Schmidt v. Lentch et al
Filing
39
ORDER granting 35 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by U.S. District Judge Karen E. Schreier on 5/5/2015. (KC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHARLES FRANCIS SCHMIDT,
CIV. 14-4032-KES
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID LENTSCH, Unit Manager;
South Dakota State Penitentiary;
DERRICK BIEBER, Unit Manager,
South Dakota State Penitentiary;
ROB FREDERICKSON, Mental Health
Therapist, South Dakota State
Penitentiary;
ERIC BRUSCHER, Correctional
Officer, South Dakota State
Penitentiary;
GREG BROSTAD, SOMP Coordinator,
South Dakota Department of
Corrections;
KRISTEN JENSEN, Mental Health
Therapist, South Dakota State
Penitentiary;
DR. DAVIDSON, Psychiatric Doctor;
MR. FRAIN, Ad. Seg. Unit Coordinator;
SOUTH DAKOTA STATE
PENITENTIARY HEALTH SERVICES,
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Defendants.
Plaintiff, Charles Francis Schmidt, is an inmate at the South Dakota
State Penitentiary (SDSP) in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Schmidt filed a pro se
civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. Defendants move for
summary judgment. Schmidt has not responded, and the time to respond has
passed. Summary judgment is granted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant Ashows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party can meet this burden
by presenting evidence that there is no dispute of material fact or that the
nonmoving party has not presented evidence to support an element of her case
on which she bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). AThe nonmoving party may not >rest on mere
allegations or denials, but must demonstrate on the record the existence of
specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial.= @ Mosley v. City of
Northwoods, Mo., 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Krenik v. County of
Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995)).
Summary judgment is precluded if there is a dispute in facts that could
affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). For purposes of a summary judgment motion, the court views the
facts and the inferences drawn from such facts Ain the light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion.@ Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
DISCUSSION
A.
Official Capacity Claims
Schmidt names several individuals as defendants, namely: David
Lentsch, Derrick Bieber, Rob Frederickson, Kristin Jensen, Dr. Davidson, Greg
Brostad, Mr. Frain, and Eric Bruscher. The complaint does not expressly state
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that they are sued in their individual capacity. “[I]n order to sue a public
official in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff must expressly and
unambiguously state so in the pleadings, otherwise, it will be assumed that
the defendant is sued only in his or her official capacity.” Johnson v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999). As a result, the court deems
that defendants are sued only in their official capacities. And because
defendants are sued only in their official capacities, Schmidt cannot pursue
damages claims against state employees in their official capacities. See Roberts
v. Lombardi, 512 F. App’x 645, 747 (8th Cir. 2013). Thus, Schmidt’s claims for
monetary relief against the individually named defendants are dismissed.
B.
State Agency Not a “Person” for Purposes of §1983.
According to the Supreme Court, a state is not a person for purposes of
§1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Neither
are state agencies. See Milles v. Iowa Bd. of Regents, 770 F. Supp. 2d 986, 992
(S.D. Iowa 2011). It is apparent from its name that defendant South Dakota
State Penitentiary Health Services (SDSPHS) is a state agency and as a result it
is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. SDSPHS is entitled to
summary judgment on all claims.
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C.
Individual claims.1
1.
Deliberate Indifference Claim Under the Eighth Amendment.
A[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes >the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain= proscribed by the
Eighth Amendment.@ Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). AThis is true whether the indifference is
manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner=s needs or by
prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or
intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.@ Id. at 104B05.
A[T]his does not mean, however, that every claim by a prisoner that he has not
received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.@ Id. at 105. A[A] prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.@ Id. at
106. Allegations of negligence will not suffice. See Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d
1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (AThe prisoner must show more than negligence,
more even than gross negligence, and mere disagreement with treatment
decisions does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.@).
A plaintiff has no constitutional right to a particular course of treatment.
See, e.g., Meuir v. Greene County Jail Employees, 487 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.
