Larson Manufacturing Company of South Dakota, Inc. v. Comardelle et al

Filing 52

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 32 Motion to Compel; granting in part and denying in part 38 Motion to Dismiss Party. Signed by U.S. District Judge Karen E. Schreier on 11/21/2013. (KC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SUPERIOR HOMES, L.L.C.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICKY COMARDELLE,
individually and d/b/a/
GOMOTEL, L.L.C., a Louisiana
Limited Liability Company,
Defendants.

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CIV. 12-4126-KES

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT
COMARDELLE’S MOTION TO
DISMISS AND GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO COMPEL

Defendant, Ricky Comardelle, moves the court to dismiss all claims
against him individually. Docket 38. Plaintiff, Superior Homes, L.L.C., resists
that motion and separately moves the court to compel discovery from
Comardelle individually and from the other named defendant, GoMotel, L.L.C.
Docket 32. For the following reasons, the court grants in part and denies in
part Comardelle’s motion to dismiss, and grants in part and denies in part
Superior Homes’s motion to compel discovery.
BACKGROUND
The facts, according to the amended complaint (Docket 31), are as
follows:
Superior Homes, located in Watertown, South Dakota, manufactures
prefabricated housing units. Comardelle lives in Louisiana, and he and his wife,

Stacy Comardelle, are the only members of GoMotel. GoMotel owns and
operates a man camp housing facility for oil field workers in North Dakota.
Sometime in the summer of 2011, Comardelle contacted Superior Homes
and inquired about the purchase of prefabricated housing units for a proposed
man camp complex in North Dakota. Superior Homes and GoMotel reached an
agreement for the construction of twenty housing units that Superior Homes
would deliver to the construction site by December 31, 2011. The parties also
agreed that time was of the essence due to tax deductions GoMotel wanted to
receive in the 2011 tax year. Accordingly, the parties agreed that Superior
Homes would pay GoMotel $20,000 per day for late delivery. Following the
agreement, Superior Homes began manufacturing the housing units.
After Superior Homes began manufacturing the units, Comardelle
requested a number of changes to the design specifications and quantity of the
order. Superior Homes completed the original twenty units in time to transport
them to Williston, North Dakota, by the agreed deadline, but Comardelle
instructed Superior Homes to store the units temporarily because the real
estate for the man camp site had not been purchased, the work site was not
ready, and GoMotel had not obtained the proper permits from the county for
the installation of the modular units. GoMotel obtained the necessary permits
in mid-January of 2012. Superior Homes then delivered the housing units to
the work site.

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GoMotel failed to make timely payments to Superior Homes. Superior
Homes contacted GoMotel several times regarding payment for the housing
units. GoMotel made two partial payments totaling $1.7 million, but a balance
of $747,352.67 remains outstanding.
In the fall of 2011, Superior Homes, GoMotel, and Comardelle were
subcontractors of Nabors Completion and Production Services Company on a
410-person man camp project in North Dakota. Superior Homes contracted
with Nabors to produce prefabricated units for the sleeping wings, laundry, and
kitchen of the housing complex. Comardelle and/or GoMotel contracted with
Nabors to perform various work, including construction of the center lodge, and
finishing work and equipment installation in the kitchen and laundry areas.
In addition to completing its contracted work on the Nabors project,
Superior Homes completed work as instructed by Comardelle. Comardelle told
Superior Homes that Nabors would compensate Superior Homes for the extra
work. When Superior Homes requested payment in the amount of $500,000
from Nabors for the additional work, Nabors refused to pay on the grounds that
Comardelle did not have the authority to speak for Nabors, and that Nabors
had already paid Comardelle for the work performed by Superior Homes.
Comardelle has refused to pay Superior Homes for the work Superior Homes
performed at his direction.

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DISCUSSION
I.

