Larson v. Colvin
Filing
18
OPINION AND ORDER affirming in part but vacating and remanding the Commissioner's decision. Signed by U.S. District Judge Roberto A. Lange on 3/1/16. (SLW)
I
f
I
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
4:14-CV-04157-RAL
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING IN
PART BUT VACATING AND
REMANDING THE COMMISSIONER'S
DECISION
Defendant.
Plaintiff Neil T. Larson ("Larson") seeks reversal of the Commissioner of Social
Security's decision denying Larson disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income (collectively "social security benefits"). For the reasons explained below, this Court
affirms in part the Commissioner's decision, but vacates and remands the decision for further
consideration.
I.
Background
A. ProceduralBackground
Larson last worked on August 15, 2007, which he contends to be the onset date of his
claimed disability. AR 225, 232. 1 In 2009, Larson filed claims for social security benefits,
which were denied in 2010 after an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge
("ALJ").
1
AR 65-75.
r
t
f
SOUTHERN DIVISION
NEIL T. LARSON,
I
There is limited information in the appeal record before this Court
The appeal record before this Court will be cited as "AR" followed by the page or page
numbers.
concerning that prior case, although the Notice of Decision-Unfavorable and the decision of the
ALJ from 20 l 0 are part of the record. AR 65-75. Larson did not appeal from that 2010 denial
of social security benefits.
On May 25, 2011, Larson protectively filed an application for supplemental security
benefits and an application for disability insurance benefits. AR 225-38. Larson's filings did
not seek reconsideration of the prior ALJ decision, but involved resubmission of infonnation and
apparently different or at least additional records. The Commissioner denied Larson's claims
initially on July 26, 2011. AR 125-27. Larson requested reconsideration, AR 128-31, and the
claims were denied upon reconsideration on March 12, 2012. AR 102-24. Larson then sought a
hearing before an ALJ, which was conducted on March 20, 2013. AR 34, 37-64. In April of
2013, the ALJ issued his decision denying Larson's claims for social security benefits. AR
7-21.
Larson then hired a new attorney, AR 32-33, who appealed to the appeals council and
submitted new material, AR 314-18, 553-72. The new material included old medical records
from prior hospitalizations and a recent evaluation of Larson by neuropsychologist James A.
Dickerson. AR 313-18, 508-72. The extensive neuropsychological evaluation directly undercut
the ALJ's foundation for denying social security benefits to Larson and raised other issues about
potentially severe cognitive and psychological impainnents impacting Larson's ability to work.
·See AR 553-72. The appeals council purportedly considered this new infonnation in stating, "In
looking at your case, we considered the reasons you disagree with the decision and the additional
evidence listed on the enclosed Order of Appeals Council."
AR l; see also AR 4 (listing
Dickerson report and additional material concerning Larson's hospitalizations for acute
pancreatitis).
Without any further explanation, the appeals council then included its stock
2
language: "We found that this information does not provide a basis for changing the
Administrative Law Judge's decision." AR 2.
In considering the record as a whole, this Court
disagrees that Dr. Dickerson's report can be so casually dismissed with regard to determining
Larson's residual functional capacity ("RFC") and ability to perform a light-duty job, such that
remand on those issues is proper. This Court, however, affirms the ALJ's decisions on certain
other matters challenged by Larson.
B. Factual Background
Larson was born in May of 1970. AR 39, 225. He has no children and has never been
married. AR 51-52, 232-33. Since 2011, Larson has lived in a subsidized housing unit and has
been supporting himself through moneys his parents give him and welfare programs, including
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits. AR 51, 226-231. Larson is adopted and
was raised in Beresford. AR 269, 556. He dropped out of high school toward the end of his
senior year and ultimately received a GED. AR 39. He attended vocational school in Mitchell
for architectural drafting and building construction for one year. AR 39. His work history
primarily has been in the food service industry, although he worked during 1999 and 2000 doing
painting for a commercial grain dryer business where he had to lift up to 70 pounds. AR 39-40.
Thereafter his employment was in making sandwiches or pizzas and in delivering pizzas. AR
39-40, 243-92. He last worked in August of 2007 delivering pizzas, but was fired from that job
reportedly for taking too long to complete the work.
AR 40-41.
Larson testified that his
diabetes and other problems caused him to become tired and fatigued, such that by August of
2007 he could no longer perform the duties of that job. AR 41-42.
