Heil v. Belle Starr Saloon & Casino et al
Filing
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ORDER denying 153 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Jeffrey L. Viken on 2/26/14. (SB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
WESTERN DIVISION
MISTY N. HEIL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BELLE STARR SALOON &
CASINO, INC.; ANGIE’S INC.;
Defendants,
and
THOMAS W. SHERWOOD, SR.,
d/b/a Sherwood Investments &
Trust Company, and
SHERWOOD FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP,
Defendants/Third-Party
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JASON ORELUP,
Third-Party Defendant.
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CIV. 09-5074-JLV
ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF HEIL’S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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CHELSEA LINTON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ANGIE'S INC.; BELLE STARR
SALOON & CASINO, INC.;
Defendants,
and
THOMAS W. SHERWOOD SR.,
d/b/a Sherwood Investments
and Trust Company, and
SHERWOOD FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP,
Defendants/Cross
Claim Plaintiffs,
vs.
JASON ORELUP,
Defendant/Cross Claim
Defendant.
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CIV. 09-5099-JLV
INTRODUCTION
Pending before the court is plaintiff Misty Heil’s motion for partial
summary judgment. (Docket 153). Ms. Heil seeks partial summary
judgment “on her claims of tangible employment action sexual harassment,
hostile work environment sexual harassment, . . . retaliatory discharge and
wrongful termination.” (Docket 154 at p. 2). Ms. Heil submits a statement
of undisputed material facts in support of the motion. (Docket 155).
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Defendants resist the motion. (Dockets 161 & 168). Defendants’ response
includes additional material facts and identifies those facts in dispute.
(Dockets 162 & 163). For the reasons stated below, Ms. Heil’s motion for
partial summary judgment is denied.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), a movant is entitled to summary judgment
if the movant can “show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Once the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest
on the allegations or denials in the pleadings, but rather must produce
affirmative evidence setting forth specific facts showing a genuine issue of
material fact exists. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256
(1986). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the case
under the governing substantive law will properly preclude summary
judgment. Id. at 248. Accordingly, “the mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be
no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 247-48 (emphasis in original).
If a dispute about a material fact is genuine, that is, if the evidence is
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, then
summary judgment is not appropriate. Id. However, the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the nonmoving party fails to “make
a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to
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which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986). “There can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving
party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323.
In determining whether summary judgment should issue, the facts
and inferences from those facts must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986). In order to withstand a motion for summary
judgment, the nonmoving party “must substantiate [her] allegations with
‘sufficient probative evidence [that] would permit a finding in [her] favor on
more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.’ ” Moody v. St. Charles
County, 23 F.3d 1410, 1412 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Gregory v. Rogers, 974
F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 913 (1993)). “A
mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to avoid summary judgment.”
Moody, 23 F.3d at 1412. The key inquiry is “whether the evidence presents
a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 251-52.
DISPUTED FACTS EXIST
The court reviewed Ms. Heil’s statement of disputed and undisputed
material facts (Docket 155), defendants’ response to Ms. Heil’s statement of
undisputed facts (Docket 163), and the briefing of all the parties (Dockets
154, 161, 168 & 169). The court concludes “the evidence presents a
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sufficient disagreement” which requires submission of Ms. Heil’s claims to a
jury. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
While Ms. Heil presented an abundance of evidence she may have
been physically or sexually assaulted by Jason Orelup, the manager of the
Belle Starr, there exists a material factual dispute whether the relationship
of Ms. Heil and Mr. Orelup was consensual and whether there existed a
hostile work environment because of Mr. Orelup’s conduct. See Docket 163
at ¶¶ 11-14, 18-21 & 23. Ms. Heil’s reply brief acknowledges these
disputes, but argues other witnesses confirm her testimony. (Docket 169 at
pp. 4-5). “[W]here motive, intent and credibility are key factors summary
judgment is generally inappropriate.” Keys v. Lutheran Family & Children’s
Services of Missouri, 668 F.2d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 1981).
Ms. Heil asserts the Belle Starr, Angie’s, the Sherwood Investments &
Trust Company (“SITC”) and the Sherwood Family Limited Partnership
(“SFLP”) constitute an integrated enterprise making not only Mr. Orelup and
Belle Starr liable for her claims, but SITC and SFLP as well. (Docket 169 at
p. 17). Ms. Heil’s factual assertions are disputed. See Docket 163 at ¶¶ 79 & 52-54; see also Docket 162 at ¶¶ 1, 9-10, 12, 14-16, 79-82, 85-86. Ms.
Heil’s reply brief acknowledges this material factual dispute. (Docket 169 at
pp. 17-18).
For these reasons, Ms. Heil’s motion for partial summary judgment is
denied.
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0RDER
Based on the above analysis, it is hereby
ORDERED that Ms. Heil’s motion for partial summary judgment
(Docket 153) is denied.
Dated February 26, 2014.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Jeffrey L. Viken
JEFFREY L. VIKEN
CHIEF JUDGE
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