Meidinger v. City of Rapid City et al

Filing 102

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 38 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying as moot 44 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; adopting 90 Report and Recommendation; overruling 93 Objection to Report and Recommendation; overruling in part and moot in part 94 Objection to Report and Recommendation. Signed by Chief Judge Jeffrey L. Viken on 9/23/14. (SB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
WESTERN DIVISION
RANDALL J. MEIDINGER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF RAPID CITY;
PETER RAGNONE,
STEVE ALLENDER,
JOHN LEAHY, and SAM KOOIKER,
in their individual capacities,
Defendants.

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CIV. 12-5064-JLV

ORDER

Pending before the court is a motion for summary judgment filed by the
City of Rapid City, Peter Ragnone, Steve Allender, John Leahy, and Sam
Kooiker (“defendants”). (Docket 38). Defendant Sam Kooiker also filed a
motion to dismiss. (Docket 44). The court referred these motions to Magistrate
Judge John E. Simko for a report and recommendation. (Docket 49). On April
23, 2014, Magistrate Judge Simko filed a report recommending the court grant
in part and deny in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Docket
90). Specifically, the magistrate judge recommended granting the motion for
summary judgment as to the City of Rapid City, Steve Allender, John Leahy
and Sam Kooiker. Id. The magistrate judge recommended granting the
motion for summary judgment by Peter Ragnone with regard to the Fourteenth
Amendment claims but denying the motion as it relates to the Fourth

Amendment claims. Id. The magistrate judge also recommended denying
defendant Sam Kooiker’s motion to dismiss. Id. Plaintiff and defendants
timely filed objections. (Dockets 93 & 94). Defendants filed a response to
plaintiff’s objections.1 (Dockets 100).
The court reviews de novo those portions of the report and
recommendation which are the subject of objections. Thompson v. Nix, 897
F.2d 356, 357-58 (8th Cir. 1990); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court may
then “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
For the reasons stated below, plaintiff’s objections are overruled and
defendants’ objections are overruled in part and moot in part. The court
adopts the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge.
A.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S FINDINGS OF FACT
Neither party made specific objections to the magistrate judge’s findings of

fact although the parties interpret testimony differently. See Dockets 93 & 94.
The magistrate judge’s findings of fact are adopted by the court in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Specific facts will be discussed to the extent they
relate to defendants’ and plaintiff’s objections.

1

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) allows a party to respond to an opposing party’s
objections.
2

B.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Defendants’ objections to the magistrate judge’s conclusions of law are:
1.

The magistrate judge erred by finding an issue of material fact
existed regarding plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims against
Peter Ragnone.

2.

The magistrate judge erred in concluding Sam Kooiker was not
entitled to legislative immunity.

(Docket 94 at p. 2).
Plaintiff’s objections to the magistrate judge’s conclusions of law are:
1.

The magistrate judge erred in finding the City of Rapid City, Sam
Kooiker, John Leahy, and Steve Allender are entitled to qualified
immunity.

2.

The magistrate judge erred in finding Peter Ragnone was entitled to
qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims
against him.

(Docket 93 at p. 2). Each objection will be addressed separately.
C.

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability in a

§ 1983 action unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established
constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 2009).
“To determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity we
engage in a two-part analysis. The ‘threshold question’ is whether, taking the
facts in the light most favorable to the injured party, the alleged facts
demonstrate that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right. If a
3

violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’ alleged facts, the
next step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. To determine
whether the right is clearly established we ask whether it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” White v. McKinley, 519 F.3d 806, 813 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotations
omitted).
“The party asserting immunity always has the burden to establish the
relevant predicate facts, and at the summary judgment stage, the nonmoving
party is given the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Id. (citation omitted). “If
there is a genuine dispute concerning predicate facts material to the qualified
immunity issue, the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment.” Id.
(citation omitted).
“[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional
provision, such as the Fourth . . . Amendment, the claim must be analyzed
under the standard appropriate to that specific constitutional provision, not
under the rubric of substantive due process.” Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638,
646 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843
(1998)); see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 288 (1994) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (finding substantive due process should be reserved for otherwise
“homeless substantial claims” and noting “the Court has resisted relying on the

