Day v. Minnehaha County et al

Filing 53

ORDER granting 33 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; granting 35 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; denying 37 Motion to dismiss 12(c) motions; denying as moot 41 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by U.S. District Judge Karen E. Schreier on 3/4/2015. (KC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TONY ANTHONY DAY,

CIV. 14-4037-KES

Plaintiff,
vs.
MINNEHAHA COUNTY, MINNEHAHA
COUNTY JAIL, and CORRECT CARE
SOLUTIONS,

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Defendants.
Plaintiff, Tony Anthony Day, filed a pro se complaint against defendants
Minnehaha County, Minnehaha County Jail, and Correct Care Solutions. After
an initial screening, the court directed service of the complaint. Subsequently,
Correct Care Solutions moved for judgment on the pleadings. Minnehaha
County and Minnehaha County Jail separately moved for judgment on the
pleadings. Day resists both motions.1 For the following reasons, the motions for
judgment on the pleadings are granted.
BACKGROUND
Day was incarcerated in the Minnehaha County Jail. Correct Care
Solutions is a private entity that provides healthcare services at the Minnehaha
County Jail under a contract with the county. Day alleges that he suffers from

Day moves for dismissal of the Rule 12(c) motions and for a judgment
in his favor based on alleged fraudulent misrepresentations by opposing
counsel. Docket 37. The court sees no misconduct or false statements in the
record by defense counsel. Accordingly, to the extent Day’s filing is a request
for judgment in his favor, it is denied.
1

bipolar disorder and was prescribed medication to address his mental health
needs. According to Day, during his incarceration, mental health staff reduced
his dosage, which resulted in mood swings, anxiety, antisocial tendencies,
paranoia, and aggressive behavior.
Day also claims to have nerve damage in his leg due to a stabbing injury.
He suggests that he needs painkillers to control the pain. He also had special
shoes that cushioned his step to relieve pain and used a cane. Day alleges that
jail staff tricked him into taking off his shoes upon intake by telling him they
would replace them with another pair, but then later told him he did not meet
the criteria for special shoes. He also alleges that his cane was taken away but
provides little detail regarding who made that decision, why it was made, or
what harm he suffered by being deprived of his cane.
Day reports that he informed medical staff of his medical issues on
numerous occasions but staff did not respond to his complaints until he
threatened to sue. Day contends that the reduction in his dosage and lack of
response to or follow-up on his mental health needs led him to getting in
numerous fights that resulted in physical injury and disciplinary action.
Therefore, Day claims that Correct Care Solutions, Minnehaha County Jail,
and Minnehaha County are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberately
disregarding his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s

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prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.2 Day seeks a total of
$80 million in damages.
LEGAL STANDARD
When reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), the court applies the same standard as
that on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).3 See Westcott v. City of
Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that courts review a Rule
12(c) motion under the same standard that governs a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).
“Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when there are no material facts to
resolve and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Mills v.
City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 497–98 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Faibisch v.
Univ. of Minn., 304 F.3d 797, 803 (8th Cir. 2002)). “The facts pleaded by the
non-moving party must be accepted as true and all reasonable inferences from
the pleadings should be taken in favor of the non-moving party.” Id. The court

At the screening stage, the court dismissed Day’s claims for negligent
provision of medical care because negligence and medical malpractice claims
are not cognizable under § 1983. Docket 10 at 6.
2

The court applies a similar standard when performing an initial
screening of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Although
the court is unaware of any Eighth Circuit precedent directly addressing this
issue, the fact that a complaint survives screening should not foreclose
subsequent Rule 12 motions even though the standards overlap. See Teahan v.
Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (concluding that the
screening and dismissal procedure in § 1915A “is cumulative of, not a
substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that the defendant may
choose to bring”); see also Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1128 (8th Cir.
1996) (noting that the Prison Litigation Reform Act “provides that a district
court may dismiss an action filed in forma pauperis ‘at any time’ if the court
determined that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted”).
3

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may consider the pleadings themselves, materials embraced by the pleadings,
exhibits attached to the pleadings, and matters of public record. Id. (citing
Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999)).
Pro se complaints, “ ‘however inartfully pleaded,’ [are] held to ‘less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ ” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972)). Nonetheless, a pro se complaint must comply with the minimal
requirements set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
specifically require pleadings to contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Although a pro se complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it
must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A pro se complaint must “allege facts sufficient to
support the claims advanced.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.
2004). The court is not required to “supply additional facts, nor will [it]
construct a legal theory that assumes facts that have not been pleaded.” Id.
(citing Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989)). If the complaint
does not contain these bare essentials, dismissal is appropriate. Beavers v.
Lockhart, 755 F.2d 657, 663 (8th Cir. 1985).
DISCUSSION
“[T]o state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts to show ‘(1) that the defendant(s) acted under color of state law,

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and (2) that the alleged wrongful conduct deprived the plaintiff of a
constitutionally protected federal right.’ ” Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 848
(8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564, 571 (8th
Cir. 2009)).
“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes ‘the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the
Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). “This is true whether the indifference is manifested by
prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in
intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally
interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Id. at 104–05. But “this does
not mean, however, that every claim by a prisoner that he has not received
adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at
105. “[A] prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Id. at 106.
The deliberate indifference standard includes both an objective and
subjective component. Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir.
1997) (citing Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997)). The
plaintiff “must demonstrate (1) that he suffered objectively serious medical
needs and (2) that the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately
disregarded those needs.” Id. (citing Coleman, 114 F.3d at 784). “A serious
medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily

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recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Coleman, 114 F.3d at 784. To
be liable for deliberately disregarding medical needs, “the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
I.

