Duffy v. DOC Mental Health Dept.
Filing
32
ORDER denying 16 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by U.S. District Judge Karen E. Schreier on 10/04/2013. (KC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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SOUTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF )
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CORRECTIONS MENTAL HEALTH
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DEPARTMENT; and
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DR. DAVIDSON,
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Mental Health Physician,
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Defendants.
SHAWN A. DUFFY,
CIV. 13-4072-KES
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff, Shawn A. Duffy, moves for a preliminary injunction. Docket 16.
Defendants, South Dakota Department of Corrections Mental Health
Department (DOC) and Dr. Christopher M. Davidson, each oppose Duffy’s
motion for preliminary injunction. Dockets 22, 26. For the reasons set forth
herein, the court denies Duffy’s motion for preliminary injunction.
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy.” Roudachevski v.
All-American Care Centers, Inc., 648 F.3d 701, 705 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted); see also Hughbanks v. Dooley, 788 F. Supp. 2d 988, 992 (D.S.D. 2011)
(“[I]n the prison setting, a request for a preliminary injunction ‘must always be
viewed with great caution because judicial restraint is especially called for in
dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.’ ”)
(quoting Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995)). “The burden of
proving that a preliminary injunction should be issued rests entirely with the
movant.” Goff, 60 F.3d at 520. To determine whether the issuance of a
preliminary injunction is appropriate, the court considers the following factors:
(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant;
(2) the state of balance between this harm and the injury that granting
the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant;
(3) the probability that movant will succeed on the merits; and
(4) the public interest.
Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981). The
court asks “whether the balance of equities so favors the movant that justice
requires the court to intervene to preserve the status quo until the merits are
determined.” Id. at 113.
Although no single factor is determinative, “[f]ailure to show irreparable
harm is an independently sufficient ground upon which to deny a preliminary
injunction.” Watkins Inc. v. Lewis, 346 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 2003); see also
Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 114 n.9 (“[T]he absence of a finding of irreparable injury
is alone sufficient ground for vacating the preliminary injunction.”). To
demonstrate irreparable harm, plaintiff must show that the harm is “certain,
great and of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable
relief.” Packard Elevator v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 782 F.2d 112, 115 (8th
Cir. 1986). Notably, “plaintiff must make a showing of actual, substantial harm
resulting from the alleged infringement.” Travelers Express Co. v. Transaction
Tracking Tech., Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1095 (D. Minn. 2003) (citation
omitted).
2
In the instant case, Duffy alleges that defendants have withheld “much
needed medication,” which he was prescribed for his “serious medical
conditions prior to April 2013.” Docket 16 at 1. “As a result of the defendants’
action and omissions, [Duffy] face[s] continued and further degradation of [his]
mental and medical conditions.” Duffy further alleges that without a preliminary
injunction, he will suffer irreparable damage to his health and “have no plain,
adequate or speedy remedy at law.” Id. at 2–3. The medications that Duffy would
like to have reinstated by this court include the following:
(1) methylphenidate for his attention deficit disorder, narcolepsy, and
depression, (2) alprazolam for his anxiety, panic attacks, and convulsions, and
(3) viibryd for his depression and mood swings. Id. at 3.
The court has reviewed the medical records provided by DOC.1 Based on
such evidence, it appears that Duffy has been seen by Dr. Davidson on five
separate occasions since his medication was discontinued in April 2013. See
Dockets 22-2, 22-3, 22-4, 22-5, 22-8. On each occasion, Dr. Davidson
discussed with Duffy the importance of undergoing a sleep test for purposes of
determining whether Duffy was, in fact, suffering from narcolepsy. Nonetheless,
Duffy has repeatedly delayed the taking of an effective sleep study by
compromising the results of previous sleep studies (Dockets 22-2, 22-3) and by
1
The DOC provided psychiatric notes from Duffy’s doctor visits on May 15,
2013 (Docket 22-2), May 31, 2013 (Docket 22-3), June 28, 2013 (Docket 22-4),
July 17, 2013 (Docket 22-5), and August 9, 2013 (Docket 22-8).
