Rhines v. Weber
Filing
348
ORDER denying 323 Motion to Amend/Correct; denying 323 Motion to Alter Judgment; denying 324 Motion to Strike. Signed by U.S. District Judge Karen E. Schreier on 7/5/16. (DJP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
WESTERN DIVISION
CHARLES RUSSELL RHINES,
5:00-CV-05020-KES
Plaintiff,
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
AMEND THE JUDGMENT AND
DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE
vs.
DARIN YOUNG, Warden, South Dakota
State Penitentiary;
Defendant.
Petitioner, Charles Rhines, moves the court to alter or amend its
judgment. Respondent, Darin Young, resists the motion. Respondent also
moves to strike certain exhibits from the record. Rhines resists the motion. For
the following reasons, the court denies the motion to alter or amend the
judgment and denies the motion to strike.
BACKGROUND
The procedural history of this case is set forth more fully in the court’s
February 16, 2016 order granting summary judgment in favor of respondent
and denying Rhines’s federal habeas petition. See Docket 305. The following
facts are relevant to the pending motions:
Rhines is a capital inmate at the South Dakota State Penitentiary in
Sioux Falls, South Dakota. He was convicted of premeditated first-degree
murder for the death of Donnivan Schaeffer and of third-degree burglary of a
Dig’Em Donuts Shop in Rapid City, South Dakota. A jury found that Rhines
should be subject to death by lethal injection, and a state circuit court judge
imposed the sentence. On February 16, 2016, this court granted respondent’s
motion for summary judgment and denied Rhines’s federal petition for habeas
corpus. Docket 305. The court entered judgment in favor of respondent on the
same day. Docket 306.
I.
Rhines’s Rule 59(e) Motion
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) was adopted to clarify a district
court’s power to correct its own mistakes within the time period immediately
following entry of judgment. Norman v. Ark. Dep’t of Educ., 79 F.3d 748, 750
(8th Cir. 1996) (citing White v. N.H. Dep’t of Empl. Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450
(1982)). “Rule 59(e) motions serve the limited function of correcting ‘manifest
errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.’ ” United States v.
Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006). “Such motions
cannot be used to introduce new evidence, tender new legal theories, or raise
arguments which could have been offered or raised prior to entry of judgment.”
Id. The habeas context is no exception to the prohibition on using a Rule 59(e)
motion to raise new arguments that could have and should have been made
before the court entered judgment. Bannister v. Armontrout, 4 F.3d 1434, 1440
(8th Cir. 1993). The Rule “is not intended to routinely give litigants a second
bite at the apple, but to afford an opportunity for relief in extraordinary
circumstances.” Dale & Selby Superette & Deli v. United States Dep't of Agric.,
838 F. Supp. 1346, 1348 (D. Minn. 1993); see also 11 Charles Alan Wright &
2
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure §
2810.1 (3d ed.) (“However, reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an
extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly”). “A district court has
broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a motion to alter or
amend [a] judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e)[.]” Metro. St. Louis, 440 F.3d at 933.
DISCUSSION
A.
Conflict of Interest
Rhines’s conflict of interest argument is based on his interpretations of
the Supreme Court’s Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) opinion. On
June 5, 2015, Rhines moved to hold his federal habeas proceeding in
abeyance.1 He argued that the stay was necessary so that he could investigate
potential ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims premised on the Martinez
decision. On August 5, 2015, the court concluded that Martinez did not apply
to him and denied Rhines’s motion for several reasons. Docket 272. As one
reason for denying Rhines’s motion, the court found that Rhines received
independent counsel between his initial-review collateral proceeding and his
federal habeas proceedings.2 Thus, there was no conflict of interest that
interfered with Rhines’s federal habeas counsel.
The court lifted the earlier stay on Rhines’s federal habeas proceeding
on February 4, 2014. Docket 224. Respondent’s summary judgment motion
became ripe for review on November 26, 2014.
1
The court’s August 5, 2015 order traces the lineage of attorneys who
have represented Rhines throughout his state and federal proceedings. Docket
272 at 10-12. The court learned during oral argument on respondent’s
summary judgment motion that two other attorneys–Judith Roberts and Mark
Marshall–also represented Rhines during his second state habeas proceeding.
2
3
Then on October 21, 2015, and two days prior to the oral argument
hearing on respondent’s summary judgment motion, Rhines moved for
reconsideration of the court’s order denying his request for a stay as well as for
permission to amend his federal habeas petition.3 According to Rhines, the
court “fail[ed] to consider the unusual factual scenario that exists in Mr.
Rhines' case. Mr. Rhines has not simultaneously had the benefit of effective,
independent counsel for the entire time that his case has been pending in
either state or federal court.” Docket 279 at 1. Rhines argued that the court’s
interpretation of Martinez and its analysis concerning the independence of his
counsel was wrong. The court concluded, among other things, however, that
Martinez did not apply and that Rhines was not entitled to relief. Docket 304 at
19-20.
Here, and like Rhines’s first motion for reconsideration, Rhines contends
that “this Court has failed to recognize the impact of [Martinez] and Trevino v.
Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013)” because several attorneys from the Federal
Public Defenders’ Office (FPDO) represented Rhines during part of his second
state habeas proceeding and in his federal habeas proceeding. Docket 323 at 2;
Docket 340 at 1. Rhines contends that this partial overlap creates an
impermissible conflict of interest.
The names of those attorneys did not appear on the federal docket.
Rhines also moved for permission to file a supplemental summary
judgment brief to include the arguments that Rhines sought to add to his
federal habeas petition. The court denied the request.
3
4
Capital petitioners such as Rhines have a statutory right to counsel, and
the court may upon motion appoint substitute counsel if the “interests of
justice” so require. Martel v. Clair, 132 S. Ct. 1276, 1286-87 (2012). The FPDO
was appointed as co-counsel for Rhines in 2009. Docket 184. Rhines never
moved for the FPDO’s substitution.4 Thus, the issue of whether Rhines was
entitled to substitute counsel was not raised before this court. While Rhines
argued that the partial overlap between the attorneys who represented him
during part of his second state habeas proceeding and the conclusion of his
federal habeas proceeding created an impermissible conflict of interest, at no
time did Rhines move for substitute federal habeas counsel, and the court does
not believe an impermissible conflict of interest exists. Docket 272 at 12. The
court is satisfied that it did not base its decision on a manifest error of law or
fact. And the court has twice analyzed and rejected Rhines’s contention that
Martinez otherwise applies to him. Because Rule 59(e) is not intended to give
litigants “a second bite at the apple,” it, likewise, is not intended to give them a
third. See Dale & Selby Superette, 838 F. Supp. at 1348. Thus, Rhines’s
conflict of interest argument fails.
B.
Juror Bias and Impropriety
1.
Actual and implied bias of jurors
Rhines contends that two jurors at his trial harbored anti-homosexual
biases against him. He argues that those biases infected his sentencing process
and caused the denial of his constitutional rights to an impartial jury, to due
Rhines returned to state court for his second state habeas proceeding
in 2005.
4
5
process, to be free from the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, and to
equal protection of the law.
Rhines did not raise previously his juror bias claim in any state or
federal proceeding.5 According to Rhines, the reason that this issue was not
presented earlier is because none of Rhines’s previous attorneys interviewed
the jurors from his trial. Some of the former jurors were interviewed recently,
and Rhines has secured their signed affidavits. Rhines argues that the
affidavits are “newly discovered evidence” under Rule 59(e) and asserts that the
court should amend its judgment accordingly in light of this new evidence.
Rhines’s argument fails, however, for several reasons. First, a motion
under Rule 59(e) cannot be used to “tender new legal theories, or raise
arguments which should have been offered or raised prior to entry of
judgment.” Metro. St. Louis, 440 F.3d at 933; see also Bannister, 4 F.3d at 1440
(“Bannister first raised the claim in the district court in a Rule 59(e) motion.
The district court correctly found that the presentation of the claim in a 59(e)
motion was the functional equivalent of a second [habeas] petition, and as such
was subject to dismissal as abusive”). Thus, Rhines’s juror bias claim should
have been raised at the outset of his habeas proceeding. See Docket 72
(directing Rhines “to include every known constitutional error or deprivation
entitling [him] to relief”). Second, a principal purpose of Rule 59(e) is to afford
courts the opportunity to correct their mistakes in the period immediately
Rhines’s federal habeas petition asserted that his right to an impartial
jury was violated because certain jurors were excluded based on their views of
the death penalty. See Docket 73.
