Heine et al v. Pinkelman et al
Filing
27
Memorandum Opinion and Order granting 18 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by U.S. District Judge Lawrence L. Piersol on 5/12/2016. (JLS)
FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MAY 12 20
16
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EMERY HEINE, JR. and CHERYL HEINE, *
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CIV 15-4061
Plaintiffs,
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vs.
SHELBY R. PINKELMAN and BRIAN
KRAMER,
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Before the Court is Defendant Brian Kramer's (Kramer), a resident of Nebraska, motion
for summary judgment. The motion is opposed only by Plaintiffs Emery Heine, Jr. and Cheryl
Heine (Plaintiffs), who are residents of South Dakota. Defendant Shelby R. Pinkelman
(Pinkelman), a resident of Wyoming, did not file a response to Kramer's motion. For the
following reasons, the motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs' lawsuit is a negligence claim against Kramer and Pinkelman. The facts giving
rise to the action occurred on June 1, 2012 at the four-way intersection of Highway 57, Highway
84, and County Road 882. The intersection is south of Harington, Cedar County, Nebraska.
Plaintiffs and Defendants were deposed, as well as Plaintiffs' two witnesses, Thomas J. Becker
(Becker) and Karma J. Schulte (Schulte).
Highway 57 is a two-lane highway running north and south. Traffic travelling north or
south on Highway 57 has the right-of-way at the intersection in issue. That is to say, traffic is not
controlled by stop lights, stop signs, or otherwise.
Highway 84 is also a two-lane highway and runs west from the point at which it
intersects with Highway 57. Thus, Highway 84 begins and ends at the intersection with Highway
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57. Traffic travelling east on Highway 84 is controlled by a stop sign at the intersection with
Highway 57.
County Road 882 is a gravel road that runs east from the point it intersects with Highway
57. Like Highway 84, County Road 882 begins and ends at its intersection with Highway 57.
Westbound traffic on County Road 882 is controlled by a stop sign at the intersection with
Highway 57.
Highway 84 and County Road 882 are offset from one another. Thus, a vehicle travelling
west on County Road 882 would be forced to tum right and travel north on Highway 57 for a
short period of time before being able to tum left and continue west on Highway 84. The
opposite is true for traffic travelling east on Highway 84. The speed limit on all three roads is 40
miles per hour. It is undisputed that no obstructions impeded the vision of any of the drivers at
the intersection. The intersection itself is positioned on a hill. The roads slope in a downward
decline in all four directions from the point of the intersection.
At the time of the accident, Pinkelman was travelling west on County Road 882 and
intended to continue west on Highway 84. Kramer, on the other hand, was travelling east on
Highway 84 and intended to make a left-hand tum in order to travel north on Highway 57.
Plaintiffs were travelling south on Highway 57, and Becker and Schulte were travelling north on
Highway 57.
It is undisputed that Kramer had come to a stop on Highway 84 at the intersection with
Highway 57. It is disputed, however, whether Pinkelman also stopped on County Road 882.
Kramer and Pinkelman herself testified at deposition that Pinkelman did stop at the intersection
with Highway 57. Becker and Schulte testified at deposition that Pinkelman did not stop.
According to Kramer, as he came to a stop at the intersection, Pinkelman was already stopped
opposite him on County Road 882. Noticing that Pinkelman had arrived at the intersection first,
and, in addition, that she intended either to tum right and proceed north on Highway 57 or tum
left and continue west on Highway 84, Kramer believed that Pinkelman had the right-of-way. As
such, Kramer motioned Pinkelman by waving his hand, intending to yield to her the right-ofway. According to Kramer, he looked north and south before waving and saw no oncoming
traffic. Pinkelman's testimony is largely consistent with Kramer's. In her deposition, Pinkelman
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stated that after seeing Kramer wave she briefly assessed traffic for herself and continued into
the intersection. Shortly thereafter, she was struck by Plaintiffs' vehicle.
Becker and Schulte testified at their depositions that Becker was driving his vehicle north
on Highway 57 with Schulte in the passenger seat. As they were travelling north on Highway 57,
they observed Pinkelman approaching the intersection on County Road 882. As they approached
the intersection, Schulte thought Pinkelman was going to collide with the passenger's side of
Becker's vehicle. Schulte then exclaimed that Pinkelman was not going to stop and, as a result,
Becker applied the brakes in order to avoid an accident. Becker and Schulte then observed
Pinkelman travel into the intersection without stopping at the stop sign on County Road 882 and
colliding with Plaintiffs as their vehicle was travelling south on Highway 57. According to an
accident reconstructionist, Pinkelman had been travelling at 22 to 26 miles per hour at the time
of the accident.
On March 23, 2015, Plaintiffs filed negligence claims against both Pinkelman and
Kramer. In the complaint, it is alleged that Pinkelman was negligent when she failed to yield to
Plaintiffs' at the intersection, which caused the accident. The complaint also alleges that Kramer
was negligent by waving to Pinkelman in order to indicate that she could enter the intersection,
which, as a result, caused Pinkelman to collide with Plaintiffs. Kramer and Pinkelman filed
crossclaims against one another for indemnity and contribution on April 20, 2015 and May 5,
2015, respectively. Docs. 5, 8. In each of the crossclaims, both Defendants allege that the other
was more at fault in causing the accident. In Defendants' respective answers to the crossclaims,
Docs. 12, 13, both Kramer and Pinkelman allege that the other failed to state a claim and
generally denied the allegations contained in the other's crossclaim. Neither Kramer nor
Pinkelman formally moved to dismiss the other's crossclaim.
Kramer moved for summary judgment against Plaintiffs on February 15, 2016. Kramer
argues summary judgment is properly granted in his favor as no dispute as to any genuine issue
of material fact regarding the proximate cause element of Plaintiffs' negligence claim against
Kramer exists. Specifically, Kramer argues that Plaintiffs have failed to show that Pinkelman
relied on Kramer's wave to the extent necessary for an actionable negligence claim. Pinkelman
did not file a response to Kramer's motion for summary judgment.
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STAND ARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
"A party asserting that a fact cannot be ... disputed must support the assertion" either by "citing
to particular parts of materials in the record," or by "showing that the materials cited do not
establish the ... presence of a genuine dispute[.]" Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(l)(A)-(B). "The movant
can also establish the absence of a disputed material fact by showing 'that an adverse party
cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact."' Jensen v. Hy-Vee Corp., No. CN. 094057-KES, 2011 WL 1832997, at *1 (D.S.D. May 13, 2011) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P 56(c)(l)(B)).
"The burden is initially placed on the moving party to establish the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (citing Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Once the party
seeking summary judgment has met this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving
party who must demonstrate "that a fact ... is genuinely disputed" either "by citing to particular
parts of materials in the record," or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the
absence ... of a genuine dispute." Fed.R.Civ.P 56(c)(l)(A)-(B). "For purposes of summary
judgment, the facts, and inferences drawn from those facts, are 'viewed in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion."' Jensen, 2011 WL 1832997, at *2 (quoting
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89
L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).
DISCUSSION
The Court is asked to rule on whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated a prima facie case of
what the Court will refer to as "negligent signaling" against Kramer. The jurisdictions that have
considered the issue are split on whether such a cause of action exists. The majority view is that
a driver that signals to another may be held liable in some circumstances. "Liability rests on the
view that sometimes a signal may be interpreted as an indication that the way is clear and it is
safe to proceed." Pell v. Tidwell, 139 So.3d 165, 168 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013), cert denied. For
purposes of Kramer's motion for summary judgment, the Court is asked to assume that
Nebraska, the State of controlling law, recognizes the negligent signaling cause of action.
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Like other negligence actions, the essential elements of an actionable
claim of negligence in a "waving driver" case are: (1) the existence of a duty of
care; (2) the defendant's breach of that duty; (3) the breach was the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs harm; and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual damages.
Boucher v. Grant, 74 F. Supp. 2d 444, 449 (D.N.J. 1999). Here, the Court is also asked to
assume that Plaintiffs have satisfied the duty and breach requirements of the prima facie case
and, instead, focus on proximate cause. "'Proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact ...
