Tieszen v. Bastian et al

Filing 49

ORDER granting 21 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by U. S. District Judge Jeffrey L. Viken on 3/27/12. (SB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
WESTERN DIVISION
RANDY L. TIESZEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JUDGE JOHN BASTIAN,
JOHN HUNTER, DON FRIEDEL,
TANYA GUNHAMMER,
IDA MAE FRIEDEL, JIM
STEWART, CURT NULY and FRED
BAXTER,
Defendants.

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CIV. 11-5053-JLV

ORDER

INTRODUCTION
On June 27, 2011, plaintiff Randy L. Tieszen, appearing pro se, filed a
complaint claiming various violations of his civil rights. (Docket 1). On July
15, 2011, Mr. Tieszen filed an amendment to his complaint identifying
additionally named defendants. (Docket 6). On November 8, 2011, defendant
Judge John Bastian filed a motion, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), asking
the court to dismiss the complaint against him for failure of plaintiff’s
complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Docket 21). The
basis for the motion is that as a Circuit Court Judge for the State of South
Dakota for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, including Butte County, South Dakota,
defendant Bastian is entitled to judicial immunity on all claims of the
complaint. (Dockets 21 & 22, p. 4). Defendant Bastian also asks the court to

decline to exercise jurisdiction under Heck v. Humphry, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)
and the Rooker-Feldman1 doctrine. (Docket 21).
The court received numerous handwritten letters from Mr. Tieszen.
(Dockets 40-47). These letters present a rambling account of the general
history of Mr. Tieszen’s relationship with law enforcement and the court system
in Butte County, South Dakota.
For the reasons stated below, defendant Bastian’s motion to dismiss is
granted.
DISCUSSION
A pro se complaint must be liberally construed. “[A] pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and can only be dismissed for failure to
state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
In reading the complaint (Docket 1), the supplement (Docket 6), as well
as Mr. Tieszen’s letters, plaintiff asserts in non-specific allegations a civil rights
claim against defendant Bastian, in his official capacity as a state circuit court
judge, for Judge Bastian’s rulings and orders in Mr. Tieszen’s criminal case,

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Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); D.C. Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983).
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Butte County, South Dakota, criminal file CR. 01-77, and a Butte County
Temporary Protection Order file TPO. 01-75. See Dockets 1, 6 & 22 at p. 2.
Plaintiff objects to the motion to dismiss on the generalized belief Judge
Bastian should not have handled those cases in the manner in which they were
resolved.
Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a claim if the plaintiff fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In
evaluating defendant Bastian’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts as true
all of the factual allegations contained in Mr. Tieszen’s claim and grants all
reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff as the nonmoving party. Braden v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (“a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’ ”) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). See also Crooks v. Lynch, 557 F.3d 846, 848 (8th Cir.
2009) (the court must review “a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true and granting
all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, the nonmoving party.”)
(brackets omitted). “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief
survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. “In assessing a
motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court should accord a pro se complaint a liberal
construction, and should not dismiss the complaint ‘unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

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would entitle him to relief.’ ” Holloway v. Lockhart, 792 F.2d 760, 761 (8th Cir.
1986) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (other internal
citation omitted).
“Judges performing judicial functions enjoy absolute immunity from
§ 1983 liability. ‘The doctrine of judicial immunity is supported by a
long-settled understanding that the independent and impartial exercise of
judgment vital to the judiciary might be impaired by exposure to potential
damages liability.’ ” Robinson v. Freeze, 15 F.3d 107, 108 (8th Cir. 1994)
(citing Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993)). “Few
doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of
judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial
jurisdiction . . . .” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). “This
immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and
corruptly, and it is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges
should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without
fear of consequences.” Id. at 554 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). “It is a judge’s duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are
brought before him, including controversial cases that arouse the most intense
feelings in the litigants. His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should
not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation
charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would

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contribute not to principled and fearless decisionmaking but to intimidation.”
Id.
“[J]udges are generally immune from suit for money damages, they can
be sued in two circumstances. First, a judge may be subject to suit for
non-judicial acts. . . . Second, judges are not immune from lawsuits based on
actions taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Duty v. City of
Springdale, Arkansas, 42 F.3d 460, 462 (8th Cir. 1994) (internal citations
omitted). Mr. Tieszen’s complaint suggests a conspiracy between Judge
Bastian and law enforcement, but plaintiff alleged no basis for a conspiracy
beyond his suggestion that inferences of a conspiracy could be drawn from
Judge Bastian’s judicial decisions.
There is no question that Judge Bastian, as a circuit court judge, had
jurisdiction to preside in Mr. Tieszen’s criminal file and over the temporary
protection order proceeding. The South Dakota Constitution provides, in part,
“[t]he circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all cases except as to any
limited original jurisdiction granted to other courts by the Legislature. The
circuit courts and judges thereof have the power to issue, hear and determine
all original and remedial writs.” Article V, § 5, South Dakota Constitution. See
also SDCL 16-6-9 (“The circuit court has original jurisdiction . . . [i]n all actions
at law and in equity . . . .”); SDCL 16-6-12 (“The circuit court has exclusive
original jurisdiction to try and determine all cases of felony, and original
jurisdiction concurrent with courts of limited jurisdiction as provided by law to

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try and determine all cases of misdemeanor and actions or proceedings for
violation of any ordinance, bylaw, or other police regulation of political
subdivisions.”).
The court concludes there is no set of facts which entitle Mr. Tieszen to
the relief he seeks against Judge Bastian. Holloway, 792 F.2d at 761-62.
Defendant Bastian’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss him from plaintiff’s
complaint is granted.
The court also declines to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff’s allegations
against defendant Bastian as the claims are a collateral attack on a criminal
judgment and a state court civil proceeding. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; D.C.
Court of Appeals, 460 U.S. at 482; Heck, 512 U.S. 477.
ORDER
Based on the court’s decision, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendant Bastian’s motion to dismiss (Docket 21) is
granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff’s claims against defendant
Bastian are dismissed with prejudice.
Dated March 27, 2012.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Jeffrey L. Viken
JEFFREY L. VIKEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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