Roth v. Walters et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 14 Motion to Dismiss; denying 17 Motion to Strike 14 MOTION to DISMISS , 17 MOTION to Strike. Signed by U.S. District Judge Lawrence L. Piersol on 1/18/2023. Mailed to Plaintiff 1/18/2023 (DJP)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ERIC LEE ROTH,
Plaintiff

4:22-cv-4096

MEMORANDUM OPINION

vs.

AND ORDER

BOB WALTERS,MERS DOE,
GALE HANDER,TITLE DOE,
JULIE RISTY,FANNIE MAE DOE,
AMY FOLSOM, 1-5 DOES,
CHRIS LILLA,
Defendants

Pending before the Court is Defendant Gayle Hander's Motion to Dismiss,

(Doc. 14), Plaintiffs Complaint(Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
engaged in a RICO conspiracy against him, and that their actions constituted
trover/negligence, breach of contract, and "indebitatus assumpsit'Vvicarious ,

liability. (Id). In response to Defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff filed a
"verified motion to strike" the answers and motions to dismiss filed by all

Defendants.(Doc. 17). Defendant Hander responded.(Doc. 21). For the following
reasons, the Court grants Defendant Hander's motion to dismiss,(Doc. 14), and
denies Plaintiffs motion to strike.(Doc. 17).

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has alleged a massive fraud and conspiracy against him in

connection with his obtaining mortgages for his real property.(Doc. 1). The basis
of his allegations appears to be that the financial system in place in the United

States is fraudulent, and therefore, the actions ofthose involved in that system also
are. (Id., PgID 3). The named Defendants are alleged to have played different roles

in the alleged conspiracy. Walters, the COO of Quicken Loans, headquartered in
Michigan, is accused offraud and many other transgressions. Hander, formerly
employed by Wells Fargo Bank, played a role in obtaining a mortgage for Plaintiff
(although Plaintiff did not sue Wells Fargo Bank in this lawsuit). Finally, three
employees of Minnehaha County, South Dakota, were sued. Lilla, the Director of

Equalization, is alleged to have taxed and conspired to tax Plaintiffs property.
Risty, the Register of Deeds, is accused of failing to file documents, which was on
the advice ofFolsom, Deputy States Attorney, who was sued for providing that
legal advice. The latter resulted in Plaintiffs filing a complaint with the South
Dakota Bar against Folsom and States Attorney Dan Haggar. (Doc. 1-2, PgID
168-69). It is unclear how the Defendants may have joined together to conspire
against Plaintiff.
This lawsuit is not the first ofthe complaints Plaintiff has made against the

Defendants. His 335-page attachment to his Complaint,(Doc. 1-2), includes many

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documents that reflect his dissatisfaction with the Defendants, their handling of his
loans, and his theories about the monetary system. The Court need not recite all of
those details to resolve the motions at hand.

At the outset, the Court takes note that Plaintiff resides in Minnehaha

County, South Dakota. Defendants Hander, Lilla, Risty, and Folsom do as well.
Walters is the sole Defendant who resides outside of this state and the Court has

granted his motion to dismiss.(Doc. 34). All Defendants who have filed answers

have also filed motions to dismiss and all challenge the Court's jurisdiction, among
other issues.

Hander's motion to dismiss raises some issues identical to those raised by
the other Defendants, but her case raises unique questions as well. As such, she
supports her motion to dismiss by arguing failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), and lack of subject matter jurisdiction, F.R.C.P.

12(b)(1). She also argues for dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party,
F.R.C.P. 12(b)(7).

LEGAL STANDARD

1. Motion to Dismiss—^Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

Defendant has alleged that all counts of the Complaint must be dismissed
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To avoid dismissal under Rule

12(b)(6), Ashcroft v. Iqbal requires that the plaintiff have included in the complaint

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"sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face." 556 U. S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937,1949,173 L. Ed.2d 868 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167

L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). See Spagna v. Phi Kappa Psi, Inc., 30 F.4th 710, 715 (8th
Cir. 2022)(dismissal proper where factual allegations failed to state a plausible
claim for relief and amounted to only a possibility that relief was warranted); Faulk
V. City ofSt. Louis, 30 F.4th 739, 744 (8th Cir. 2022)(quoting Iqhal standard and
reversing denial of motion to dismiss).

As the court considers a motion to dismiss, it must assume all facts alleged
in the complaint are true. Colemanv.