Establishment of the causal relationship between a defendant's actions or failure to act and a
plaintiffs injuries requires a showing that the action or omission must have been a substantial
factor in producing those injuries."' Powers v. Torres, No. CV040833380, 2006 WL 329863, at
*4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2006) (unpublished opinion). Most important to the decision in this
case, "[i]n 'waved driver' cases, an [] element of proximate cause involves whether or not the
[non-signaling] driver actually relied on the gesture of the signaling driver." Grant, 74 F. Supp.
2d at 452. See Terrell v. Central Washington Asphalt, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00142-APG-VCF, 2016
WL 950906, at *2 (D. Nev. March 7, 2016) ("In those jurisdictions that adopt the majority rule,
the signal is not a proximate cause of the injured party's damages unless the signaled person
'actually relied' on it.") (citation omitted); Tidwell, 139 So.3d at 169 (quoting Isaacs v. Larkin
Elec. Co., No. 16948, 1998 WL 906394, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 4, 1998) (unreported case))
(on the issue of whether a signaler may be held liable for negligence, the court noted, '"It is also
necessary, under the majority view [in negligent signaling cases], that the [non-signaling] driver
actually relied on the signal as an 'all-clear' message."'); Torres, 2006 WL 329863, at *4
(quoting Annot., 14 A.L.R. 5th 193, 202 (2005)) ("In the body of case law dealing with
motorists' liability for signaling another vehicle or pedestrian to proceed, '[m]ost courts have
held that, for [proximate cause] to be established, there must be reliance by the signaled driver or
pedestrian to proceed, thus, where courts have found that there was no such reliance, they have
upheld summary judgments or verdicts against the plaintiffs bringing the action."') (alterations
in original).
The issue of reliance often turns on the interpretation of the signal given. Of the various
courts that have ruled on the issue,
[m]any of the cases address the issue of whether summary judgment is
appropriate by endeavoring to decide whether the signal, under the circumstances,
is properly characterized as (1) a mere yielding of the right of way, a sort of"you
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go first and I will not hit you" characterization; or (2) an indication that the way is
"all clear," a sort of "it is safe to proceed to your destination" characterization.
Speaking in general terms, the cases indicate that a driver giving a "you go first"
signal is much less likely, if at all, to be held liable for negligence than is a driver
giving an "all clear" signal.
Martinez ex rel. Chavez v. Martinez, No. E2000-01990-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 256152, at *2
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Thus, "'a driver's negligence in giving such a signal is not presented
where the signal could not reasonably have been interpreted as a signal to proceed across lanes of
oncoming traffic."' Id. at *4 (quoting Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Wray, 266 S.E.2d 882, 884 (Va.
1980)). Some courts have devised factors pertinent to how a signal should be interpreted, which
include
(1) the conduct of the parties, see Kerfoot [v. Waychoff], 501 So.2d [588,] 589
[(Fla. 1987)]; (2) the timing between the giving of the signal and the movement of
the signaled individual, see, e.g., Cofield [v. Nuckles], 387 S.E.2d [493,] 498
[(Va. 1990)]; (3) the presence or absence of extraordinary circumstances such as
unusual obstacles or obstructions, see Peka [v. Boose], 43 l N.W.2d [399,] 401
[(Mich. Ct. App. 1988)]; (4) whether the signaled individual is a child of tender
age, see Sweet [v. Ringwelski], 106 N.W.2d [742,] 745 [(Mich. 1961)]; Bell [v.
Giamarco], 553 N.E.2d [694,] 697 [(Ohio Ct. App. 1988)]; and (5) the type of
signal given, see Askew [By Askew v. Zeller], 521 A.2d [459,] 462 [(Pa. 1987)].
Id. Two additional factors most heavily considered by courts in determining the liability of a
signaling driver include "the positioning of the vehicles and the drivers' respective abilities to
discern whether the way is all clear." Id. (citations omitted).
Here, the only ones who witnessed Kramer's wave were Kramer himself and Pinkelman.
