Wulf v. Coffee Cup Fuel Stops and Convenience Stores, LLC

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying as moot 2 MOTION to Appoint Counsel, granting 3 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, denying as moot 6 MOTION to Electronically File Documents, and dismissing 1 Complaint. Signed by U.S. District Judge Lawrence L. Piersol on 3/10/25. (SKK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

CRYSTAL ANN WULF,

CIV. NO.4:24-4229-LLP

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

vs.

GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN

FORMA PAUPERIS,DENYING MOTION
TO APPOINT COUNSEL,DENYING
ELECTRONIC FILING,AND

COFFEE CUP FUEL STOPS AND

CONVENIENCE STORES,LLC,
Defendant.

DISMISSING COMPLAINT

Pending before the Court is a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 3), a
Motion to Appoint Counsel(Doc. 2), and a Motion to Electronically File Documents(Doc.6)filed
by pro se plaintiff Crystal Ann Wulf("Ms. Wulf'). For the following reasons, Ms. Wulfs Motion

for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis is granted. Her Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
Her Motion to Appoint Counsel and Motion for Electronic Filing are denied without prejudice.
BACKGROUND

I.

Facts

On December 31,2024,Plaintiff Crystal Ann Wulffiled a lawsuit against Coffee Cup Fuel
Stops and Convenience Stores, LLC. The Complaint identifies the basis for jurisdiction in this

matter as diversity of citizenship, indicating that Plaintiff is a resident of Pipestone Coimty,
Minnesota and Defendant a resident of Minnehaha County, South Dakota.(Doc. 1) However,the
Complaint, in which Plaintiffrequests the Court grant punitive damages in the amount of$40,000

does not identify an amount in controversy sufficient to meet the $75,000 threshold for diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.(Doc. 1)

However, the Court's jurisdiction in this matter can be premised on federal question
jurisdiction. Plaintiff alleges a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which is a
claim arising under federal law. (Doc. 1). Thompson v. Benedictine Health Ctr. at Innsbruck, No.

21-CV-0969 (PJS/KMM), 2021 WL 3146530, at *1 (D. Minn. July 26, 2021)(finding federal1

question jurisdiction over claims arising under Title VII); see also Rush v. State Arkansas DWS,
876 F.3d 1123,1125(8th Cir. 2017)(reversing order dismissing Title VII claim for lack ofsubject
matter jurisdiction where unverified letter to EEOC supported exhaustion of administrative
remedies).

Ms. Wulfbrings this action against Coffee Cup Fuel Stop in Brandon, South Dakota on the
ground that this employer discriminated against her for expressing her religious beliefs. In her
Complaint, Ms. Wulf states, "I believe that I was denied reasonable religious accommodations. I
believe that I was forced to leave my position for expressing my beliefs."
Ms. Wulf alleges that on March 4, 2024, a store manager who overheard a conversation

between Ms. Wulf and a co-worker told Ms. Wulfthat she "could no[t] say the word church while
[] working,[and] not... speak about Jesus." Ms. Wulfresponded by telling the manager that the
alleged restriction was illegal and filed a complaint with Human Resources.

Ms. Wulf also alleges that "on a prior day, the date I am not sme of the store manager
banned ear buds from the kitchen. Ms. Wulf alleges this decision was made "two days after Terri,
the kitchen manager, granted me permission to listen to my prayer line for one hour a day, two
times per week." Ms. Wulf alleges a co-worker was "still allowed to wear earbuds in the kitchen

to listen to his audio books due to 'prior approval.'"
Ms. Wulf alleges the area supervisor came to speak with her and said,"we don't allow our
employees to carry fire arms [sic] to work and we will not allow them to speak about Jesus either."
According to Ms. Wulf,the supervisor was "equating my religion to being as offensive as carrying
a loaded weapon." Ms. Wulf alleges that she asked ifshe would be fired for speaking about Jesus.
According to Ms. Wulf, the supervisor "threaten[ed] her employment" by saying,"we won't fire
you for that but...," leaving an open-ended statement.

The Complaint does not indicate whether, when or how her employment at Coffee Cup
Fuel Stop ended. Ms. Wulfs application to proceed in forma pauperis does not identify Coffee
Cup Fuel Stop in her employment history.
Ms. Wulf alleges that she filed a charge with the EEOC and was granted a notice of right
to sue (charge number: 444-2024-01403).

I.

Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
Ms. Wulf seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 3). This Court may authorize the

commencement of suit without prepayment offees when an applicant files an affidavit stating she
is unable to pay the costs of the lawsuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Deterrnining whether an applicant is
sufficiently impoverished to qualify to proceed in forma pauperis under § 1915 is committed to

the court's discretion. Cross v. Gen Motors Corp, 721 F.2d 1152, 1157 (8th Cir. 1983). "[I]n
forma pauperis status does not require a litigant to demonstrate absolute destitution." Lee v.

McDonald's Corp., 231 F.3d 456,459(8th Cir. 2000)(citation omitted).
Ms. Wulfs affidavit states that "[b]ecause of my poverty I am unable to pay a reasonable
attorney fee." (Doc. 3). The expenses set forth in Ms. Wulfs affidavit indicate that even if she

were to forego all expenses related to "Recreation, entertainment, newspapers, magazines," the
filing fee combined with her other expenses, would exceed Ms. Wulfs expected income for the
month. In turn, the Court grants Mr. Wulfs request to proceed informa pauperis.
II.

Screening of Complaint under 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
A. Standard of Review

The inquiry does not end there. Congress has directed this Court under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) to review and screen claims in a complaint being filed in forma pauperis to
determine if they are:(1) frivolous or malicious;(2)fail to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (3) seek monetary relief against a defendant who has immunity. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

An action is frivolous if"it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Aziz v Burrows,

976 F.2d 1158, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992)(quoting

v Williams, 480 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)).

A complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted ifit contains sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl Corp v
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In reviewing whether a complaint states a claim on which
relief may be granted, the Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint
and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Braden v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc ,588
F.3d 585,594(8th Cir. 2009). To state a claim for relief, a complaint must plead more than "legal
conclusions" and "[tjhreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusoiy statements." Ashcroftv Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678(2009)(citing Twombly,550 U.S. at
555). Although the factual allegations in the complaint need not be detailed, they must he
sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A
plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for reliefthat "allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
"Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. (citation
omitted).

A pro se complaint,"however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner,404 U.S. 519,520-21 (1972)(citing
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). A reviewing court has the duty to examine a pro
se complaint "to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory." Williams

V Willits, 853 F.2d 586,588(8th Cir. 1988). However, a court is not required to supply additional
facts for a pro se plaintiff, nor construct a legal theory that assumes facts which have not been
pleaded. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)(citing Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d
1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989). The Court must also weigh all factual allegations in favor of the
plaintiff, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32
(1992).
B. Application

Ms. Wulf alleges discriminatory treatment in violation of Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act

of 1964 ("Title YII"). Ms. Wulf alleges that her former employer treated her unfavorably on
account of her religious beliefs. The Court considers Ms. Wulfs claim under Title VII. Under

Title VII, codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq, it is an unlawful employment practice for an
employer:

(1)to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2)to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise

adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.

Ms. Wulfs Complaint identifies her religion as a protected classification that would justify
relief under Title VII. Under Title VII, Ms. Wulf appears to plead two harms:(1) constructive
termination and(2)failure to make reasonable accommodations.

