Augustine v. Pitchford et al

Filing 60

ORDER granting 49 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by U.S. District Judge Karen E. Schreier on 12/28/2021. Mailed to Daniel Augustine via USPS. (VMM)

Case 4:20-cv-04072-KES Document 60 Filed 12/28/21 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: 1533

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DANIEL TODD AUGUSTINE,

4:20-CV-04072-KES

Plaintiff,
vs.
JESSICA SCHREURS, Director of
Nursing/RN, in her individual capacity,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
SCHREURS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendant.

Plaintiff, Daniel Todd Augustine, filed a pro se civil rights lawsuit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Docket 1. Augustine’s claims against defendants in their
official capacities were dismissed in this court’s screening order. Docket 5 at 8.
Defendants Darin Young, Jessica Cook, Savannah Pitchford and Derrick Bieber
were granted summary judgment in their favor based on qualified immunity.
Docket 43. Now, defendant Jessica Schreurs makes a renewed motion for
summary judgment. Docket 49.
I.

Factual Background
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Augustine, as the

non-moving party, the facts are: 1 The court incorporates by reference all the
facts included in its earlier summary judgement order found at Docket 43. In
Because Schreurs moves for summary judgment, the court recites the facts in
the light most favorable to Augustine. Where the facts are disputed, both
parties’ averments are included. Under D.S.D. Civ. LR 56.1(D), “All material
1

Case 4:20-cv-04072-KES Document 60 Filed 12/28/21 Page 2 of 5 PageID #: 1534

addition to the earlier stated facts, Augustine did not dispute that Schreurs’
name did not appear on Augustine’s treatment records during the relevant time
periods, that Schreurs had no personal involvement in changing Augustine’s
packing twice a day, that Schreurs was not involved in the day-to-day medical
care afforded to Augustine, and that Augustine did not communicate with
Schreurs or notify her in any manner that the iodoform strips had expired.
Docket 57 ¶¶ 44, 46, 52, 53.
II.

Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant “shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party can meet this
burden by presenting evidence that there is no dispute of material fact or by
showing that the nonmoving party has not presented evidence to support an
element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). To avoid summary judgment, “[t]he
nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must
demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a
genuine issue for trial.” Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th
Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). The underlying substantive law

facts set forth in the movant’s statement of material facts will be deemed to be
admitted unless controverted by the opposing party’s response to the moving
party’s statement of material facts.” Augustine did not object to Schreurs’
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Renewed Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket 57), so the court deems those statements to be
admitted.
2

Case 4:20-cv-04072-KES Document 60 Filed 12/28/21 Page 3 of 5 PageID #: 1535

identifies which facts are “material” for purposes of a motion for summary
judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.
Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id.
“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will
not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 247-48
(emphasis omitted).
Essentially, the availability of summary judgment turns on whether a
proper jury question is presented: “The inquiry performed is the threshold
inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other
words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved . . .
in favor of either party.” Id. at 250. Prisoners who proceed pro se are entitled to
the benefit of liberal construction at the pleading stage. Quam v. Minnehaha
Cnty. Jail, 821 F.2d 522, 522 (8th Cir. 1987). Nonetheless, the summary
judgment standard set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
remains applicable to prisoners proceeding pro se. Id. The district court is not
required to “plumb the record in order to find a genuine issue of material fact.”
Barge v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 87 F.3d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1996).
Courts must remain sensitive, however, “to the special problems faced by
prisoners attempting to proceed pro se in vindicating their constitutional
rights, and [the Eighth Circuit does] not approve summary dismissal of such
3

Case 4:20-cv-04072-KES Document 60 Filed 12/28/21 Page 4 of 5 PageID #: 1536

pro se claims without regard for these special problems.” Nickens v. White, 622
F.2d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 1980). “[W]hen dealing with summary judgment
procedures technical rigor is inappropriate where . . . uninformed prisoners are
involved.” Ross v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1216, 1219 (7th Cir. 1985).
C.

Legal Analysis

Schreurs asserts that she was not personally involved in the alleged
constitutional violations. Docket 50 at 3. Augustine did not respond to
Schreurs’ renewed motion for summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit has
recognized that
[a] supervisor cannot be held liable for an employee's
unconstitutional actions based on a theory of respondeat superior.
Rather, a supervisor incurs liability for a violation of a federally
protected right when the supervisor is personally involved in the
violation or when the supervisor's corrective inaction constitutes
deliberate indifference toward the violation. The supervisor must
know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or
turn a blind eye for fear of what [he or she] might see.
Ottman v. City of Independence, 341 F.3d 751, 761 (8th Cir. 2003) (second
alteration in original) (citations and internal quotations omitted). “[A]
supervisor can act with ‘deliberate, reckless indifference’ even when he does
not act ‘knowingly.’ ” Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 544, 551-52 (8th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir. 1988)). A
supervisor is only liable for an Eighth Amendment violation when she was
“involved in the violation[.]” Ottman, 341 F.3d at 761.
The undisputed facts show that Schreurs’ name did not appear on
Augustine’s treatment records during the relevant time periods, that Schreurs
4

Case 4:20-cv-04072-KES Document 60 Filed 12/28/21 Page 5 of 5 PageID #: 1537

had no personal involvement in changing Augustine’s packing twice a day, that
Schreurs was not involved in the day-to-day medical care afforded to Augustine,
and that Augustine did not communicate with Schreurs or notify her in any
manner that the iodoform strips had expired. Docket 57 ¶¶ 44, 46, 52, 53.
Because Schreurs’ only role was that of a supervisor and Augustine has
presented no evidence to show that she was personally involved with or had
knowledge of Augustine’s alleged deficient care, Schreurs is entitled to summary
judgment in her favor.
Thus, it is ORDERED:
1. That Defendant Schreurs’ motion for summary judgment (Docket 49) is
granted.
Dated December 28, 2021.
/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

5