Scott v. Haynes et al

Filing 46

OPINION and ORDER denying 30 Motion for Reconsideration filed by La'Shane Donyale Scott.. Signed by Chief Judge Roberto A. Lange on 5/8/2024. Delivered to La'Shane Donyale Scott via usps. (SLT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

4:23-CV-041I5-RAL

LA'SHANE DONYALE SCOTT,

Plaintiff,
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING

vs.

PLAINTIFF'S

DR. AARON HAYNES, Chief Medical Official;
KAYLA TINKER, Medical Trainer/Supervisor;
KELLIE WASKO, Secretary of the Dept. of

Corrections; SGT MOORE, Officer In Charge;
OFFICER
OFFICER

HALEY, Corrections
ELEHRS, Corrections

Officer;
Officer;

OFFICER VAN BLAIR COM, Corrections

Officer; OFFICER KEROESKA, Corrections
Officer, a/k/a Kocourek; CHIEF WARDEN
TERESA BITTINGER, Chief Warden; UNIT
COORDINATOR
ROBINSON,
Unit
Coordinator; CHEF TANYA, of Aramark;
ARAMARK CO.; UNIT COORDINATOR
PECHOUS; HEALTH SERVICE STAFF
MEMBER ALEXIS; MELISSA MATURAN,
ADA
Coordinator/Corrections
Specialist;
ASSOCIATE
WARDEN
JOHNSTON,
Associate Warden of the State of South Dakota

Department of Corrections; SGT. ROWER,
Correctional Officer ofthe State of South Dakota

Department of Corrections; UNIT MANAGER
EKEREN, Unit Manager of the South Dakota
Department of Corrections; UNIT MANAGER
ELLIS, Unit Manager of the South Dakota
Department of Corrections; UNIT MANAGER
HANSON, Unit Manager of the South Dakota
Department
of
Corrections;
JEANNIE
BERTSCH, Prison Official of the South Dakota

Department

of

Corrections;

UNIT

COORDINATOR MAYER, Unit Coordinator at

the Department of Corrections; RYAN, Medical
Supervisor/Leadership; CLINICIAN DIRECT
RESPONSIBLE; JOHN

DOE/JANE

DOE,

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Health Service Staff Directly Responsible at the
South Dakota Department of Corrections;
NURSE SARAH, Health Service Nurse of the

State ofSouth Dakota Department ofCorrections;
JOHN DOE, Aramark Food Service Company
Chief Supervisors; and LINDA, Of Aramark,
Defendants.

Plaintiff La'Shane Donyale Scott, an inmate at the Mike Durfee State Prison, filed a pro se

civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1. Scott filed an amended complaint. Doc. 20,
which this Court screened dismissing in part and directing service in part. Doc. 27. Scott moves
for reconsideration on several claims dismissed during screening. Doc. 30.
I.

Motion for Reconsideration

The United States Court ofAppeals for the Eighth Circuit has traditionally instructed courts
to consider motions for reconsideration either under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). See Sanders v.

Clemco Indus.. 862 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1988).
A.

Rule 59(e)

Rule 59(e) does not specify the standards for alteration or amendment. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e). In the Eighth Circuit, a court must find a "manifest error[]" of law or fact in its ruling to

alter or amend its judgment under Rule 59(e). See Hagerman v. Yukon Enerev Corp.. 839 F.2d
407,414(8th Cir. 1988)(internal quotation omitted). But Rule 59(e) motions may not be used to
introduce evidence, tender new legal theories, or raise arguments that could have been offered or

raised prior to the entry ofjudgment. Id A party may also move to alter or amend judgment to
present newly discovered evidence. Id

1.

Access to Chapel Activities

In Scott's original and amended complaint and supplemental filings, he alleges that he was
removed from the South Dakota State Penitentiary's(SDSP)Muslim Ramadan list beeause he had

a supra pubic catheter and was unable to hold his bladder for over four hours. Doe. 1-1 at 40. He
claims that SDSP's chapel rules prohibited inmates from reentering chapel services once they
leave. Id, Scott was removed from the Muslim Ramadan list for twenty-seven days, but he was

placed back on the Muslim Ramadan list and granted an aecommodation to return to ehapel
aetivities after using the restroom. Id, at 36-39; Doc. 20 157. During screening of Scott's

amended complaint, this Court dismissed his First Amendment Free Exercise claim because he
had not alleged sufficient facts shovvdng that defendants substantially burdened his exercise of
religion. Doc. 27 at 29.

