, concluding that the plaintiffs had abandoned their claim against the
bank and, by extension, the FDIC, after recovering an amount nearly sufficient
to cover the judgment from a co-defendant. Nonetheless, the district court’s
analysis proves instructive here.
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The district court determined that a case could not be removed from a
state court to a federal court after the state court entered a final judgment
which terminated litigation. Dewey, 930 F.2d at 598-99 (citing Mestice, 201
F.2d at 363; Thorp Finance Corp., 587 F. Supp. at 533). It reasoned that “if
removal were granted, it would be sitting as an appellate court reviewing a state
court decision” and concluded that “[s]uch a scenario offended the district
court's senses of comity and federalism.” Id. at 599. The same concerns are
implicated here. The court adopts this reasoning and joins the Sixth, Second,
and Third Circuits and holds that removal after a final judgment has been
entered in state court is improper. Thus, Manna Ministry’s motion for a
summary remand is granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(4)
II.
The Myerses’ Stated Basis for Removal Does Not “Arise Under
Federal Law.”
Even if the Myerses had not waited until after the state court issued a
final judgment to remove this action to this court, removal would be improper
because the Myerses’ stated basis for removal does not “arise under federal
law.” The Myerses’ stated basis for removal is 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), which is the
removal statute. They also appear to be arguing that this court has subject
matter jurisdiction over their claim because the land in question was an original
U.S. Land Patent grant. See Docket 7 at 1 (“Judge Larry Long in state court
admitted in open court that the matter with the ‘Land Patent’ is a federal issue
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and he cannot make rulings relating thereto.”) The Myerses cite no authority in
support of this position.
“A defendant generally is required to cite the proper statutory basis for
removal and to allege facts from which a district court may determine whether
removal jurisdiction exists.” Pet Quarters, Inc. v. Depository Trust & Clearing
Corp., 559 F.3d 772, 778 (8th Cir. 2009). On the civil cover sheet the Myerses
completed when filing their Notice of Removal, the Myerses were asked to
identify the civil statute under which they were filing. The Myerses listed
§ 1441(b), standing alone, as the basis for jurisdiction. This is insufficient,
because it does not identify the independent statutory basis under which the
putative claim or right arises. While failure to provide a proper statutory basis is
not always jurisdictionally fatal, such forgiveness is limited to cases where the
jurisdictional requirements have been met. See Wiles v. Capitol Indemnity Corp.,
280 F.3d 868,871 (8th Cir. 2002). That is not the case here.
“Removal based on federal question jurisdiction is governed by the well
pleaded complaint rule: jurisdiction is established only if a federal question is
presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Pet Quarters,
559 F.3d at 779. The complaint here raises no issues of federal law. Nor does
adjudication of the only state-law claim it contains “turn on a federal
constitutional or other important federal question.” Id. (citing Merrell Dow
Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808-09 (1986)). The fact that the land
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in question derives from a federal land grant patent does not create federal
jurisdiction or create a substantial question of federal law; the resolution of this
case does not turn on the interpretation of the federal land grant patent. Thus,
subject matter jurisdiction cannot be predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), the
language of which tracks the “arising under” statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that Manna Ministry’s motion for a summary remand (Docket
4) is granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(4).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the alternative, Manna Ministry’s
motion to remand (Docket 4) is granted pursuant to § 1447(c).
Dated May 31, 2012.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
CHIEF JUDGE
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