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Due Process Clause when doing so would have duplicated protection that a
more specific constitutional provision already bestowed”).
Mr. Meidinger’s claims related to Mr. Ragnone’s false testimony to the
grand jury are covered by the protections afforded under the Fourth
Amendment. See Winslow v. Smith, 696 F.3d 716, 738 (8th Cir. 2012)
(recognizing the right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from the use of
false evidence to secure a conviction) (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,
269 (1959)). Mr. Meidinger’s claims related to a reckless investigation and
manufactured evidence are not specifically covered under the Fourth
Amendment and are appropriately considered under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
D.

DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS
1.

Whether Peter Ragnone is entitled to summary judgment on
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims.

Judge Simko concluded there were genuine issues of material fact
relating to testimony Mr. Ragnone gave to two grand juries. (Docket 90 at p.
19). Specifically, Judge Simko found Mr. Meidinger presented sufficient
evidence to allow a reasonable inference Mr. Ragnone gave false testimony
related to Mr. Meidinger’s confession about knowingly cutting breaks to Fish
drivers and that alternate cover was exclusively sawdust. Id. Based on these
findings, Judge Simko recommended denying Mr. Ragnone’s motion for

5

summary judgment on Mr. Meidinger’s Fourth Amendment claim. Id. at pp.
19-22.
Mr. Ragnone argues in his objections he had no “obligation to provide
only the best version of facts” and contends his testimony to the grand juries
was supported by Mr. Meidinger’s statements. (Docket 94 at pp. 2-3). Mr.
Ragnone argues the evidence Judge Simko relied on in finding an issue of
material fact was “contradicted by Meidinger’s own statements.” Id. at p. 9.
An individual has a constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment to
be seized only upon “a truthful factual showing sufficient to constitute
probable cause before an arrest warrant can issue.” (Docket 90 at p. 13)
(quoting Moody v. St. Charles County, 23 F.3d 1410, 1412 (8th Cir. 1994)).
Information to establish probable cause “must be truthful in the sense that the
information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as
true.” Moody, 23 F.3d at 1412. “The threshold issue then is whether, viewed
in the light most favorable to [Meidinger], the facts as alleged demonstrate that
[Mr. Ragnone’s] conduct violated a constitutional right.” McKinley, 519 F.3d at
813 (quotations omitted).
Mr. Meidinger contends Mr. Ragnone lied to the grand jury regarding
material facts Mr. Ragnone knew were untrue at the time he testified. Having
reviewed the transcript of Mr. Ragnone’s interview of Mr. Meidinger and the
grand jury transcript and viewing those facts in a light most favorable to Mr.

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Meidinger, the court finds there are genuine issues concerning material
predicate facts.
Mr. Ragnone told the grand jury sawdust was the only alternate cover.
As noted by the magistrate judge, the testimony implied “every load Fish
delivered to the landfill which came from a source other than Merillat was
necessarily fraudulent because the load could not possibly be sawdust.”
(Docket 90 at p. 21). Mr. Ragnone allegedly knew this testimony was false
because John Leahy informed Mr. Ragnone in an e-mail prior to Mr. Ragnone
testifying before the grand jury that sawdust was not the only material which
qualified as alternate cover. (Docket 65-1 at p. 2).
Mr. Ragnone claims Mr. Meidinger himself believed sawdust was the only
alternate cover and “cannot claim that Ragnone violated his constitutional
rights by having the same understanding of alternate cover as Meidinger.”
(Docket 94 at p. 12). Mr. Meidinger testified at his deposition he “generally
understood” Mr. Ragnone thought alternate cover was sawdust. (Docket 41-2
at p. 9). Mr. Meidinger was then asked: “And that’s the same thing you would
have thought, and you had been at the landfill for seven years; right?” Id. Mr.
Meidinger responded: “Correct.” Id. This does not clarify Mr. Meidinger’s
understanding of alternate cover because it is unclear whether he was
answering “correct” to the first question, that he understood alternate cover to
be sawdust only, or whether he was answering “correct” to the fact he worked

