Hatchett v. Pennington County Jail et al
Filing
34
ORDER granting 22 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Jeffrey L. Viken on 9/30/14. (SB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
WESTERN DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER J. HATCHETT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PENNINGTON COUNTY JAIL,
MILLER, Correctional Officer,
Pennington County Jail, in his
individual and official capacities;
EDWARDS, Correctional Officer,
Pennington County Jail; in his
individual and official capacities;
SGT. MUNSCH, Correctional
Officer, Pennington County Jail, in
his individual and official
capacities; CAPT. BROOKE HAGA,
Captain, Pennington County Jail,
in her individual and official
capacities.
Defendants.
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CIV. 12-5094-JLV
ORDER GRANTING MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On December 26, 2012, plaintiff Christopher J. Hatchett, appearing pro
se, filed a complaint against the defendants Pennington County Jail, Joseph
Edwards, Casey Munsch, and Brooke Haga (collectively “defendants”) alleging
various violations of his constitutional rights.1 (Docket 1).
Pending before the court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment
filed on February 19, 2014. (Docket 22). Defendants also filed a statement of
1
Jeremy Miller was also named as a defendant. The court dismissed the
claims against Mr. Miller without prejudice for Mr. Hatchett’s failure to comply
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) or respond to the court’s notice under Rule 4(m).
material facts. (Docket 24). Plaintiff did not file a response to either the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment2 or statements of material facts.3
BACKGROUND
The facts are drawn from the complaint, plaintiff’s deposition testimony,
and the defendants’ statement of material facts. (Dockets 1, 24 & 27-1). Mr.
Hatchett filed a complaint asserting his Eighth Amendment rights were violated
while he was incarcerated at the Pennington County Jail. During the relevant
time period, Mr. Hatchett was serving a one-year sentence for a prior conviction
of threatening law enforcement and was also awaiting trial on a first degree
burglary charge for which he was ultimately convicted and given a seven-year
sentence.
Mr. Hatchett was incarcerated at the Pennington County Jail beginning
on April 3, 2012. On June 5, 2012, Mr. Hatchett received a notice of
disciplinary hearing in which he admitted a rule violation. On September 3,
2012, Mr. Hatchett received another notice of a rule violation for assaulting a
2
On May 6, 2014, the court issued a show cause order to Mr. Hatchett
requiring him to show good cause why the court should not grant defendants’
motion for summary judgment. (Docket 31). On May 6, 2014, the order was
sent to the address provided by plaintiff. Mr. Hatchett did not respond to
defendants’ motion or the court’s order to show cause.
3
“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to
properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the
court may . . . (2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; or (3)
grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials--including the
facts considered undisputed--show that the movant is entitled to it[.]” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e).
2
fellow inmate. Mr. Hatchett punched another inmate, put him in a chokehold,
and threw the inmate into a table. Mr. Hatchett testified during his deposition
the inmate got mouthy with him while playing cards and called him out. Mr.
Hatchett testified he then went into the inmate’s cell and “did him up.” As a
result of the incident, Mr. Hatchett was reclassified for administrative
segregation on September 7, 2012.
On September 10, 2012, Mr. Hatchett wrote the Classification Committee
regarding his reclassification into administrative segregation. The
Classification Committee responded on September 21, 2012, confirming Mr.
Hatchett’s sanctions were enhanced due to him threatening staff and indicated
to Mr. Hatchett he would remain in administrative segregation. On September
27, 2012, Mr. Hatchett wrote another letter to the Classification Committee
requesting to be removed from segregation. The Classification Committee
denied Mr. Hatchett’s request based on his conduct in assaulting another
inmate and threatening a supervisor. Mr. Hatchett again requested a
reclassification on October 4, 2012, which was again denied by the
Classification Committee. The Committee stated they believed Mr. Hatchett
posed a significant threat to the facility.
On October 26, 2012, the Classification Committee wrote Mr. Hatchett a
letter indicating the Committee continued to believe Mr. Hatchett was a risk
and a substantial threat to the operation of the jail. The Classification
3
Committee also acknowledged a letter sent by Mr. Hatchett stating he would
“raise hell” if he was not taken off administrative segregation.
