Lynde v. Astrue

Filing 32

ORDER granting 22 Motion for Attorney Fees; granting 29 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by U. S. District Judge Jeffrey L. Viken on 6/13/12. (SB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
WESTERN DIVISION
ELISA LYNDE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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CIV. 10-5022-JLV
ORDER GRANTING MOTION
FOR EAJA FEES

On March 4, 2012, the court entered an order reversing the
determination of the Commissioner that Ms. Lynde was not disabled and
remanded the matter for rehearing. (Docket 20). Ms. Lynde then moved for
an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA). (Docket 22). Counsel initially sought fees in the amount of
$2,555.00 and costs in the amount of $366.50 for a total award of
$2,921.50. The Commissioner opposed the request, contending that the
motion was premature as the court’s order had not become final.
Additionally, the Commissioner opposed the request for fees, arguing that
the government’s position was substantially justified. (Docket 27). Ms.
Lynde then filed a supplemental motion for attorney’s fees amending the
total award to $2,922.51 in fees and $541.85 in costs. (Docket 29). The
Commissioner did not respond to this supplemental motion.

DISCUSSION
A.

Ripeness
Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Commissioner

could file a notice of appeal within 60 days after the entry of the judgment.
See Fed. R. App. 4(a)(1)(B). The Commissioner was correct in stating Ms.
Lynde’s motion for attorney’s fees was premature when it was filed on
March 7, 2012, just three days after the court entered judgment in favor of
Ms. Lynde. However, the time for filing a notice of appeal expired on May 3,
2012, and the motion is now ripe for disposition.
B.

Merits
Section 2412(d)(1)(A) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides in

pertinent part that “a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the
United States fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil
action . . . brought by or against the United States in any court having
jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the
United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make
an award unjust.” Here, Ms. Lynde is considered a prevailing party and is
entitled to an award of fees and expenses. The Commissioner, however,
objects to the award of attorney’s fees, arguing that the ALJ’s determination,
though not supported by substantial evidence, was substantially justified.
“A position enjoys substantial justification if it has a clearly reasonable
basis in law and fact.” Goad v. Barnhart, 398 F.3d 1021, 1025 (8th Cir.
2005) (citing Brouwers v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 723, 275 (8th Cir. 1987)).
Substantial justification is “determined on the basis of the record (including
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the record with respect to the action or failure to act by the agency upon
which the civil action is based) which is made in the civil action for which
fees and other expenses are sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
In the Order dated March 4, 2012, the court found the ALJ erred in
assessing Ms. Lynde’s complaints of pain as not credible. The court also
concluded the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions of Ms. Lynde’s two
treating physicians. The ALJ is to assign controlling weight to the opinions
of treating physicians if those opinions are not inconsistent with the medical
evidence. The ALJ incorrectly found the opinions were not supported by the
record when, in fact, the opinions were consistent with each other and with
the medical evidence as a whole. The court concludes neither the ALJ’s
determination nor the Commissioner’s subsequent position in this matter
had “a clearly reasonable basis in law and fact.” See Goad, 398 F.3d at
1025. As a result, the court finds the requested award of fees and costs is
appropriate. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motions for an award of fees in the amount of
$2,922.51 and costs in the amount $541.85 (Dockets 22 and 29) are
granted.
Dated June 13, 2012.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Jeffrey L. Viken
JEFFREY L. VIKEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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