Meyer v. JP Morgan Chase Bank et al
Filing
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ORDER denying 5 Motion. Signed by Chief Judge Jeffrey L. Viken on 8/17/15. (SB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
WESTERN DIVISION
CIV. 15-5059-JLV
RENE D. MEYER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
TEMORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK,
CHASE MANHATTAN MORTGAGE
CORPORATION, AND AUTO-OWNERS
INSURANCE,
Defendants.
On August 14, 2015, plaintiff Rene Meyer, appearing pro se, filed a
complaint against the defendants. (Docket 1). Plaintiff’s complaint seeks to
invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 by alleging
breach of contract claims against the defendants for dealings involving two
mortgages and a homeowner’s insurance policy. Id. at pp. 1-3. Plaintiff’s
claims also appear to invoke the federal question of jurisdiction of the court.
28 U.S.C. § 1401. Those claims are: count 1, unlawful seizure in violation of the
First Amendment─freedom of religion; count 2, unlawful seizure in violation of
the Thirteenth Amendment─enslaving plaintiff against her will; and count 3,
violation of the First Amendment─threats of homelessness. Id. at p. 2. The
fourth count of the complaint alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Id. at p. 5. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages. Id. at pp.
5-6.
Plaintiff also filed a motion to stop a mortgage foreclosure and sheriff’s
auction. (Docket 5). Plaintiff’s motion seeks a temporary restraining order to
prevent the Sheriff’s Office of Pennington County, South Dakota, from
conducting a sheriff’s sale pursuant to a judgment of foreclosure entered in the
case captioned JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association vs. Rene D.
Wiswell, . . . aka Rene D. Meyer, et al, Civil No. 14-1566, in the Seventh Judicial
Circuit Court for the State of South Dakota. (Docket 5-1 at pp. 3-4). The
sheriff’s sale is scheduled to occur at 10 a.m. on August 21, 2015. Id. at p. 4.
“[P]ro se complaints are to be construed liberally . . . .” Stone v. Harry,
364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (referencing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976). “A pro se [complaint] should be ‘interpreted liberally and . . . should
be construed to encompass any allegation stating federal relief.’ ” Bracken v.
Dormire, 247 F.3d 699, 704 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing White v. Wyrick, 530 F.2d
818, 819 (8th Cir. 1976)). “[P]ro se litigants must set [a claim] forth in a manner
which, taking the pleaded facts as true, states a claim as a matter of law.”
Stringer v. St. James R-1 School District, 446 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir. 2006). “A
remedial interpretation of this kind often involves supplying legal or factual
statements that the [complaint] should contain, or relaxing the rule that requires
such statements, where it reasonably appears that they were omitted merely for
lack of legal know-how.” Bracken, 247 F.3d at 704. For purposes of
considering plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order only, the court
will interpret the complaint as stating a claim for federal relief. Id.
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The abstention doctrine announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), “directs federal courts to abstain from hearing cases when (1) there is an
ongoing state judicial proceeding which (2) implicates important state interests,
and when (3) that proceeding affords an adequate opportunity to raise the federal
questions presented.” Fuller v. Ulland, 76 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing
Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423,
432 (1982)). The decision of the court to abstain under the Younger principles
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. The United States Supreme Court held
“that Younger requires a federal court to abstain not only when and while the
state trial court proceedings were ongoing, but until the state defendant (and
federal plaintiff) exhausts [her] appellate remedies.” Tony Alamo Christian
Ministries v. Selig, 664 F.3d 1245, 1250 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608-09 (1975) (“We therefore hold that Younger
standards must be met to justify federal intervention in a state judicial
proceeding as to which a losing litigant has not exhausted [her] state appellate
remedies.”). “[D]eference [is] to be accorded state proceedings which have
already been initiated and which afford a competent tribunal for the resolution of
federal issues.” Huffman, 420 U.S. at 609, n.21.
By plaintiff’s own pleadings she acknowledges there is currently an
ongoing state court action involving the same issues which form the basis for
federal relief. That state court action implicates traditional state interests and
provides plaintiff with “an adequate opportunity to raise the federal questions
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presented.” Fuller, 76 F.3d at 959. Plaintiff’s claim against the defendants
under a homeowner’s insurance policy, while potentially collateral to plaintiff’s
ability to pay her obligations under the mortgages, is not within the framework
traditionally contemplated for a real estate mortgage foreclosure action. That
claim, if meritorious, can be remedied by money damages through the diversity
jurisdiction of the federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A temporary restraining
order cannot issue when money damages are an adequate remedy.
Under the abstention doctrine of Younger, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and
Middlesex County Ethics Committee, 457 U.S. 423 (1982), the court must refrain
from exercising federal jurisdiction at this time and not interfere with the ongoing
state foreclosure action. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order (Docket
5) is denied.
Dated August 17, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Jeffrey L. Viken
JEFFREY L. VIKEN
CHIEF JUDGE
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