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at the landfill for seven years. Nonetheless, whether Mr. Meidinger believed
sawdust was the only alternate cover does not excuse Mr. Ragnone’s testimony
because Mr. Ragnone allegedly knew prior to testifying before the grand jury
that sawdust was not the only alternate cover. When giving Mr. Meidinger the
benefit of all reasonable inferences, Mr. Ragnone’s allegedly false testimony
regarding alternate cover tends to prove Mr. Meidinger was indeed the inside
man.
Mr. Meidinger also contends Mr. Ragnone falsely told the grand jury he
confessed to accepting money in exchange for cutting breaks to Fish drivers.
While Mr. Meidinger told Mr. Ragnone he accepted money from Fish drivers on
a couple of occasions, he never confessed to taking the money in exchange for
giving breaks to Fish drivers. Rather, Mr. Meidinger told Mr. Ragnone he took
the money around Christmastime and that he never intentionally allowed Fish
drivers to dump at a reduced or free rate.
When Mr. Meidinger was asked about cutting breaks to Fish drivers on
alternate cover loads, Mr. Meidinger responded “I don’t know if I’ve been
cutting breaks or not. I just – what they tell me is what I use as the material
ID.” (Docket 95-1 at p. 14). Mr. Meidinger disagreed with Mr. Ragnone when
asked if he cut Fish drivers breaks because they were friends. Id. at p. 25. Mr.
Meidinger stated he never intentionally gave Fish drivers breaks at the scale.
Id. at p. 41.

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Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Meidinger, “[a] jury
could . . . conclude [Mr.] Ragnone inappropriately accepted that Mr. Meidinger
confessed or that [Mr.] Ragnone intentionally testified falsely when he testified
that [Mr.] Meidinger confessed.” (Docket 90 at p. 23). Additionally, a jury
could conclude Mr. Ragnone inappropriately accepted that sawdust was the
only alternate cover material or that he intentionally testified falsely about
alternate cover. These issues require the weighing of evidence and credibility
determinations and are not appropriately resolved on summary judgment. See
Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (8th Cir. 1996) (“At the
summary judgment stage, the court should not weigh the evidence, make
credibility determinations, or attempt to determine the truth of the matter.”).
The court finds the magistrate judge did not error in denying Mr. Ragnone’s
motion for summary judgment on Mr. Meidinger’s Fourth Amendment claims.
Defendants’ objection is overruled
E.

PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS
1.

Whether the magistrate judge erred in finding the City of
Rapid City, Sam Kooiker, John Leahy, and Steve Allender are
entitled to qualified immunity.

Mr. Meidinger contends his substantive due process rights were violated
by defendants’ reckless investigation and the manufacturing of false evidence,
including ignoring exculpatory evidence, failing to conduct a complete
investigation and fabricating or falsifying evidence. (Docket 93 at pp. 4-15).

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“[A] due process right against a reckless investigation was clearly
established in 1986.” Winslow, 696 F.3d at 739 (citations omitted). “To
establish a constitutional violation based on an inadequate investigation, a
plaintiff must show that the defendant officer’s ‘failure to investigate was
intentional or reckless, thereby shocking the conscience.’ ” Id. at 732 (quoting
Cooper v. Martin, 634 F.3d 477, 481 (8th Cir. 2011)). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held “ ‘that the following circumstances
indicate reckless or intentional failure to investigate that shocks the
conscience: (1) evidence that the state actor attempted to coerce or threaten the
defendant, (2) evidence that investigators purposefully ignored evidence
suggesting the defendant’s innocence, (3) evidence of systematic pressure to
implicate the defendant in the face of contrary evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Akins v.
Epperly, 588 F.3d 1178, 1184 (8th Cir. 2009)). “Mere negligent failure to
investigate, such as failing to follow up on additional leads, does not violate
due process.” Id.
“While a reckless investigation claim may be supported by proof that
investigators exerted ‘systematic pressure to implicate the defendant in the face
of contrary evidence,’ a manufactured false evidence claim requires proof that
investigators deliberately fabricated evidence in order to frame a criminal
defendant.” Id. (quoting Akins, 588 F.3d at 1184. “[A] failure to investigate
claim may be inextricably bound with a false evidence claim, where the

10

Plaintiffs’ theory is that investigators recognized deficiencies in a case and
manufactured false evidence to fill those gaps.” Id.
The magistrate judge found Steve Allender, John Leahy, Sam Kooiker,
and the City of Rapid City were protected by qualified immunity and entitled to
summary judgment.
a.

