Contreras v. United States of America

Filing 90

ORDER granting 54 Motion to Appoint Counsel ; granting 69 Motion to Appoint Counsel; granting 19 Motion to Appoint Counsel; granting 44 Motion to Appoint Counsel. Appointed Christopher D. Dohrer for Mario M. Contreras. Signed by U.S. District Judge Lawrence L. Piersol on 11/8/18. (SLW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
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MARIO M. CONTRERAS,
Movant,

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CIV 17-4075

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CR12-10047

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-vs-

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ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

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Respondent.

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Mario M.Contreras has filed four motions seeking appointment ofa lawyer to represent him

in his Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Docs. 19,
44, 54 and 69.)

It is well settled that "[a] habeas corpus proceeding is civil in nature, and 'the Sixth

Amendmentrightto counsel afforded for criminal proceedings does not apply.'"iToggarJ v. Purkett,
29 F.3d469,471 (8th Cir. 1994)(citingBoydv. Groose,4 F.3d 669,671 (8th Cir. 1993)). Although
there is no constitutional right to appointment ofcounsel in habeas proceedings,a court may,"in the

interests ofjustice," appoint representation to any financially eligible person who is seeking relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). The Eighth Circuit has discussed the
circumstances in which the appointment of counsel is appropriate:

When exercising its discretion, a district court should first determine whether a pro
se habeas petitioner has presented a nonfnvolous claim. If the petitioner has
presented only claims that are fiivolous or clearly without merit, the district court
should dismiss the case on the merits without appointing counsel.Ifthe petitioner has

presented a nonfiivolous claim, the district court should then determine whether,
given the particular circumstances of the ease, the appointment of counsel would
benefit the petitioner and the court to such an extent that "the interests ofjustice so
require" it. To determine whether appointment of counsel is required for habeas
petitioners with nonfnvolous claims, a district court should consider the legal
complexity ofthe case, the factual complexity ofthe case, the petitioner's ability to
investigate and present [articulate] his claim, and any other relevant factors.

Abdullah v. Norris, 18 F.3d 571,573(8th Cir. 1994)(intemal citations omitted);see also McCall v.

Benson, 114 F.3d 754,756(8th Cir. 1997);Battle v. Armontrout,902 F.2d 701,702(8th Cir. 1990).

Applying the Eighth Circuit's reasoning, this Court finds that Mr. Contreras has presented
a nonfrivolous claim. Among other things,he claims that medical records show a pre-existing heart

defect may have caused his daughter's death. This issue alone is complex and Mr. Contreras is

hampered in his ability to investigate the facts. Mr. Contreras has found a lawyer who is willing to
represent him, and that lawyer has identified issues that may necessitate medical testimony and an
evidentiary hearing. The Court finds that the appointment ofcounsel would benefit Mr. Contreras
and the Court to such an extent that the interests ofjustice require the appointment ofcounsel under

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B).' Christopher D. Dohrer is willing to accept this appointment.
Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED:

1.

That the motions for appointment of counsel are granted (docs. 19, 44, 54 and 69),
and Christopher D. Dohrer, Attorney at Law, 202 South Main Street, Suite 230,
Aberdeen, SD 57401, is appointed, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b), to represent
Mario M. Contreras in this action.

Dated this ^ day ofNovember,2018.
BY THE COURT;

.Qudm
Lawrence L. Piersol

United States District Judge
ATTEST:

MATTHEW W. THELEN,CLERK

BY;_

(SEAL)

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DEPUTY

The Court also finds and concludes that Mr. Contreras is a "person financially unable

to obtain adequate representation" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) and therefore a
"financially eligible person" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B).