Clark v. State of South Dakota et al

Filing 9

ORDER Dismissing Case. Signed by U.S. District Judge Karen E. Schreier on 9/11/15. (SLW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JONATHAN D. CLARK,

4:15-CV-04132-KES

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER DISMISSING
COMPLAINT

SOUTH DAKOTA and
MINNEHAHA COUNTY,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Jonathan D. Clark, filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, naming the State of South Dakota and Minnehaha County as
defendants. Clark is an inmate at the South Dakota State Penitentiary in Sioux
Falls, South Dakota. The court has “screened” this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
' 1915 and dismisses it for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. '' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & (iii).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 5, 2014, Clark pleaded guilty to Failure to Provide Notice of a
New Address and was sentenced to five years imprisonment. Docket 5 at 12. In
a separate, pending matter, Clark brought claims against the prosecutor and
judge from his criminal trial as well as claims against a police officer and
corrections officer. See Clark v. Gross, 4:15-cv-04068-KES, Docket 1. Following
Magistrate Judge Veronica Duffy’s recommendation, the district court

dismissed the claims against the prosecutor and judge because they were
immune from suit but allowed the claims against the police officer and
corrections officer to proceed. Clark v. Gross, 4:15-cv-04068-KES, Docket 18.
Clark now files this complaint against different plaintiffs: the State of South
Dakota and the County of Minnehaha. Docket 1 at 4.
In Count I of his complaint, Clark claims that the State of South Dakota
violated his rights because he was sentenced illegally by the state court. Docket
1 at 4. He claims that he served his sentence, but is being held illegally past
his parole date. Id. In Count II, Clark claims that his right of access to the
courts is being violated by Minnehaha County. Id. at 5. To cure the illegal
sentence he was given, he sent letters to the judge, state’s attorney, and court
clerk in Minnehaha County, but has not received a satisfactory answer. Id. He
claims that if his sentence was corrected he would be released. Id.
Clark claims that he has been injured because of his confinement. Id. at
4. He is stressed, has high blood pressure, cannot sleep, and is being kept from
his family. Id. As relief, Clark demands $3,420,000. This represents relief for
the injuries he suffered from every day he was incarcerated illegally and
emotional distress. Id. at 7. For the following reasons, Clark’s complaint is
dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 because it fails to state a claim on which
relief can be granted.
LEGAL STANDARD
The court must assume as true all facts well pleaded in the complaint.
Estate of Rosenberg by Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 36 (8th Cir. 1995).
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Also, “although liberally construed, a pro se complaint must contain specific
facts supporting its conclusions.” Allen v. Purkett, 5 F.3d 1151, 1153
(8th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). A complaint “does not need detailed factual
allegations . . . [but] requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). If it does not contain these bare
essentials, dismissal is appropriate. Beavers v. Lockhart, 755 F.2d 657, 663
(8th Cir. 1985). Bell Atlantic requires that a complaint’s factual allegations
must be “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Id. at 1965; see
also Abdullah v. Minnesota, 261 Fed. Appx. 926, 927 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell
Atlantic noting complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations
regarding all material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some
viable legal theory).
It has long been recognized that “civil rights pleadings should be
construed liberally.” Frey v. City of Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, 671
(8th Cir. 1995). The complaint, however, must at the very least contain facts
which state a claim as a matter of law, and must not be conclusory. Id. Broad
and conclusory statements unsupported by factual allegations are not
sufficient. Ellingburg v. King, 490 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1974). Finally, although
pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, Athey must still allege facts
sufficient to support the claims advanced.@ Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914
(8th Cir. 2004). The court is not required to supply additional facts for a pro se
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plaintiff, nor construct a legal theory that assumes facts which have not been
pleaded. Id. It is with these standards in mind that Clark=s complaint is
carefully considered.
DISCUSSION
Section 1983 does not confer substantive rights but merely provides a
means to vindicate rights conferred by the Constitution or laws of the United
States. Gatlin ex rel. Estate of Gatlin v. Green, 362 F.3d 1089, 1093 (8th Cir.
2004). Section 1983 requires a claimant to identify the particular right that has
been violated. Id. If the claimant fails to allege a violation of a right secured
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, he has not stated a claim
upon which relief may be granted under Section 1983. Isakson v. First Nat’l
Bank in Sioux Falls, 990 F.2d 1098, 1098 (8th Cir. 1993). Liberally construed,
Clark’s complaint alleges claims for illegal sentencing and violation of his right
of access to the courts.
A. Count I – Illegal Sentencing
Clark claims that the State of South Dakota violated his rights by
sentencing him illegally, and he seeks monetary relief as a remedy. Count I
only names the State of South Dakota as a party defendant. “The sovereign