Steve Allender

The magistrate judge concluded Mr. Allender was protected by qualified
immunity and is entitled to summary judgment because “[h]e had no direct
involvement in the investigation . . . did not testify . . . [and] [t]here was no
evidence of any conduct by Allender which deprived Meidinger of any
constitutional right.” (Docket 90 at p. 32).
In reviewing Mr. Meidinger’s complaint, his response to the motion for
summary judgment, and his objections to the report and recommendation, the
only references to Mr. Allender relate to the fact he supported his employee,
Mr. Ragnone. Mr. Meidinger failed to show how Mr. Allender violated his
constitutional rights. Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Mr.
Meidinger, there is no evidence which supports that conclusion. The court
finds Mr. Allender is entitled to summary judgment.
b.

John Leahy

Mr. Meidinger contends Mr. Leahy knew sawdust was not the only
alternate cover material and also knew Kieffer Sanitation delivered a significant
amount of alternate cover to the landfill but had no contract to haul sawdust.
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(Docket 93 at p. 3). Mr. Meidinger alleges Mr. Leahy attributed the entry of
incorrect truck tare weights to him when, in fact, other scale attendants
entered those weights after Mr. Meidinger. Id. Mr. Meidingher alleges Mr.
Leahy’s theory about manipulated truck weights bolstered Mr. Ragnone’s fraud
theory and subjected Meidinger to systematic implication in the fraud
allegations.
The magistrate judge found there was no evidence Mr. Leahy fabricated
any evidence, but “[a]t most . . . misinterpreted facts.” (Docket 90 at p. 32).
The court agrees with the magistrate judge’s assessment. Mr. Leahy’s
testimony before the grand jury was that there was “no other significant fraud
at the landfill.” Id. at p. 10. Mr. Meidinger produced no evidence this
testimony was false and no evidence to suggest Mr. Leahy believed his
testimony was false. With regard to the definition of alternate cover, Mr. Leahy
told Mr. Ragnone in an e-mail prior to Mr. Ragnone testifying before the grand
jury that alternate cover included materials other than sawdust. There is no
evidence Mr. Leahy fabricated the definition of alternate cover in order to
implicate Mr. Meidinger.
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Mr. Meidinger, there is no
evidence to support the conclusion Mr. Leahy fabricated or manufactured
evidence. Mr. Leahy may have been negligent in the way he handled certain
matters, including investigating other employees at the landfill, but “[m]ere
negligent failure to investigate, such as failing to following up on additional
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leads, does not violate due process.” Winslow, 696 F.3d at 732. Mr.
Meidinger’s objections are overruled.
c.

Sam Kooiker

The magistrate judge found that “[w]hile Kooiker was the instigator of the
investigation and while he made [the] landfill fraud issue the centerpiece of his
campaign for mayor, he did not deprive Meidinger of any constitutional right.”
(Docket 90 at p. 33). Mr. Meidinger contends “[Mr.] Kooiker pressed for a
criminal investigation, identifying Meidinger as the inside man” even after he
was told by “Landfill officials that his information [about illegal activity at the
landfill] was unfounded.” (Docket 93 at p. 3). Mr. Meidinger asserts “Kooiker
as mayor continued to pursue a civil suit against Meidinger after Meidinger’s
acquittal” on the criminal charges. Id.
Other than turning over the investigation to police, Mr. Kooiker was not
involved in the investigation. There is no evidence Mr. Kooiker fabricated or
manufactured any evidence which was used against Mr. Meidinger. Although
Mr. Kooiker may have believed Mr. Meidinger was involved in illegal activity at
the landfill, this is not a violation of a constitutional right. The court finds Mr.
Kooiker is entitled to qualified immunity. Mr. Meidinger’s objection is
overruled.
d.