5
6
following the entry of the judgment. Norman, 79 F.3d at 750. But Rhines does
not explain how the court made a mistake regarding an issue that was never
before the court. Third, because Rhines did not raise his juror bias claim
during any of his state proceedings, this court cannot consider it. Baldwin v.
Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (“Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus,
a state prisoner . . . must ‘fairly present’ his claim in each appropriate state
court”); Rucker v. Norris, 563 F.3d 766, 769 (8th Cir. 2009) (agreeing with the
district court that an “issue is procedurally barred because it was not ‘fairly
present[ed]’ to the appropriate state court”) (alteration in original). And while
Rhines argues that each of his prior attorneys–including his initial-review
collateral proceeding attorney–failed to develop his juror bias claim, Rhines
cannot avail himself of the rule from Martinez because Rhines’s defaulted claim
is not a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at
1320.
As to Rhines’s newly discovered evidence argument, the court finds that
Rule 59(e) is applicable in this context.6 The Eighth Circuit applies the same
standard for Rule 59(e) motions based on newly discovered evidence as it does
In Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652-53 (2004) the Supreme Court
held that a habeas petitioner must satisfy § 2254(e)(2) “when a prisoner seeks
relief based on new evidence without an evidentiary hearing.” But unlike this
case, the Holland case involved an exhausted claim rather than a new claim.
Id. at 650. Regardless, relief under § 2254(e)(2) also requires as a prerequisite
that the new evidence “could not have been previously discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii); Holland, 542 U.S. at
653.
6
7
for Rule 60(b)(2) motions.7 Miller v. Baker Implement Co., 439 F.3d 407, 414
(8th Cir. 2006). “To prevail on this motion, [the movant is] required to show—
among other things—that the evidence proffered with the motion was
discovered after the court's order and that he exercised diligence to obtain the
evidence before entry of the order.” Anderson v. United States, 762 F.3d 787,
794 (8th Cir. 2014). The evidence must also be admissible. Murdock v. United
States, 160 F.2d 358, 362 (8th Cir. 1947).
Here, and regardless of whether the juror affidavits are admissible,
Rhines has had roughly twenty years to develop the evidence he now offers. In
fact, Rhines faults each of his attorneys for not developing this evidence
sooner. See, e.g., Docket 323 at 2 (“Beginning with trial counsel, counsel at
every stage of the prior proceedings have failed to interview the jurors”). But
Rhines’s allegations undermine the foundation of his motion. For Rhines to
prevail, he must show that this evidence could not have been discovered earlier
despite having exercised reasonable diligence to obtain it. Rhines, however,
asserts that the evidence should have been discovered earlier if his attorneys
were diligent. Rhines’s contention is the inverse of what Rule 60(b)(2) is
designed to address. He makes no showing that “he had been unable to
uncover the newly discovered evidence prior to the court’s summary judgment
ruling.” Miller, 439 F.3d at 414. Likewise, the decades-long period of delay
Rule 60(b)(2) provides that litigants may seek relief from a final
judgment or order based on “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2).
7
8
while the evidence was obtainable indicates a lack of diligence. Holland v.
Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 653 (2004) (rejecting an argument to present new
evidence because “[i]t is difficult to see, moreover, how respondent could claim
due diligence given the 7-year delay”). “Because this evidence was available to
[Rhines], it should have been presented prior to the entry of judgment.” Metro.
St. Louis, 440 F.3d at 935.
Finally, to the extent that Rhines’s motion could be construed as a
motion to present new evidence related to issue IX.D of his federal habeas
petition,8 the court’s conclusion is the same. Issue IX.D was adjudicated on the
merits in state court. Section 2254(d) and the rule in Pinholster limit this
court’s review of a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court to
the record that was before the state court. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170,
181 (2011). Rhines’s juror affidavit evidence was not presented to or considered
by the state court that adjudicated the claim. Rhines cannot use Rule 59(e) to
circumvent § 2254(d) and Pinholster. Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 489
(1975) (holding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in § 2254
proceedings to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory
provisions). Consequently, this court cannot consider the evidence. Thus,
Rhines’s newly discovered evidence argument fails.