40 F.3d 255, 258(8th Cir. 1994). See

also Yankton Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Dept. ofHealth & Human Services, 496 F. Supp.
2d 1044(D.S.D. 2007); Broin and Associates, Inc. v. Genencor Intern., Inc., 232

F.R.D. 335, 338(D.S.D. 2005). The complaint is to be viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Broin, 232 F.R.D. at 338 (citing Frey v.
Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667,671 (8th Cir. 1995)). Although the court should grant
the Motion to Dismiss only in the "unusual case in which a plaintiffincludes
allegations that show on the face ofthe complaint that there is some insuperable
bar to relief," it is a requirement that the complaint "contain facts which state a
claim as a matter oflaw and must not be conclusory." Frey, 44 F.3d at 671. While

conclusory statements are insufficient, well-pleaded factual allegations should be

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deemed true and the District Court should proceed to determine whether plaintiff is
entitled to relief. Drobnakv. Andersen Corp., 561 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 2009).
When the court considers a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), it examines the complaint
and '"matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to
judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of
the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is
unquestioned;' without converting the motion into one for summary
judgment." Faloni and Associates, LLC v. Citibank N.A., 2020 WL 4698475, *2
(D.S.D. 2020)(quoting Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab, Inc., 688 F.3d 928,931
n.3 (8th Cir. 2012)(citing 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1357(3d ed. 2004))).

2. Failure to join indispensable party—Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7)
Defendant Hander has moved to dismiss because Plaintiff has failed to join
an indispensable party. F.R.C.P. 12(b)(7). When a party makes such an allegation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, Required Joinder of Parties, comes into play. The Rule
provides as follows:
(a)Persons Required to Be Joined if Feasible.
(1)Required Party. A person who is subject to service of process and whose
joinder will not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be
joined as a party if:
(A)in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief
among existing parties;...

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(b) When Joinder Is Not Feasible. If a person who is required to be joined
if feasible cannot be joined, the court must determine whether, in equity and
good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or
should be dismissed.

This Court addressed the rules governing joinder of an indispensable party in
LeBeau v. United States, 115 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1175 (D.S.D. 2000)(reversed on
other grounds 474 F.3d 1334(Fed. Cir. 2007)). There, certain tribes moved to

intervene and then to move to dismiss an action filed by individuals to challenge
the constitutionality of a law which reduced funding available to satisfy ajudgment
ofthe Indian Claims Commission. Id. at 1173. The Court described the procedure
to follow in addressing who qualifies as a "necessary" party as follows:

The Court must first inquire whether an absent person is a "necessary" party
pursuant to Rule 19(a). Ifthe absent person is not necessary as defined
in Rule 19(a), the Court ends the inquiry, denies the motion to dismiss for
failure to join an absent person and proceeds with the action. Gwartz v.
Jefferson MemorialHosp. Ass'n, 23 F.3d 1426, 1428 (8th Cir. 1994).
However,if the Court determines an absent person is a necessary party and
the absent person may not be joined pursuant to Rule 19(a), then the Court
must determine, pursuant to Rule 19(b), whether the action should proceed
among the parties before it, or should be dismissed. Rochester Methodist
Hosp. V. Travelers Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 1006, 1016 (8th Cir. 1984).
115 F. Supp.2d at 1175.

Following that procedure, the Court concluded the tribes were not "necessary"
parties, but even ifthey were, the action would proceed because the tribes'
sovereign immunity would prevent their joinder. Id. at 1178.

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In Raven Indus., Inc. v. Topcon Positioning Systems, Inc., the Court faced a

similar problem when plaintiff alleged conversion, unjust enrichment, fraudulent
concealment and interference with business expectancy, among other claims. 2009

WL 2998570(D.S.D. 2009). Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to join an
indispensable party, i.e., the company with whom plaintiff had originally
contracted. 2009 WL 2998570, *7. The Court first set forth the procedure to
follow to resolve the issue, as outlined in LeBeau. 115 F.Supp.2d at 1175. The
Court ruled the company (which had gone out of business) was not a necessary
party under Rule 19(a)(1) because the purchase agreement at issue defined the
plaintiffs ownership interests, which also could be clarified by an individual who
was the purported owner ofthe absent company. Id. at *8. As a result, the Court
denied the motion to dismiss because a reasonable alternative existed.

3. Motion to Dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction -Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

Defendant Hander argues the Court lacks jurisdiction in this case. Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, a federal district court has jurisdiction to hear "all civil

actions arising under the Constitution, Laws, or treaties of the United States." The
Court also has jurisdiction where the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000 and is
between "citizens of different states." 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiff has styled his

first cause of action as "Trespass on the case—Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Law."(Doc. 1, PgID17). This is the sole federal claim in this

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lawsuit. The Court will address the requirements for pleading claims under the
applicable sections ofthe Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute,
18U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964.