Conspiracy

“To prove a § 1983 conspiracy claim against a particular defendant, the
plaintiff must show: that the defendant conspired with others to deprive him or
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her of a constitutional right; that at least of one of the alleged co-conspirators
engaged in an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and that the overt act
injured the plaintiff.” Askew v. Millerd, 191 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1999)
(internal citations omitted).
Based on the evidence in this case, Mr. Meidinger contends “a jury could
reasonably infer that the conspiracy to falsely implicate Meidinger began
immediately when Kooiker met with Ragnone; that Ragnone took an overt act
in that direction with the false confession less than 10 days later; and less than
15 days later, Leahy acts overtly to implicate Meidinger.” (Docket 93 at p. 17).
Having reviewed the evidence in this case, the court agrees with the
magistrate judge’s recommendation that Mr. Meidinger’s conspiracy claim fails
as a matter of law. There is no evidence to suggest Mr. Kooiker, Mr. Allender,
Mr. Leahy, or anybody else persuaded Mr. Ragnone to testify the way he did
before the grand jury. “To advance past the summary judgment stage, [a
plaintiff] must ‘allege with particularity and specifically demonstrate material
facts that the defendants reached an agreement.’ ” Reasonover v. St. Louis
Cnty, Mo., 447 F.3d 569, 582 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Marti v. City of Maplewood,
57 F.3d 680, 685 (8th Cir. 1995)). No evidence of an agreement exists.
“A commonly held belief that a crime has been committed is not a
conspiracy. Various people engaged in investigating and reporting suspected
criminal activity does not amount to conspiracy. [The court must] look for a
genuine factual issue of concerted activity toward an unlawful objective.”
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Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1454 (8th Cir. 1987), overruled on other
grounds by Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991).
Mr. Meidinger has not produced any evidence to show the various parties
cooperated with each other in a scheme to either get Mr. Ragnone to testify
falsely, to advance Mr. Ragnone’s career, to advance Mr. Leahy’s career, or to
advance Mr. Kooiker’s career. Furthermore, there is no evidence any of these
individuals did not genuinely believe Mr. Meidinger was the inside man at the
landfill. The court concludes Mr. Meidinger’s conspiracy claim fails as a matter
of law. Mr. Meidinger’s objection is overruled.
e.

City of Rapid City: Monell Claim

A city “may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its
employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or
custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government
as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City
of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). When a municipal custom or policy
caused the deprivation of a constitutional right, the municipality may be held
liable. Id. at 690-91. In this case, Mr. Meidinger must show that “the action
that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy
statement, . . . officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality’s officers
or that a constitutional deprivation was visited pursuant to government custom
even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the
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body’s official decisionmaking channels.” Marchant v. City of Little Rock,
Arkansas, 741 F.2d 201, 204 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
tortfeasor – or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (emphasis in
original). Liability may be imposed against a municipality for a single decision
by a policymaker who has final decision making authority in that area of the
government’s business. Slimgen v. City of Rapid City, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1061,
1066 (D.S.D. 2000) (citing Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478
(1986)).
Mr. Meidinger argues Mr. Kooiker initiated the investigation by turning it
over to the City Attorney and police after he was told by landfill officials that no
illegal activity was occurring at the landfill. (Docket 93 at p. 22). Mr.
Meidinger contends the other defendants, including Mr. Leahy and Mr.
Ragnone, “fabricated and manufactured evidence to implicate Meidinger to
establish the public corruption case as envisioned by Kooiker.” Id.
As discussed above, neither Mr. Leahy nor Mr. Kooiker fabricated or
manufactured evidence. Furthermore, there is no evidence the other
defendants had anything to do with Mr. Ragnone’s allegedly false testimony in
front of the grand jury. As noted by the magistrate judge, even if the court
assumes Mr. Kooiker, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Allender, and Mr. Ragnone’s belief was
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that Mr. Meidinger was the inside man, “[t]here is no evidence to support the
conclusion that either a policy maker for the city had anything to do with
Ragnone’s allegedly false testimony or that it was a policy of the city for its
police officers to testify falsely to a grand jury in this single instance or as a
matter of custom.” (Docket 90 at p. 35). The City of Rapid City is not liable for
the conduct of its employee, Mr. Ragnone. Mr. Meidinger’s objection is
overruled.
2.