Issue IX.D alleged that Rhines’s trial attorneys were ineffective because
they failed to exclude evidence of Rhines’s homosexuality. See Docket 73.
8
9
2.
Juror consideration of extrinsic evidence and ex parte
contacts with the trial judge
Rhines argues that the jurors considered extrinsic evidence during the
course of his trial. According to Rhines, the jurors at some point discussed a
newspaper article that speculated about which of the jurors would serve as
alternates. Rhines also argues that the jurors had improper ex parte contact
with the trial judge when the judge allegedly told the jurors “that he would not
refer to them by name and that the defense could ask them to affirm that the
verdict as read was true.” Docket 323 at 7. Rhines contends that these
incidents violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
This claim, like Rhines’s juror bias claim, was not raised previously in
any state or federal proceeding. For the reasons stated more fully in section
I.B.1, supra, the court denies Rhines’s motion to raise the claim for the first
time now and denies Rhines’s motion to present new evidence in support of the
claim.
3.
Whether one of the jurors did not live in Pennington
County
Rhines’s trial took place in Pennington County, South Dakota. Rhines
argues that one of the jurors actually lived in Meade County, rather than
Pennington County, and that the juror was thus ineligible to serve at Rhines’s
trial. Rhines argues that this error violated his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
This claim, like Rhines’s preceding arguments, was not raised previously
in any state or federal proceeding. For the reasons stated more fully in section
10
I.B.1, supra, the court denies Rhines’s motion to raise the claim for the first
time now and denies Rhines’s motion to present new evidence in support of the
claim.
C.
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Claims
Rhines moves for reconsideration of the court’s adjudication of issues
IX.A, IX.B, and IX.I of his federal habeas petition. Those three issues all
concerned whether Rhines’s trial counsel’s investigation and presentation of
mitigating evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Each claim
was considered and rejected in state court. This court concluded that Rhines
was not entitled to relief on any of his claims. See Docket 305 at 82-101.
1.
Appropriate standard of review
Rhines challenges the legal standards used to adjudicate his ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims. Ineffective assistance claims are governed
generally by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The state court
cited and analyzed the Strickland test. Docket 204-1 at 21 (explaining the socalled “deficient performance” and “prejudice” prongs). The court applied that
test using the facts of the Strickland opinion and several other Supreme Court
decisions involving attorneys’ mitigation efforts for comparative purposes. See
id. at 19 (citing Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) and Darden v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 168 (1986)). The state court determined that Rhines failed to show
that his attorneys’ performance was deficient and, therefore, it concluded that
Rhines was not entitled to relief.
11
This court set out in its order granting summary judgment in favor of
respondent the applicable standard of review in Rhines’s case. See Docket 305
at 8-11. That standard is established by § 2254. The court cannot grant relief
unless a state court’s adjudication of a claim is “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or unless the
decision is “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
Also, “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be
presumed to be correct,” and the habeas petitioner “shall have the burden of
rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The Supreme Court has elaborated on the application of
those provisions in numerous opinions, and this court’s order set forth those
principles. Docket 305 at 8-11.
The court also set forth the more specific standards that apply when a
state court adjudicates an ineffective assistance claim. Id. at 82. The court
held:
In the context of § 2254, however, Rhines must overcome an
additional hurdle. This court’s task is to determine if the state
court’s decision involved an objectively unreasonable application of
the Strickland standard. See Knowles [v. Mirzayance,] 556 U.S.
[111,] 122 [(2009)]. Because the Strickland standard itself is
deferential to counsel’s performance, and because this court’s
review of the state court’s decision under § 2254 is also deferential,
the standard of review applied to Rhines’s ineffective assistance
claims is ‘doubly deferential.’ Id. at 123. Consequently, ‘the
question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The
question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel
satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.’ Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011); see also Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1403
12
(noting the petitioner must demonstrate that the state court’s
determination regarding both prongs was unreasonable to be
entitled to relief).
Id. This court concluded that the state court’s resolution of Rhines’s ineffective
assistance claims was reasonable and that Rhines was not entitled to relief.