Minnehaha County Jail
Under South Dakota law, jails are established by the board of county

commissioners and operated at county expense. SDCL 24-11-2. “[C]ounty jails
are not legal entities amenable to suit.” Owens v. Scott Cnty. Jail, 328 F.3d
1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003). Day does not argue otherwise. Accordingly,
Minnehaha County Jail is entitled to judgment on the pleadings.
II.

Minnehaha County
A governmental entity is liable under § 1983 “only when the entity itself

is a moving force behind the violation. That is, the entity’s official policy or
custom must have caused the constitutional violation.” Clay v. Conlee, 815
F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 1987). To subject the county to liability, Day must
show that the alleged constitutional violations stemmed from an
unconstitutional policy or custom. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)
(quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)). “ ‘[I]t is when
execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.’ ” Ricketts v. City of
Columbia, Mo., 36 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 1994) (alterations and emphasis

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retained) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Serv., 426 U.S. 658,
694 (1977)).
Day states that he wants to hold Minnehaha County responsible for the
behavior of certain Correct Care Solutions employees who deprived him of his
medication. See Docket 1-1 at 5. His complaint also suggests that jail
personnel may have been responsible for taking his shoes and cane. But Day
provides no evidence of any policy or custom of Minnehaha County to act in an
unconstitutional manner. Without evidence of a policy or custom inflicting a
constitutional injury, the county cannot be held liable.
Furthermore, differences in medical opinions or treatments do not
amount to constitutional violations. See Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096
(8th Cir. 2000) (“The prisoner must show more than negligence, more even
than gross negligence, and mere disagreement with treatment decisions does
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”). Even if Day could point to
some sort of pattern or custom, it would not be unconstitutional for prison
mental health staff to limit Day to a lower dosage of medication if they believed
that was an appropriate treatment. Additionally, jail staff members are not
policymakers such that their actions can be interpreted as a policy of the
county. See Jenkins v. Cnty. of Hennepin, Minn., 557 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir.
2009).
Because there is no evidence of a policy or custom of Minnehaha County
that is the moving force behind a constitutional violation, Day cannot establish
that Minnehaha County may be liable for the constitutional violations, if any,

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Day suffered. Accordingly, Minnehaha County is entitled to judgment on the
pleadings.
III.

Correct Care Solutions
A private party can be held liable under § 1983 where it acts under color

of state law. See, e.g., Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980). Here, Day has
alleged that Correct Care Solutions acted under color of state law. Nonetheless,
“a corporation acting under color of state law will only be held liable under
§ 1983 for its own unconstitutional policies.” Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
984 F.2d 972, 975-76 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). “The
proper test is whether there is a policy, custom or action by those who
represent official policy that inflicts injury actionable under § 1983.” Id. at 976.
Day seems to base his complaint in large part on the fact that his preincarceration dosage of certain mood-stabilizing medication was 100 mg, but
he was initially only given 25 mg, which was later increased to 50 mg. He also
contends that at least two Correct Care Solution employees ignored his
complaints and failed to recognize the behavioral symptoms of his decreased
medication levels. These allegations may amount to negligence but they do not
establish the requisite subjective disregard of a serious medical condition. Even
if Day could establish that his constitutional rights were violated, he has not
made any allegations or included facts in his complaint about any policy or
custom of Correct Care Solutions. He also has not alleged any act by a
policymaker for which Correct Care Solutions could be held responsible.

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Because Day has not alleged a basis on which Correct Care Solutions may be
liable, Correct Care Solutions is entitled to judgment on the pleadings.
CONCLUSION
Minnehaha County Jail is not an entity amenable to suit. Minnehaha
County and Correct Care Solutions can only be held liable if a constitutional
violation was the result of a policy or custom. The pleadings reveal no
allegations of any policies or customs of either entity that played a role in the
harms Day alleges he suffered. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the motions for judgment on the pleadings by Correct
Care Solutions (Docket 33) and Minnehaha County and Minnehaha County
Jail (Docket 35) are granted, and the complaint is dismissed..
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss defendants’ Rule
12(c) motions by Tony Anthony Day (Docket 37) is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for a protective order and a
stay on discovery by Correct Care Solutions (Docket 41) is denied as moot.
Dated March 4, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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