Neither Plaintiffs nor Plaintiffs' witnesses saw Kramer's wave. According to both Kramer and
Pinkelman, the wave was meant to convey and was interpreted, respectively, that Pinkelman had
the right-of-way, not that her path was clear of traffic. Deposition of Brian Kramer, Doc. 23-5, at
3; Deposition of Shelby Pinkelman, Doc. 23-1, at 4. That testimony is uncontroverted.
Pinkelman also insists that she came to a complete stop upon reaching the intersection and that
"[t]here was quite a few cars coming from the south[,]" the direction Becker and Schulte were
travelling from. Pinkelman Deposition at 3. In addition, Pinkelman stated that Kramer waved at
her "about 30 seconds" prior to Pinkelman deciding it was safe to proceed. Id. at 4. Pinkelman
claims that she did not see cars approaching from the north, the direction Plaintiffs were
travelling from. Id. To the north, the direction Plaintiffs were coming from, Pinkelman claims
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she could see clearly "[u]ntil the hill went down[, which] was probably about a hundred yards or
less." Id. During the duration of time that Pinkelman was stopped, she claims that she "look[ ed]
back and forth [about five times] while [she] was waiting for traffic to allow [her] through." Id.
Kramer's deposition testimony is largely consistent with Pinkelman's. According to
Kramer, as he approached the intersection, Pinkelman had already come to a stop across from
him. Kramer Deposition at 3. When Kramer came to a stop at the intersection, he "motioned
[Pinkelman] to give her the right-of-way." Id. Kramer believed that because Pinkelman was
angled as if she intended to go north (make a right-hand turn) or continue east (continue across
all lanes of Highway 57) she had the right-of-way. Id. at 4. Kramer further stated that, at the
intersection, his view to the north was no better than Pinkelman's as the upward incline of the
roads "leveled off' at the intersection. Id. In addition, there were no obstructions blocking the
view northward. Id. According to Kramer's deposition, after Kramer motioned to Pinkelman
only a short time elapsed-one to five seconds-before Pinkelman made her way across Highway
57 and was struck by Plaintiffs. Id. at 6.
The testimony of Becker and Schulte conflicts with the testimony of Kramer and
Pinkelman principally on the issue of whether or not Pinkelman stopped at the intersection.
According to both Becker and Schulte, Pinkelman did not stop and, instead, proceeded directly
through the intersection until she collided with Plaintiffs. Deposition of Thomas J. Becker, Doc.
23-2, at 5; Deposition of Karma J. Schulte, Doc. 23-4, at 3. Becker and Schulte stated that there
were no obstructions that would have made it difficult to see the vehicles involved; vehicles
could be seen coming from the north and south. Becker Deposition at 5; Schulte Deposition at 5.
According to their own deposition testimony, neither Becker nor Schulte saw Kramer wave at
Pinkelman. Becker Deposition at 4; Schulte Deposition at 7.
Based on the conflicting testimony about whether or not Pinkelman stopped at the
intersection, Plaintiffs argue that summary judgment is inappropriate. According to Plaintiffs,
genuine issues of material fact exist as to the credibility of the witnesses that should be left for a
jury. The Court does not agree. "It is the function of the court to determine the questions of
causation in cases in which a jury could not reasonably differ." Askew, 521 A.2d at 463. The
instant case presents such a situation. According to Pinkelman's own testimony, she assessed for
herself the flow of traffic when deciding to continue east across Highway 57; she looked to the
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north and south several times in order to ensure safe passage. While the testimony of Becker and
Schulte controverts Pinkelman's statements that she stopped at the intersection, nothing in the
deposition testimony of Becker, Schulte, or Plaintiffs or other evidence in the record controverts
Pinkelman's assertion that she did not rely on Kramer's wave. Pinkelman herself explicitly
disclaimed any reliance on Kramer's wave beyond giving her the right-of-way. "[W]hen a party
makes statements of fact in a 'clear, intelligent, unequivocal' manner, they should be considered
as conclusively binding against h[ er] in the absence of any explanation or modification, or of a
showing of mistake or improvidence." Gamet v. Jenks, 197 N.W.2d 160, 164 (Mich. Ct. App.
