Piekkola v. Jackley et al

Filing 68

ORDER granting 66 Motion to Intervene. Signed by U.S. District Judge Karen E. Schreier on 10/17/2016. (JLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MAX PIEKKOLA,

4:15-CV-04148-KES
Plaintiff,

vs.
JOSH KLIMEK, Unit Manager, Mike
Durfee State Prison, individual and
official capacities;
TAMMY DEJONG, Unit Coordinator,
Mike Durfee State Prison, individual
and official capacities;
TRAVIS TJEERDSMA, Case Manager,
Mike Durfee State Prison, individual
and official capacities;
KELLY TJEERDSMA, Corporal, Mike
Durfee State Prison, individual and
official capacities;
DUSTIN TJEERDSMA, Correctional
Officer, Mike Durfee State Prison,
individual and official capacities;
LEE KAUFENBERG, Special Security
Captain, Mike Durfee State Prison,
individual and official capacities;
LYLE STOCK, Sergeant, Mike Durfee
State Prison, individual and official
capacities;
TAMMY DOYLE, Unit Manager at Mike
Durfee State Prison, in her individual
and official capacities; and
STEVE REYNOLDS, previous supervisor
of the automotive program, Mike Durfee
State Prison, individual and official
capacities,
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO INTERVENE

INTRODUCTION
Applicant for intervention, Karri Reynolds, moves to intervene as an
interested party. Docket 66. Defendants oppose the motion. Docket 67. For the
reasons set forth below, the Karri Reynolds’ motion to intervene is granted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 21, 2015, Max Piekkola, an inmate at Mike Durfee State
Prison, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Docket 1. In his original and
amended complaint, Piekkola raised various claims that defendants were
violating his constitutional rights, including that defendants were denying him
contact with Karri.1 Docket 1; Docket 19. The court screened Piekkola’s
amended complaint and directed service. Docket 14. On June 24, 2016,
defendants answered Piekkola’s complaint, and on September 15, 2016, they
moved for summary judgment. Docket 44.
According to defendants, on August 8, 2016, Karri mailed a motion to
intervene to defendants’ attorney, but she did not file the motion with the
court. Docket 67 at 3. On August 12, 2016, the court denied Piekkola’s motion
for preliminary injunction because it was “too early in the case to determine
that Piekkola is likely to prevail on the merits.” Docket 40 at 3. On
September 15, 2016, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Docket
44.

For the sake of clarity, the court refers to Karri Reynolds by her first name
because Steve Reynolds is a defendant in this case.
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On October 3, 2016, Karri filed a motion to intervene as an interested
party that was essentially identical to the motion she sent to defendants’
attorney. Docket 66. In her motion, Karri adopts the factual background of
Piekkola’s original and amended complaints, Docket 66 at 1, which includes
the fact that Piekkola and Karri are in a romantic relationship and that
defendants are denying them the ability to communicate with one another.
Docket 19 ¶ 26, 37, 123. Karri also objects to defendants’ characterizations of
her purported statements in their answer to Piekkola’s amended complaint.
Docket 66 at 1.
Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that Karri’s motion was
untimely. Docket 67. They argue that Karri should have moved to intervene in
August when she sent the motion to defendants’ attorney and before the court
dismissed Piekkola’s motion for preliminary injunction and before defendants
had filed their motion for summary judgment. Id. at 2-3. Defendants also argue
that Karri Reynolds’s interests will be adequately protected by Piekkola and
that intervention is not allowed here because Karri’s and Piekkola’s interests
are identical. Id. at 4-5.
DISCUSSION
Karrie moves to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2).
Docket 66 at 1. The rule for intervention of right states:
(a) Intervention of Right. On timely motion, the court must permit
anyone to intervene who:
...
(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that
disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or
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impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless
existing parties adequately represent that interest.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). The Eighth Circuit construes Rule 24 liberally and
resolves any doubts in favor of the proposed intervenors. See United States v.
Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1159 (8th Cir.1995) (listing cases); see also
Sierra Club v. Robertson, 960 F.2d 83, 86 (8th Cir.1992) ( “Doubts regarding
the propriety of permitting intervention should be resolved in favor of allowing
it, because this serves the judicial system's interest in resolving all related
controversies in a single action”).
I.

Article III Standing
A party seeking to intervene must establish Article III standing. United

States v. Metro St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 2009). “ ‘To
show Article III standing, a [party] has the burden of proving: (1) that he or she
suffered an injury-in-fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the
challenged conduct, and (3) that the injury likely will be redressed by a
favorable decision.’ ” South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 665 F.3d 986, 989–
90 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Pucket v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist. No. 23–2, 526 F.3d
1151, 1157 (8th Cir. 2008)). Defendants do not challenge Karri’s standing and
the court finds that she satisfies the Article III standing test.
II.

