Hicks v. Young et al

Filing 25

ORDER granting 23 Motion for Protective Order - discovery stayed; motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity defense to be filed by defendants no later than October 9, 2015. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Veronica L. Duffy on 8/13/2015. (CG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LAPETE R. HICKS, SR.,

4:15-CV-04048-KES

Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER, DOC 23

vs.
WARDEN DAREN YOUNG, ASSOCIATE
WARDEN TROY PONTO, DR. EUGENE
REGIER, DR. RYAN MANSON,
Defendants.

This matter is before the court on plaintiff LaPete R. Hicks, Sr.’s pro se
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Docket No. 1. Defendants have
filed a motion seeking a protective order from the court staying discovery in
this matter until such time as they are able to file a dispositive motion on the
defense of qualified immunity. See Docket No. 23.
In order to show a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Hicks
must show (1) defendants acted under color or state law and (2) “ ‘the alleged
wrongful conduct deprived him of a constitutionally protected federal right.’ ”
Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Schmidt v. City of
Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564, 571 (8th Cir. 2009)).
Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability and from
having to defend themselves in a civil suit if the conduct of the officials “does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity is immunity from
suit, not just a defense to liability at trial. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
526 (1985). Therefore, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly stressed the
importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in
litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 536 (1991).
To determine whether an official may partake of qualified immunity, two
factors must be determined: (1) whether the facts that plaintiff has shown
make out a violation of a constitutional right and (2) whether that
constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time of the official’s acts.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If the court finds that one of the two
elements is not met, the court need not decide the other element, and the court
may address the elements in any order it wishes “in light of the circumstances
of the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if the answer to either of the
Saucier prongs is “no.”
“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make
reasonable but mistaken judgments,” and “protects ‘all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’ ” Stanton v. Sims, ___
U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.
Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986))).
“ ‘We do not require a case directly on point’ before concluding that the law is
clearly established, ‘but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.’ ” Stanton, 134 S. Ct. at 5. “ ‘Officials
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are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing
bright lines.’ ” Ambrose v. Young, 474 F.3d 1070, 1077 (8th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)).
The Supreme Court has stated that “if the defendant does plead the
[qualified] immunity defense, the district court should resolve that threshold
question before permitting discovery.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,
598 (1998) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). Only if the plaintiff’s claims
survive a dispositive motion on the issue of qualified immunity will the plaintiff
“be entitled to some discovery.” Id. Even then, the Court has pointed out that
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 “vests the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor discovery
narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery.” Id. Such discretion
includes the ability to establish limits on the number of depositions and
interrogatories, to limit the length of depositions, to limit the number of
requests to admit, to bar discovery on certain subjects, and to limit the time,
place, and manner of discovery as well as its timing and sequence. Id.
Here, defendants have asserted the affirmative defense of qualified
immunity. See Docket No. 16. Based on the above law, the court hereby
ORDERS that defendant’s motion for protective order [Docket No. 23] is
granted. Defendants shall file their motion based on the qualified immunity
defense as soon as possible, but no later than October 9, 2015. It is further
ORDERED that defendant shall provide immediately to Mr. Hicks any
and all medical records, including kites regarding medical care, pertaining to
himself during his period of incarceration with defendants. This order is
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intended to cover all medical records for Mr. Hicks for the period indicated,
even if those records are in the custody of medical providers outside the South
Dakota state penitentiary system. If necessary, Mr. Hicks shall sign a release
allowing independent medical providers to disclose his medical records to
defendant in order to effectuate this order.
DATED this 13th day of August, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

VERONICA L. DUFFY
United States Magistrate Judge

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