Conversion to Motion for Summary Judgment
The parties dispute whether the court should treat Comardelle’s motion

as a motion to dismiss or convert it to a motion for summary judgment. A
motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is limited to the initial pleadings. Brooks
v. Midwest Heart Grp., 655 F.3d 796, 799-800 (8th Cir. 2011). “If, on a motion
under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary
judgment . . . . All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all
the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
If material beyond the pleadings is offered in conjunction with a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the court may convert the motion to a motion for summary
judgment, or it may “reject [any material outside the pleadings] or simply not
consider it.” 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1366 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter Wright & Miller]; see also Casazza
v. Kiser, 313 F.3d 414, 417-18 (8th Cir. 2002) (reiterating that a district court
does not convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary judgment if
the court does not rely upon matters outside the pleadings). The decision to
convert the motion or to exclude the material beyond the pleadings is wholly
discretionary. 5C Wright & Miller § 1366.
Material outside the pleadings includes “ ‘written or oral evidence in
support of or in opposition to the pleading that provides some substantiation
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for and does not merely reiterate what is said in the pleadings.’ ” BJC Health
Sys. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 348 F.3d 685, 687 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Gibb v.
Scott, 958 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1992)). “In adjudicating Rule 12(b) motions,
courts are not strictly limited to the four corners of complaints.” Dittmer Props.
L.P. v. F.D.I.C., 708 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Outdoor Cent., Inc. v.
GreatLodge.com, Inc., 643 F.3d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 2011)). “ ‘[T]he court
generally must ignore materials outside the pleadings, but it may consider
some materials that are part of the public record or do not contradict the
complaint, as well as materials that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings.’
” Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab., Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 931 (8th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999)).
The court may also consider matters incorporated by reference into the
complaint without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a summary judgment
motion. Id. at 931 n.3 (quoting 5B Wright & Miller § 1357).
The parties have substantial discovery remaining. Summary judgment is
premature at this time. Accordingly, the court will treat Comardelle’s motion as
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and will evaluate only the amended complaint and the
three exhibits attached to it and incorporated by reference, all found at Docket
31. The court will also consider the parts of the parties’ briefs that present the
law and argument related to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but not the additional
factual material and exhibits submitted with those briefs.

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II.

Motion to Dismiss
A. Standard
Rule 8 requires a plaintiff to plead “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
“Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); see also Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816,
817 (8th Cir. 2010) (clarifying that “Twombly and Iqbal did not abrogate the
notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2)”).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The court determines
plausibility by considering only the materials in the pleadings and exhibits
attached to the complaint, drawing on experience and common sense and
viewing the plaintiff’s claim as a whole. Whitney v. Guys, Inc., 700 F.3d 1118,
1128 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mattes v. ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 697
n.4 (8th Cir. 2003)). At the motion to dismiss stage, the court accepts as true
all factual allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in
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favor of the nonmoving party. Freitas v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 703 F.3d
436, 438 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d
847, 850 (8th Cir. 2012)).
B. Analysis
1. GoMotel Project
Superior Homes asserts claims for breach of contract (count one),
quantum meruit (count two), and detrimental reliance (count three) against
GoMotel and Comardelle individually from conduct related to the GoMotel
housing project. Superior Homes argues with respect to these claims that
Comardelle should not be dismissed based on a piercing the corporate veil
theory. See Docket 43 at 19-24 (arguing that a piercing the corporate veil
theory creates personal liability, thereby precluding dismissal).
In the amended complaint,1 all of the acts attributed to Comardelle with
respect to the GoMotel project were done by Comardelle on behalf of GoMotel.
Any action GoMotel took would necessarily be through Comardelle or another
natural person. See 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limited Liability Companies § 12 (“Like a
corporation, a limited liability company can act only through its agents.”). The
fact that Comardelle negotiated with Superior Homes and agreed to the