Here, Rhines argues that the state court’s interpretation of the Strickland
test was wrong. He argues that the state court’s appraisal of the “deficient
performance” prong was not exacting enough of counsel’s performance. Rhines
also argues that the state court’s description of the “prejudice” prong was
incomplete. And Rhines argues that this court’s review of the state court’s
decision was based on an improper standard.
Rhines, however, already received an opportunity to challenge–and he
did challenge–the state court’s analysis. See Docket 232 at 80-96 (Rhines’s
summary judgment brief). Rule 59 is not a vehicle for re-litigating old matters
or advancing arguments that should have been made before. Metro. St. Louis,
440 F.3d at 933. Rhines cites in support of his “deficient performance”
argument the Supreme Court’s decisions in Strickland, Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510 (2003), Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), and Rompilla v.
Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005). This court previously considered and rejected the
same argument Rhines raises now. The court stated:
While Rhines argues that Williams and Wiggens were controlling
and dispositive, the Supreme Court has explained that Strickland
is the appropriate standard that courts should apply to resolve
ineffective assistance claims. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1406-07
(rejecting argument that Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla v. Beard,
545 U.S. 374 (2005) impose a duty to investigate in every case).
Likewise, the Court cautioned against ‘attributing strict rules to
13
this Court’s recent case law.’ Id. at 1408.
Docket 305 at 97. The court is satisfied that it did not make a manifest error
concerning this issue.
As to Rhines’s prejudice argument, the state court described the
prejudice prong as requiring a showing of “actual prejudice.” Docket 204-1 at
21. Rhines argues that the state court should have included the Supreme
Court’s further explanation that prejudice requires “a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the
confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A defendant must
satisfy both Strickland prongs, however, and a court can adjudicate them in
either order if the defendant fails to establish one. Id. at 697. The state court
never reached the prejudice inquiry because it concluded that Rhines’s
attorneys rendered reasonably competent assistance. This court agreed with
the state court. Thus, even assuming the state court’s description of the
prejudice prong was objectively unreasonable–which it was not–the error would
not affect the outcome of Rhines’s case. The court is satisfied that it did not
make a manifest error concerning this issue.
Regarding Rhines’s argument that this court applied the incorrect
standard of review to the state court’s decision, Rhines does not identify the
standard the court should have applied. Rhines cites primarily to various cases
involving the review of ineffective assistance claims in the first instance. The
Supreme Court has explained, however, that the “doubly deferential” standard
14
under § 2254(d) applies when a federal court reviews a state court’s
adjudication of an ineffective assistance claim on the merits. The court finds no
manifest error with its decision. Thus, Rhines is not entitled to relief.
2.
Mitigation investigation
The bulk of Rhines’s motion contends that his trial attorneys failed to
properly investigate and present mitigating evidence. His arguments can be
grouped broadly into five areas where, according to Rhines, his attorneys
should have investigated further: (1) Rhines’s family; (2) Rhines’s military
history; (3) Rhines’s jail and criminal records; (4) Rhines’s mental health; and
(5) Rhines’s family history of exposure to neurotoxins.
Each area highlighted by Rhines, with the exception of the neurotoxins
issue, was investigated by his trial attorneys. See Docket 204-1 at 16-19
(noting “Rhines’[s] counsel did investigate possible mitigation evidence. They
investigated by talking to Rhines, his family and friends, reviewing his military
service records, his schooling, employment history, [and] psychiatric and
psychological examinations and found that there was very little mitigating
evidence to be found or presented.”). Like Rhines’s standard of review
argument, Rhines had the opportunity to contest–and did contest–the state
court’s determinations concerning his attorneys’ efforts and their strategy.
Docket 232 at 80-93. This court rejected those arguments and concluded that
Rhines was not entitled to habeas relief. Here, Rhines devotes many pages of
his reconsideration brief to re-litigating his mitigation claims. But Rhines
cannot use Rule 59(e) to re-litigate old matters or advance new arguments that
15
should have been made before. Metro. St. Louis, 440 F.3d at 933. And
bookending those arguments with conclusory language that this court’s
decision was unreasonable is an insufficient basis to justify relief. The court
finds no manifest error with its decision. Thus, Rhines’s claims will not be
revisited.