1972) (quoting Southern Rendering Co. v. Standard Rendering Co., 112 F. Supp. 103, 108 (E.D.
Ark. 1953)). In addition, given that all parties agree that Pinkelman's direction was regulated by
a stop sign and no obstructions existed blocking Pinkelman's view to the north, no reasonable
juror could conclude that Pinkelman relied on Kramer's wave beyond giving her the right-ofway.
Whether or not Pinkelman actually stopped at the stop sign has no genuine connection to
her reliance on Kramer's wave because Pinkelman had a nondelegable duty to stop at the stop
sign, yielding the right-of-way to traffic travelling north and south. See Woods v. 0 'Neil, 767
N.E.2d 1119, 1124 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (noting that courts in other jurisdictions have upheld
summary judgment or directed verdict when it was determined "that the person signaled had a
nondelegable duty to look for oncoming traffic."); Dawson v. Griffin, 816 P.2d 374, 379 (Kan.
1991) ("What we do know is this: [the defendant] had a nondelegable duty to yield to oncoming
traffic while making a left tum; and the only reasonable and safe thing to assume from a hand
wave is, 'I won't hit you."') (emphasis in original). To reiterate, none of the deposition testimony
indicates that any obstruction existed that would have impeded Pinkelman from assessing the
flow of traffic for herself. Thus, even when viewing the facts most favorably to Plaintiffs, no
genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether Pinkelman relied on Kramer's wave. Taking
Kramer's and Pinkelman's testimony together with the two heavily considered factors discussed
above-the vehicles' positions and the drivers' abilities to view oncoming traffic, Martinez,
supra-the only reasonable conclusion that a jury could come to is that Pinkelman did not rely on
Kramer's wave beyond Pinkelman being given the right-of-way. Under the majority view
recognizing a cause of action for negligent signaling, signaling to another driver merely that she
has the right-of-way does not provide actionable grounds for a negligence claim. See Askew, 521
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A.2d at 462 (holding that it is normally for a jury to decide if a wave is something more than
merely yielding the right-of-way. "Of course, where the facts are clear and, based on the facts, no
inference of negligence may reasonably be drawn, the judge may rule as a matter of law that the
signaler is not liable."); Kerfoot v. Waychoff, 501 So.2d 588, 589 (Fla. 1987) ("We do not accept
petitioner's contention that the trend is to impose liability on the signaling driver. We read the
cases to mean that whether liability is determined as a matter of law is an issue resolved case by
case, based on unrefuted facts of the vehicles' positions, the parties' conduct, and a reasonable
interpretation of the signal under the circumstances.").
Faced with similar facts as the instant case, the court in Askew By Askew v. Zeller noted,
"The focus of our inquiry is [] whether the court was correct in finding as a matter of law that
legal causation was not present. Where relevant facts are not in dispute and the remoteness of the
causal connection between the negligence of the original actor and the injury is so clear, the issue
becomes one oflaw." 521 A.2d 459, 463 (Pa. 1987) (citing Clevenstein v. Rizzuto, 266 A.2d 623
(Pa. 1970)). In Askew, a vehicle collision occurred at a T-shaped intersection. Defendant Ulla
Olsson was stopped at the intersection in a line of traffic travelling west. Defendant Darrell J.
Zeller, opposite Olsson on the same street, was travelling east and waiting at the intersection to
make a left-hand tum. The intersection was clear and, noticing that Zeller had turned on his left
tum signal, Olsson motioned to Zeller by waving her hand from left to right. Olsson did not look
to her right or her rear before waving Zeller on. Zeller, however, had a clear view of traffic
coming from Olsson's right. Plaintiff Richard Askew was, like Olsson, travelling west. Askew
was in the lane to the right of Olsson and intended to travel straight through the intersection. As
Zeller made his left-hand tum, Askew struck the side of Zeller's vehicle. Olsson's vehicle was
not involved in the accident.
Affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Olsson, the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania noted, "Although the Askews have asserted the existence of a dispute
regarding Zeller's interpretation of Olsson's signal, nothing in the record supports their assertion.