1

The parties do not agree on which jurisdiction’s substantive law
regarding piercing the corporate veil should apply. The court does not decide
this issue because Superior Homes did not plead facts to support its claim
under the substantive law of any of the potential jurisdictions.
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contract on GoMotel’s behalf does not state a claim for relief of piercing the
corporate veil against Comardelle in his individual capacity.
Superior Homes contends that, even though it did not plead any formal
elements of a piercing claim, that legal conclusion can be inferred from the
surrounding factual allegations. To survive a motion to dismiss, Superior
Homes has to provide defendants notice of the theory on which it is to proceed
and plead sufficient facts to make that claim plausible on its face. See
MacDonald v. Summit Orthopedics, Ltd., 681 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1025-26 (D.
Minn. 2010) (citing Murrin v. Fischer, 2008 WL 540857, at *22 (D. Minn.
Feb. 25, 2008)). But the amended complaint contains no factual allegations
supporting piercing, such as undercapitalization, commingling of funds,
absence of corporate records, corporate payment of individual obligations, or
other facts that would indicate some type of corporate fraud. See Bank of
Montreal v. Avalon Capital Grp., Inc., 743 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1032 (D. Minn.
2010) (dismissing two individual defendants because the amended complaint
did not contain facts that supported piercing the corporate veil). The mere fact
that Comardelle acted on behalf of GoMotel, even if assumed to be true, is
insufficient to establish a claim against Comardelle individually by piercing the
corporate veil.
Additionally, Superior Homes argues that pleading joint and several
liability and naming Comardelle and GoMotel together in its factual allegations
states a claim against Comardelle personally because the two entities and their
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interests are indistinguishable. But using the two names interchangeably does
not sufficiently plead a cause of action against one party when there are no
other facts in the pleadings to support that claim. See Meighan v. TransGuard
Ins. Co. of America, Inc., 2013 WL 5596915, at *7 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 11, 2013)
(finding that referring to the defendants collectively and asserting joint and
several liability were “naked legal conclusions” rather than properly pleaded
facts and did not support a plausible claim for relief). Accordingly, the court
grants Comardelle’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted with respect to counts one, two, and three of the amended
complaint.
2. Nabors Project
a. Count Four: Breach of Express Contract
To survive a motion to dismiss on count four, Superior Homes must
plead sufficient facts to give rise to a plausible inference that Comardelle and
Superior Homes formed a valid and enforceable contract, that Comardelle
breached that contract, and that Superior Homes was damaged. See Come Big
or Stay Home, LLC v. EOG Resources, Inc., 816 N.W.2d 80, 84 (N.D. 2012)
(laying out the elements for breach of contract under North Dakota law); Bowes
Constr., Inc. v. S.D. Dep’t of Transp., 793 N.W.2d 36, 43 (S.D. 2010) (outlining
similar elements under South Dakota law). Superior Homes does not need to
produce a contract in the pleadings. See Chambers v. Travelers Cos., 2009 WL
873124, at *2, 5-6 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2009) (allowing a breach of contract
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claim to proceed when the plaintiff had alleged a right to receive a bonus that
had not been paid, even though the plaintiff did not provide the contract
provision itself).
The amended complaint states that “Comardelle requested and directed
Superior Homes to complete various work on the Nabors Project including, but
not limited to, electrical, plumbing, and finish work in the center lodge
building, kitchen, and laundry.” Am. Compl. ¶ 34. In contrast to the GoMotel
project allegations, it is not clear that Comardelle was acting only in his
capacity as manager of an LLC with respect to the Nabors project. In fact, the
amended complaint, if taken as true, implies that Comardelle was not. See Am.
Compl. ¶ 37 (alleging that Comardelle held himself out as an agent of Nabors,
not GoMotel). Furthermore, Superior Homes alleges in the amended complaint
that Comardelle represented that Nabors would pay Superior Homes, that
Comardelle did not have the authority to bind Nabors, that Superior Homes
actually performed the work requested by Comardelle, and that Comardelle has
refused to pay. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37-41. Taken as true, these facts give rise to a
reasonable inference that Comardelle could be liable for a breach of an express
oral contract, even if all the details of the alleged contract are not before the
court at this time. Therefore, Superior Homes has stated a claim against
Comardelle individually upon which relief could be granted with regard to
Count Four.