Whether the magistrate judge erred in finding Peter Ragnone
was entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment claims against him.

Mr. Meidinger contends the magistrate judge erred in concluding “that
other than Ragnone’s testimony about the confession and sawdust, ‘there is no
potentially material, predicate false or manufactured evidence from Ragnone’s
investigation which was used to persuade the grand jury to indict Meidinger.’ ”
(Docket 93 at p. 5) (quoting Docket 90 at p. 17-18). Contrary to the magistrate
judge’s conclusion, Mr. Meidinger contends there is “ample evidence of
fabricated evidence produced during the investigation.” (Docket 93 at p. 5).
Mr. Meidinger primarily relies on Moran to argue his reckless
investigation claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against Mr. Ragnone.
Moran was a case where police mistakenly thought a mentally impaired
teenager was caught in the act of burglary. Moran, 296 F.3d at 639. As a
result of mistake the teenager was beaten, leaving him with severe lacerations
and a broken ankle. Id. at 640. Shortly after the incident, the police chief
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publically acknowledged the mistake and was committed to punishing the
wrongdoers. Id. Moran, a sergeant with the police department, became the
chief suspect in the investigation, was charged criminally and was acquitted at
trial. Id. at 640-42. Moran then filed suit against the police department
alleging malicious prosecution and a violation of his substantive due process
rights. Id. at 642.
In Moran, the Eighth Circuit recognized that “when a person is damaged
by outrageous police misconduct but the resulting injury does not neatly fit
within a specific constitutional remedy, the injured party may, depending on
the circumstances, pursue a substantive due process claim under section
1983.” Id. at 646. In reviewing the facts of the case, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that Moran “offer[ed] evidence of a purposeful police conspiracy to
manufacture, and the manufacture of, false evidence.” Id. at 647.
Instead of simply allowing a weakly supported
prosecution to proceed, Moran correctly asserts that the
evidence can be read to show acts designed to falsely
formulate a pretense of probable cause. Although the
Fourth Amendment covers seizures, which would be
satisfied by Moran’s arrest, law enforcement’s intentional
creation of damaging facts would not fall within its ambit.
Id. Specifically, the court found “officials purposely conspired to manufacture
evidence in order to make [Moran] an innocent scapegoat for a devastating
travesty that embarrassed the police department and its managers, and
evidence that the executive actions may have been partially undertaken to

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protect other, more favored, employees in the department.” Id. The court
concluded:
[Moran] introduced evidence that tend[ed] to show a police
department that publicly and financially committed itself to
producing a culprit for an alleged wrongdoing before any such
wrongdoing was actually established. [Moran] produced proof
of questionable procedures, of pressures placed on officers to
incriminate a specific person or corroborate the department’s
official line, of a hasty condemnation of Moran and of improper
consideration of his race. Moreover, [Moran] offered proof that,
at various times, certain defendants purposely ignored evidence
that strongly tended to exonerate him.
Id. at 647-48.
Mr. Meidinger argues his case is similar to Moran because he is alleging
Mr. Ragnone and others fabricated and manufactured evidence which can “ ‘be
read to show acts designed to falsely formulate a pretense of probable cause’
. . . [and therefore his] case [falls] within the sphere of the Due Process Clause.”
(Docket 93 at p. 6).
Despite Mr. Meidinger’s claims, the court finds Moran is distinguishable
on several grounds. First, the Eighth Circuit concluded the facts of Moran did
not neatly fit within the protections provided under the Fourth Amendment.
Moran, 296 F.3d at 647. Here, Mr. Meidinger’s claims neatly fall within the
protections afforded under the Fourth Amendment and the court has held Mr.
Ragnone is not entitled to summary judgment under that standard. See
Albright, 510 U.S. at 288 (Souter, J., concurring) (finding substantive due
process should be reserved for otherwise “homeless substantial claims” and
noting “the Court has resisted relying on the Due Process Clause when doing

