Jamison v. Cox

Filing 14

ORDER denying Respondent's 8 Motion to Dismiss and Ordering Respondent to Respond to the Merits of Petitioner's Petition. Signed by U.S. District Judge Karen E. Schreier on 03/30/2021. MAILED to Mr. Jamison on 03/31/2021. (SAC) Modified filed date on 3/31/2021 (SAC).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RODERICK JAMISON,

4:20-CV-04201-KES
Petitioner,

vs.
J.W. COX, in his capacity as Warden of
Yankton Federal Prison Camp,

ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS AND
ORDERING RESPONDENT TO
RESPOND TO THE MERITS OF
PETITIONER’S PETITION

Respondent.
Petitioner, Roderick Jamison, brings this pro se petition for writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Docket 1. The petition was assigned to
a United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and this
court’s March 9, 2015, standing order.
Respondent moves to dismiss Jamison’s petition for his alleged failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Docket 8. The Magistrate Judge entered a
report and recommendation recommending Jamison’s petition be dismissed
without prejudice to allow him to exhaust his administrative remedies. Docket
12 at 6. Jamison objects to the report and recommendation. Docket 13.
The court’s review of the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation
is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The court reviews de novo any objections to the magistrate judge’s
recommendations with respect to dispositive matters that are timely made and

specific. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In conducting its de
novo review, this court may then “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,
the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1); United States v. Craft, 30 F.3d 1044, 1045 (8th Cir. 1994).
Generally, only after a prisoner exhausts the administrative remedies
with the Bureau of Prisons may a prisoner seek judicial review of sentencing
credit determinations. See United States v. Tindall, 455 F.3d 885, 888 (8th Cir.
2006) (“Prisoners are entitled to administrative review of the computation of
their credits, 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.16, and after properly exhausting these
administrative remedies, an inmate may seek judicial review through filing a
habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”). But the exhaustion
requirement for a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is judicially created and not
a jurisdictional requirement. Lueth v. Beach, 498 F.3d 795, 797 n.3 (8th Cir.
2007). “In determining whether exhaustion is required, federal courts must
balance the interest of the individual in retaining prompt access to a federal
judicial forum against countervailing institutional interests favoring
exhaustion.” McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146-47 (1992).
In McCarthy, the Supreme Court recognized “three broad sets of
circumstances in which the interests of the individual weigh heavily against
requiring administrative exhaustion[:]” (1) the “administrative remedy may
occasion undue prejudice[;]” (2) the “administrative remedy may be inadequate”
because there is doubt that the agency can grant effective relief; and (3) the
remedy is inadequate because the administrative body is biased and has
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predetermined the issue. Id. at 147-49. Under the first broad exception, the
Supreme Court recognized that “[e]ven where the administrative
decision[-]making schedule is otherwise reasonable and definite, a particular
plaintiff may suffer irreparable harm if unable to secure immediate judicial
consideration of his claim.” Id. at 147. Further, a habeas petition can be
excused from the exhaustion requirements if the process would be futile and
serve no useful purpose. See Elwood v. Jeter, 386 F.3d 842, 844 n.1 (8th Cir.
2004). Once the Bureau of Prison’s (BOP) Central Office has rendered a
decision on a BP-11 appeal, the administrative process is fully exhausted. See
28 C.F.R. §§ 542.14-542.15 (2021).
Here, the Magistrate Judge recommends that “[t]his case presents a
number of factual disputes best served by creating a complete administrative
record. That can only be done if Mr. Jamison is required to finish out the
administrative exhaustion process. The court concludes he should be required
to do so.” Docket 12 at 6. Jamison sent his BP-11 appeal to the BOP’s Central
Office on January 13, 2021. Docket 13 at 1. Respondent claims that Jamison
has a “projected release date of December 19, 2022, via an early release under
18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) for successful completion of a RDAP.” Docket 9 at 1. But in
his objection, Jamison asserts that if he is awarded his earned time credits
under the FSA, his release date should have been on May 12, 2020. Docket 13
at 1. Additionally, Jamison alleges that completion of the administrative
remedy process would be futile because the “BOP will invariably deny the

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application of the credits after it delays the Petitioner for months and
months[.]” Id.
Jamison has alleged facts to show that requiring him to exhaust his
administrative remedies before coming into court would cause him irreparable
harm because he is allegedly already entitled to be released from prison. See
McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 147. Additionally, he has alleged futility. See Elwood,
386 F.3d at 844 n.1. Thus, respondent’s motion to dismiss (Docket 8) is
denied. This court rejects the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation.
Further, respondent must respond to the merits of Jamison’s petition within
twenty-one days from the entry of this order.
Thus, it is ORDERED:
1. That respondent’s motion to dismiss (Docket 8) is denied.
2. That the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation (Docket 12) is
not adopted.
3. That Jamison’s objections (Docket 13) are overruled.
4. That respondent must respond to the merits of Jamison’s petition
within twenty-one days from the entry of this order.
Dated March 30, 2021
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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