Cooks v. Astrue et al
Filing
19
ORDER granting 11 Motion for Summary Judgment and remanding decision of Commissioner. Signed by U.S. District Judge Karen E. Schreier on 10/22/2013. (KC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
REBECCA R. COOKS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.
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CIV. 12-4177-KES
ORDER REMANDING
DECISION OF COMMISSIONER
Plaintiff, Rebecca R. Cooks, seeks review of the Commissioner of Social
Security’s decision denying her claim for social security disability insurance
(SSDI).1 The Commissioner opposes the motion and moves the court to affirm
the decision. The court remands.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 23, 2010, Cooks applied for SSDI alleging disability beginning
March 6, 2009. AR 143-47.2 The Social Security Administration denied Cooks’s
application. AR 87-89. Cooks requested reconsideration, which was
subsequently denied. AR 93-95. Cooks, with the assistance of counsel,
1
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Carolyn W. Colvin is automatically
substituted for Michael J. Astrue. This action survives the substitution. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
2
record.
All citations to “AR” refer to the appropriate page of the administrative
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). AR 98-99. After
the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Cooks was not disabled and
thus was not entitled to benefits. AR 27-38. Cooks then requested that the
Appeals Council review the ALJ’s decision along with new evidence, which
request was denied. AR 1-6. Subsequently, Cooks commenced this action,
requesting judicial review of the Commissioner’s determination that she is not
disabled. Docket 1.
FACTS
Cooks was born on June 3, 1953. AR 159. Cooks finished high school
and completed two years of college in 1986, obtaining an associate’s degree in
business. AR 59, 165. Cooks has two grown children and recently remarried in
June of 2010. AR 62.
During the last fifteen years, Cooks has worked in accounting and sales
(1993-2000), at a flower shop (2000-2002), as a credit collections
representative (2002-2006), as a welder (2006-2008), and in customer service
and retention (2008-March 6, 2009). AR 175. Between 1996 and 2008, Cooks
earned over $20,000 each year. AR 151. Cooks indicated that she worked full
time until March 6, 2009. AR 175-180. Cooks stated that she had difficulty
hearing customers in her last job, that the stress was difficult for her to
handle, and that she struggled to interact professionally with customers, coworkers, and supervisors. AR 77. Additionally, she stated that she left her
2
welding job because it required too much time on her feet and she left her job
at the flower shop “partially [due to] the walking around and lifting but it was
also I didn’t have [medical] insurance.” AR 60. Cooks currently relies on her
husband’s disability benefits, food stamps, Section Eight housing benefits, and
church food giveaways for support. AR 62.
In her SSDI application, Cooks claimed a disability based on bipolar
disorder, depression, anxiety, panic attacks, hearing loss, right knee problems,
fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue, migraines, and diabetes. AR 164.
I.
Physical Limitations
Cooks has a number of chronic physical limitations documented in the
record. She has a history of obesity. As a result, Cooks had a gastric bypass in
1998 and subsequently lost a great deal of weight, although she gained some of
it back recently. AR 63-64. Cooks underwent a right knee arthroplasty on
May 29, 2009, to treat degeneration in that joint.3 AR 238. Cooks went through
physical therapy following the successful procedure, but she subsequently has
reported knee pain on occasion. AR 262, 330.
Cooks has difficulty hearing. She started wearing bilateral hearing aids
in 2008. AR 64. Cooks states that she can hear in a quiet setting, but she
3
Arthroplasty is the “[c]reation of an artificial joint to correct advanced
degenerative arthritis [or an] operation to restore as far as possible the integrity
and functional power of a joint.” Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 161 (28th ed.
2006).
3
struggles to hear over the telephone or in an environment with other sounds.
AR 64-65. Cooks also suffers from headaches, although the cause is unknown.
See, e.g., AR 309. She has controlled her headaches with medication. Id. In
addition, Cooks has complained of fatigue and inability to sleep, and she has
been diagnosed with fibromyalgia.4 AR 404, 407. Cooks has taken a number of
different medications to relieve pain and help her sleep. She also participated
in a sleep study, which was inconclusive. AR 417.