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b. Count Five: Breach of Implied Contract
“A contract is implied in fact where the intention . . . is not manifested by
direct or explicit words by the parties, but is to be gathered by implication or
proper deduction from the conduct of the parties, language used, or acts done
by them, or other pertinent circumstances attending the transaction.” Weitzel v.
Sioux Valley Heart Partners, 714 N.W.2d 884, 892 (S.D. 2006); see also Jerry
Harmon Motors, Inc. v. Heth, 316 N.W.2d 324, 327 (N.D. 1982) (“[I]mplied
contracts are based on the surrounding facts and circumstances to determine
whether or not the parties actually intended to enter into a contract but failed
to articulate their promises.”).
Superior Homes pleaded facts about the circumstances surrounding the
Nabors project that could establish a basis for an implied contract on which
Comardelle could be individually liable. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-36 (alleging
Comardelle requested work from Superior Homes); Am. Compl. ¶ 37 (alleging
Comardelle promised Superior Homes compensation); Am. Compl. ¶ 40
(alleging that Comardelle or GoMotel received payment from Nabors); Am.
Compl. ¶ 41 (alleging that Superior Homes has not been compensated). The
facts in the amended complaint, taken as true, state a claim for relief against
Comardelle individually that is plausible on its face with respect to count five.
c. Count Six: Unjust Enrichment
Under North Dakota law, “[u]njust enrichment requires a plaintiff to show
‘(1) an enrichment; (2) an impoverishment; (3) a connection between the
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enrichment and the impoverishment; (4) absence of a justification for the
enrichment and impoverishment; and (5) an absence of a remedy provided by
law.’ ” Thimjon Farms P’ship v. First Int’l Bank & Trust, 837 N.W.2d 327, 336
(N.D. 2013) (quoting Hayden v. Medcenter One, Inc., 828 N.W.2d 775, 781 (N.D.
2013)). “ ‘The essential element of recovery under unjust enrichment is the
receipt of a benefit by the defendant from the plaintiff which would be
inequitable to retain without paying for its value.’ ” Id. at 336-37 (quoting
McGhee v. Mergenthal, 735 N.W.2d 867, 872 (N.D. 2007)). Similarly, under
South Dakota law, for a plaintiff to succeed on an unjust enrichment claim, the
plaintiff must show (1) the defendant received a benefit from the plaintiff; (2)
the defendant was aware of the benefit; and (3) that it is inequitable to allow the
defendant to retain the benefit without paying for it. Buffalo Ridge Corp. v.
Lamar Advertising of S.D., Inc., 793 N.W.2d 809, 814-15 (S.D. 2011) (citing
Hofeldt v. Mehling, 658 N.W.2d 783, 788 (S.D. 2003)).
The amended complaint alleges facts that show Superior Homes
conferred a benefit on Comardelle by performing work he or his company was
supposed to perform. Compare Am. Compl. ¶ 33 (describing the work
Comardelle and/or GoMotel contracted with Nabors to perform), with Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 34-35 (describing the work Superior Homes actually performed at
Comardelle’s request). It is unclear from the amended complaint whether
Comardelle personally received payment from Nabors for the work performed by
Superior Homes, but it is not unreasonable to infer that Comardelle did
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personally receive some payment from Nabors. Furthermore, Superior Homes
would not ordinarily have access to the information about which party Nabors
paid without discovery into the financial information from Nabors, Comardelle,
or GoMotel. Therefore, Superior Homes has pleaded sufficient facts to state a
facially plausible claim for relief against Comardelle individually on count six.
d. Count Seven: Quantum Meruit
The South Dakota Supreme Court defined the equitable remedy of
quantum meruit as follows:
Quantum meruit implies a contract where none exists and awards
restitution for the value of the service provided under that implied
contract. . . . To recover under quantum meruit, the plaintiff must
prove, among other things, that the defendant requested the
plaintiff’s services and the plaintiff reasonably expected to be
paid. . . . Further, damages may be awarded even if the plaintiff’s
services conferred no benefit.
Johnson v. Larson, 779 N.W.2d 412, 417-18 (S.D. 2010) (internal citations
omitted). North Dakota law applies a similar test. See Hayden, 828 N.W.2d at
783 (“To prevail on a claim based on quantum meruit, the claimant must
establish the recipient accepted benefits under circumstances which would
reasonably notify the recipient that the claimant had an expectation of payment
for the services rendered.”).
The amended complaint contains allegations that Comardelle requested
the services provided by Superior Homes. Am. Compl.¶¶ 34-36. Additionally,
the amended complaint asserts that Superior Homes expected to be paid, and

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Comardelle knew of that expectation. Am. Compl. ¶ 37. These facts are
sufficient to state a facially plausible claim for relief against Comardelle
individually on count seven.
Because Superior Homes pleaded factual content that allows the court to
draw a reasonable inference that Comardelle could individually be liable for the
misconduct alleged in the complaint with respect to counts four, five, six, and
seven, the court denies Comardelle’s motion to dismiss on those counts.
III.