3
refusing to participate in subsequent sleep studies (Dockets 22-4, 22-5).2 In the
absence of a sleep study, Dr. Davidson has observed no signs of narcolepsy
(Docket 22-5), and Dr. Davidson is unwilling to prescribe methylphenidate for
what appears to be self-diagnosed narcolepsy (Docket 22-4 at 2).3
When Dr. Davidson refused to prescribe methylphenidate for Duffy’s
alleged narcolepsy, Duffy began requesting methylphenidate to treat his anxiety
and undiagnosed ADHD. Dockets 22-4, 22-5. With regard to Duffy’s anxiety,
Dr. Davidson suggested Duffy treat such condition with psychotherapy rather
than medication. Docket 22-5. Not only had Duffy “been showing a lot of
resilience, motivation, and productivity without taking any meds,” but Dr.
Davidson believed that Duffy demonstrated a history of substance abuse, as
evidenced by his request for Xanax during a previous sleep study, and should
therefore try alternative, non-medication treatments to address his anxiety.
2
In an e-mail to prison officials, Dr. Davidson suggested that Duffy’s sleep
study be placed on hold and then described the various ways in which Duffy had
complicated the process:
Mr. Duffy’s actions, for example, misleading the pulmonologists
before his sleep study to get Xanax which he does not take, sending
threatening or accusatory letters to everyone he can think of, and
giving us names of many providers/places that he says have
knowledge of, or actually performed a sleep study which where [sic]
not at all actually involved with a sleep study, have complicated the
case and delayed diagnostic and treatment even further.
Docket 22-7 at 1.
3
Dr. Davidson will not prescribe methylphenidrate to treat Duffy’s alleged
narcolepsy until there is documentation of such condition. Docket 22-4 at 2.
Dr. Davidson has reviewed Duffy’s medical records and has been unable to
substantiate a previous diagnosis of narcolepsy. Id. at 1.
4
Dockets 22-3, 22-5, 22-6. With regard to treating Duffy’s alleged ADHD,
Dr. Davidson has not observed evidence that Duffy struggles with such
condition. Docket 22-5. To the contrary, Dr. Davidson believes Duffy is “very
motivated” and “can focus on certain details very well.” Based on his
observations and his review of medical reports from other correctional facilities,
Dr. Davidson suspects the real issue is that Duffy does not believe he can
function without methylphenidate.
Based on this information, it is evident that Duffy is receiving appropriate
treatment for the conditions of which he complains. Duffy has not been
diagnosed with ADHD or narcolepsy, and thus he is not entitled to a
prescription medication to treat either condition. Dr. Davidson did diagnose
Duffy with anxiety. Accordingly, Dr. Davidson explored several effective, nonmedication alternatives for the treatment of Duffy’s anxiety. Finally,
Dr. Davidson has suggested alternative anti-depressants to Duffy, but Duffy has
not been interested.4 Therefore, to the extent Duffy “feel[s] that sudden or
prolonged discontinuation of prescribed medications can and will have
disastrous results [on his] well being,” the court finds that such results would
be self-inflicted. Docket 16 at 2. Duffy refuses to participate in a sleep study
4
During his initial evaluation, Dr. Davidson suggested Duffy be taken off
alprazolam and placed on Xanax. Docket 26 at 1–2. Both are benzodiazepines,
but unlike Xanax, alprazolam “has potential for abuse and is often used
recreationally.” Id. at 2. Then, in August 2013, Dr. Davidson suggested Duffy
take Prozac to manage his depression, but Duffy refused. Docket 22-8 at 5.
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that would allow Dr. Davidson to more accurately treat Duffy’s alleged
conditions, and he discounts alternative treatment plans for the management of
his anxiety disorder and depression. Thus, the court finds that Duffy has failed
to demonstrate actual, substantial harm resulting from the alleged
infringement. Because “[f]ailure to show irreparable harm is an independently
sufficient ground upon which to deny a preliminary injunction,” Watkins, 346
F.3d at 844, the court denies Duffy’s motion for preliminary injunction.5
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that Duffy’s motion for preliminary injunction (Docket 16) is
denied.
Dated October 4, 2013.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5
Even so, Duffy would not likely succeed on the merits of the claim
asserted in his motion for preliminary injunction. Based on the psychiatric
reports submitted to the court, it appears Duffy is receiving adequate medical
care. Dr. Davidson has thoroughly evaluated Duffy at least once a month since
April 2013, and he appears observant of and attentive to Duffy’s needs. The
reports demonstrate that the issue before the court is one involving a
disagreement over the appropriate course of treatment, and disagreement with a
medical judgment is not sufficient to state a constitutional violation. Davis v.
Hall, 992 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d
1234, 1240 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that “inmates have no constitutional right to
receive a particular or requested course of treatment, and prison doctors remain
free to exercise their independent medical judgment”) (citation omitted).
6
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