On October 28, 2012, Michael Cole, a Pennington County Jail employee,
filed a report indicating he noticed fishing line in Mr. Hatchett’s cell and
informed Casey Munsch of the situation. Munsch directed Jeremy Miller and
Joseph Edwards to perform a shakedown or search of Mr. Hatchett’s cell. Mr.
Hatchett initially refused to be restrained during the shakedown but complied
after speaking with Munsch. After Mr. Hatchett’s cell had been searched,
Munsch, Edwards and Miller placed Mr. Hatchett back in his cell, closed the
door, and directed him to place his hands through the door slot in order to
remove the handcuffs. The handcuff on Mr. Hatchett’s right hand was removed
without incident. Mr. Hatchett alleges the officers had a difficult time removing
the handcuff from his left hand so he attempted to turn around and stick his
left arm farther out the door slot. Mr. Hatchett alleges the officers then pulled
and twisted his left arm, spraining his wrist, and leaving cuts on his wrist and
forearm. During the incident, Mr. Hatchett testified he got upset and slammed
his right fist into the cell door, injuring his knuckle or his pinkie on his right
hand.
Defendants contend Mr. Hatchett attempted to stick his right arm out the
door slot in an effort to prevent the officers from removing the cuff from his left
wrist and stated he was going to keep the cuffs. Following the incident, Mr.
Hatchett requested to go to the hospital but was refused. Instead, a nurse
4
came to Mr. Hatchett’s cell to examine and treat his injuries. Jail records
indicate a nurse examined Mr. Hatchett’s injuries within two hours of the
incident and gave Mr. Hatchett ice and medication. Mr. Hatchett testified his
left hand bled for ten minutes and stopped on its own. Mr. Hatchett also
claimed his left wrist was scarred as a result of the incident but he had his left
wrist tattooed following the incident and no scar was visible.
On October 29, 2012, Mr. Hatchett again wrote the Classification
Committee asking to be reclassified. The Committee responded by requiring
Mr. Hatchett to sign a non-suicide contract. On October 31 and November 2,
2012, Mr. Hatchett wrote the Classification Committee asking for a
reclassification. The Classification Committee reviewed Mr. Hatchett’s behavior
of October 28, 2012, and notified Mr. Hatchett his sanctions were being
enhanced for the incident.
On November 30, 2012, the Classification Committee wrote Mr. Hatchett
and told him they would like to see no behavior issues from him for the next
week and if Mr. Hatchett could go the week without incident, the Committee
would consider removing or lessening his sanctions. On January 4, 2013, the
Classification Committee wrote Mr. Hatchett telling him he was being removed
from administrative segregation.
On January 15, 2013, Mr. Hatchett assaulted another inmate at the
Pennington County Jail and admitted hitting the inmate because he was
5
running his mouth about a card game and got into his face. The Classification
Committee placed Mr. Hatchett back in administrative segregation.
As a result of the October 28, 2012, incident with defendants, Mr.
Hatchett filed a complaint asserting violations of his Eighth Amendment rights.
Mr. Hatchett’s complaint contains seven counts, all of which he asserts violate
the Eighth Amendment. Mr. Hatchett claims: (1) Munsch, Edwards and Miller
used excessive force when removing his handcuffs; (2) Haga placed him in
administrative segregation in retaliation for his complaints related to the
October 28, 2012, incident; (3) the Jail refused to protect him from the
incidents; (4) the Jail was indifferent to his medical needs related to the
incident; (5) the Jail unjustifiably placed him in administrative segregation;
(6) Munsch, Miller and Edwards assaulted him on October 28, 2012; and
(7) Munsch, Miller and Edwards subjected him to emotional anguish. (Docket
1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence,4 viewed in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine
issue of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Clark v. Kellog, Co., 205 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000); see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Once the motion for summary judgment is made and
4
Included within the evidence are the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
6
supported, it places an affirmative burden on the non-moving party to go
beyond the pleadings and by affidavit or otherwise designate specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Commercial Union Ins. v.
Schmidt, 967 F.2d 270, 271 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Although “the court is required to . . . give [the nonmoving] party the benefit of
all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts,” Vette Co. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir. 1980), the nonmoving
party may not “rest upon mere denials or allegations.” Forrest v. Kraft Foods,
Inc., 285 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 2002). Instead, the nonmoving party must “set
forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
DISCUSSION
A.