Records from the Orthopedic Institute show that Cooks has complained
of low back pain, knee pain, and neck pain. AR 622-32. Doctors diagnosed
Cooks with polyneuropathy5 with an unknown cause (AR 623), advanced
spondylosis6 (AR 627), and bilateral knee problems (AR 624). Cooks underwent
acupuncture, massage therapy, and electrical muscle stimulation. She
requested a gym membership. AR 623. She was also given an epidural
injection, but she preferred more conservative treatments. AR 625. She
reported that those treatments gave her relief. AR 623, 624.
4
Fibromyalgia is a “syndrome of chronic widespread soft-tissue pain
accompanied by weakness, fatigue, and sleep disturbances; the cause is
unknown.” Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 725 (28th ed. 2006).
5
Polyneuropathy is “[a] disease process involving a number of peripheral
nerves (literal sense) [or a] nontraumatic generalized disorder of peripheral
nerves, affecting the distal fibers most severely . . . .” Stedman’s Medical
Dictionary 1536 (28th ed. 2006).
6
Spondylosis is the “[d]egeneration or deficient development of a portion
of the vertebra . . . .” Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 1812 (28th ed. 2006).
4
II.
Mental Limitations
Cooks has been diagnosed with depression, anxiety, panic attacks,
bipolar disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). See AR 404, 440,
463, 475 (diagnosing depression, PTSD, and bipolar disorder); AR 417, 428,
451 (diagnosing depression and PTSD); AR 542, 545, 546, 549, 552 (diagnosing
major depressive disorder, PTSD, and panic disorder); AR 596 (diagnosing
anxiety disorder); AR 597, 610 (diagnosing bipolar disorder); AR 611
(diagnosing anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder, depression, and panic disorder);
AR 615 (diagnosing depression, bipolar disorder, panic disorder, anxiety
disorder, polysubstance dependence in full remission, and PTSD). Two state
sources diagnosed Cooks with intermittent explosive disorder and mood
disorder. AR 523, 531. Cooks reports a history of physical and sexual abuse.
See, e.g., AR 613. Cooks has taken a long list of medications to control her
conditions and symptoms. See, e.g., AR 608-09 (listing current and past
medications). Frequently, Cooks’s doctors indicated that she was alert,
oriented, well-groomed, and behaved appropriately. Some doctors expressed
concern that Cooks was overmedicated, which might contribute to her fatigue.
AR 381, 392.
ALJ DECISION
On September 20, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision denying Cooks’s
application for SSDI. AR 24-38. The ALJ used the sequential five-step
5
evaluation process.7 At the first step, the ALJ determined that Cooks had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 6, 2009. AR 30. At step two,
the ALJ found that Cooks had the following severe impairments: hearing
impairment, fibromyalgia, mild right foot drop,8 and obesity. Id. At step three,
the ALJ determined that Cooks did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or equaled a listed impairment. AR 34. At step four, the
ALJ concluded that Cooks had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to
perform a range of light and sedentary work.9 Id. Based on the testimony of a
Vocational Expert (VE), the ALJ decided Cooks could perform her past relevant
7
An ALJ must follow “ ‘the familiar five-step process’ ” to determine
whether an individual is disabled: “(1) the claimant was employed; (2) she was
severely impaired; (3) her impairment was, or was comparable to, a listed
impairment; (4) she could perform past relevant work; and if not, (5) whether
she could perform any other kind of work.” Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909,
921 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 929 (8th Cir.
2010)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (detailing the five-step process).
