Rozone Productions, LLC et al v. Raczkowski et al
Filing
108
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 101 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney and granting 102 Motion to Seal Document. Signed by U. S. District Judge Jeffrey L. Viken on 8/16/11. (SB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
WESTERN DIVISION
ROZONE PRODUCTIONS, LLC;
RTR ILLUMINATED INVESTORS 3,
LLC; and ROBERT T. ROSEN,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ANDREW ROCKY RACZKOWSKI;
TICKETS PLUS INCORPORATED,
d/b/a Star Tickets Plus;
GOOD MUSIC AGENCY, INC.,
d/b/a Talent Buyers Network;
BRIAN KNAFF; and
ROBERT J. STRUYK,
Defendants.
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CIV. 09-5015-JLV
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART
MOTION TO WITHDRAW
INTRODUCTION
Attorneys G. Verne Goodsell and David S. Barari move to withdraw as
counsel for defendants Good Music Agency, Inc., a/k/a Talent Buyers Network,
Brian Knaff, and Robert J. Struyk. (Docket 101). Attorney Goodsell makes the
motion because the defendants are unable to pay for legal services. Id. These
defendants desire to proceed pro se as follows:
Brian Knaff - pro se;
Good Music Agency, Inc. - Brian Knaff - pro se; and
Robert Struyk - pro se.
Id. Mr. Goodsell also moves the court to seal his affidavit filed in support of the
motion to withdraw. (Docket 102).
THE LAW
28 U.S.C. § 1654 provides:
In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct
their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such
courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes
therein.
Without variance, every federal appeals court allows an individual, as a
defendant, to discharge his attorney and proceed pro se under § 1654. “As a
general matter of federal law, an individual proceeding in federal court has the
right to present his case pro se . . . .” Leftridge v. Connecticut State Trooper
Officer No. 1283, 640 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2011) (referencing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654). However, “pro se representation does not excuse a party from
complying with a court's orders and with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Ackra Direct Marketing Corporation v. Fingerhut Corporation, 86 F.3d 852,
856-57 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Jones v. Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 163 (7th Cir.
1994); Anderson v. Home Insurance Co., 724 F.2d 82, 84 (8th Cir. 1983)).
“It has been the law for the better part of two centuries . . . that a
corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel.”
Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council., 506 U.S. 194,
201-02 (1993). “[S]ave in a few aberrant cases, the lower courts have uniformly
held that 28 U.S.C. § 1654 . . . does not allow corporations, partnerships, or
associations to appear in federal court otherwise than through a licensed
attorney.” Id. at 202.
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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is not one which has embraced a
“few aberrant case[s].” A non-lawyer may not represent a corporation in federal
court. Steele v. City of Bemidji, 257 F.3d 902, 905 (8th Cir. 2001). See
Knoefler v. United Bank of Bismarck, 20 F.3d 347, 348 (8th Cir. 1994) (“A
nonlawyer, such as these purported ‘trustee(s) pro se’ has no right to represent
another entity, i.e., a trust, in a court of the United States.”); Joshua Building
Trust v. Clementi, 78 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 1996) (Table) (“A non-lawyer trustee
may not represent a trust pro se in federal court.”). See also Lattanzio v.
COMTA, 481 F.3d 137, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A] layperson may not represent
a separate legal entity such as a corporation. . . . We have extended this
reasoning to partnerships and single shareholder corporations, as well as to
shareholders who file derivative suits. . . .” (citing Rowland v. Cal. Men’s
Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993) (other
internal citations omitted); United States v. 9.19 Acres of Land, More or Less,
in Marquette County, Michigan, 416 F.2d 1244, 1245 (6th Cir. 1969) (“The
United States District Court was clearly correct in ruling that a corporate
president may not represent his corporation before a federal court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654 . . . .”); Turner v. American Bar Ass’n, 407 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Tex.
1975), aff’d, 539 F.2d 715 (Table), aff’d, 542 F.2d 56 (Table) (corporations and
partnerships must be represented by licensed counsel).
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ORDER
Based on the above analysis, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendants’ motion (Docket 101) is granted in part and
denied in part.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion to seal (Docket 102)
is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Brian Knaff shall be permitted
to represent himself, on a pro se basis, throughout the remainder of this case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Robert J. Struyk shall be
permitted to represent himself, on a pro se basis, throughout the remainder of
this case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorneys G. Verne Goodsell and David
S. Barari are permitted to withdraw as counsel for defendants Brian Knaff and
Robert J. Struyk.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Brian Knaff shall not be
permitted to represent Good Music, Inc.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorneys G. Verne Goodsell and David
S. Barari shall remain as counsel of record for defendant Good Music, Inc.,
pending proper substitution of counsel under the local rules of the court.
Dated August 16, 2011.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Jeffrey L. Viken
JEFFREY L. VIKEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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