Timeliness
An intervention of right must be timely. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). The

timeliness determination is committed to the discretion of the court. Am. Civil
Liberties Union of Minn. v. Tarek ibn Ziyad Acad., 643 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir.

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2011). When considering whether a motion to intervene is timely, a court
“should specifically consider: (1) the extent the litigation has progressed at the
time of the motion to intervene; (2) the prospective intervenor's knowledge of
the litigation; (3) the reason for the delay in seeking intervention; and (4)
whether the delay in seeking intervention may prejudice the existing parties.”
Id. at 1094.
The court finds that Karri’s intervention is timely. Although defendants
filed their motion for summary judgment, Karri’s intervention is not likely to
substantially alter the arguments in their motion. In defendants’ response to
the motion to intervene, defendants do not explain how they would be
prejudiced. Karri’s involvement is important at this stage to respond to
allegations made by defendants in support of their motion.
Defendants argue that the motion is untimely because Karri knew about
the case in August but did not file her motion until October. While Karri did
not explain the delay, it did not prejudice defendants. If anything, defendants
had advance notice that Karri planned on intervening in this matter. The court
will not hold a non-prejudicial delay against a pro se party who is not
benefitted by the delay. Therefore, the court finds that Karri’s motion to
intervene is timely.
III.

Cognizable Interest
“An interest is cognizable under Rule 24(a)(2) only where it is ‘direct,

substantial, and legally protectable.’ ” Med. Liab. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alan Curtis
LLC, 485 F.3d 1006, 1008 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at
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1161). Karri claims that she has such an interest in contact with Piekkola.
Docket 66 at 2. Because Karri’s First Amendment rights are implicated, her
interest is substantial and protectable. Therefore, the court finds that Karri has
a cognizable interest sufficient to support intervention.
IV.

Impairment of Interest
Rule 24(a)(2) only requires that Karri show the disposition of this action

may as a practical matter impair her interests. See Kan. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v.
Reimer & Koger Assocs., Inc., 60 F.3d 1304, 1307–08 (8th Cir. 1995)
(summarizing various formulations of the standard). If Piekkola’s case is
dismissed, contact between he and Karri will be denied. Therefore, Karri has
shown that her interests would be impaired.
V.

Representation by Present Parties
An applicant for intervention that is not a government agency bears only

a “ ‘minimal burden of showing that its interests are not adequately
represented by the parties.’ ” South Dakota ex rel. Barnett v. U.S. Dep't of
Interior, 317 F.3d 783, 785 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d
1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1996)). For such applicants, “Rule 24(a)'s third criterion is
easy to satisfy[.]” Mausolf, 85 F.3d at 1303. Karri’s interests are not adequately
represented by Piekkola. He is an inmate, and his access to legal materials is
completely controlled by defendants. Karri meets her “minimal burden” to show
that Piekkola cannot adequately represent her interests.
Defendants argue that Karri’s interest and Piekkola’s interest are
identical, and therefore intervention is inappropriate. “The adequacy of
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representation depends on the similarity of interests between the proposed
intervenor and the parties already before the court.” Taylor v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co.,
251 F.3d 735, 741 (8th Cir. 2001). Karri’s and Piekkola’s interests are similar,
but they are not identical. The Supreme Court has explained that prisoners’
constitutional rights “are more limited in scope than the constitutional rights
held by individuals in society at large. In the First Amendment context, for
instance, some rights are simply inconsistent with the status of a prisoner or
‘with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system[.]’ ” Shaw v.
Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822
(1974)).
Karri and Piekkola are not seeking to vindicate the same right because
defendants may circumscribe Piekkola’s First Amendment rights in a way that
would be unconstitutional if applied to Karri. Therefore, Karri shows that
Piekkola cannot adequately represent her interest. Because Karri’s interests
could be impaired by the outcome of this case, and she is not adequately
represented by Piekkola, the court grants her motion to intervene under Rule
24(a)(2).
Thus, it is
ORDERED that Karri’s motion to intervene (Docket 66) is granted. She is
added as a plaintiff intervener to this matter. If defendants wish to file an
amended motion for summary judgment, they must do so by November 4,
2016. If they do not wish to file an amended motion for summary judgment,
they must give the court notice. After defendants have filed either an amended
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motion or notice that they do not wish to amend their motion, plaintiffs will
have 21 days to respond.
Dated October 17, 2016.
BY THE COURT:

/s/Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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