In Scott's motion for reconsideration, he alleges that after being granted an

aecommodation, he "was only allowed to attend the last three days of the Islamic-Holy Month of
Ramadan." Doc. 30 T| 2. He alleges that a letter from Defendant Melissa Maturan granted him an
accommodation to return to activity after using the bathroom, but he was subject to a search upon

returning to the activity. Id, Scott claims that "[ojther same and similar situated inmates from
other religious activities were not strip searched, or searched at all when they went to use the
bathroom." Id. 13.
a.

-

First Amendment Free Exercise Claim

Scott moves for reconsideration on the dismissal of his First Amendment Free Exercise

claim because he "sincerely praetices and follows the teachings of the Islamic Faith." Id, 4. In
order to state a First Amendment free exercise claim, Scott must allege faets showing that prison
offieials have substantially burdened the free exereise of his religion. Patel v. U.S. Bureau of

Prisons. 515 F.3d 807, 813 (8th Cir. 2008). Substantially burdening the free exercise of religion
means that the defendants' actions

must significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or expression that manifests some
central tenet of a person's individual religious beliefs; must meaningfully curtail a
person's ability to express adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a person
reasonable opportunities to engage in those activities that are fundamental to a
person's religion.
Mumhv V. Mo. Den't of Corr.. 372 F.3d 979,988 (8th Cir. 2004)(cleaned up).
This Court dismissed Scott's claim on screening because he had not alleged that any

particular defendant engaged in particular conduct that substantially burdened his free exercise of
religion. ^Doc. 27 at 29. Although Scott has alleged that he was not able to attend religious
services, he does not allege that burdens to his religion were caused by the defendants. He claims
that Maturan granted him an accommodation, but he does not allege that any of the named
defendants were involved with his removal from the Ramadan list or prohibiting him from

attending religious services. Thus, his motion for reconsideration of dismissal ofhis Free Exercise
claim is denied.

b.

Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference Claim

Scott's motion for reconsideration alleges claims arising under the Eighth Amendment
for deliberate indifference for serious medical needs about his urology issues. Doc. 30 ^ 3. Scott
states that he has "well Known and Medical documented history have being fitted with a Supra

Pubic Catheter, and then having it removed after wearing it for several years. I have a very weak
bladder." Id.(internal quotations omitted).
"[DJeliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Estelle v.
Gamble. 429 U.S. 97, 104(1976)(quoting Gregg v. Georgia. 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). "This

is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's

needs or hy prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or

intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescrihed." Id. at 104-05 (footnotes omitted).
"This conclusion does not mean, however,that every claim by a prisoner that he has not received

adequate medical treatment states a violation ofthe Eighth Amendment." Id. at 105. "[A]
prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs." Id. at 106. Allegations of negligence will not suffice, nor will mere

disagreement with treatment decisions. Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096(8th Cir. 2000)
(citing Est. of Rosenberg. 56 F.3d at 37).
The deliberate indifference standard includes both an objective and subjective component.

Dulanv v. Camahan. 132 F.3d 1234,1239(8th Cir. 19971 Cciting Coleman v. Rahija. 114F.3d778,

784 (8th Cir. 1997)). The plaintiff "must demonstrate (1) that [he] suffered objectively serious
medical needs and (2)that the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those
needs." Id (citing Coleman, 114 F.3d at 784). "A serious medical need is 'one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.'" Coleman. 114 F.3d at 784(quoting
Camberos v. Branstad,73 F.3d 174,176(8th Cir. 1995)). To be liable for deliberately disregarding
medical needs,"the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v.

Brennan. 511 U.S. 825, 837(1994).

Here, Scott does not allege facts showing that Maturan was aware of and deliberately
indifferent to his medical needs. S^ Doc. 1-1 at 36^2. Scott does not claim that Maturan was

aware of his urology concerns prior to his request for an accommodation. Id Scott alleges that

Maturan granted him an accommodation, permitting him to use the bathroom and return to
religious activities. Doc. 3012. Although Scott alleges that unit staff and prison officials refused
to allow him to return to religious activities if he went to the bathroom, he does not identify any

particular defendant involved in the conduct or allege sufficient facts to show deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. See Doc. 1-1 at 36^2. Thus, Scott's motion for

reconsideration as to his Eighth Amendment claim related to his urology issues is denied.
c.

Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim

In Scott's amended complaint, he alleges a violation ofthe Fourteenth Amendment because
"[t]he Fourteenth Amendment means that the government can't discriminate, against you or treat

you poorly because of your religion[.]" |
Doc. 20 57. But his amended complaint did not allege
any facts indicating that he was treated differently from same or similarly situated inmates because
of his religion. See id. He also does not allege that any particular defendant engaged in
discriminatory conduct related to his religion. See id.: Doc. 1-1 at 36-39.
In Scott's motion for reconsideration, he states that "[ojther same and similar situated

inmates from other religious activities were not strip searched, or searched at all when they went
to use the bathroom." Doc. 30 13. Scott did not allege such facts in his original or amended
complaint or supplemental filings. Rule 59(e) motions may not be used to introduce evidence,

tender new legal theories, or raise arguments that could have been offered or raised prior to the
entry ofjudgment. S^ Hagerman. 839 F.2d at 414 (internal quotation omitted); United States v.
Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006)(citing Innovative Home Health

Care v. P.T.-O.T. Assoc. ofthe Black Hills. 141 F.3d 1284, 1286(8th Cir. 1998)).
Even if this Court construed Scott's motion for reconsideration as a motion to amend his

complaint, Scott's request to amend his Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim about

chapel activities would be denied as moot. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires the government to"'treat similarly situated people alike,' a protection that

applies to prison inmates." Murphv. 372 F.3d at 984 (quoting Rouse v. Benson, 193 F.3d 936,
942 (8th Cir. 1999)). To show an equal protection violation, a plaintiff "must show that he is
treated differently than a similarly situated class of inmates, that the different treatment burdens
one of his fundamental rights, and that the different treatment bears no rational relation to any

legitimate penal interest." IT (citing Weiler v. Purkett, 137 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir. 1998)(en
banc)). It is also an equal protection violation if "the different treatment is based upon either a

suspect classification or a fundamental right." Pateh 515 F.3d at 815 (8th Cir. 2008)(internal
quotations and citations omitted). "Suspect classifications include those such as race, alienage,
gender, or national origin." Knann v. Hanson. 183 F.3d 786, 789 (8th Cir. 1999)(citing City of
Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr.. 473 U.S. 432,440(1985)).

Scott generally alleges that he was treated differently from other same and similarly
situated inmates, but he does not allege facts to support his conclusion that he was treated

differently. Doc. 30 ^ 3. He does not allege any facts showing who treated him differently and
even if he was treated differently, that the alleged different treatment was motivated based on his

religion. See id. A pro se complaint is liberally construed, but even with this construction,"apro
se complaint must contain specific facts supporting its conclusions." Martin v. Sargent. 780 F.2d
1334,1337(8th Cir. 1985)(citation omitted). See also Frickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89.94(2007)
(per curiam). Thus, Scott's motion for reconsideration of dismissal of his Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection claim related to chapel activities is denied.

2.

First Amendment Retaliation Claims

In Scott's amended complaint, he stated that he "want[s] to become gainfully employed so

that [he] can work [his] way out of prison and get (Earned Discharge Credits) or (EDC's)[.]
However, out of retaliation Prison Officials will not give [Scott] ajob which 'extends [his] prison
term.'" Doc. 20 ^ 64. During screening of Scott's complaint, this Court dismissed Scott's
Fourteenth Amendment due process claims for violation of his liberty interests because he was not

provided Earned Discharge Credits or prison employment. Doc. 27 at 48-49.
Scott argues that "Prison Officials' action or inaction with respect to program, job or
classification matters also may deprive [a prisoner] ofa liberty interest ifit affects parole eligibility

or good time credits." Doc. 30 ^ 7. He also claims that "[t]he right to parole for the plaintiff and
its conditions in the community are based upon treatments, and not just earned discharge credits

or (EDC's)." Id "Inmates have no protected liberty interest in immediate access to a treatment

program, even programs providing significant benefits such as [the Sex Offender Treatment
Program] of drug treatment." Cutwright v. Crawford. 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198984, at *4(S.D.
Iowa June 9, 2014) (citing Persechini v. Callawav, 651 F.3d 802, 807 (8th Cir. 2011)). "The

general rule flowing from these cases is that '[t]he Due Process Clause standing alone confers no
liberty interest in freedom from state action taken "within the sentence imposed."'
" Persechini,
651 F.3d at 808 (alteration in original) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480 (1995)).
Scott has not alleged that denial of access to treatment programs will result in him serving a longer
sentence than imposed. Thus, he has not established a liberty interest in the right to treatment
programs to reduce his sentence.