The court will, however, address several specific issues raised in Rhines’s
motion. For example, Rhines cites a number of affidavits signed by individuals
who, like the jurors, were also recently interviewed. See, e.g., Docket 323-8
(signed March 15, 2016); Docket 323-9 (signed March 11, 2016); Docket 32310 (signed March 15, 2016). Rhines references these affidavits in support of his
arguments that the court’s decision was erroneous. Rhines’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claims were each adjudicated on the merits in state
court. Rhines has not shown that these contemporary affidavits, or similar
evidence containing the same substance, were ever presented to or considered
by the state court. Thus, this court cannot consider the affidavits. Pinholster,
563 U.S. at 181.
As for Rhines’s neurotoxins argument, it is a theory that Rhines
advanced in his October 21, 2015 motion to amend his federal habeas petition.
See Docket 281 at 3-5. Rhines asserted that his trial attorneys as part of their
mitigation efforts should have investigated whether Rhines was exposed to
pesticides and other toxins while he was growing up in McLaughlin, South
Dakota. Rhines argued that that exposure could have caused him to develop
various neurological disorders. He claimed that the failure of his trial attorneys
16
to pursue this area of inquiry suggested that their mitigation efforts were
deficient. And Rhines moved to buttress his argument with affidavits from
three experts who reviewed Rhines’s case file and records. See
Docket 281-1, -2, and -3. Those experts made their own findings and
conclusions concerning Rhines, his background, his mental health, and the
effectiveness of Rhines’s trial counsel’s mitigation efforts.
This court denied Rhines’s motion to amend his federal habeas petition
to include his new theory and evidence. Rhines’s ineffective assistance claims
were each adjudicated on the merits in state court. This court held that the
rule in Pinholster prevented Rhines from “bolster[ing] his exhausted ineffective
assistance claims with new evidence that was not presented to or considered
by the state court.” Docket 304 at 18. The court, for similar reasons, denies
Rhines’s motion to present these arguments and this evidence as part of his
reconsideration motion.
In sum, Rhines has not identified any manifest error with the court’s
judgment concerning his ineffective assistance claims. Thus, Rhines is not
entitled to relief.
D.
Jury Note and Juror Confusion
Rhines moves for reconsideration of the court’s adjudication of Issue IX.E
of his federal habeas petition. Issue IX.E alleged that Rhines’s trial attorneys
were ineffective due to the way they handled a note from the jurors. The state
court denied Rhines’s claim, and this court concluded that Rhines was not
entitled to relief. Docket 305 at 106-08.
17
Here, Rhines attempts to re-litigate Issue IX.E. He invokes arguments
that either were made or should have been made before and also cites evidence
that was not presented to the state court that adjudicated his claim. Rhines’s
argument suffers the same infirmities as those discussed in sections I.A-C,
supra. The court is satisfied that its decision did not involve any manifest error.
Thus, Rhines’s ineffective assistance claim will not be revisited.
Rhines has failed to justify altering or amending the court’s judgment.
Thus, Rhines’s Rule 59(e) motion is denied.
II.
Respondent’s Motion to Strike
Respondent moves the court to strike various exhibits from the court’s
docket. These exhibits consist of affidavits and other documents that the court
determined that it cannot consider because, for example, Rhines did not
present the evidence to any state court for consideration. Cf. Pinholster, 563
U.S. at 181. Rhines, nonetheless, cited to some of those same exhibits in his
Rule 59(e) motion, and respondent asserts that Rhines may continue to do so
on appeal. Thus, respondent asks the court to excise the exhibits from the
docket.
The court will not strike the exhibits. Respondent has not shown that he
will be prejudiced by the continued presence of the exhibits on the court’s
docket. Thus, the motion is denied.
CONCLUSION
Rhines has not shown any manifest error with the court’s decision. Thus,
he is not entitled to relief. Respondent has not shown that the various exhibits
18
should be struck from the court’s docket. Therefore, the exhibits will remain.
Thus, it is
ORDERED that Rhines’s motion to alter or amend the judgment (Docket
323) is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent’s motion to strike (Docket
324) is denied.
Dated July 5, 2016.
BY THE COURT:
/s/Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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