Larson's medical history is significant for two critical bouts with acute pancreatitis.
Larson was hospitalized in June and July of 2002 for treatment of severe pancreatitis. AR
3
508-29. After his discharge, Larson resumed work. AR 277-81. However, Larson apparently
stopped taking medication to treat his pancreatic issues and became critically ill in late December
of2004. AR 531-32. Larson was hospitalized from December 30, 2004, until January 28, 2005,
with a life-threatening bout of acute pancreatitis. AR 531-52. Larson at one point was subject
to a do-not-resuscitate order during part of that one month of hospitalization.
AR 532.
However, Larson was able to engage in substantial gainful employment for most of the next two
years after his discharge from this second hospitalization. AR 277.
The record is devoid of documentation as to Larson's health around the alleged date of
the onset of disability-August 15, 2007. Besides the hospitalizations for acute pancreatitis, the
earliest medical records in the appeal record before this Court are from 2009. Larson typically
sought medical care from Falls Community Health, which provides health care for low income
or indigent individuals. AR 43. By 2009, Larson had poorly-controlled diabetes and issues with
his knees and back.
AR 358-59.
The records from 2010 from Falls Community Health
characterize Larson as having diabetes, poorly controlled; low back pain with pain radiating
down the right leg at times; and obesity. AR 345-58. A record from January of 2010 mentions
the possible need for Larson to undergo a psychiatric examination. AR 356. However, the
records from 2010 do not support a conclusion of cardiovascular problems at that time. See AR
356 ("No cardiovascular symptoms"); AR 352 (noting heart rate, rhythm, and sounds as normal).
Larson's medical records from 2011 reflect poorly-controlled diabetes, as well as high
cholesterol. AR 338-41, 362. In March of 2011, Larson reported feeling fairly well, but having
trouble sleeping. AR 341. Those records characterize Larson as being resistant to any changes
suggested on how he might better regulate his diabetes and address other health issues. AR 341.
4
In late April of 2011, Larson went to Sanford USO Medical Center for chest pain and
shortness of breath. AR 320. Although his blood sugar was within the range of normalcy,
Larson felt dizzy and had an elevated heart rate. AR 326. Larson's symptoms resolved, and he
was discharged to go home. AR 330. Subsequent records from Falls Community Health reflect
that his chest pain was resolved, but that he was continuing to have low back pain as well as left
shoulder pain from sleeping on it wrong. AR 338.
In June of 2011, Larson visited Falls Community Health, where his blood sugar range
was reported to be very high at times, and where his trouble sleeping was noted. AR 368.
According to the records, his "[b ]ack [is] feeling better but he continues to have some bad days,
but the good days are more frequent than before." AR 368. In the summer of 2011, Larson was
on a series of medications, including Crestor, 2 Actos, 3 TriCor, 4 Flonase, 5 HydrochlorothiazideLisinopril, 6 Singulair, 7 Cozaar, 8 as well regular insulin for control of his ongoing diabetes. AR
333.
2
Crestor "is used together with a proper diet to lower cholesterol and triglycerides (fats) in the
blood."
Rosuvastatin (Oral Route), Mayo Clinic, http://www.mayoclinic.org/drugssupplements/rosuvastatin-oral-route/description/drg-20065889 (last updated Jan. l, 2016).
Crestor may help slow or prevent medical problems including hardening of the arteries and
certain blood vessel and heart problems. Id.
3
Actos helps control blood sugar levels and is taken by patients to help treat type 2 diabetes.
Pioglitazone
(Oral
Route),
Mayo
Clinic,
http://www.mayoclinic.org/drugssupplements/pioglitazone-oral-route/description/drg-20065503 (last updated Dec. 1, 2015).
4
TriCor is used by patients to treat high cholesterol and triglyceride levels. Fenofibrate (Oral
Route),
Mayo
Clinic,
http://www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/fenofibrate-oralroute/description/drg-20068427 (last updated Nov. 1, 2015). TriCor "may help prevent the
development of pancreatitis ... caused by high levels of triglycerides in the blood." Id.
5
Flonase is a nasal corticosteroid that is used to treat "stuffy nose, irritation, and discomfort of
hay fever, other allergies, and other nasal problems." Corticosteriod (Nasal Route), Mayo Clinic,
http://www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/corticosteroid-nasal-route/description/drg20070513 (last updated Nov. 1, 2015).
6
Hydrochlorothiazide-Lisinopril is a combination drug that treats high blood pressure. Lisinopril
And Hydrochlorothiazide (Oral Route), Mayo Clinic, http://www.mayoclinic.org/drugssupplements/lisinopril-and-hydrochlorothiazide-oral-route/description/drg-20069073
(last
5
On July 23, 2011, non-examining physician Kevin Whittle issued two separate but very
similar Disability Determination Explanations. AR 81-100. Dr. Whittle received certain listed
medical records through June of 2011. AR 83-84, 93-94. Dr. Whittle determined that Larson
had severe impairments of diabetes mellitus, spine disorders, and sleep-related breathing
disorders, but that Larson appeared to overstate his limitations. AR 86, 96. Dr. Whittle assessed
Larson's functional limitations and noted Larson could: occasionally lift or carry twenty pounds,
frequently lift and carry ten pounds, sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday, frequently climb
stairs and ladders, and frequently stoop, bend, or crouch.
AR 86-87, 96-97.
Dr. Whittle
concluded and opined that Larson did not have the ability to perform past relevant work, but had
the RFC to perform light work and thus was not disabled. AR 89, 99.
Larson twice more in 2011 received emergency room care for chest pain. On August 14,
2011, Larson presented to Sanford USD Medical Center because of having a headache,
dizziness, and chest discomfort. AR 393. His symptoms resolved, and a cardiac referral simply
confirmed the previously diagnosed diabetes, hypertension, and dyslipidemia.
AR 393-95.
Larson presented again to the emergency room on October 9, 2011, with chest pain. AR 377.
updated Dec. 1, 2015). "Lisinopril is an angiotensin converting enzyme ... inhibitor" that
blocks the substance which causes blood vessels to constrict. Id. "Hydrochlorothiazide is a
thiazide diuretic (water pill) ... [that] reduces the amount of water in the body by increasing the
flow of urine which helps lower the blood pressure." Id.
7
Singulair treats and prevents asthma by decreasing the "symptoms and the number of acute
asthma attacks." Montelukast (Oral Route), Mayo Clinic, http://www.mayoclinic.org/drugssupplements/montelukast-oral-route/description/drg-20064902 (last updated Dec. 1, 2015).
Singulair is also "used to prevent exercise-induced bronchoconstriction (EIB), and treat
symptoms of seasonal (short-term) or perennial (long-term) allergies, such as sneezing, runny
nose, itching, or wheezing." Id.
8
Cozaar "is an angiotensin II receptor blocker" which is used to treat high blood pressure and
"may reduce the risk of strokes and heart attacks." Losartan (Oral Route), Mayo Clinic,
http://www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/losartan-oral-route/description/drg-2006734 l
(last updated Jan. 1, 2016). Patients with type 2 diabetes who have had a history of high blood
pressure may also take Cozaar to treat kidney problems. Id.
6
Larson underwent a stress test, where there were no significant abnormal findings, and Larson
himself expressed the view that personal stress likely caused his temporary chest pain. AR 377.
Larson reportedly seemed depressed, but would not share what psychological stressors he felt.
AR 377-78.
On February 27, 2012, psychologist Shelley Sandbulte at Family Services, Inc.,
completed a report for South Dakota Disability Determination Services regarding her assessment
of Larson. AR 397--404. Larson was cooperative, direct, and forthright during Sandbulte's
interview of him. AR 397. Larson denied any past psychiatric or psychological issues. AR 397.
Larson talked of having been teased and bullied through life. AR 398. Larson reported having a
neck and back injury from a 1994 motor vehicle accident and described his two serious bouts of
pancreatitis. AR 398. Larson also spoke of his recent emergency room visits and mentioned
feeling sleep deprived. AR 398. Larson described his educational background and his work
history, including being fired from his final job in 2007 because, in his assessment, his unstable
blood sugars affected his work performance. AR 399-400. Larson talked of a somewhat lonely
existence, having two friends and socializing mostly in the community room of his apartment
complex. AR 400. Larson described himself as somewhat depressed and complained of low
back pain and right hip pain, causing him to spend much of his time lying on a floor. AR 40 l.
Sandbulte did not observe Larson shifting in his chair or moving about during the interview,
however. AR 401. Larson performed normally on some simple cognitive tests administered by
Sandbulte. AR 402-04. Larson acknowledged that he can drive and shop and that his parents
pay for much of his bills. AR 402.