Zeller's own statements remain uncontradicted." Id. During his deposition, Zeller had "clearly
and unequivocally stated that he interpreted Olsson's signal only to mean [Olsson] would remain
stopped and he could proceed in front of her." Id. The Askew court rejected the idea that Zeller
negligently making his left-hand tum reasonably permitted an inference that Zeller must have
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also relied on Olsson's signal to mean that the intersection was clear of traffic. The Askew court
determined, "Even if we were to conclude, which we do not, that Olsson's act of signaling was
negligent, her act was not in the legally responsible chain of events that caused the accident that
injured Askew. Therefore, the trial judge was correct in awarding summary judgment in her
favor." Id.
Here, the only people who saw Kramer's wave were Kramer himself and Pinkelman. As
discussed, both Kramer and Pinkelman stated in deposition testimony that the wave was meant to
indicate that Pinkelman had the right-of-way. The wave was not meant to, and was not taken to
mean, that the way was clear for Pinkelman to continue eastward across Highway 57. No
testimony cited to by Plaintiffs controvert Pinkelman's claim of non-reliance. As such, "[t]he
uncontradicted deposition testimony of a co-defendant, who is an adverse party and equally
liable to the plaintiff, is a sound basis for summary judgment." Id. at 464 (citing Reading Co. v.
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 64 Pa. D. & C.2d 4 76 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1973), ajf'd per
curiam 311 A.2d 335 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973)).
Finally, this Court understands that the courts of Nebraska have not ruled on whether
Nebraska follows the majority or minority rule in "negligent signaling" cases. In this case,
however, what rule Nebraska follows would not affect the outcome. Under the minority rule, "no
duty exists for a signaling motorist to exercise caution and prevent accidents. This view rests on
the premise that a signal to cross can be interpreted as no more than a yielding of the right of
way." Tidwell, 139 So.3d at 168. Under the majority rule, while a signaling motorist may be held
liable for negligence, reliance by the non-signaling driver on the signaling driver's wave must be
shown in order to satisfy the element of proximate cause of a negligence claim. Id. at 169. Thus,
here, Kramer could not be held liable for negligence at all under the minority view and, as the
Court finds to be missing here, Kramer can only be held liable under the majority view upon a
showing that Pinkelman relied on Kramer's wave. There is no evidence to support such a
showing. All of the evidence is to the contrary. Therefore, under either the majority or minority
rule, Kramer cannot be held liable for "negligent signaling." Kramer's motion for summary
judgment will be granted.
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CONCLUSION
In order to survive a motion for summary judgment in a negligence case, once the burden
has shifted to the nonmovant, she must demonstrate that a prima facie case of negligence exists
and there are genuine issues of material fact that must be presented to a jury. In the case at bar, in
order to satisfy the proximate cause requirement of the prima facie case, Plaintiffs are required to
show that Defendant Pinkelman relied on Defendant Kramer's wave beyond a mere yielding of
the right-of-way. Plaintiffs have failed to do so. Based on the uncontradicted testimony of
Kramer and Pinkelman, Pinkelman did not so rely on Kramer's wave and there exists no genuine
issue of material fact to be presented to the jury.
Because Pinkelman did not oppose Kramer's motion for summary judgment, the Court
will assume Pinkelman has no objection to Kramer's absence from this case. Since the Court
finds as a matter of law that Kramer cannot be held liable for negligence, the claim for indemnity
and contribution, Doc. 8, against Kramer by Pinkelman is dismissed, as well as Kramer's
crossclaim, Doc. 5, against Pinkelman. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that (1) Defendant Brian Kramer's motion for summary judgment,
Doc. 18, against Plaintiffs Emery Heine, Jr. and Cheryl Heine is granted; (2) Defendant Shelby
Pinkelman's crossclaim, Doc. 8, against Defendant Brian Kramer is dismissed; and (3)
Defendant Brian Kramer's crossclaim, Doc. 5, against Shelby Pinkelman is dismissed.
~
Dated this
\l day of May, 2016.
BYTHECOU~
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