Libertarian Party of South Dakota et al v. Krebs et al
Filing
73
MEMRANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 69 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by U.S. District Judge Karen E. Schreier on 8/31/16. (SLW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LIBERTARIAN PARTY OF SOUTH
DAKOTA;
KEN SANTEMA, State Chair of the
Libertarian Party of South Dakota;
BOB NEWLAND;
CONSTITUTION PARTY OF SOUTH
DAKOTA;
LORI STACEY, State Chair of the
Constitution Party of South Dakota;
and JOY HOWE,
4:15-CV-04111-KES
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SHANTEL KREBS, in her official
capacity as Secretary of State of the
State of South Dakota; and
MARTY J. JACKLEY, in his official
capacity as Attorney General of the
State of South Dakota,
Defendants.
Plaintiffs brought suit against defendants seeking in part a declaratory
judgment that SDCL 12-5-1 is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs also sought a
permanent injunction that would require the South Dakota Secretary of State
Shantel Krebs to place two Constitution Party candidates on the November
2016 general election ballot. Docket 60. This court denied the motion. Plaintiffs
now move the court to reconsider its order. The court denies plaintiffs’ motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on June 15, 2015. Docket 1.
Plaintiffs brought suit challenging the newly signed legislation SB 69. Id. at 4.
The bill amended SDCL 12-5-1 so that a new political party needed to submit
its petition for state recognition to the Secretary of State by the first Tuesday in
March rather than the last Tuesday in March. Id. After plaintiffs filed their
complaint, a referendum petition signed by South Dakota voters was submitted
to the South Dakota Secretary of State. Docket 9 at 2-3. After the Secretary of
State’s Office reviewed the petition and found that the required number of valid
signatures were present, the Secretary of State’s Office scheduled SB 69 to
appear on the 2016 general election ballot. Defendants then filed a motion to
dismiss this case as moot. Docket 8. Plaintiffs responded by filing a motion to
amend the complaint. Docket 12. This court denied defendants’ motion to
dismiss and granted plaintiffs’ motion to amend. Docket 18.
Next plaintiffs’ filed their amended complaint, challenging the
constitutionality of SDCL 12-5-1 as currently written. Docket 19. Defendants
filed their answer in which they explained that SDCL 12-5-1 “only applies to
new political parties that seek to organize and participate in the primary
election[,]” and that “[n]ew political parties are not precluded from organizing
and nominating candidates at a state convention as provided in SDCL 12-521.” Docket 21 at 3. Plaintiffs were surprised by defendants’ reading of SDCL
12-5-1. Docket 29 at 2. Plaintiffs described the defendants’ reading of SDCL
12-5-1 as a “sudden change in policy” that was unlike any in recent history. Id.
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at 2-3. Because the parties interpreted SDCL 12-5-1 in radically different ways,
the issues surrounding plaintiffs’ challenge to the statute became muddled.
During the briefing on defendants’ first motion for summary judgment,
defendants argued that SDCL 12-5-1 was constitutional because the statute
helped the state maintain the integrity of the ballot and ensured that the
Secretary of State’s Office had enough time to meet its obligations. Docket 26.
Plaintiffs, in part, responded that the defendants’ new interpretation of SDCL
12-5-1—which allowed SDCL 12-5-21 candidates to forgo a primary election—
showed that defendants had no rational interest in “confer[ring] on one set of
candidates a July 11 [petition] deadline while saddling another set with a
March 29 deadline.” Docket 33. In essence, plaintiffs argued South Dakota
could not force a political party’s candidates to participate in a primary election
when certain elected offices were exempt from participation. In denying
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the court found that it could not
“determine as a matter of law on this record that the burden imposed on the
plaintiffs’ right to ballot access is greater than South Dakota’s interest in
enforcing SDCL 12-5-1[.]” Docket 43 at 13. Additionally, the court denied
summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claim
“[b]ecause South Dakota has not given any reason for the disparate
treatment[.]” Id. at 15.
Once again motions for summary judgment are before the court. Docket
44; Docket 54. The court has not ruled on the motions for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs also filed a motion for a permanent injunction that would enjoin
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Secretary of State Krebs from continuing to refuse to place the names of Kent
Evans and Wayne Schmidt on the upcoming general election ballot as
Constitution Party Candidates for the office of United States Senate and State
House, respectively. Docket 60. The court denied that motion. Docket 68.
Plaintiffs now move under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for the court to reconsider its
order denying the relief requested in the motion for permanent injunction.
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to
relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding due to “mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). The rule
is grounded in equity and it “is to be given a liberal construction so as to do
substantial justice and ‘prevent the judgment from becoming a vehicle of
injustice.’ ” MIF Realty L.P. v. Rochester Assocs., 92 F.3d 752, 755 (8th Cir.