"It is also well settled that prisoners do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest

in having a prison job." Patterson v. Rvks, 2011 WL 1793158, at *4(D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2011)

(collecting cases) R&R adopted by 2011 WL 1793186 (D. Minn. May 11, 2011). Many courts
have held that "the loss of a mere opportunity to accumulate credit towards a sentence is not
sufficient to create a protected liberty interest." Fiorito v. Fikes, 2022 WL 16699472, at *6

(D. Minn. Nov. 3, 2022)(collecting cases). Thus, Scott has not established a.liberty interest in
prison employment. Earned Discharge Credits, or treatment programs, and his motion for
reconsideration of dismissal of his due process claims related to prison employment. Earned
Discharge Credits, or treatment programs is denied.
Scott claims that "[o]ut of retaliation for filing grievances, complaints and lawsuits, the

plaintiff is not allowed or permitted by prison Officials and Unit Staff to work a job or attend
mandated treatment programs." Doc. 30^7(citation omitted). This Court held that Scott's claims
for retaliation for denial of employment, costing him opportunities to receive Earned Discharge
Credits, survived screening. Doc. 27 at 30-32. Thus, Scott's motion for reconsideration for First
Amendment retaliation claims is denied as moot.
3.

First Amendment Access to the Courts

Scott claims that "Prison Officials intentionally removed a check 'upon Information and

Belief,' from the plaintiffs privileged legal mail for the amount of $35.98- to stop, or stall his
'Small Claims Court,' law suit [sic] against listed defendant Teresa Bittinger." Doc. 30 ^ 13.
During § 1915A screening, this Court dismissed Scott's First Amendment access-to-the-courts

claim because Scott's small claims action is not a challenge to his sentence or conditions of

confinement. Doc. 27 at 35 n.l7. "The right of access to the courts is satisfied if the prisoner has
'the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement

before the courts.'" Zink v. Lombardi. 783 F.3d 1089, 1108 (8th Cir. 2015)(quoting Lewis v.
Casev. 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996)). See also Card v. Doolev. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171132, at

*34-35(D.S.D. Dec.23,2015)("The right of access to the courts extends only as far as protecting
the inmate's ability to prepare initial pleadings in a civil action regarding his current confinement

or in an application for a writ of habeas corpus."(quoting Blevins v. Dobbs. 2009 WL 3123021,

at *3(D. Colo. Sept. 23, 2009)); Wolff v. McDonnell.418 U.S. 539, 579(1974)(holding that the
right to access to the courts applies in habeas and civil rights contexts). Thus, Scott's motion for
reconsideration for dismissal ofhis First Amendment access to the court claim for his small claims
action is denied.

4.

Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference Claims

Scott received his medical records from Avera McKennan Hospital after this Court

screened his complaint. Doc. 30 Tf 10. Scott claims that the records show that transport was

delayed on October 7, 2023,"due to correctional staff not being ready to go and unwilling to let
(EMS) take pt. without a follow car despite being told by crew that it was an emergant [sic]
situation." Id (citing Doc. 30-1). Although Scott has obtained additional medical records, the

newly discovered evidence does not show involvement by anyone against whom Scott's Eighth
Amendment claims were dismissed. See generallv id.; Doc. 27. Thus, because the newly

discovered evidence does not allege any facts about any dismissed claims, Scott's motion for
reconsideration about the dismissal ofEighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims is denied.
In his motion for reconsideration, Scott claims that "Prison Officials are more than aware

and familiar vvith the Plaintiff[']s chronic care and seizure conditions. Necessary doctor prescribed
medications and housing locations when ever he is placed in Segregated Housing unit, or SHU to

provide him with faster and better access to (EMS) paramedics and observation." Doc. 30 ^ 11.
He also claims that "[t]he Hill SHU obstructs this ability and life saving treatments." Id. Scott

generally alleges that prison officials are aware, but he does not identify any particular defendant

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who was aware of and deliberately indifferent to his serious medieal needs. Thus, Scott's motion

for reconsideration about the dismissal of Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims is
denied.