Counts 3, 4 and 5 of plaintiff’s complaint
Counts 3, 4 and 5 are claims against the Pennington County Jail itself.
None of the other defendants are listed in these counts and no reference is
made to any other party. “[C]ounty jails are not legal entities amenable to
suit.” Owens v. Scott County Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003). Counts
3, 4 and 5 are dismissed without prejudice.
7
B.
Defendants, in their official capacities, did not deprive Mr.
Hatchett of his constitutional rights
Mr. Hatchett brings a § 1983 action against the defendants in their
official and individual capacities. (Docket 1 at pp. 2-3). Insofar as Mr. Hatchett
alleges defendants violated his constitutional rights in their official capacities,
the court finds the § 1983 suit is actually a suit against Pennington County
itself. See Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating that a suit
against a public official in his/her official capacity is actually a suit against the
entity for which the public official is an agent).
“In general, ‘a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an
injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents’ on a respondeat superior
theory of liability.” Parrish, 594 F.3d at 997 (citing Monnell v. New York Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). To impose § 1983 liability on a local
government body, a plaintiff must show that an official policy or widespread
practice caused a deprivation of a constitutional right. Monnell, 436 U.S. at
690–91. Mr. Hatchett has neither alleged nor demonstrated that an official
policy or widespread practice violated his constitutional rights. Accordingly,
Mr. Hatchett’s § 1983 action against defendants in their official capacities is
dismissed.
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C.
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in their
individual capacities because their conduct did not violate
Mr. Hatchett’s clearly established constitutional rights
With respect to Mr. Hatchett’s § 1983 action against defendants in their
individual capacities, qualified immunity will function to protect those
defendants whose actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly
established constitutional rights. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982); see also Ambrose v. Young, 474 F.3d 1070, 1077 (8th Cir. 2007) (“ ‘The
qualified immunity standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments by
protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.’ ”) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)). To determine
whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the court will address
each of Mr. Hatchett’s constitutional claims as set forth in defendants’ brief in
support of their motion for summary judgment. (Docket 29). “If the answer [to
whether a constitutional right was violated] is no, we grant qualified
immunity,” and enter summary judgment in favor of defendants. Grayson v.
Ross, 454 F.3d 802, 808–09 (8th Cir. 2006).
1. Count 1 - Excessive Force
Mr. Hatchett claims defendants Munsch, Edwards and Miller used
excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment5 when removing his
handcuffs on October 28, 2012. (Docket 1).
5
Generally, claims against pretrial detainees are analyzed under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth
Amendment. See Owens, 328 F.3d at 1027. However, during his deposition,
Mr. Hatchett confirmed he was alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment
rights while serving his sentence on his prior conviction and not while awaiting
trial on his pending charges of first degree burglary. (Docket 27-1 at p. 2).
9
In order to succeed on this claim, Mr. Hatchett must show that
defendants Munsch, Edwards and Miller, while acting under the color of state
law, violated his constitutional rights.
The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment protects prisoners from the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” by their jailers.
When jail officials are alleged to have used excessive force
against a prisoner, “the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether
force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”
“One acts ‘maliciously’ by undertaking, without just cause
or reason, a course of action intended to injure another; in
contrast, one acts ‘sadistically’ by engaging in extreme or
excessive cruelty or by delighting in cruelty.”
United States v. Miller, 477 F.3d 644, 647 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal citations
omitted). “[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may
suggest ‘whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary’
in a particular situation.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (quoting
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)). “The Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from
constitutional recognition de minimus uses of physical force, provided that the
use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Wilkins,
559 U.S. at 37-38.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Hatchett, he has not
shown that force was applied “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” The
facts indicate the defendants had a difficult time removing the handcuff from
Mr. Hatchett’s left wrist. Notably, Mr. Hatchett conceded the handcuff was
10
removed from his right hand prior to any allegation of excessive force. Although
Mr. Hatchett complains of injuries to his right hand, he admits those injuries
were self-inflicted when he got upset and punched the cell door. The
defendants are not responsible for Mr. Hatchett’s self-inflicted injuries. The fact
Mr. Hatchett was upset and punched the cell door also lends some credence to
defendants’ contention Mr. Hatchett was upset and attempted to reach his
right arm out of the door slot in an attempt to keep the handcuffs. Even
assuming Mr. Hatchett’s version of the events is accurate, Mr. Hatchett
suffered very minor injuries as a result of the incident. Mr. Hatchett testified
during his deposition that his arm and wrist bled for ten minutes and the
bleeding stopped on its own.
