Caskey v. South Dakota State Penitentiary et al
Filing
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ORDER granting defendants' 46 Motion to Stay. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Veronica L. Duffy on 05/08/15. (Duffy, Veronica)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CODY RAY CASKEY,
4:14-CV-04010-KES
Plaintiff,
vs.
SOUTH DAKOTA STATE
PENITENTIARY, SOUTH DAKOTA
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DR.
EUGENE REGIER, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITY; RYAN MANSON, CNP, IN
HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; DARIN
YOUNG, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND
OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; JUSTIN
ELKINS, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND
OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; KAYLA
THEILAN, IN HER INDIVIDUAL AND
OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; JANE DOES,
IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL
CAPACITIES; JOHN DOES, IN THEIR
INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL
CAPACITIES; AND DENNIS LAUSENG,
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
STAY DISCOVERY
[DOCKET NO. 46]
Defendants.
This matter is before the court on plaintiff Cody Ray Caskey’s pro se
amended complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Docket Nos. 1 & 22.
Defendants have filed a motion seeking an order from the court staying
discovery in this matter until such time as they are able to file a dispositive
motion on the defense of qualified immunity. See Docket No. 46. Mr. Caskey
has not responded to defendants’ motion.
In order to show a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Caskey
must show (1) defendants acted under color or state law and (2) “ ‘the alleged
wrongful conduct deprived him of a constitutionally protected federal right.’ ”
Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Schmidt v. City of
Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564, 571 (8th Cir. 2009)).
Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability and from
having to defend themselves in a civil suit if the conduct of the officials “does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity is immunity from
suit, not just a defense to liability at trial. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
526 (1985). Therefore, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly stressed the
importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in
litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 536 (1991).
To determine whether an official may partake of qualified immunity, two
factors must be determined: (1) whether the facts that plaintiff has shown
make out a violation of a constitutional right and (2) whether that
constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time of the official’s acts.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If the court finds that one of the two
elements is not met, the court need not decide the other element, and the court
may address the elements in any order it wishes “in light of the circumstances
of the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if the answer to either of the
Saucier prongs is “no.”
“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make
reasonable but mistaken judgments,” and “protects ‘all but the plainly
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incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’ ” Stanton v. Sims, ___
U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.
Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986))).
“ ‘We do not require a case directly on point’ before concluding that the law is
clearly established, ‘but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.’ ” Stanton, 134 S. Ct. at 5. “ ‘Officials
are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing
bright lines.’ ” Ambrose v. Young, 474 F.3d 1070, 1077 (8th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)).
The Supreme Court has stated that “if the defendant does plead the
[qualified] immunity defense, the district court should resolve that threshold
question before permitting discovery.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,
598 (1998) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). Only if the plaintiff’s claims
survive a dispositive motion on the issue of qualified immunity will the plaintiff
“be entitled to some discovery.” Id. Even then, the Court has pointed out that
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 “vests the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor discovery
narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery.” Id. Such discretion
includes the ability to establish limits on the number of depositions and
interrogatories, to limit the length of depositions, to limit the number of
requests to admit, to bar discovery on certain subjects, and to limit the time,
place, and manner of discovery as well as its timing and sequence. Id.
Here, defendants have asserted the affirmative defense of qualified
immunity. See Docket No. 27. Based on the above law, the court hereby
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ORDERS that defendant’s motion to stay [Docket No. 46] is granted.
Defendants shall file their motion based on the qualified immunity defense as
soon as possible, but no later than July 1, 2015. It is further
ORDERED that defendant shall provide immediately to Mr. Caskey any
and all medical records, including kites regarding medical care, pertaining to
himself during his period of incarceration with defendants. This order is
intended to cover all medical records for Mr. Caskey for the period indicated,
even if those records are in the custody of medical providers outside the South
Dakota state penitentiary system. If necessary, Mr. Caskey shall sign a release
allowing independent medical providers to disclose his medical records to
defendant in order to effectuate this order.
DATED this 8th day of May, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
VERONICA L. DUFFY
United States Magistrate Judge
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