Klynsma et al v. Hydradyne, LLC

Filing 88

ORDER granting 69 Motion to Stay and 72 Joinder; denying as moot 75 Motion to Extend Deadlines; granting 85 Motion for Joinder; denying as moot 86 Motion to Extend Deadlines. Signed by Chief Judge Jeffrey L. Viken on 5/18/15. (SB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
WESTERN DIVISION
KENNETH KLYNSMA & LINDA
KLYNSMA, Personal Representatives
of the Estate of ADAM D. KLYNSMA,
deceased,
Plaintiffs,

CIV. 13-5016-JLV
ORDER STAYING DEADLINES AND
HOLDING MOTION TO COMPEL IN
ABEYANCE

vs.
HYDRADYNE, LLC, f/k/a
HYDRADYNE HYDRAULICS, LLC;
T.J. WELDING & FABRICATION CO.;
CAMBCO INC.,
Defendants.

Defendant Hydrayne, LLC (“Hydradyne”) moves the court to stay the
discovery deadlines pending the court’s resolution of its and defendant T.J.
Welding & Fabrication Co.’s (“T.J. Welding’s”) pending dispositive motions for
summary judgment. (Docket 69). T.J. Welding joined in Hydradyne’s motion
to stay the discovery deadlines under Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). (Docket 72).
Defendants move the court to stay the discovery deadlines in this case “until a
date 120 days from this Court’s decision on the pending motions for summary
judgment . . . along with a stay of the motion deadline of sixty days from the close
of discovery.” (Docket 69). Alternatively, defendants requested a “stay [of] the
current general discovery deadline to a date 120 days from this Court’s decision
on Defendant Hydrayne’s pending motion to compel with a further stay of the
motion deadline of sixty days from the close of discovery.” Id. In responding to

plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to stay, defendants also proposed a
ninety-day stay of the discovery deadlines. (Docket 74 at p. 2).
Plaintiffs Kenneth and Linda Klynsma object to defendants’ motion to stay
the discovery deadlines. (Docket 73). Plaintiffs assert defendants’ “pending
Motions for Summary Judgment are without substantial merit, and should be
denied.” Id. Plaintiffs further assert that “an extension of four months from
the date that the Court rules on the pending motions. . . . is unreasonable.” Id.
In the alternative, if the court grants a stay of the discovery deadlines, plaintiffs’
request the stay in discovery deadlines be limited to sixty days following the
court’s ruling on the pending motions. Id.
“A district court has broad powers of case management, including the
power to limit discovery to relevant subject matter and to adjust discovery as
appropriate to each phase of litigation.” Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g,
Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803-04 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b), (c); 26(b);
42(b)). “Under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may
move the court for a protective order staying discovery. A court may only issue
such an order, however, upon the movant’s showing of good cause, including to
avoid undue burden or expense.” TE Connectivity Networks, Inc. v. All Sys.
Broadband, Inc., Civil No. 13-1356 ADM/FLN, 2013 WL 4487505, at *1 (D.
Minn. Aug. 20, 2013) (citations omitted). The court “may also control the timing
and sequence of discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
26(d).” Johnson v. New York Univ. Sch. of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
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“[A] stay of discovery is appropriate pending resolution of a potentially
dispositive motion where the motion appear[s] to have substantial grounds or,
stated another way, do[es] not appear to be without foundation in law.” Id.
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Vivid Techs., Inc., 200
F.3d 795 at 803-04 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“When a particular issue may be dispositive,
the court may stay discovery concerning other issues until the critical issue is
resolved.”); 8 Charles Alan Wright & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 2040, at 521 (2d ed. 1994)). “A stay of discovery pending the
determination of a dispositive motion ‘is an eminently logical means to prevent
wasting the time and effort of all concerned, and to make the most efficient use of
judicial resources.’ ” Chavous v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance
Auth., 201 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2001) (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v.
Department of Energy, 84 F.R.D. 278, 282 (D. Del.1979)).
On July 3, 2014, Hydradyne filed a motion for summary judgment.
(Docket 38). On September 25, 2014, defendant T.J. Welding filed a motion for
summary judgment. (Docket 59). Both motions have been fully briefed by all
parties and are pending before the court for resolution.1 Hydradyne and T.J.
Welding also filed a motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs’
compensatory damages claim for the pain and suffering suffered by Adam
1The