8
Foot drop is a “[p]artial or total inability to [lift up] the foot, as a
consequence of which the toes drag on the ground during walking unless a
steppage gait is used . . . [it] has many causes, including disorders of the
peripheral and central nervous systems . . . .” Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 756
(28th ed. 2006)
9
The ALJ assessed Cooks’s RFC as follows: “[Cooks] is limited to lifting
and/or carrying 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. [Cooks] is
limited to sitting for a total of 6 hours of an 8-hour workday. [Cooks] is limited
to standing and/or walking for a total of 2 hours of an 8-hour workday. [Cooks]
is limited to occasionally stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; but never
balancing or climbing. [Cooks] would have problems on the telephone
discriminating languages and difficulty hearing during conversation with
customers.”
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work as a bookkeeper as it was actually performed. Id. at 37-38. Therefore, the
ALJ concluded that Cooks was not disabled.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court must uphold the ALJ’s decision if it is supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings
of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall
be conclusive . . . .”); Teague v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 611, 614 (8th Cir. 2011).
“Substantial evidence is ‘less than a preponderance, but is enough that a
reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's
conclusion.’ ” Pate-Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 942 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Maresh v. Barnhart, 438 F.3d 897, 898 (8th Cir. 2006)). In determining whether
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, the court considers evidence
that both supports and detracts from the ALJ’s decision. Moore v. Astrue, 623
F.3d 599, 605 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). If substantial evidence
supports the Commissioner’s decision, the court may not reverse it merely
because substantial evidence exists in the record that would support a
contrary position or because the court would have determined the case
differently. Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing
Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993)).
The Commissioner must support her decision with substantial evidence
in the record as a whole. Evans v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 832, 833 (8th Cir. 1994).
7
The ‘substantial evidence in the record as a whole’ standard is not synonymous
with the less rigorous ‘substantial evidence’ standard.” Burress v. Apfel, 141
F.3d 875, 878 (8th Cir. 1998). “ ‘Substantial evidence on the record as a
whole’ . . . requires a more scrutinizing analysis.” Gavin v. Heckler, 811 F.2d
1195, 1199 (8th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
In determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole, the court reviews the entire
administrative record and considers six factors: (1) the ALJ’s credibility
determinations; (2) the claimant’s vocational factors; (3) medical evidence from
treating and consulting physicians; (4) the claimant’s subjective complaints
relating to activities and impairments; (5) any third-party corroboration of
claimant’s impairments; and (6) a vocational expert’s testimony based on proper
hypothetical questions setting forth the claimant’s impairment(s). Stewart v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 581, 585-86 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing
Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1989)).
The court also reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine if an
error of law has been committed, which may be a procedural error, the use of
an erroneous legal standard, or an incorrect application of the law. Collins v.
Astrue, 648 F.3d 869, 871 (8th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Issues of law are
reviewed de novo with deference accorded to the Commissioner’s construction of
8
the Social Security Act. Id. (citing Juszczyk v. Astrue, 542 F.3d 626, 633 (8th
Cir. 2008)).
DISCUSSION
I.
Step Two
Cooks argues that the ALJ did not properly analyze whether certain
physical and mental limitations were severe medically determinable
impairments at step two, which led to the omission of those impairments from
her RFC. At step two, Cooks must establish whether she has a medically
determinable physical or mental impairment that is severe. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii); Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 2007) (“It is the
claimant’s burden to establish that [her] impairment or combination of
impairments are severe.”) (citation omitted). A severe impairment must
“significantly” limit the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities, 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c), such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting,
pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, handling, understanding, remembering
simple instructions, using judgment, responding appropriately to usual work
situations, and dealing with changes in a routine work setting. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 416.921(b)(1)-(6). Basic work activities relate to the abilities and aptitudes
necessary to perform most jobs. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b).
9
A.
Physical Limitations
Cooks asserts that the ALJ failed to consider her spondylosis and
polyneuropathy to be medically determinable impairments, and therefore
omitted those conditions from her RFC. Docket 12 at 29. Notably, Cooks does
not contend that the ALJ erred by finding that those conditions were not severe;
her alleged error relates only to the omission of spondylosis and polyneuropathy
from her RFC. Therefore, the only error Cooks asserts at step two with respect
to her physical limitations is a failure to classify Cooks’s spondylosis and
polyneuropathy as medically determinable impairments.