In Stonebridge Collection, Inc. v. Carmichael, the court emphasized that to

state a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), the plaintiff must plead "(1) conduct(2)of
an enterprise(3)through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity." 791 F.3d 811, 82223 (8th Cir. 2015){c^aotingNitro Distrih., Inc. v. Alticor, Inc., 565 F.3d 417,428
(8th Cir. 2002)). See also GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-2 ex rel. LL Funds LLC

V. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 133 F.Supp.3d 1203, 1225(D.S.D. 2015). The
Stonebridge court also explained the requirement of a pattern ofracketeering,
meaning at least two predicate acts that are related and pose a threat of continued

criminal activity. 791 F.3d at 823. Whether a pattern of racketeering activity
exists is a question offact for the court. Id.
When a plaintiff relies on fraud as the RICO predicate act, the provisions of
F.R.C.P. 9(b) apply, meaning the complaint must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). See GSAA, 133 F.Supp.3d
at 1225 {citing Murr Plumbing, Inc. v. Scherer Bros. Fin. Servs. Co., 48 F.3d 1066,
1069(8th Cir. 1995)). Conclusory allegations are not sufficient. Id. (citing

Drobnak,561 F.3d at 783). The particularity requirement "demands a higher
degree of notice than that required for other claims," United States ex rel. Benaissa

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V. Trinity Health,963 F.3d 733, 739(8th Cir. 2020)(quoting United States ex rel.

Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 317 F.3d 883,888 (8th Cir. 2003))."To satisfy
Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement,'the complaint must plead such facts as the
time, place, and content ofthe defendant's false representations, as well as the
details ofthe defendant's fraudulent acts, including when the acts occurred, who
engaged in them, and what was obtained as a result,"' Benaissa, 963 F.3d at 739

(quoting United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke's Hasp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 556
(8th Cir. 2006)). In the event the requirements of Rule 9(b) are not met, the court
will dismiss the RICO claim. GSAA, 133 F.Supp.3d at 1227. See also Schiedv. U-

HaulInternational, Inc., 2021 WL 3287708, *8(D.S.D. 2021)(dismissing RICO
claim where court is "unwilling to guess" what the illegal activity at issue is).
When a court dismisses the only federal claim in a lawsuit, it determines
whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claim.

28 U.S.C. § 1367. The court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if
"the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the
district court has original jurisdiction." Id. §1367(c)(2). See In re Cotter
Corporation, (N.S.L.), 22 F.4th 788, 792(8th Cir. 2022);Innovative Home Health

Care, Inc. v. P.T-O.T Assocs. Ofthe Black Hills, 141 F.3d 1284, 1286(8th Cir.
1998).

As this Court noted in Hujfv. City ofBrookings Police Dept.,

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The United States Supreme Court has advised:

[A]federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage
ofthe litigation, the values ofjudicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case
brought in that court involving pendent state-law claims. When the balance
ofthese factors indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as

when the federal-law claims have dropped out ofthe lawsuit in its early
stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the

exercise ofjurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice.
2022 WL 2528255, *8(D.S.D. 2022)(quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,
484 U.S. 343, 350(1988)(citing United Mine Workers ofAmerica v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715,726-27(1966))).

4. Motion to strike—^Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)
Plaintiff has moved to strike Defendant Hander's answers and motions to

dismiss. F.R.C.P. 12(f) authorizes a court to "strike from a pleading an insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(f). As the Eighth Circuit has stated,"Striking a party's pleading,

however, is an extreme and disfavored measure." BJC Health System v. Columbia
Cas. Co., 478 F.3d 908,917(8th Cir. 2007)(citing Stanbury Law Firm, PA v. IRS,
221 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000)). The court views the pleadings "in the light

most favorable to the pleading party." Nasuti v. Walmart, 2021 WL 3403666, *1
(D.S.D. 2021).
ANALYSIS

1. Motion to Dismiss-Rule 12(b)(6)
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Although a court construes a pro se Plaintiffs claim liberally, a complaint
must allege a plausible claim for relief. Spagna, 30 F.4th at 715. In this case,
Plaintiff rests his claims on his beliefthat the monetary system in the United States
is fraudulent. For example, his complaint alleges:

6b.FEDERAL RESERVE NOTES are not lawful money, legal tender or
currency pursuant to the constitution, described in attached Exhibit A,Law
ofthe case (see sec.. Federal Reserve Notes are not legal tender and sec.,

the seven money clauses ofthe constitution) and is incorporated by reference
as though fully stated herein. Banks create credit and debt out ofthin are. I

have to sell my labor, services or goods for credit and debt. My debt notes
include valuable consideration.

