Gard v. Dooley et al

Filing 43

ORDER granting 42 Motion to Stay; defendants shall file their motion based on the qualify immunity defense no later than May 2, 2016. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Veronica L. Duffy on 2/29/2016. (CG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
REX GARD,

4:14-CV-04183-LLP
Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY AND
SET DEADLINES

vs.
BOB DOOLEY, CHIEF WARDEN,
INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
JENIFER STANWICK, DEPUTY
WARDEN, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL
CAPACITY; REBECCA SCHIEFFER,
ASSOCIATE WARDEN, INDIVIDUAL
AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; SUSAN
JACOBS, ASSOCIATE WARDEN,
OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY;
TAMMY DEJONG, UNIT STAFF,
OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY;
AND OTHER DOC STAFF, UNKNOWN
AT THIS TIME, INDIVIDUAL AND
OFFICIAL CAPACITIES;

DOCKET NO. 42

Defendants.

This matter is before the court on plaintiff Rex Gard’s pro se amended
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et. seq. See Docket
Nos. 1 & 22. Defendants have filed a motion seeking an order from the court
staying discovery in this matter until such time as they are able to file a
dispositive motion on the defense of qualified immunity. See Docket No. 42.

In order to show a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Gard
must show (1) defendants acted under color or state law and (2) “ ‘the alleged
wrongful conduct deprived him of a constitutionally protected federal right.’ ”
Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Schmidt v. City of
Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564, 571 (8th Cir. 2009)). A prisoner claiming a RLUIPA
violation must show, as a threshold matter, that there is a substantial burden
on his ability to exercise his religion. Murphy v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections,
372 F.3d 979, 988 (8th Cir. 2004); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b).
RLUIPA does not waive the sovereign or 11th Amendment immunity of
states for money damages claims. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 285-88
(2011); Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639, 655 (8th Cir. 2009). Therefore, no
claim lies against the state itself for money damages under RLUIPA, nor will a
claim for money damages lie against an individual state official sued in his or
her official-capacity. Id. Furthermore, RLUIPA does not provide a claim
against state officials in their individual capacities for money damages. Sisney
v. Reisch, 533 F. Supp. 2d 952, 968 (D.S.D. 2008), reversed, sub nom, on other
grounds, Van Wyhe, 581 F.3d 639. Cf. Sossamon, 563 U.S. at 289 (stating
“[t]he question here is not whether Congress [in enacting RLUIPA] has given
clear direction that it intends to exclude a damages remedy, but whether
Congress has given clear direction that it intends to include a damages
remedy.”) (citation omitted). Therefore, the only claim allowed Mr. Gard on his
RLUIPA claim is a claim for injunctive relief against defendants who are sued in
their official capacities. Id.
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Qualified immunity protects government officials sued in their individual
capacities from liability and from having to defend themselves in a civil suit if
the conduct of the officials “does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Therefore, since RLUIPA does not encompass claims against officials who are
sued in their individual capacities, qualified immunity does not apply to
RLUIPA claims. Sisney, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 968; Sossamon, 563 U.S. at 289.
Qualified immunity is immunity from suit, not just a defense to liability
at trial. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The Supreme Court has
“repeatedly stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the
earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,
536 (1991).
To determine whether an official may partake of qualified immunity, two
factors must be determined: (1) whether the facts that plaintiff has shown
make out a violation of a constitutional right and (2) whether that
constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time of the official’s acts.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If the court finds that one of the two
elements is not met, the court need not decide the other element, and the court
may address the elements in any order it wishes “in light of the circumstances
of the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if the answer to either of the
Saucier prongs is “no.”

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“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make
reasonable but mistaken judgments,” and “protects ‘all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’ ” Stanton v. Sims, ___
U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131
S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986))).
“ ‘We do not require a case directly on point’ before concluding that the law is
clearly established, ‘but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.’ ” Stanton, 134 S. Ct. at 5. “ ‘Officials
are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing
bright lines.’ ” Ambrose v. Young, 474 F.3d 1070, 1077 (8th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Hunter, 502 U.S. at 229).
The Supreme Court has stated that “if the defendant does plead the
[qualified] immunity defense, the district court should resolve that threshold
question before permitting discovery.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,
598 (1998) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818); Hunter, 502 U.S. at 229. Only if
the plaintiff’s claims survive a dispositive motion on the issue of qualified
immunity will the plaintiff “be entitled to some discovery.” Crawford-El, 523
U.S. at 598. Even then, the Court has pointed out that FED. R. CIV. P. 26 “vests
the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor discovery narrowly and to dictate
the sequence of discovery.” Id. Such discretion includes the ability to
establish limits on the number of depositions and interrogatories, to limit the
length of depositions, to limit the number of requests to admit, to bar discovery

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on certain subjects, and to limit the time, place, and manner of discovery as
well as its timing and sequence. Id.
Here, defendants have asserted the affirmative defense of qualified
immunity. See Docket No. 26 at p. 4. That defense, however, is inapplicable to
Mr. Gard’s RLUIPA claim. Defendants seek a stay of all discovery until August
22, 2016, so they can file a motion seeking summary judgment on their
qualified immunity defense, which only applies to Mr. Gard’s § 1983 claims.
Balancing the need for discovery to go forward on the RLUIPA claim against
defendants’ right to have an early determination of the qualified immunity
defense under the above-discussed case law, the court concludes a stay is
appropriate, but not for the length of time defendants request, which is some
six months hence. Based on the foregoing, the court hereby
ORDERS that defendant’s motion to stay [Docket No. 42] is granted.
Defendants shall file their motion based on the qualified immunity defense as
soon as possible, but no later than May 2, 2016.
DATED this 29th day of February, 2016.
BY THE COURT:

VERONICA L. DUFFY
United States Magistrate Judge

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