The ALJ did mention the objective medical evidence relating to
spondylosis and polyneuropathy in her step two analysis. AR 30. Additionally,
the ALJ discussed the limitations from spondylosis and polyneuropathy in her
RFC discussion. AR 34-35. Based on the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ must have
considered Cooks’s spondylosis and polyneuropathy to be medically
determinable impairments at step two, but the ALJ found they were not severe.
Because Cooks does not challenge the severity determination of the ALJ’s
decision with respect to her spondylosis and polyneuropathy, the ALJ did not
err at step two with respect to Cooks’s physical limitations.
B.
Mental Limitations
Cooks contends that the ALJ incorrectly determined at step two that her
mental limitations were not severe.
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1.
Nardini Opinion
Cooks contends that the ALJ improperly relied on Dr. Nardini’s opinion in
weighing the severity of Cooks’s mental limitations. Specifically, Cooks argues
that Dr. Nardini’s licensing did not qualify him as an acceptable medical source.
“Acceptable medical sources are . . . [l]icensed or certified psychologists.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a). Dr. Nardini has a Ph.D., but he was never a licensed or
certified psychologist in South Dakota. Docket 18-1. Dr. Nardini was a licensed
social worker. Docket 17 at 20 n. 14. Therefore, Dr. Nardini was not an
acceptable medical source under the Commissioner’s regulations.
Even though Dr. Nardini was not an acceptable medical source, the ALJ
was still able to consider Dr. Nardini’s report. In determining the severity of a
mental impairment, an ALJ is not limited to only considering acceptable
medical opinions. 20 C.F.R. 404 Subpt. P, App. 1, pt. A, § 12.00D(1)(c). “In
addition to evidence from ‘acceptable medical sources,’ we may use evidence
from ‘other sources,’ . . . to show the severity of the individual’s impairment(s)
and how it affects the individual’s ability to function. These sources include, but
are not limited to: [m]edical sources who are not ‘acceptable medical sources,’
such as nurse practitioners, physician assistants, licensed clinical social
workers, naturopaths, chiropractors, audiologists, and therapists . . . .” SSR 0603p. Furthermore, “[i]nformation from these ‘other sources’ cannot establish the
existence of a medically determinable impairment. Instead, there must be
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evidence from an ‘acceptable medical source’ for this purpose. However,
information from such ‘other sources’ may . . . provide insight into the severity
of the impairment(s) and how it affects the individual’s ability to function.” Id.
The ALJ was therefore allowed to rely on Dr. Nardini’s opinion as an opinion
from an “other source,” and could properly consider Dr. Nardini’s opinion in
evaluating the severity of Cooks’s mental limitations.
2.
State Expert Opinion and Treating Physician Opinions
Cooks contends that the ALJ gave insufficient weight to the opinions of
Dr. Zhao, Dr. Fuller, and Barbara Palmer, all treating sources, and
Dr. Buchkoski, the non-examining state agency expert. According to Cooks,
those sources suggest she has moderate mental limitations, rather than mild
limitations as the ALJ concluded.
Cooks bases her argument on the global assessment of functioning (GAF)
scores assigned to Cooks by Drs. Zhao and Fuller. Both gave Cooks GAF scores
between 55 and 60, indicating moderate limitations. The Eighth Circuit has
held that an ALJ is not bound to conform a claimant’s RFC to a GAF score,
though the score may be a helpful guide. Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922,
930-31 (8th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the ALJ was not bound to accept the GAF
scores as conclusive proof that Cooks’s mental impairments were severe.
Because the sole error Cooks alleges with respect to Drs. Fuller and Zhao
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relates to the weight given to the GAF scores, the ALJ did not err in her
consideration of those opinions.