Sandbulte's diagnostic impression of Larson included possible dysthymia; dependent
personality disorder with possible self-centeredness and a sense of entitlement; physical
7
complications of diabetes, obesity, low back pain, leg pain, COPD, sleep apnea, and varicose
veins by self-report; and psychological stressors. AR 402. Sandbulte was unsure if Larson's
depression was due to declining health or a product of his lack of motivation in being proactive
about his own health and independence. AR 403. Sandbulte ultimately opined "that there are no
psychiatric or psychological issues that would interfere in [Larson's] ability to be employed
and/or negatively impact his activities of daily living." AR 404. Sandbulte concluded that the
issue of disability, in her view, turned on the effect of his physical issues, including diabetes and
obesity. AR 404.
In April of 2012, Larson reported to Sanford USO Medical Center with symptoms of
shaking, possibly from elevated blood sugar. AR 406. The symptoms resolved and he was sent
home. AR 405-13.
On October 19, 2012, Larson presented to Sanford USO Medical Center with nausea and
lightheadedness.
AR 415.
His blood sugar reading was 292 at that time, his weight was
recorded as 290 pounds, and he had chronic low back pain.
hospitalized until October 21, 2012, with diabetic ketoacidosis.
AR 415-16.
Larson was
Doc. 415--45.
He was
discharged with instructions to keep his blood sugar in good control through medication, diet,
and exercise. AR 424. During the hospitalization, he underwent an assessment for sleep-related
desaturation, with the finding of possible desaturation in early morning hours. AR 444.
On November 27, 2012, Larson was seen at Heuermann Counseling Clinic, which
provides mental health care to low and no income individuals in Sioux Falls, for anxiety related
to his upcoming disability hearing. AR 449.
Larson was hospitalized from December 28 until December 31, 2012, at Sanford USO
Medical Center due to reported chest pain. AR 450. Larson underwent a series of tests as a
8
result.
AR 450-60. A venous duplex study was largely normal, but recorded evidence of
superficial venous insufficiency of his right lower extremity. AR 460. There was no evidence of
deep venous thrombosis or superficial thrombophlebitis of either the right or left lower
extremity. AR 460. Larson's discharge summary stated that "he has multiple excuses as to why
he cannot change his diet or exercise, most related to money and agoraphobia." 9 AR 465. The
discharge summary also noted that his diabetes was poorly controlled and that he was on the
maximum dosing of Crestor and Tricor for triglycerides. AR 466. The findings of Larson's
nuclear stress test were described as containing a "small defect, with intensity that is mildly
reduced." AR 467.
The appeal record contains few medical records concerning Larson's treatment after
2012. Larson visited Falls Community Health on January 14, 2013, with a chief complaint of
low back pain ongoing for a couple of years. AR 462. Larson described that chiropractic
treatment helped him for only a day and that he had no money for an MRI. AR 462. Larson
complained of pain radiating down both legs. AR 462. Larson also mentioned that he had been
in the hospital for a cardiology workup, the results of which were good. AR 462.
The administrative hearing before the ALJ then occurred on March 20, 2013. AR 37. At
the administrative hearing, Larson testified about his education and work, as detailed above. AR
38-56. Larson described his physical issues and treatment, focusing on diabetes, varicose veins
in his right leg, low back pain, leg weakness, dizziness due to high blood sugars, and high blood
pressure. AR 42-46. Larson spoke of having trouble sleeping due to his discomfort, sleeping on
a mat on his floor, limits to his sitting to a two-hour period and no more than four hours in a day,
trouble standing for more than three hours in a day and no more than half an hour at a time, and
9
Agoraphobia is "a fear of being in open or public spaces." Agoraphobia, Merriam-Webster,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/agoraphobia (last visited Feb. 23, 2016).
9
ability to walk for forty-five minutes to an hour at a time and no more than two hours in a day.
AR 48-50. Larson said that he could lift up to sixty pounds when his back was not bothering
him.
AR 51.
Larson lived alone and his activities primarily include watching television,
listening to the radio, surfing the internet, and laying around. AR 46-47, 52. Larson testified
that he makes his own meals, has his own car, and walks his apartment building for exercise.
AR 52.
In answers to questions by the ALJ, Larson acknowledged that his primary care
physician had not placed limitations on him and that his mental health issue was anxiety. AR 54.
Larson described himself as being a bit less healthy at the time of the 2013 hearing than he had
been in 2010, during the prior hearing with the ALJ. AR 55-56.