court notes plaintiffs did not request additional time to conduct
discovery when responding to defendants’ motions for summary judgment. See
Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 445 F.3d 50, 59 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Where, as
here, a party has had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery, it is well
within the district court’s province, at least in the absence of a showing of
changed circumstances or particularized need, to stay further discovery pending
the determination of a dispositive motion.”).
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Klynsma. (Dockets 76 & 81). This court granted the defendants’ motion for
partial summary judgment. (Docket 87).
Defendants’ remaining motions for summary judgment are potentially
dispositive and do not appear to be “without foundation in law.” Johnson, 205
F.R.D. at 434. Plaintiffs assert that a four-month extension of the discovery
period from the date the court rules on the pending summary judgment motions
is unreasonable and that expert depositions may not be necessary following the
defendants’ expert witness disclosures. (Docket 73 at p. 1-2). Plaintiffs have
not demonstrated any prejudice by the court granting a stay of the discovery and
motion filing deadlines pending its resolution of defendants’ motions for
summary judgment. If a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to any
motion, discovery will recommence 30 days after the court rules.
Hydradyne’s Motion to Compel
Defendant Hydradyne filed a motion to compel on June 16, 2014.
(Docket 32). On June 26, 2014, Hydradyne, in accordance with an agreement
with plaintiffs’ counsel, filed a motion to extend the deadline in which plaintiffs
must respond to Hydradyne’s motion to compel, citing “a tentative agreement
that would resolve . . . the motion to compel regarding counseling and medication
records.” (Docket 36). On June 27, 2014, this court granted Hydradyne’s
unopposed motion and gave plaintiffs until August 1, 2014, to respond to the
motion to compel. (Docket 37). On July 30, 2014, plaintiffs filed a
memorandum in opposition to Hydradyne’s motion to compel (Docket 49) and on
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August 8, 2014, Hydradyne filed a response to plaintiffs’ opposition to its motion
to compel. (Docket 51).
At issue in Hydradyne’s motion to compel is whether plaintiffs must
produce documents responding to Hydradyne’s second, third and fourth
requests for production.
REQUEST 2: Produce all records related to marriage or individual
counseling for Kenneth Klynsma and Linda Klynsma, and Adam
Klynsma.
REQUEST 3: Produce all records related to the prescription and
purchase of any medication for depression or any other mental
disorder suffered by Kenneth Klynsma, Linda Klynsma and Adam
Klynsma.
REQUEST 4: Produce all records related to any charges brought
against Adam Klynsma and any resolution of those charges, whether
made while Adam Klynsma was a juvenile or as an adult.
(Docket 33 at pp. 6-7).
Defendants’ requests for production are designed to uncover
information regarding the potential damages plaintiffs could recover if
successful in their wrongful death claim. (Docket 33 at p. 1); see also
Docket 13 at p. 4 (amended complaint). “In every action for wrongful
death the jury may give such damages as they may think proportionate to
the pecuniary injury resulting from such death to the persons . . . for
whose benefit such action shall be brought.” SDCL § 21-5-7. In order to
recover damages in a wrongful death claim brought on behalf of a deceased
adult child, a parent-plaintiff must establish “the child’s willingness and

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ability during his majority to furnish support for his parents.” Hodkinson
v. Parker, 70 S.D. 272, 276 (S.D. 1944).
The discovery sought in Hydradyne’s motion to compel may bear on the
damages Hydradyne may be found liable for if plaintiffs are ultimately successful
on their wrongful death claim. (Docket 13 at p. 4). In briefing their motions for
summary judgment, defendants dispute any liability on plaintiffs’ underlying
claims. See Dockets 39 & 60. Plaintiffs have not requested additional time to
conduct discovery in responding to defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
See Aponte-Torres, 445 F.3d at 59. The discovery sought in Hydradyne’s
motion to compel is not necessary for the court’s resolution of the pending
motions for summary judgment and may not be required following the court’s
adjudication of those motions.
A review of the timing in which Hydradyne filed its motion to compel
relative to the filing of the motions for summary judgment or partial
summary judgment demonstrates this. Hydradyne filed its motion for
summary judgment on July 3, 2014, seventeen days after filing its motion
to compel and six days after the court granted its motion to extend the time
in which plaintiffs could respond to the motion to compel to August 1,
2014. (Dockets 32, 37, 38). T.J. Welding filed its motion for summary
judgment on September 25, 2014, prior to the resolution of Hydradyne’s
motion to compel. (Docket 59). Plaintiffs did not oppose defendants’

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motion for partial summary judgment which was made prior to the
resolution of Hydradyne’s motion to compel. (Docket 80).
In light of the timing of the defendants’ motions for summary
judgment, the subject matter of the motion to compel, and plaintiffs’ lack
of discovery objections when responding to defendants’ motions for
summary judgment and partial summary judgment, the court will hold
Hydradyne’s motion to compel (Docket 32) in abeyance pending the
resolution of defendants’ motions for summary judgment. (Dockets 38 &
59). Good cause appearing, it is
ORDERED that the motions (Dockets 69 & 72) are granted in accord with
the foregoing analysis. All discovery and motions deadlines including those of
existing motions in limine are stayed pending the resolution of Hydradyne LLC’s
and T.J. Welding & Fabrication Co.’s motions for summary judgment. (Dockets
38 & 59). If a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to either motion for
summary judgment, discovery will recommence 30 days after the date of the
court’s order on defendants’ summary judgment motions. Future scheduling
deadlines will be established upon resolution of those motions.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to compel (Docket 32) is held in
abeyance pending the resolution of Hydradyne LLC’s and T.J. Welding &
Fabrication Co.’s motions for summary judgment. (Dockets 38 & 59).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion (Docket 75) requesting the
court to modify its scheduling order is denied as moot.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant T.J. Welding & Fabrication
Co.’s motion to join defendant Hydradyne, LLC’s motion in limine (Docket 85)
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion (Docket 86) requesting the
court to extend the time in which plaintiffs must respond to defendants’ motions
in limine is denied as moot.
Dated May 18, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Jeffrey L. Viken
JEFFREY L. VIKEN
CHIEF JUDGE

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