Little v. Rapid City Regional West Hospital et al

Filing 14

ORDER DISMISSING CASE. Signed by Chief Judge Jeffrey L. Viken on 11/30/16. (SB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
WESTERN DIVISION
JEREMIAH LITTLE,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CIV. 16-5065-JLV
ORDER DISMISSING CASE

RAPID CITY REGIONAL WEST
HOSPITAL and
PENNINGTON COUNTY SHERIFFS,
Defendants.
On July 28, 2016, plaintiff Jeremiah Little filed a complaint against
defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket 1). The court granted
Mr. