Rhines v. Weber

Filing 222

ORDER denying 216 Motion for Summary Judgment without prejudice; denying as moot 217 Motion to Extend. Signed by U.S. District Judge Karen E. Schreier on 11/25/2013. (KC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
WESTERN DIVISION
CHARLES RUSSELL RHINES,
Petitioner,
vs.
DARIN YOUNG, Warden, South
Dakota State Penitentiary
Respondent.

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CIV. 00-5020-KES

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHOUT
PREJUDICE AND
CONTINUING STAY

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner, Charles Rhines, was convicted of premeditated first-degree
murder and third-degree burglary. On January 26, 1993, a jury sentenced him
to death by lethal injection. Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to
the South Dakota Supreme Court. Fourteen issues were raised on direct
appeal, including the excusal of prospective juror Diane Staeffler, the state’s
use of its peremptory challenges, the use of victim impact testimony, and the
proportionality review. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s
conviction and sentence and the United States Supreme Court denied further
review on December 2, 1996.
Petitioner then applied for a writ of habeas corpus in state court on
December 5, 1996. In his state habeas, petitioner raised numerous issues,
including ineffective assistance of counsel, the excusal for cause of prospective
juror Diane Staeffler, and the constitutionality of the South Dakota capital

punishment statutes. Rhines’s state habeas was denied by the trial court on
October 8, 1998. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the denial on
February 9, 2000.
On February 22, 2000, Rhines filed a federal petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. An amended petition for writ of habeas
corpus was filed on November 20, 2000, that alleged thirteen grounds for
relief. Respondent alleged that several of the grounds had not been exhausted
and were, therefore, procedurally defaulted. On July 3, 2002, this court found
that petitioner’s grounds for relief Two(B), Six(E), Nine(B), (H), (I), and (J),
Twelve, and Thirteen were unexhausted. This court stayed the petition pending
exhaustion of Rhines’s state court remedies on the condition that Rhines file a
petition for habeas review in state court within 60 days and return to federal
court within 60 days of completing the state proceedings. The state appealed.
On direct appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the stay
and remanded the case so this court could determine whether Rhines could
proceed by dismissing the unexhausted claims from his petition. Rhines v.
Weber, 346 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2003). The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether a district court may issue an order of
stay and abeyance in a mixed petition for habeas corpus, that is, a petition
containing exhausted and unexhausted claims. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269
(2005). The Court held that stay and abeyance is permissible under some
circumstances. Id., 544 U.S. at 277. The Court remanded the case to the
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Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals so it could determine whether this court
abused its discretion in granting the stay. Id. at 279. The Court specifically
stated that “once the petitioner exhausts his state remedies, the district
court will lift the stay and allow the petitioner to proceed in federal
court.” Id. at 275-76 (emphasis added).
Because this court did not have the benefit of the controlling Supreme
Court authority when it issued the order of stay and abeyance in 2002, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to this court to analyze the
petition for writ of habeas corpus under the new test enunciated in Rhines.
Rhines v. Weber, 409 F.3d 982, 983 (8th Cir. 2005). This court was directed to
analyze each unexhausted claim to: (1) determine whether Rhines had good
cause for his failure to exhaust the claims in state court, (2) determine
whether the claims were plainly meritless, and (3) consider whether Rhines
had engaged in abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay. Id. (citing Rhines,
544 U.S. at 277-28). On December 19, 2009, this court found that Rhines had
good cause for failing to exhaust the claims, the claims were not plainly
meritless, and Rhines had not engaged in abusive litigation tactics. Docket 73.
The court ordered that Rhines’s petition for habeas corpus was stayed pending
exhaustion in state court. Id.
Rhines promptly returned to state court to exhaust his claims. On
February 27, 2013, the Circuit Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit of South
Dakota entered judgment in favor of respondent on all of Rhines’s claims
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properly before the court. Rhines timely requested a Certificate of Appealability
from both the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court of South Dakota, the
latter of which was denied on July 17, 2013. In early October of 2013, Rhines
filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.
On September 5, 2013, respondent filed in this court a motion for
summary judgment on all claims. Rhines requests additional time to respond
to the motion for summary judgment arguing that the motion was improperly
filed because the court has not lifted the stay it previously imposed or in the
alternative, that additional time is necessary to respond due to the complexity
of the motion.
DISCUSSION
In Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 333 (2007), the United States
Supreme Court found that for purposes of determining the limitations period
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
“[s]tate remedies are exhausted at the end of state-court review.” As a result,
Rhines’s state remedies were exhausted when the South Dakota Supreme
Court denied his request for a Certificate of Appealability on July 17, 2013.
This does not end the inquiry as to whether the federal habeas action
should remain stayed pending resolution of the petition of certiorari to the
Supreme Court, however, because the Supreme Court further noted in
Lawrence that “a district court concerned about duplicative work can stay the
habeas application until this Court resolves the case or, more likely, denies the
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petition for certiorari.” Id. at 335. Here, some of the same claims are pending
in federal district court and the United States Supreme Court. There is no
reason to duplicate efforts that would result in judicial inefficiencies inherent
from proceedings in two federal courts at the same time on the same case. As a
result, the stay will remain in place pending resolution of Rhines’s petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court. After the Supreme Court resolves
Rhines’s petition for certiorari, respondent should move this court to lift the
stay.
Because respondent’s motion for summary judgment was filed before the
court entered an order lifting the stay, the motion is denied without prejudice.
After this court enters an order lifting the stay, respondent may refile his
motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that respondent’s motion for summary judgment (Docket
216) is denied without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Rhines’s motion to extend time to
respond (Docket 217) is denied as moot.
Dated November 25, 2013.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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