Mongar v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company

Filing 138

ORDER granting 37 Motion for Summary Judgment regarding plaintiff Stacy Moingar's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Signed by U.S. District Judge Lawrence L. Piersol on 3/26/14. (DJP)

FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MAR 26 201~

DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

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STACY J. MONGAR,
CIV 12-4101
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Plaintiff,
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* ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
vs.
* JUDGMENT ON EMOTIONAL
*
DISTRESS CLAIM
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HARTFORD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
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Defendant.
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By Order issued on October 15, 2013, this Court denied Hartford Life Insurance Company's

(Hartford) motion for summary judgment except as to plaintiff Stacy Mongar's (Mongar) claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court reserved ruling on that issue and heard
argument on the emotional distress claim at the motion and pre-trial conference on November 4,
2013. Having now fully considered all ofthe evidence and argument on the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim, the Court will grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment on that
claim for the following reasons.

DISCUSSION

Principles of Summary Judgment
Rule 56(a) ofthe Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be
entered "ifthe movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, the Court is required to view the facts in the light most favorable to the non­
moving party and must give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
underlying facts. AgriStor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732, 734 (8th Cir. 1987). The moving party
bears the burden ofshowing both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and its entitlement
to judgment as a matter oflaw. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(I); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 257 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party may not rest on
the allegations of its pleadings but must set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence,
showing that a genuine issue ofmaterialfact exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1);Anderson, 477 U.S. at

257; City ofMf. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273-74 (8th Cir. 1988).

In order to establish the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must
prove:

(1) an act by defendant amounting to extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent on
the part of the defendant to cause plaintiff severe emotional distress; (3) the
defendant's conduct was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries; and (4) the
plaintiff suffered an extreme disabling emotional response to defendant's conduct.

Tibke v. McDougall, 479 N.W.2d 898, 906 (S.D. 1992). The requirement that the defendant's
conduct be gross and extreme is based on the supreme court's judgment that such conduct is more
likely to cause the required level ofemotional distress and its determination to avoid litigation "in the
field of bad manners." Id. at 907. Thus, this tort "requires conduct exceeding all bounds usually
tolerated by decent society and which is of a nature especially calculated to cause, and does cause,
mental distress ofa very serious kind." Id.

The evidence regarding Mongar's emotional response to defendant's conduct is not sufficient
to survive summary judgment. Mongar claims she lost sleep and experienced chest and back pain.
Initially she could not go to a doctor because she was the sole income-earner and they had no income
or insurance. Eventually she went to a doctor for her chest pain, but she could not name the doctor
and she did not recall ifthey related the chest pain to stress. Mongar consulted a doctor about her
back pain, but she could not recall what doctor she saw or whether the doctor related the back pain
to her stress. No medical records were submitted to document her ailments, and Mongar has not
referred to an expert to testifY that she suffered emotional or physical problems as a result of
Hartford's actions. Mongar testified that she experienced anxiety and embarrassment and had to
consult with pastors and counselors at her church.

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While the Court is sensitive to the difficulties that Mongar endured when she found herself
unemployed, her situation is not markedly different from that ofany other person who lost his or her
job. Lost sleep, anxiety and needing someone to talk to for support are the norm in such a situation
and certainly are not the manifestation of an extreme disabling emotional response. Accordingly,
Hartford will be granted summary judgment on this claim.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 37, is granted in
part as to Plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in Count III of the
Complaint.

Dated this 26th day of March, 2014.
BY THE COURT:

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L rence L. Piersol
United States District Judge
ATTEST:

JOSEPH

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BY:
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DEPUTY

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