1996) (quoting Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. A & P Steel, Inc., 733 F.2d 509, 515 (8th
Cir. 1984)). Its purpose is “to preserve the delicate balance between the
sanctity of final judgments . . . and the incessant command of a court's
conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.” Id. At the same time,
“[r]elief under Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary remedy that lies within the
discretion of the trial court.” Hunter v. Underwood, 362 F.3d 468, 475 (8th Cir.
2004) (quoting In re Design Classics, Inc., 788 F.2d 1384, 1386 (8th Cir. 1986)).
“Thus, relief will not be granted under Rule 60(b)(1) merely because a party is
unhappy with the judgment. Consequently, “[r]eversal of a district court’s
denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is rare because Rule 60(b) authorizes relief in only
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the most exceptional of cases.” Noah v. Bond Cold Storage, 408 F.3d 1043,
1045 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hope Elec. Corp., 293
F.3d 409, 415 (8th Cir. 2002)).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs, in their motion for reconsideration, argue three points: (1) this
court has already addressed the disparate treatment issue; (2) the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure require this court to grant plaintiffs’ requested relief
because plaintiffs are entitled to relief; and (3) this court has a duty to remedy
violations of federal rights. Docket 70.
A.
The court’s prior memorandum opinion and order
The court’s prior order found that defendants had not shown that
defendants were entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law on
plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claim. That does not mean, however, that
plaintiffs’ are entitled as a matter of law to summary judgment in their favor.
The amended complaint focuses on the nomination of presidential candidates.
Docket 19 at 7. Plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent injunction, however, involves
Constitution Party candidates who were not running for president. Docket 60.
The relief plaintiffs now seek is outside of the parameters of plaintiffs’ amended
complaint regardless of this court’s prior order. Plaintiffs provide no legal
authority for how the court can overlook that fact. The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals has explained that the complaint “must provide the defendant with fair
notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Adams v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 813 F.3d 1151, 1154 (8th Cir. 2016). Here,
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plaintiffs’ amended complaint does not provide defendants sufficient notice of
the grounds upon which plaintiffs’ request a permanent injunction for
candidates who are running for the United States Senate and the state House
of Representatives.1
Furthermore, the specific relief sought by the Constitution Party could
not be granted to these particular candidates because the Constitution Party
complied with SDCL 12-5-1. The reason both candidates are not on the general
election ballot is because they failed to comply with SDCL 12-6-1 and 12-6-4.
The heart of plaintiffs’ argument is that political parties should not be forced to
participate in a primary. This means that plaintiffs are either: (1) challenging
SDCL 12-5-21 and arguing that the listed candidates who can gain ballot
access by being nominated by a party’s state convention should include all
candidates or (2) challenging SDCL 12-6-1 and 12-6-4 and arguing that no
candidates should have to participate in a primary election. But plaintiffs’
amended complaint does not challenge the constitutionality of SDCL 12-6-1,
12-6-4, or 12-5-21. It only alleges the unconstitutionality of SDCL 12-5-1,
which addresses new political party recognition. The court finds that plaintiffs’
requested relief is outside the parameters of their amended complaint.
“The level of detail that should be required [in a complaint] will vary with the
circumstances of different kinds of cases.” 13B Charles Alan Wright et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.15 (3d ed. 2016). Here, plaintiffs are
challenging the constitutionality of a state statute. Parties are generally
required to be specific about which statute is being challenged. Cf. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 5.1 (requiring parties to notify the Attorney General of the United States or
state attorney general when a statute is challenged and the government is not a
party).
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It should also be noted that “[w]hen the validity of an act of the Congress
is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised,
it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided.” Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). This philosophy stems
from a belief that the court should “minimize the occasions on which [the
court] confront[s] and perhaps contradict[s] the legislative branch.” Antonin
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 249
(2012). As such, the court finds that a challenge to SDCL 12-5-1 does not
necessarily challenge the constitutionality of SDCL 12-6-1, 12-6-4, or 12-5-21.
Thus, the scope of relief requested in the motion for permanent injunction
exceeds the scope of relief that is necessary to address the claims set forth in
plaintiffs’ amended complaint.
B.
Remaining Claims
Lastly, plaintiffs argue that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require
this court to grant plaintiffs’ requested relief because plaintiffs are entitled to
relief and this court has a duty to remedy violations of federal rights. Both of
these arguments assume plaintiffs prevail in this litigation. The court has
entered no such order. If plaintiffs do prevail on their claims as pleaded in their
amended complaint, they are entitled to some form of relief, but not the terms
of the permanent injunction they currently seek.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent injunction is denied because the relief
requested is not related to the allegations pleaded in their amended complaint.
Furthermore, the specific remedy asked for in the motion for permanent
injunction is denied because it is not relief related to plaintiffs’ challenge to
SDCL 12-5-1. Good cause appearing, it is
ORDERED plaintiffs’ motion (Docket 69) is denied.
DATED this 31st day of August, 2016.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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