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so would have duplicated protection that a more specific constitutional
provision already bestowed”). Second, unlike the facts in Moran, there is no
evidence Mr. Ragnone pressured any witnesses to incriminate Mr. Meidinger or
corroborate Mr. Ragnone’s theory of the case. Third, there is no evidence the
police department or any other entity committed itself publically and financially
to frame Mr. Meidinger prior to any investigation into potential wrongdoing.
Mr. Meidinger contends Mr. Kooiker identified him as the wrongdoer and then
turned his name over to the police department. However, Mr. Ragnone
personally observed Mr. Meidinger at his place of employment and interviewed
several witnesses, including Mr. Meidinger, before criminal charges were
brought. Unlike Moran, Mr. Meidinger had the opportunity to explain his side
of the story during his interview with Mr. Ragnone.
The court agrees with the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Mr.
Meidinger has not offered sufficient evidence to support his theory of a police
conspiracy to manufacture evidence designed to falsely formulate a pretense of
probable cause to deprive him of his liberty.2 The fact Mr. Ragnone focused his
investigation on Mr. Meidinger does not make his investigation reckless, nor
does it shock the conscience. Additionally, that Mr. Ragnone focused his
investigation on Fish Garbage and not Kieffer is not evidence of a reckless

2

Mr. Meidinger contends the State’s expert created a false or
manufactured exhibit which incorrectly identified Meidinger working the scales
at the dump when he was not, in fact, working. However, the exhibit also
contained correct information. At most, this constitutes a negligent
investigation and does not rise to the level of a reckless investigation. There is
no evidence related to the creation of this exhibit which tends to support a
conclusion it was intentionally falsified to incriminate Mr. Meidinger.
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investigation. See Winslow, 696 F.3d at 732 (“Mere negligent failure to
investigate, such as failing to follow up on additional leads, does not violate
due process.”). Finally, Mr. Meidinger’s argument related to Mr. Ragnone’s use
of Don Anderson, a confidential informant who worked for Fish, is misplaced.
Mr. Anderson never implicated Mr. Meidinger as the inside man at the landfill.
(Docket 66) (identifying persons involved in suspicious activity between Fish
Garbage Service and the landfill as Cliff Fish, Chuck Cordes and Steve Pope).
It is difficult to see how a confidential informant who did not identify Mr.
Meidinger as the inside man violates Mr. Meidinger’s constitutional rights.
This is particularly true when the information provided by Mr. Anderson was
accurate.
The court finds the report and recommendation related to Mr. Ragnone is
an accurate and thorough recitation of the law and facts involved in this case.
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Mr. Meidinger, the court finds
there is insufficient evidence to support a reckless investigation claim against
Mr. Ragnone. Mr. Meidinger’s objection is overruled.
F.

MOTION TO DISMISS
The magistrate judge concluded defendant Sam Kooiker was not entitled

to legislative immunity and recommended denying Mr. Kooiker’s motion to
dismiss. (Docket 90). Mr. Kooiker objects to this finding. Despite the
objection, the court does not need to reach this issue because the court
determined Mr. Kooiker is entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant Kooiker’s
objection is moot.

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ORDER
Based on the above analysis, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff’s objections (Docket 93) to the report and
recommendation are overruled.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ objections (Docket 94) to the
report and recommendation are overruled in part and moot in part.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the report and recommendation
(Docket 90) is adopted in accordance with the analysis above.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary
judgement (Docket 38) is granted in part and denied in part.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Sam Kooiker’s motion to
dismiss (Docket 44) is denied as moot.
Dated September 23, 2014.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Jeffrey L. Viken
JEFFREY L. VIKEN
CHIEF JUDGE

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