Motion to Compel
A. Standard
The scope of discovery in civil matters is governed by Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 26, which provides:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as
follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense—including
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location
of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good
cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the
subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need
not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All
discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Rule 26(b) allows great freedom in discovery.” 8 Wright
& Miller § 2007. “ ‘Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the

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other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.’ ” Id. (quoting
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507-08 (1947)).
“While the standard of relevance in the context of discovery is broader
than in the context of admissibility . . . this often intoned legal tenet should not
be misapplied so as to allow fishing expeditions in discovery.” Hofer v. Mack
Trucks, Inc., 981 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). A
party seeking discovery must make a “threshold showing of relevance . . .
before parties are required . . . to produce a variety of information which does
not reasonably bear upon the issues in the case.” Id. “Mere speculation that
information might be useful will not suffice; litigants seeking to compel
discovery must describe with a reasonable degree of specificity, the information
they hope to obtain and its importance to their case.” E.E.O.C. v. Woodmen of
the World Life Ins. Soc’y, Civ. No. 03-165, 2007 WL 1217919, at *1 (D. Neb.
Mar. 15, 2007) (citing Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 994 (8th Cir.
1972)).
After the party requesting discovery has met its threshold burden, the
burden shifts to the party resisting discovery to show “ ‘that the requested
documents either do not come within the broad scope of relevance defined
pursuant to [Rule 26(b)(1)] or else are of such marginal relevance that the
potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary
presumption in favor of broad disclosure.’ ” Penford Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins.
Co., 265 F.R.D. 430, 433 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (quoting St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v.
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Commercial Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 511 (N.D. Iowa 2000)). Mere boilerplate
or conclusory objections that a request is “overly broad, burdensome, or
oppressive,” are insufficient, and the resisting party must provide specific
reasons why the relevant discovery should not be allowed. Burke v. Ability Ins.
Co., 291 F.R.D. 343, 349 (D.S.D. 2013) (citing Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Fine Home
Managers, Inc., Civ. 09-234, 2010 WL 2990118, at *1 (E.D. Mo. July 27, 2010)).
A party may make a motion under Rule 37 to compel disclosure or
discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). Such a motion “may be made if: . . . a party
fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33[,] or . . . a party
fails . . . to permit inspection . . . as requested under Rule 34.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(a)(3)(B). “Before filing a motion to compel . . . the aggrieved party must
attempt to confer with the unresponsive party in an effort to obtain the desired
material without court action.” 8B Wright & Miller § 2285.
B. Analysis
1. Comardelle
Comardelle has not filed an answer to Superior Homes’s amended
complaint, but he has filed a motion to dismiss. Superior Homes served its first
set of interrogatories and document requests on Comardelle in November 2012.
Docket 34-3. Along with standard interrogatories and document requests,
Superior Homes requested Comardelle’s personal financial information and tax
returns from 2007 to the present. Comardelle has refused to respond because
he argues he is not a proper party to the suit. Docket 36 at 1-3. Comardelle
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also contends the requests for his financial and tax records are irrelevant and
intended to harass or intimidate. Id. at 3.
Because the court is denying Comardelle’s motion to dismiss with respect
to counts four, five, six, and seven, he is a party to the suit. The requests for
Comardelle’s financial information and tax records from 2007 to 2010 are not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible or relevant
evidence, and are an unnecessary intrusion into Comardelle’s affairs. But
Comardelle’s financial and tax records from 2011 to the present could provide
evidence on whether Comardelle personally received any financial benefit or
payment for his role in the Nabors project. Proof of such a benefit is an element
of Superior Homes’s unjust enrichment claim. Superior Homes has made a
threshold showing that the requested information, from 2011 to the present, is
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible and relevant
evidence. Therefore, the burden shifts to Comardelle to provide specific reasons
why the discovery requests are overly broad, burdensome, or oppressive.
Comardelle has not made any showing of why the requested discovery,
limited to records from 2011 to the present, should not be allowed. Instead,
Comardelle stands on the generic objections that he is not a proper party and
the requested information is a fishing expedition. The records from 2011 to the
present fall within the broad scope of discovery, Superior Homes has made a
threshold showing of relevance, and Comardelle has provided no specific
reasons why the information should not be produced.
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Accordingly, the court grants Superior Homes’s motion to compel
Comardelle to respond to Superior Homes’s first set of interrogatories and
document requests, but the requests for financial information and tax returns
are limited to records from 2011 to the present.
2. GoMotel
GoMotel has filed an answer and counterclaim, claiming liquidated
damages for the alleged late delivery of the GoMotel project homes, and seeking
damages for repair costs and lost rent on the GoMotel project. Docket 37.
a. Tax and Financial Records
Superior Homes submitted several discovery requests relating to
GoMotel’s tax returns and financial records. Interrogatory eight inquired:
Do you claim to have to have [sic] suffered an adverse tax
consequence as a result of the delivery of the modular units
purchased from Superior Homes, LLC after December 31, 2011? If
so, describe in detail the adverse tax consequence you claim to
have suffered and provide a detailed calculation of the actual
monetary damages you claim to have suffered as a result of the
adverse tax consequence.
Docket 34-2 at 6. Document request three asked GoMotel to “[p]roduce your
Federal and State Income Tax Returns, along with all accompanying schedules
and documents, for tax years 2007 through the present.” Id. at 10. Document
request four asked GoMotel to “[p]roduce all financial statements including, but
not limited to, balance sheets, profit and loss statements, and cash flow
statements, for GoMotel, LLC for the last five years.” Id. Document request six