2007). Plaintiff’s mere disagreement with the course of treatment provided fails
1
Because Schmidt’s claims are without merit, the court will not address
the additional issue of whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
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to state a claim of deliberate indifference. Bender v. Regier, 385 F.3d 1133,
1137 (8th Cir. 2004).
The deliberate indifference standard includes both an objective and
subjective component. Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir.
1997) (citing Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997)). The
plaintiff Amust demonstrate (1) that he suffered objectively serious medical
needs and (2) that the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately
disregarded those needs.@ Id. (citing Coleman, 114 F.3d at 784). AA serious
medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor=s attention.@ Coleman, 114 F.3d at 784. To
be liable for deliberately disregarding medical needs, Athe official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.@ Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
In the instant case, Schmidt represents that he suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a condition he developed after witnessing a
fellow inmate get electrocuted to death and, on a separate occasion, finding a
dead body while participating in a community service project through SDSP.
Docket 1 at 4. As a result of these experiences, Schmidt has been diagnosed
with PTSD, and he suffers from nightmares, cold sweats, flash backs, panic
attacks, and anxiety. But based on the undisputed facts, Schmidt has been
seen by mental health staff during their rounds. He was prescribed Wellbutrin
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in September of 2013, which is a medication often prescribed as treatment for
mental health issues such as PTSD. Schmidt received his medication during
the relevant time period. Schmidt may disagree with the course of treatment
that was provided, but such a disagreement is not sufficient to show deliberate
indifference. Based on the undisputed facts, defendants are entitled to
summary judgment in their favor on this claim.
2.
Failure to Protect Claims Under the Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on the part of prison officials to
A >take reasonable measures to [protect prisoners from] substantial risks of
serious harm.= @ Prater v. Dahm, 89 F.3d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Reece v. Groose, 60 F.3d 487, 491 (8th Cir. 1995)). That duty Arequires only
that prison officials >take reasonable measures to abate substantial risks of
serious harm, of which the officials are aware.= @ Id. Explicitly included within
that duty is the prison officials= duty A >to protect prisoners from violence at the
hands of other prisoners.= @ Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)
(quoting Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir.
1988)).
Here, Schmidt alleges that he requested protective custody from a gang
whose members had previously attacked him and subsequently warned him
that if he failed to Acheck in,@ he would Aget beat up.@ Docket 1 at 6. At the
protective custody hearing on the issue, Schmidt alleges that defendants told
him to Alearn to just take a punch and don=t fight back.@ Two days after that
hearing, Schmidt was allegedly attacked by a gang member once again. Id. at
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7. As punishment for fighting back, Schmidt claims he was placed in the
segregated housing unit for twenty days. Upon his release, Schmidt received
threats from the prison gang and was told that if he failed to bear witness to
an attack that was to take place outside his prison cell, the gang would once
again attack him. Accordingly, Schmidt watched another inmate get knocked
out and suffer a broken nose, a broken cheekbone, and serious head trauma.
Because defendants determined that Schmidt had previous knowledge of this
attack, Schmidt claims he was punished for the violent conduct of other
inmates and placed in segregated housing for ninety days.
As a result of defendants= failure to protect him from threats to his
safety, Schmidt alleges that he has suffered extreme paranoid anxiety and lives
in fear for his life. Further, Schmidt alleges that these events, including his
repeated placement in the segregated housing unit, have exacerbated his
PTSD. Schmidt also alleges that while he was held in the segregated housing
unit, defendants further threatened his safety by overdosing him for his mental
conditions.
The undisputed facts show that Schmidt met with defendant Lentsch on
November 4, 2013. During this meeting, Schmidt said he expected to be able to
stay out of trouble if he was placed on Bravo floor. He was then placed on
Bravo floor. Because defendants took appropriate action to prevent harm to
Schmidt by placing him on a floor where both he and defendants thought he
would be safe, Schmidt has not established that defendants failed to take
reasonable steps to prevent Schmidt from being subjected to substantial risks
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of serious harm. Furthermore, Schmidt failed to allege that any of the named
defendants were personally involved with his alleged over medication. Absent
personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation, a named
defendant is not liable based on a theory of respondeat superior. Martin v.
Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985). Thus, defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on Schmidt’s claim for failure to protect.
3.
Prison Conditions Claim Under the Eighth Amendment.
To sufficiently allege that conditions of confinement violate the Eighth
Amendment, a prisoner must assert the following:
(1) the alleged deprivation is, Aobjectively, sufficiently serious,@
resulting Ain the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life=s
necessities,@ and (2) that the prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to Aan excessive risk to inmate health or safety,@
meaning that the officials actually knew of and disregarded the
risk.
Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at
834). Nonetheless, Athe Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.@
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). Therefore, with regard to the
first element, a prison condition is not deemed cruel and unusual unless it
Ainflicts unnecessary or wanton pain or is grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime warranting imprisonment.@ Id. at 348; see also Rhodes,
452 U.S. 337 at 347 (ATo the extent that such conditions are restrictive or even
harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their
offenses against society.@).
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With regard to the second element, Aconstructive knowledge, or the
>should have known= standard, is not sufficient to support a finding of
deliberate indifference . . . .@ Spruce v. Sargent, 149 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir.
1998) (citation omitted). AAbsent a showing that the prison officials consciously
understood that prison conditions created such an excessive risk, the
conditions are not a punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment.@ Williams, 49 F.3d at 445 (citation omitted).
Here, Schmidt has alleged that defendants inflicted cruel and unusual
punishment on him by placing him in administrative segregation despite the
fact that he suffers from PTSD and the prison officials were aware that he
suffers from PTSD. Schmidt alleges that the isolated nature of administrative
segregation has exacerbated his PTSD. Schmidt further alleges that his
placement in administrative segregation is unwarranted as he is a non-violent
criminal.
The undisputed facts show that Schmidt received mental health care
while he was in administrative segregation. There is no showing that prison
officials consciously understood that the prison conditions created an
excessive risk to Schmidt’s health or safety. And with regard to the fact that
Schmidt was housed in segregation even though his underlying conviction was
for a non-violent crime, the Eighth Circuit has held that “a demotion to
segregation, even without cause, is not itself an atypical and significant
hardship.” Orr v. Larkins, 610 F.3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir. 2010). Thus,
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defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Schmidt’s prison conditions
claim.
4.
Due Process Claim Under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Prisoners are entitled to the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment=s
Due Process ClauseBA[t]hey may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.@ Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974)
(citations omitted). Accordingly, A[t]he Supreme Court has outlined procedures
correctional facilities must follow to conduct an impartial due process
hearing.@ Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 830 (8th Cir. 2008). Schmidt has
alleged that defendant Bruscher falsely accused him of committing certain
prohibited acts, the consequence of which was placement in a maximum
security unit that was dangerous and resulted in severe mental anguish.
Docket 1 at 5. Schmidt contends that defendant Bruscher knew the write-up
was false, but did it because he was told to do so.
The undisputed facts show that Schmidt grabbed Bruscher’s wrist while
Bruscher was trying to confiscate a contraband cell phone from Schmidt’s cell.
Schmidt’s actions constituted the prohibited act for which Schmidt was
punished. This was not a false write-up. Schmidt received notice of the charges
that were lodged against him by Bruscher. He was informed of his right to
remain silent and he waived that right. Schmidt presented evidence in the form
of a statement and he attempted to call a witness, but the witness did not
provide a statement. The Disciplinary Hearing Officer relied on the written
statement of Bruscher and issued hearing findings and a decision. Thus,
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Schmidt’s due process rights were not violated and defendants are entitled to
summary judgment in their favor on this claim.
Because Schmidt has not succeeded on the merits on his claims, his
request for injunctive relief is denied.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket 35)
is granted. Judgment will be entered in favor of defendants.
Dated May 5, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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