Mr. Hatchett’s history at Pennington County jail shows his penchant for
being violent. At the time of the incident, Mr. Hatchett was in administrative
segregation for assaulting another inmate and threatening staff. Mr. Hatchett
also threatened to “raise hell” if he was not given a reclassification.
Defendants’ report that Mr. Hatchett was attempting to keep the cuffs is
supported by Mr. Hatchett’s statement just days before that he was going to
“raise hell.” There is no evidence that any force was applied by defendants
maliciously or sadistically or that they delighted in cruelty. The court finds any
force that was applied was done in good faith and in an effort to restore
discipline. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Hatchett’s
excessive force claim.
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2. Count 2: Administrative Segregation
Mr. Hatchett’s claims Captain Haga retaliated against Mr. Hatchett for
his complaints related to the October 28, 2012, incident by placing him in
administrative segregation. Despite Mr. Hatchett’s claim, the record is clear
Mr. Hatchett was placed in administrative segregation by the Classification
Committee long before the October 28, 2012, incident. On October 28, 2012,
Mr. Hatchett was already classified as a high risk inmate and was placed in
administrative segregation for assaulting another inmate and threatening jail
staff. Following the October incident, Mr. Hatchett remained in administrative
segregation. There is no evidence Mr. Hatchett was reclassified high risk or
placed in administrative segregation as a result of the October incident. Mr.
Hatchett’s claim also is undermined by the fact he was taken out of
administrative segregation not long after the October 28, 2012, incident.
Furthermore, Mr. Hatchett “does not have a constitutional right to a particular
prison . . . classification.” Sanders v. Norris, 153 F. App’x 403, 404 (8th Cir.
2005). Captain Haga is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
3. Count 6: Assault
Mr. Hatchett alleges the incident on October 28, 2012, was also an
assault. Mr. Hatchett testified during his deposition that this claim raises the
12
same allegation as in count 1 discussed above. For the reasons stated above,
the court finds defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.6
4. Count 7: Emotional Anguish
Mr. Hatchett alleges he suffered emotional anguish as a result of the
injury he sustained to his arm during the October 28, 2012, incident. Mr.
Hatchett also claims he was depressed because of his administrative
segregation classification.
First, the court finds defendants are not responsible for any mental
anguish suffered by Mr. Hatchett as a result of his classification in
administrative segregation. The record clearly demonstrates Mr. Hatchett’s
classification was the result of his own conduct and had nothing to do with the
incident on October 28, 2012. Mr. Hatchett was in administrative segregation
long before October 2012 and, in fact, was taken out of administrative
segregation not long after the October incident.
Mr. Hatchett also testified during his deposition he had been seeing a
psychologist for depression issues before the October incident occurred.
6
Additionally, a claim for the tort of assault is a state law claim and
requires notice of the claim be given to the Pennington County Auditor. See
SDCL §§ 3-21-1, 3-21-2, 3-21-3(2). “No action for the recovery of damages for
personal injury . . . caused by a public entity or its employees may be
maintained against the public entity or its employees unless written notice of
the time, place, and cause of the injury is given to the public entity.” SDCL § 321-2. There is no proof Mr. Hatchett presented a written notice of his assault
claim to the Pennington County Auditor as required under South Dakota law.
This requirement is a condition precedent to bringing a claim for damages.
13
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Mr. Hatchett, there is no evidence
he suffered from depression as a result of the minor injuries he incurred in
October 2012. Furthermore, as discussed above in relation to the excessive
force claim, the court finds the defendants acted in “good faith [and in an] effort
to maintain or restore discipline.” See Miller, 477 F.3d at 647.
Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket 22) is
granted as to all claims in plaintiff’s complaint.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counts 1, 2, 6, and 7 of plaintiff’s
complaint are dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counts 3, 4, and 5 of plaintiff’s complaint
are dismissed without prejudice.
Dated September 30, 2014.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Jeffrey L. Viken
JEFFREY L. VIKEN
CHIEF JUDGE
14
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