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asked GoMotel to “[p]roduce all documents evidencing the amount of adverse
tax consequence you suffered as a result of the delivery of the modular units
purchased from Superior Homes, LLC after December 31, 2011.” Id.
Superior Homes argues that GoMotel’s tax returns are relevant to
determining the reasonableness of the liquidated damages provision, and its
financial records are discoverable for the purpose of investigating the amounts
of repair costs and lost profit. GoMotel objects to the requested discovery as
overly broad and argues that (1) GoMotel’s proposed stipulation that it suffered
no adverse tax consequences makes discovery of its tax records irrelevant, and
(2) the tax returns and financial records are irrelevant to the reasonableness of
the liquidated damages provision.
GoMotel was incorporated in 2011. Consequently, it has no financial
information or tax returns from previous years. But GoMotel’s tax returns and
financial records from 2011 to the present likely would bear on one or more
elements Superior Homes would have to prove at trial, such as whether, and to
what extent, GoMotel received a benefit from Superior Homes, or the amount of
damages suffered in GoMotel’s counterclaim. Superior Homes has made a
threshold showing that GoMotel’s tax returns and financial records could
reasonably lead to the discovery of relevant and admissible evidence. Therefore,
the court will evaluate whether GoMotel has offered sufficient reasons why the
requested discovery should not be allowed.

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First, GoMotel’s proposed stipulation would not relieve it of its duty to
respond to document requests three and four. See Huang v. Continental Tire
The Americas, LLC, Civ. 10-12598, 2011 WL 2620987, at *5 (E.D. Mich. July 5,
2011) (finding that a feasibility stipulation with respect to an alternative design
was not an adequate substitute for discovery because the plaintiffs could use
the discovery for other purposes). The stipulation would sufficiently answer
interrogatory eight and document request six, but the lack of adverse tax
consequences is not the only fact contained in GoMotel’s tax returns and
financial records that Superior Homes may want to prove at trial. For example,
Superior Homes may want to prove which, if any, tax deductions or
depreciations GoMotel claimed in all relevant tax years for the purposes of
showing a benefit to GoMotel under count three. Additionally, the financial
records might prove exactly what benefits GoMotel has received both from the
GoMotel project and from Nabors for work performed by Superior Homes, or
shed light on the damages alleged to be suffered in GoMotel’s counterclaim.
Second, GoMotel argues that its tax returns and financial records are
irrelevant to the liquidated damages provision because liquidated damages
replace the need to prove actual damages. But the presence of a liquidated
damages provision does not mean that Superior Homes is barred from seeking
any financial discovery. GoMotel’s tax returns and financial records likely
contain information relevant to some of Superior Homes’s claims and some of
GoMotel’s defenses. GoMotel’s tax returns could provide Superior Homes with
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information relating to the proportionality of the liquidated damages to any
probable damages, information on any tax benefits relating to the GoMotel
project, or information relating to any financial benefit to GoMotel from Nabors
related to Superior Homes’s work on the Nabors project. Similarly, GoMotel’s
financial reports could also provide Superior Homes with information on any
financial benefit received by GoMotel from Nabors as compensation for work
actually performed by Superior Homes, or information relating to GoMotel’s lost
rents and other damages. Any potential harm to GoMotel is minimized by the
protective order issued November 7, 2013. Docket 51.
Superior Homes has met its threshold burden of demonstrating that
GoMotel’s tax returns and financial records are discoverable under Rule 26.
The specific objections made by GoMotel do not prove that the information
Superior Homes seeks to discover should not be had. Accordingly, the court
grants Superior Homes’s motion to compel GoMotel to provide its tax returns
and its financial records in response to document requests three and four, but
limits the required production to returns and records from 2011 to the present.
If the parties actually agree to the proposed stipulation that GoMotel suffered
no adverse tax consequences as a result of delivery of the homes after
December 31, 2011, the court will not compel GoMotel to provide any further
answer to interrogatory eight or document request six; if the parties do not
agree to the stipulation, then GoMotel must fully and completely answer
interrogatory eight and document request six.
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b. Records of Repair and Lost Profit
Superior Homes submitted one interrogatory and two document requests
relating to the repair costs GoMotel claims it incurred as a result of Superior
Homes’s poor construction. Interrogatory eleven states: “Describe in detail what
repairs were required to the modular units as alleged in Paragraph XV of your
Counterclaim and provide the following information for each: . . . [w]hen the
repairs were made; . . . [w]ho made the repairs; and . . . [t]he cost for making
the repairs.” Document request seven asks GoMotel to “[p]roduce all documents
including, but not limited to, invoices and photographs, evidencing you suffered
the $308,936 in [repair cost] damages you claim to have sustained as alleged in
Paragraph XV of your Counterclaim.” Document request eight asks GoMotel to
“[p]roduce all documents evidencing you suffered the $2,432,000 in [lost rent]
damages you claim to have sustained as alleged in Paragraph XVI of your
Counterclaim.”2
GoMotel does not dispute that such records would be discoverable under
Rule 26. Rather, GoMotel insists it has already turned over all such records as
they were kept in the ordinary course of business. Docket 36 at 13. Superior
Homes disagrees and states that the records produced by GoMotel are
incomplete and unverified. Docket 41 at 5.