The ALJ at the administrative hearing then called vocational expert James Miller as a
witness. AR 56. Miller initially testified that Larson's past job as a pizza delivery person would
fit his limitations, but that his other past work would not. AR 58. Miller saw no reduction in
Larson's ability to do a full range of unskilled light work and singled out the unskilled job of a
mail clerk as being one that Larson could perform.
AR 59-60.
On cross-examination by
Larson's counsel, Miller conceded that the limitations that Larson described in his testimony
would render him incapable of returning to the pizza delivery job. AR 61-62.
C. ALJ Ruling and Appeals Council Consideration
The ALJ issued his decision in April 2, 2013, denying Larson's applications for benefits.
AR 10-2 l. The ALJ concluded that Larson met the insured status requirement of the Social
Security Act through December 31, 2012. AR 12. The ALJ appropriately analyzed Larson's
claim under the sequential five-step evaluation process in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) and
416.920(a).
Under "the familiar five-step process" to determine whether an individual is
disabled, Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 929 (8th Cir. 2010), "[t]he ALJ 'consider[s]
10
I
!
whether: (1) the claimant was employed; (2) she was severely impaired; (3) her impairment is,
or was comparable to, a listed impairment; (4) she could perform past relevant work; and, if not,
(5) whether she could perform any other kind of work." Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 921
(8th Cir. 2011) (second alteration in original) (quoting Halverson, 600 F.3d at 929); see also 20
C.F .R. § 416.920 (detailing the five-step process used in evaluation claims).
At the first step, the ALJ determined that Larson had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since the alleged onset date of the claimed disability, August 15, 2007. AR 12. At step
two, the ALJ found that Larson suffered from the following severe impairments:
diabetes
mellitus, obesity, degenerative disc disease, and a sleep disorder. AR 12. The ALJ chose not to
consider hypertension or cardiovascular issues to be a severe impairment because Larson's
hypertension could be controlled by medication and his cardiovascular workup and history
indicated his issues to be non-severe. AR 13. The ALJ considered Larson's mental health
impairments to be minimal limitations. AR 13. At step three, the ALJ determined that Larson
did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the
severity of one of the listed impairments. AR 14-15. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ
considered degenerative disc disease, diabetes, and obesity from among the listings. AR 15.
At step four, the ALJ determined that Larson was unable to perform any past relevant
work. AR 19. In doing so, the ALJ appeared to credit Larson's testimony of his limitations and
depart from Miller's initial testimony that Larson could do light-duty work generally including
his past work as a pizza maker and delivery man. See AR 19, 58-60. Rather, the ALJ appeared
to accept the position of Larson's counsel in cross-examination of Miller, where Miller
acknowledged that Larson's description of his limitations would render him unable to return to
his pizza delivery job. See AR 61-62. Nevertheless, under the step-five analysis of whether
11
I
l
t
I
I
i
I
!
Larson could perform any other work, the ALJ concluded that Larson had the RFC to perform
light-duty work. AR 15-19. In reaching that conclusion, the ALJ drew from the assessment
done by Dr. Whittle in July of 2011. AR 18-19; see AR 81-100. In concluding that jobs
existed in significant numbers in the.national economy that Larson could perform, the ALJ relied
t
i
•
f
l
I
i
on the vocational expert's opinion that Larson could work as a "mail clerk." AR 20 (emphasis
I
J
omitted). The ALJ therefore concluded that Larson was not disabled. AR 20-21.
r
~·
After the ALJ' s decision, Larson retained new counsel, who in tum requested that
neuropsychologist James A. Dickerson evaluate Larson. AR 32-33, 553-66. On October 27,
2013, Dr. Dickerson undertook a neuropsychological evaluation of Larson. AR 553. Dickerson
reviewed medical records, including Larson's hospitalizations in 2002 and in late 2004 and early
2005 for acute pancreatitis. AR 552-54. During that second hospitalization, Larson had been on
mechanical ventilation and very critically ill. AR 531-32, 553-54. Dr. Dickerson interviewed
Larson's adoptive parents, who described him as not seeming to "get it," having difficulty
planning his time, struggling to finish tasks, not learning from experience, having difficulty
communicating, having unusual sleep patterns, and shopping at night to avoid any crowds. AR
554-55. Larson's adoptive parents also described circumstances of his birth and upbringing.