Next, Cooks argues that the ALJ did not give appropriate weight to
Palmer’s opinion that Cooks had more than mild limitations. But Palmer’s
opinion is not as conclusive as Cooks suggests. Palmer observed that “insight is
limited, judgment impaired, mild to moderate anxiety, mild to moderate
depression, no suicidal thinking. . . . [Cooks has] once again lost her job and
feels badly about that but is managing it appropriately.” AR 555. The ALJ could
conclude, from this opinion and the rest of the record, that Cooks had only mild
mental limitations.
Finally, Cooks argues that the ALJ gave too little weight to a nonexamining state agency expert, Dr. Buchkoski, in determining the severity of
her mental limitations. The ALJ expressly discounted Dr. Buchkoski’s opinion
that Cooks had a moderate degree of limitation in concentration and
understanding instructions and is only capable of simple tasks. The ALJ
concluded that other parts of Dr. Buchkoski’s opinion were inconsistent with
that assessment, and that those limitations were inconsistent with Cooks’s
testimony and the detailed review of Cooks’s treatment history listed in the
ALJ’s decision. The ALJ provided sufficient reasons for giving little weight to
that part of Dr. Buchkoski’s opinion.
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The ALJ did not err in weighing the available evidence on the severity of
Cooks’s limitations. The ALJ’s determination that Cooks’s mental impairments
are not severe is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
II.
Step Four
A.
RFC
Before an ALJ moves to step four, the ALJ determines the claimant’s RFC.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). A claimant’s RFC “is the most [she] can still do [in a
work setting] despite [her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). The RFC
assessment is an indication of what the claimant can do on a “regular and
continuing basis” given the claimant’s disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(b). “The
ALJ should determine a claimant’s RFC based on all the relevant evidence,
including the medical records, observations of treating physicians and others,
and an individual’s own description of his limitations.” Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465
F.3d 881, 887 (8th Cir. 2006). “ ‘[T]o find that a claimant has the [RFC] to
perform a certain type of work, the claimant must have the ability to perform
the requisite acts day in and day out, in the sometimes competitive and
stressful conditions in which real people work in the real world.’ ” Reed v.
Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 923 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Thomas v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d
666, 669 (8th Cir. 1989)).
At step four, the ALJ determined that Cooks could perform a range of
sedentary and light work. Based on her RFC, and the testimony of a VE, the
14
ALJ found that Cooks could perform her past job as a bookkeeper as it was
actually performed, and therefore Cooks was not disabled.
1.
Physical Limitations in RFC
Cooks argues that her physical limitations were improperly considered
when determining her RFC. As discussed in Part IA, supra, the ALJ’s decision
shows that she did consider all of Cooks’s medically determinable physical
impairments, whether severe or nonsevere, when formulating Cooks’s RFC. AR
34-37.
Cooks asserts that the ALJ improperly assessed Cooks’s credibility when
discounting the impact of her subjective complaints of pain from her medically
determinable impairments. “[W]hen evaluating a claimant’s credibility, in
addition to considering the absence of objective medical evidence to support
complaints of pain, an ALJ should consider a claimant’s reported daily
activities, the duration, frequency and intensity of his or her pain, precipitating
and aggravating factors, medication, and functional restrictions.” Steed v.
Astrue, 524 F.3d 872, 875 n.4 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Polaski v. Heckler, 739
F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984)). “The ALJ is not required to discuss methodically
each Polaski consideration, so long as [she] acknowledged and examined those
considerations before discounting [Cooks’s] subjective complaints.” Id. at 876
(internal quotation omitted). An ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to
15
deference because the ALJ is in a better position than a reviewing court to
gauge credibility. Travis v. Astrue, 477 F.3d 1037, 1042 (8th Cir. 2007).
The ALJ’s credibility decision is supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole. First, the ALJ detailed the medications Cooks has taken to
control her pain and whether the medications worked. The ability to
successfully control pain with medication can be inconsistent with an allegation
of disabling pain. Moore v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 520, 525 (8th Cir. 2009).