2

GoMotel has since reduced its claim for lost rent from $2,432,000 to
$756,000. See Docket 41 at 4.
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An itemization of the necessary repairs including details about who made
the repairs, when they were made, and the costs of the repairs is a reasonable
request that is relevant to GoMotel’s counterclaim, which seeks over $300,000
in damages from Superior Homes. Superior Homes should not have to sift
through a stack of Bates-stamped documents and guess which documents
support GoMotel’s claim for damages. As a result, Superior Homes’s motion to
compel additional responses to interrogatory eleven and document requests
seven and eight are granted.
C. Request for Fees and Expenses
Rule 37 authorizes the court to award expenses, including attorney’s
fees, to the prevailing party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A) and (B); 8B Wright &
Miller § 2285 (“The great operative principle of Rule 37(a)(5) is that the loser
pays.”). A court must not award expenses if the movant did not attempt to
resolve the matter in good faith without court action, if the opposing party’s
position was substantially justified, or if other circumstances would make an
award of expenses unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). Before awarding any
expenses, the court must give each side an opportunity to be heard. Id.
The conduct of Comardelle individually and GoMotel required Superior
Homes to file this motion. Based on the correspondence between the parties,
Superior Homes attempted to resolve the discovery dispute in good faith before
requesting court action. Docket 34-4; Docket 34-5; Docket 34-6. Before the
court awards expenses, Superior Homes, Comardelle, and GoMotel may submit
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to the court argument addressing whether nondisclosure was substantially
justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Counsel
for Superior Homes may also submit an affidavit of expenses and fees related to
filing the motion to compel. The deadline to submit these filings is December 5,
2013.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Comardelle’s motion to dismiss (Docket 38) is granted
without prejudice with respect to counts one, two, and three of the amended
complaint, and denied with respect to counts four, five, six, and seven of the
amended complaint.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Superior Homes’s motion to compel
Comardelle to respond to its first set of interrogatories and document requests
(Docket 32) is granted, but it is limited to tax returns and financial records
from 2011 to the present.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Superior Homes’s motion to compel
directed at GoMotel (Docket 32) is granted with respect to document requests
three and four, and GoMotel will disclose its tax returns and financial records
from 2011 to the present. Superior Homes’s motion to compel a response to
interrogatory eight and document request six is granted, and GoMotel must
answer interrogatory eight and document request six if the parties cannot agree
on a stipulation of GoMotel’s adverse tax consequences. Superior Homes’s
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motion to compel a response to interrogatory eleven and document requests
seven and eight is granted. All responses are due by December 12, 2013.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties will submit argument on
expenses by December 5, 2013.
Dated November 21, 2013.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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