AR 556. Dr. Dickerson interviewed Larson and found him to be able to communicate well. AR
557. Dr. Dickerson deemed Larson to have a panic disorder and agoraphobia, illustrated by his
propensity to shop in the wee morning hours to avoid crowds. AR 558. Larson scored generally
well on intelligence testing and had a full scale IQ of 95. AR 559-60. However, Larson scored
very poorly on certain tests, including tests of processing speed and his verbal learning abilities.
AR 560. Larson passed a series of tests and demonstrated himself to be a good visual learner,
AR 561-62, but did not pass other tests, AR 563.
12
Dr. Dickerson believed Larson to have
,
'
l
t
I
I
I
dementia due to organ failure and encephalopathy, panic disorder with agoraphobia, and
dysthymia. AR 563. Dr. Dickerson then explained that survivors of critical illness can suffer
prolonged and disabling cognitive impairments with lasting cognitive effects. AR 564. Dr.
Dickerson ultimately opined that his neuropsychological testing revealed that "Mr. Larson could
not specifically perform the 209.687-026 Mail Clerk Job." AR 570. Dr. Dickerson reasoned
that Larson lacked the cognitive abilities and dexterity to do such work.
AR 570.
Dr.
Dickerson's opinion thus directly undercut the ALJ's conclusion that Larson could work as a
mail clerk.
The appeals council had before it information that the ALJ did not-specifically, records
from Larson's hospitalizations for acute pancreatitis and Dr. Dickerson's report. AR 4. The
appeals council purported to take these matters into consideration by noting, "In looking at your
case, we considered the reasons you disagree with the decision and the additional evidence listed
on the enclosed Order of Appeals Council." AR 1, 4. Without any further explanation, the
appeals council stated: "We found that this information does not provide a basis for changing
the Administrative Law Judge's decision." AR 2. Basically, the appeals council decision is the
stock form for denying review that this Court has previously and repeatedly seen from the
appeals council.
II.
Standard of Review and Preliminary Issues
A. "Substantial Evidence in the Record as a Whole" Standard
When considering whether the Commissioner properly denied social security benefits, a
court must "determine whether the decision is based on legal error, and whether the findings of
fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole." Collins v. Astrue, 648 F.3d
869, 871 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971 (8th Cir. 2000)); see also
13
Nowling v. Colvin, No. 14-2170, slip op. at 12-13 (8th Cir. Feb. 22, 2016). "Legal error may be
an error of procedure, the use of erroneous legal standards, or an incorrect application of the
law," id. (internal citations omitted), and such errors are reviewed de novo, id. (quoting Juszczyk
v. Astrue, 542 F.3d 626, 633 (8th Cir. 2008)).
The Commissioner's decision must be supported by substantial evidence in the record as
a whole. Evans v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 832, 833 (8th Cir. 1994); see Nowling, slip op. at 12-13;
Chaney v. Colvin, No. 14-3433, slip op. at 4 (8th Cir. Feb. 3, 2016). "Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla," Consol. Edison Co. ofN.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938), but
"less than a preponderance," Maresh v. Barnhart, 438 F.3d 897, 898 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting
McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000)); see also Nowling, slip op. at 13. It is
that which "a reasonable mind would find adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion."
Miller v. Colvin, No. 14-1639, slip op. at 6 (8th Cir. Apr. 27, 2015) (quoting Davis v. Apfel, 239
F.3d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 2001)); accord Nowling, slip op. at 13; Burress v. Apfel, 141 F.3d 875,
878 (8th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Chater, 86 F.3d 823, 826 (8th Cir. 1996). "[T]he 'substantial
evidence in the record as a whole' standard is not synonymous with the less rigorous 'substantial
evidence' standard[.]" Burress, 141 F.3d at 878. "'Substantial evidence on the record as a
whole' ... requires a more scrutinizing analysis." Gavin v. Heckler, 811 F .2d 1195, 1199 (8th
Cir. 1987) (quotation omitted.).
A reviewing court therefore must "consider evidence that supports the [Commissioner's]
decision along with evidence that detracts from it." Siemers v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 299, 301 (8th
Cir. 1995); see also Nowling, slip op. at 13. In doing so, the court may not make its own
findings of fact, but must treat the Commissioner's findings that are supported by substantial
evidence as conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Benskin v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 878, 882 (8th
14
Cir. 1987) (noting that reviewing courts are "governed by the general principle that questions of
fact, including the credibility of a claimant's subject testimony, are primarily for the
(Commissioner] to decide, not the courts").