6c. Alleged mortgage lenders do not loan lawful money, legal tender,
currency, deposits and they can not loan credit, described fully in paragraph
6, Law ofthe case. Exhibit A sec.. Banks Can Not Loan Credit.

6d. There has never been a meeting ofthe minds thought good faith with any
of alleged mortgage lenders.
(Doc. 1, PgID 3).

The complaint further states:
17. FEDERAL RESERVE NOTES are unconstitutional, unlawful in so

many ways. There must be a remedy for people or this would be treason.
The US Code describes FEDERAL RESERVE NOTES as being obligations
ofthe United States over and over again and uses the word discharge a lot. I
have described this in the Law ofthe Case Exhibit A, section: Notice of

Memorandum ofLaw- Points and Authorities in Support ofInternational
Bill ofExchange....
(Doc. 1, PgID 5).

Plaintiffs complaint lists "Duty of all defendants," (id., 196,PgID 17), and
"BREACH OF DUTY BY DEFENDANTS,"(id., H 97,PgID 17), including with
respect to Defendant Hander, many instances of fraud "to extort money," and
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"lying about loaning me lawful money."(Id.). Among other allegations, Plaintiff

includes "racketeering organized conspiracy coercion to extort money through
fraudulent conversion of my bom name, my property, land, rights through
fraudulent use oflanguage with willful intent." (Id.,^ 97.j, PgID 18). Plaintiff
also includes "racketeering organized conspiracy coercion to extort money lying
about me being a person." (Id., ^ 97.0., PgID 18).
Plaintiffs claim against Defendant Hander is "for general damages of
450,000.00 lawful dollars pursuant to the constitution"(not preceded by a dollar
sign). (Doc. 1, PgID 21). The specific involvement of Hander in Plaintiffs case

is as follows: Plaintiff alleges Defendant Hander was employed at Wells Fargo
Bank,(Doc. 1 PgID 1), that Plaintiff entered into "an alleged loan" with her,(id.,
PgID 2), and that she hired First Dakota Title company to do a title search,(id., Tf
58,PgID 10). Defendant Hander admits her employment, agrees she sent a letter
to Hegg Realtors stating Plaintiff was approved for a loan, and signed off on

Plaintiffs Home Buyer Education course.(Doc. 15, PgID 410-411, citing Doc. 12,PgID 31, 33). Plaintiff has included a warranty deed and title insurance policy
on which Hander's name does not appear. (Doc. 1-2, PgID 24-30).
The Court finds that Plaintiffs claim is based on his own theories about the

monetary system and does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted under
Rule 12(b)(6). Hander's activities in this case do not amount to fraud under any

12

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reading ofthe complaint or other documents submitted in this case. The Court

grants Defendant Hander's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).(Doc. 14).
2. Motion to Dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party—^Rule
12(b)(7)

Plaintiff did not name Wells Fargo Bank as a defendant in this case. As

noted above, Defendant Hander was an employee of Wells Fargo Bank and any of
her actions relevant to this case were as the bank's agent. If an employee has acted
wrongfully, not only is the employee responsible, but in accordance with S.D.C.L.

§ 59-6-9,"a principal is responsible to third persons for the negligence of his agent
in the transaction ofthe business ofthe agency, including wrongful acts committed
by such agent in and as part ofthe transaction of such business...." As the South
Dakota Supreme Court stated in Cameron v. Osier, the concept ofrespondent
superior "is well established as 'holding an employer or principal liable for the
employee's or agent's wrongful acts committed within the scope ofthe
employment or agency.'" 930 N.W.2d 661,663(S.D. 2019). See also Dakota
Provisions, LLC v. Hillshire Brands Company, 226 F.Supp.3d 945,952(D.S.D.
2016)(reviewing parameters of agency law in South Dakota).