Furthermore, if an impairment can be controlled through treatment or
medication, it cannot be considered disabling. Id. (citing Kisling v. Chater, 105
F.3d 1255, 1257 (8th Cir. 1997)). The ALJ adequately documented the
numerous instances in the record where Cooks reported conservative
treatments or medication worked well to control her pain.
The ALJ also noted Cooks’s own statements on different occasions about
the duration, frequency, and intensity of her pain. For example, the ALJ noted
that “[c]linic records indicate complaints of pain . . . in May 2010, but 0 pain in
June 2010 . . . .” AR 36. The record contains other instances where Cooks
reported that she felt “pretty good” or that she did not appear to be in distress.
The ALJ properly considered those inconsistent reports about the duration,
frequency, and intensity of pain in determining Cooks’s credibility.
Finally, the ALJ discussed Cooks’s daily activities and functional
restrictions, and found them inconsistent with an allegation of disabling pain.
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Specifically, the ALJ noted that Cooks requested a note from a physician
regarding a gym membership. The ALJ also considered evidence from Cooks’s
sister about Cooks’s daily activities and found the extent of those activities
undermined Cooks’s subjective complaints of pain.
The ALJ adequately assessed Cooks’s credibility under the Polaski factors.
Based on the medical opinions, the medical records, Cooks’s testimony, and the
other evidence in the record, the ALJ determined that Cooks’s complaints of
disabling pain were not credible. Cooks’s RFC is supported by substantial
evidence in the record as a whole with respect to Cooks’s physical limitations.
2.
Mental Limitations in RFC
At step two, the ALJ found that Cooks’s medically determinable mental
impairments were not severe. The RFC must include the limitations from all
medically determinable impairments, regardless of whether they are considered
severe. SSR 96-8p (“In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must consider limitations
and restrictions imposed by all of an individual’s impairments, even those that
are not ‘severe.’ ”). The ALJ failed to include Cooks’s mental limitations in
developing her RFC.
In contrast to the ALJ’s extensive and well-supported discussion of
Cooks’s mental limitations at step two, the ALJ’s written opinion at step four is
notably devoid of any reference to Cooks’s mental limitations. Given Cooks’s
numerous mental impairments, her mental limitations should be a primary
17
consideration in determining her RFC. Here, it is not clear whether they were
considered at all. Even if the ALJ did consider Cooks’s mental limitations, this
court has no way to review the ALJ’s finding. A court should not be left to
“speculate on what basis the Commissioner denied a . . . claim.” Collins v.
Astrue, 648 F.3d 869, 872 (8th Cir. 2011). The omission of Cooks’s mental
limitations from her RFC requires remand in this case.
B.
Previous Relevant Work Determination
Cooks argues that the ALJ erred in finding that she could perform her
previous job as a bookkeeper at a flower shop. She also introduces evidence
that her job was not truly a bookkeeping job but involved other, more physically
demanding, tasks. Because the court is remanding this matter to the
Commissioner to reconsider Cooks’s RFC, it would be premature for the court to
decide whether Cooks can perform her past relevant work. On remand, the ALJ
should determine Cooks’s RFC, including her mental limitations, and then
consider whether Cooks can perform her past relevant work.
Additionally, because the court is remanding this matter to the
Commissioner for reconsideration of Cooks’s RFC, it is unnecessary for the
court to determine at this time whether the ALJ sufficiently explained the
balance limitations in the original RFC for the purposes of establishing the
range of work Cooks is able to perform.
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CONCLUSION
Where the ALJ’s findings are insufficient or inadequate, remand is
appropriate. Following review of the record, the court finds that the ALJ erred in
determining Cooks’s RFC because the ALJ did not incorporate Cooks’s
nonsevere medically determinable mental conditions. On remand, the ALJ
should determine Cooks’s RFC including her mental limitations and should
determine, based on that RFC, whether Cooks can perform her past relevant
work or other work in the national economy. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision denying Cooks’s claim for
benefits is remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
Dated October 22, 2013.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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