"If, after undertaking this review, [the court]
determine[s] that 'it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of
those positions represents the (Commissioner's] findings, [the court] must affirm the decision of
the [Commissioner]." Siemers, 47 F.3d at 301 (quoting Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 838
(8th Cir. 1992); see also Chaney, slip op. at 4 (quoting Dixon v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 602, 605 (8th
Cir. 2003)). The court "may not reverse simply because [it] would have reached a different
conclusion than the ALJ or because substantial evidence supports a contrary conclusion."
Miller, slip op. at 6 (quoting Blackbum v. Colvin, 761 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2014)); see also
Nowling, slip op. at 13.
B. Effect of Prior Decision
Larson's previous application for social security benefits was denied in 2010 and not
appealed. AR 65-75. The Commissioner and Larson debate the effect of res judicata as it
relates to Larson's previous application and denial of benefits. Doc. 16 at 2; Doc. 17 at 2-4.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has explained that "[r]es
judicata bars subsequent applications for [social security benefits] based on the same facts and
issues the Commissioner previously found to be insufficient to prove the claimant was disabled.
If res judicata applies, the medical evidence from the initial proceeding cannot be subsequently
reevaluated." Hillier v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 486 F.3d 359, 364-365 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal
citations and quotations omitted). In this case, however, Larson does not attempt to reopen the
ALJ' s 2010 decision denying benefits.
Instead, Larson is claiming that additional medical
evidence, when considered alongside some of the medical evidence before the ALJ in 2010,
15
establishes that he had multiple severe impairments during the time period relevant to the case
and is entitled to social security benefits. Medical evidence that predates a claimant's alleged
onset of disability date is not categorically irrelevant to a finding of a severe impairment. See
Groves v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 809, 810-11 (7th Cir. 1998) ("There thus is no absolute bar to the
admission in the second proceeding of evidence that had been introduced in the prior proceeding
yet had not persuaded the agency to award benefits. The 'readmission' of that evidence is barred
only if the finding entitled to collateral estoppel effect establishes that the evidence provides no
support for the current claim."); see also Hanneman v. Astrue, 11-CIV-4113-RAL, 2012 WL
1812424, at 9 (D.S.D. May 17, 2012); Smith v. Astrue, 09-CV-3065-DEO, 2011 WL 1230327,
at *3 n.8 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 30, 2011).
The prior decision of the Commissioner, from which Larson did not appeal, may
foreclose considering the disability onset date to have been in August of 2007, but does not
foreclose consideration of whether Larson is entitled to social security benefits at this time
because he became disabled thereafter. Larson, of course, must show that he was insured under
the Social Security Act when he became disabled to get disability insurance benefits. Hinchey v.
Shalala, 29 F.3d 428, 431 (8th Cir. 1994). However, as the ALJ found, Larson met the insured
status requirements under the Social Security Act through December 31, 2012. AR 10. Thus,
the prior, final decision from 2010 on Larson's entitlement to social security benefits in 2010
does not foreclose the possibility of his being entitled to such benefits under his present claim.
Moreover, the Commissioner did not assert res judicata as an affirmative defense or basis for
denial of Larson's claims. Doc. I I; see also Marcus v. Sullivan, 926 F.2d 604, 6I5-I6 (7th Cir.
I 99I) (a commissioner can waive res judicata through failing to raise it as an affirmative defense
in its answer).
I6
f
f
C. Effect of Submission of New Evidence to Appeals Council
Another preliminary issue important to this case is the effect of the submission of new
evidence by Larson between the time of the ALJ decision and the appeals council affirmance.
Where, as in Larson's case, the appeals council considers new evidence but denies review, a
district court "must determine whether the ALJ' s decision was supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole, including the new evidence." Davidson v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 987, 990
(8th Cir. 2007). The Eighth Circuit explained in Cunningham v. Apfel why this is the case:
The regulations provide that the Appeals Council must evaluate the entire record,
including any new and material evidence that relates to the period before the date
of the ALJ's decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b). The newly submitted
evidence thus becomes part of the "administrative record," even though the
evidence was not originally included in the ALJ's record. See Nelson v. Sullivan,
966 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1992). If the Appeals Council finds that the ALJ' s
actions, findings, or conclusions are contrary to the weight of the evidence,
including the new evidence, it will review the case. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b).