immunity enjoyed by states and recognized in the Eleventh Amendment bars
private parties from bringing actions for damages against unconsenting states
in federal courts.” Thomas v. St. Louis Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 447 F.3d 1082,
1084 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Becker v. Univ. of Neb., 191 F.3d 904, 908
(8th Cir. 1999)). The Supreme Court has ruled that § 1983 does not abrogate a
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state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345
(1979). South Dakota is immune from the relief claimed by Clark.
Even if South Dakota was not immune, Clark’s illegal sentencing claim
would fail. The United States Supreme Court has held that “a prisoner in state
custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge ‘the fact or duration of his
confinement.’ ” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (quoting Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)). “[A] prisoner cannot use § 1983 to obtain
damages where success would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of a (not
previously invalidated) conviction or sentence.” Id. at 81. Vindication of Clark’s
illegal sentence claim would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of his
sentence. Therefore, he cannot use § 1983 to bring this claim and fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted. For these reasons, and pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii), Count I of Clark’s complaint is dismissed.
B. Count II – Access to Courts
Clark claims that Minnehaha County denied him access to the courts. A
county may be liable for violation of constitutional rights if the violation was
caused by its customs or policies. Crawford v. Van Buren Cty., Ark., 678 F.3d
666, 669 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Rynders v. Williams, 650 F.3d 1188, 1195
(8th Cir. 2011)).
Prisoners are constitutionally guaranteed the right of access to the
courts. White v. Kautzky, 494 F.3d 677, 679 (8th Cir. 2007). For prisoners, this
access consists of “the capability to bring ‘actions seeking new trials, release
from confinement, or vindication of fundamental civil rights.’ ” Id. at 680
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(quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977)). In order to show a
violation, a prisoner “must establish the state has not provided an opportunity
to litigate a claim challenging the prisoner's sentence or conditions of
confinement in a court of law, which resulted in actual injury, that is, the
hindrance of a nonfrivolous and arguably meritorious underlying legal claim.”
Id. But Clark has not alleged that he is being denied access to the courts. In
fact, documents he supplied to this court show that his habeas petition is
pending in state court, and he is represented by counsel. Docket 6 at 1. Delay
alone does not constitute a violation of his right to access the courts. Because
Clark fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, the claim is
dismissed.
C. Plaintiff's Filing Fees
Both the legislative history and the case law interpreting the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) instruct that unsuccessful prison litigants, like
any other litigants, do not receive their filing fees back if their cases are
dismissed. The fact that Clark’s case is dismissed pursuant to the screening
procedures of § 1915 does not negate his obligation to pay the fee. In re Prison
Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997). The obligation to pay a
filing fee accrues the moment a plaintiff files his complaint with the court, and
it cannot be avoided merely because the case is eventually dismissed as
frivolous. Anderson v. Sundquist, 1 F.Supp.2d 828, 830 n. 5 (W.D. Tenn.
1998). One of the purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act is to

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require the prisoners to pay a very small share of the large burden
they place on the Federal judicial system by paying a small filing
fee upon commencement of lawsuits. In doing so, the provision
will deter frivolous inmate lawsuits. The modest monetary outlay
will force prisoners to think twice about the case and not just file
reflexively. Prisoners will have to make the same decision that law
abiding Americans must make: Is the lawsuit worth the price?
Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting 141 Cong. Rec. at
S7526 (May 25, 1995)); see also In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529-30 (8th Cir.
1997) (prisoner will be assessed full filing fee even if his case is dismissed
because “the PLRA makes prisoners responsible for their filing fees the moment
the prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal.”). Clark remains
responsible for the balance of the $350.00 filing fee.
Clark is advised that the dismissal of this lawsuit will be considered his
first “strike” for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a
judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the
prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or
detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of
the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of
serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
CONCLUSION
Clark alleges that he was illegally sentenced and denied access to the
courts. His complaint seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief and fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.
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It is ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without
prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii), and 1915A(b)(1) and
that Clark remains responsible for the balance of the $350.00 filing fee.
Dated September 11, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

/s/Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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