On its face. Plaintiffs complaint acknowledges that Hander was an
employee of Wells Fargo Bank. (Doc. 1, PgID 1). He alleges Wells Fargo
conspired with others. (Id., ^ 77,PgID 13). There is no indication that Hander did
anything relevant to this case except as an employee of Wells Fargo acting within
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the scope of her employment. There is no indication whatsoever of any fraud on
Hander's part because the claims against her rest on Plaintiffs theories about the

monetary system. Ifthere is any wrongdoing with respect to the financing Plaintiff
received from Wells Fargo, the Bank, not Defendant Hander, would be
responsible. Therefore, it would be impossible for Hander's interests to be

properly protected without the Bank participating in the lawsuit as a party. LeBeau,
115 F.Supp.2d at 1175. To be clear, however. Plaintiffs statements about the

monetary system are insufficient to form a basis for him to recover on any theory
from either Hander or Wells Fargo in this case.
The Court finds Wells Fargo Bank is a necessary party to the case because
adequate relief cannot be given in its absence. F.R.C.P. 19. Given the Court's
resolution of Hander's motions pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6), above, and 12(b)(1),

below, the Court grants Hander's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(7) and
declines to permit Plaintiffto join Wells Fargo Bank in this action.
3. Motion to Dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction—^Rule 12(b)(1)
Plaintiff alleges a RICO conspiracy existed among the Defendants in this
case. All of the allegations appear to be based on Plaintiffs view that the
monetary system itself is fraudulent, as discussed above. His claim rests on an
"indisputably meritless theory." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327(1989).

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He fails to allege the elements of a RICO action, i.e., conducting the affairs of an
enterprise through a pattern ofracketeering activity, and conspiring to do so. He
alleges there was a conspiracy but supplies no facts to support his assertion. He
fails to allege his claims offraud with particularity, as required by Rule 9(b).
Instead, as noted above in the discussion of Rule 12(b)(6), Plaintiff accuses

Defendant Hander of many instances of fraud involving extortion, lying, and
racketeering.(Doc. 1, PgID 18). Although Plaintiff freely employs terms such as
treason, fraud, and racketeering, none of his claims allege any individual
fraudulent conduct by Hander. His allegations are grounded in his beliefs about the
monetary system as a whole. Therefore, the Court grants Defendant Hander's
motion to dismiss the RICO claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). The question
presented, then is whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Carnegie-Mellon,
484 U.S. at 350.

In this case, the values ofjudicial economy, convenience, fairness and
comity outweigh any interest in maintaining federal jurisdiction over any claims
remaining after dismissal ofthe RICO claim. The litigation is in the early stages,
the sole federal claim has been dismissed, and the sole Defendant who is not a
resident of South Dakota has been dismissed. Furthermore, the Court has dismissed

all claims separately under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7), so any exercise of

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supplemental jurisdiction would be inappropriate. For these reasons, the Court

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims.
4. Plaintiffs motion to strike—^Rule 12(f)
Plaintiff alleges the attorneys in the case have violated certain Rules of
Evidence in filing their answers and motions. The Federal Rules ofEvidence do
not apply at the pleading stage, FRE 101. The allegation that the documents filed

by the attorneys violate the Hearsay Rule,FRE 801, and rules governing witnesses,
FRE 602, is without merit because the Rules ofEvidence do not apply at this stage
ofthe proceedings. Neither does FRE 301, dealing with presumptions, which
Plaintiff asserts as a basis to strike. He also seems to be accusing all ofthe
attorneys of lying.(Doc. 17,PgID 424).
Furthermore, pursuant to F.R.C.P. 11, attorneys are directed to sign

pleadings on behalf oftheir clients, given the rule's directive that "every pleading,
written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one attorney ofrecord in
the attorney's name." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). The attorney is required to have a
reasonable basis for a pleading, which ordinarily comes from the client. Questions
about the admissibility of such evidence are resolved at a later stage ofthe

proceedings.

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The Court finds there is nothing in Defendant's answer or motions that

should be stricken as "redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous" under
Rule 12(f) and denies Plaintiffs motion to strike.(Doc. 17).
CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has filed a wide-ranging complaint alleging serious misconduct by
Defendant Hander and others. The allegations are baseless. The Court finds the
complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Rule 12(b)(6), and for failure to join an indispensable party. Rule
12(b)(7). The Court grants Defendant Hander's motion to dismiss,(Doc. 14), on
these bases. The Court further finds that Plaintiffs claim of violation ofthe

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964,
must be dismissed for failure to allege the elements and for failure to plead
allegations offraud with particularity. The Court grants Defendant Hander's
motion to dismiss the claim of violation ofthe Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations statute and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any
remaining claims.(Doc. 14). The Court finds that Plaintiffs motion to strike,(Doc.
17), is without merit and denies it.

Accordingly,IT IS ORDERED that
1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss(Doc. 14)is granted; and
2. Plaintiffs motion to strike (Doc. 17)is denied.

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Dated this (jP "day of January, 2023.
BY THE COURT

vawrence L. Piersol

United States District Judge
ATTEST:

MATTHEW W.THELEN,CLERK

18