Here, the Appeals Council denied review, finding that the new evidence was
either not material or did not detract from the ALJ's conclusion. In these
circumstances, we do not evaluate the Appeals Council's decision to deny review,
but rather we determine whether the record as a whole, including the new
evidence, supports the ALJ's determination. See Nelson, 966 F.3d at 366.
222 F.3d 496, 500 (8th Cir. 2000); see also Riley v. Shalala, 18 F.3d 619, 622 (8th Cir. 1994).
Thus, this Court is not to decide whether the appeals council erred in denying review, but
to evaluate whether the records unavailable to the ALJ of the two hospitalizations for serious
pancreatitis and the subsequent neuropsychological evaluation are of such impact to prevent the
conclusion that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the ALJ's decision. In
short, this Court is left with the "peculiar task" of deciding "how the ALJ would have weighed
the new evidence had it existed at the initial hearing." Bergmann v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 1065, 1068
(8th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). "Critically, however, this Court may not reverse the decision
of the ALJ merely because substantial evidence may allow for a contrary decision." Id.
I
17
f
[
III.
Discussion of Issues Raised
Larson raises four issues with the ALJ's decision: I) whether the ALJ failed to identify
certain severe impairments at step two of the sequential evaluation; 2) whether the ALJ correctly
determined that Larson's impairments did not meet or equal a listed level impairment; 3) whether
the ALJ properly assessed RFC; and 4) whether the ALJ's findings in step five comported with
legal standards and substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Doc. 15 at 29. This decision
addresses each of these issues separately.
A. ALJ's Assessment of Severe Impairments at Step Two
At step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable
impairment that is "severe" or a combination of impairments is "severe."
§§ 404.1520(c), 416.921.
20 C.F.R.
An impairment or combinations of impairments is "severe" if it
significantly limits an individual's ability to perform basic work activities. Id. §§ 404.1520(c),
416.921 An impairment or combination of impairments is "not severe" when medical or other
evidence establishes only a slight abnormality having no more than a minimal effect on an
individual's ability to work. Id.§§ 404.1521, 416.921.
The claimant has the burden to establish that her impairments or combination of
impairments are severe. Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 2007). "Severity is not an
onerous requirement for the claimant to meet, but it is also not a toothless standard .... " Id. at
708 (internal citation omitted).
An impairment is "severe" if it "significantly limits [an
individual's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).
Basic work activities means "the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs."
§ 404.1521 (b ).
Id.
These abilities and aptitudes include "[p ]hysical functions such as walking,
standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling reaching, carrying, or handling;" "[ c ]apacities for
18
seeing, hearing, and speaking;" "[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple
instructions;" "[using] judgement;" "responding appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and
usual work situation; and" "[ d]ealing with changes in a routine work setting."
20 C.F .R.
§ 404.1521(b)(l)-(6). "An impairment is not severe if it amounts only to a slight abnormality
that would not significantly limit the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities." Kirby, 500 F.3d at 707. "The sequential evaluation process may be terminated at
step two only when the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments would have no
more than a minimal impact on her ability to work." Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Caviness v. Massanari, 250 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 2001)).
The ALJ concluded that Larson's diabetes mellitus, obesity, degenerative disc disease,
and sleep disorders were severe impairments. Larson takes issue with the ALJ not including
cardiovascular issues and possible small vessel or peripheral vascular disease being severe
impairments for Larson. 10
Mindful of the "substantial evidence in the record as a whole"
standard, this Court cannot conclude that the ALJ erred at step two by failing to include those
particular conditions among the severe impairments found. There is substantial evidence in the
medical records to conclude that Larson did not have a severe impairment on account of
cardiovascular issues or small vessel or peripheral vascular disease.
Larson had been to an emergency room on several occasions for feelings of chest pain,
but typically was released because the chest pain subsided. The chest pain prompting those
emergency room visits seemed to be caused by stress or abnormal blood sugars, and the medical
records do not connect the hospitalizations to a "severe" impairment of cardiovascular disease.
See AR 319-32, 372-96, 405-15.
While Larson was at Sanford USO Medical Center in
10
Larson did not challenge the ALJ's determination that Larson's mental health impairments
were minimal limitations, so this Court does not address that issue.
19
December of 2012, he underwent testing to evaluate the possible cause of periodic chest pain.
The test results described only a "small defect," with the only irregular finding being "evidence
of superficial venous insufficiency of the right lower extremity." AR 460, 467. Although
Larson had multiple risk factors-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?