With respect to the first issue, "[a]n employee is constructively terminated only if(1) her
working environment is objectively intolerable (i.e., intolerable to a reasonable person), and (2)
either the employer intends to force the employee to quit, or it is reasonably foreseeable that the

employer's actions would cause the employee to quit." Darke v. Lurie BesikofLapidus & Co,
LLP, 550 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1045 (D. Minn. 2008). Ms. Wulf has stated that she was "forced to

leave [her] position," leaving the Court to infer that she ceased working at the Coffee Cup Fuel
Stop at some time after March 4, 2024. Ms. Wulfalleged that she perceived the area supervisor's
open-ended response to her question about firing as a threat. Ms. Wulfhas not identified additional
facts such as the approximate date of her employment ended, nor has she indicated whether she

had any further conversations with the employer in which one party (or the other) indicated an
intention to terminate the employment on a particular date. The facts alleged at this stage are
insufficient to demonstrate an objectively intolerable environment nor one that creates a
reasonably foreseeable chance of causing the employee to quit.

The Court also considers whether Ms. Wulf has stated a claim that her employer failed to
provide reasonable accommodation for her religious beliefs. "For a Title VII claim based on a

failure to accommodate religious beliefs, th[e Eighth Cjircuit has a three-part test: To establish a

prima facie case ofreligious discrimination under Title VII,[employees] must show [1] that they
have a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; [2] that they
informed [employer] of this belief; and [3] that they were disciplined for failing to comply with
the conflicting requirement ofemployment."Ringhofer v Mayo Clinic, Ambulance, 102 F.4th 894,
900 (8th Cir. 2024). Ms. Wulf has alleged that she informed her employer of attending church,
speaking about Jesus, and listening to a prayer line and that her employer prohibited her from
engaging in those practices at work. Those allegations are sufficient to demonstrate the first two

requirements of the three-part test set out above. However, Ms. Wulf has not alleged any
disciplinary action for failing to comply with the conflicting work requirement. It is not clear if

the conversation between Ms. Wulf and the area supervisor ended with any kind of plan of action

nor whether she continued to work at Coffee Cup Fuel Stop for any period of time following that
conversation. The Court takes into consideration the Eighth Circuit's guidance that at this early
stage in the proceedings,"[t]he complaint should be read as a whole, not parsed piece by piece to
determine whether each allegation,in isolation, is plausible."Id Accepting Ms. Wulfs allegations
as true at this stage of the analysis, the Court nevertheless cannot fill in the information gap

between the open-ended statement that Ms. Wulf perceived as a threat and how her employment
ended.

At this stage, Ms. Wulfs case does not survive screening. It will be dismissed without

prejudice."Without prejudice" means that Ms. Wulf may,if she wishes, submit a new Complaint,
but it must include additional facts to overcome the deficiencies of the present Complaint and
"raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

III.

Motion to Appoint Counsel

Ms. Wulf also moves the Court to appoint counsel. (Doc. 2). "A pro se litigant has no

statutory or constitutional right to have counsel appointed in a civil case." Stevens v. Redwing,
146 F.3d 538, 546 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Wiggins v Sargent, 753 F.2d 663, 668 (8th Cir.

1985)). "In civil rights matters the court may pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 request an attorney to
represent a party if, within the court's discretion, the circumstances are such that would properly
justify such a request." Mosby v Mabry, 697 F.2d 213, 214 (8th Cir. 1982)(internal quotations
and citation omitted). Since the Complaint is dismissed, albeit without prejudice, the request to
appoint counsel is moot and is DENIED.

IV.

Motion To Electronically File Documents

Ms. Wulf has also requested leave to electronically file documents in this case.(Doc. 6)This
Motion is moot and DENIED.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that;

1. Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 3) is GRANTED,

2. Plaintiffs Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a cause of
action.

3. Plaintiffs Motion to Appoint Counsel(Doc. 4)is DENIED as moot;
4. Plaintiffs Motion to Electronically File Documents(Doc. 6)is DENIED as moot.
Dated this 10th day of March, 2025

BY THE COURT:

^OjtVJUJUUUL
Lawrence L. Piersol

ATTEST:
MATTHEW W. THELEN,CLERK

United States District Judge