In his motion for reconsideration, Scott claims that "he is in severe pain and that his
condition has become worse." Id ^ 8. He claims that he suffered more than de minimis injuries
because of Officer Haley, Officer Moore, and Unit Coordinator Robinson's use of force. Id

Because of the injury, Scott needs back injections and has been prescribed a new medication,
Gabapentin. Id Scott has been scheduled for a time sensitive procedure at Mike Durfee State
Prison, but "this time sensitive procedure and medication is being 'delayed' for some unknown
reason,causing further damage and pain to the plaintiff." Id T|9(citing Doc. 30-1). Scott's motion
for reconsideration alleges new Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims for conduct that

occurred at the Mike Durfee State Prison. Doc. 30

8-9. If he wishes to allege new claims, he

must do so by filing a motion to amend his complaint. Scott is warned that an amended complaint
supersedes prior complaints, rendering the prior complaint without legal effect. In re Atlas Van

Lines. Inc.. 209 F.3d 1064,1067(8th Cir. 2000)(citing Washer v. Bullitt Cntv.. 110 U.S. 558,562
(1884)). Thus,if Scott moves for leave to amend his complaint, all claims he seeks to bring in this
lawsuit must be included in his proposed amended complaint.
5.

Claims Against John Doe/Jane Doe

In Scott's motion for reconsideration, he alleges that he believes that the nurse who "made

false statements against him on Approximately 6/13/2023[,]" was the same nurse, who acted in

concert with Nurse Alexis "when they both approached him while he was taking a shower on AFloor-Section-6 in Jameson Annex,to get the plaintiffto recant his story and coerce him to obsolve

[sic] nurse Alexis of her racial slurs and inflammatory insinsitive [sic] comments." Doc. 30 T| 12

II

(internal quotations omitted). This Court held that Seott's Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claims against John Doe in their individual and official capacities survived § 1915A
screening. Thus, Scott's motion for reconsideration is denied as moot.
Scott claims that "[ojnly through the Court, or the Discovery Procedures can the plaintiff

fully ascertain the name of this 'Jane Doe Nurse[.]"' Id. This Court informed Scott that he will
have to identify John Doe. Doc. 27 at 43 n. 18. Perhaps Scott will have to do so through discovery
from the defendants. But this Court does not have the responsibility to figure out whom Scott
intends to reference or sue.

6.

Claims Against Global Tel* Link(GTL)

Scott requests this Court reconsider its dismissal of his claims against Global Tel* Link

(GTL). Doc. 30 Tf 15. Scott claims that he "was unsure if the Court would allow him to name
GTL-Global *Tel Link, as a listed defendant... so to be safe, rather than sorry the plaintiff did in

fact name GTL,which is a private company that is contracted with the state[.]" Id Although Scott
requests this Court to reconsider its dismissal of his claims against GTL,Scott has not alleged that
there was any error in fact or law ofthis Court's ruling dismissing his claims against GTL and has
not submitted newly discovered evidence that was not available at the time he filed his original
and amended complaints and supplements. Thus, Scott's motion for reconsideration of this
Court's order dismissing his claims against GTL is denied.
B.

Rule 60(b)

Rule 60(b) authorizes a court to relieve a party from a final judgment or order under the
following circumstances:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to

move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);(3)fraud(whether previously called intrinsic
or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the

12

judgment is void;(5)the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is
based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or(6)any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

Liberally construing Scott's motion, Scott alleges that dismissal of several of his claims on
screening should be reconsidered because of newly discovered medical records that he could not
obtain prior to this Court's screening of his complaint. See Doc. 30 T| 10. But Scott's records do
not constitute allegations of conduct by any individual against whom his Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims were dismissed against on screening. S^

Doc. 30-1. Thus, this Court construes Scott's filing of newly discovered medical records as a
supplement to his amended complaint, and his motion for reconsideration is denied.
11.

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Scott's motion for reconsideration. Doc. 30, is denied.

DATED May

2024.

BY THE COURT:

C2u(l'-^ROBERTO A. LANGE
CHIEF JUDGE

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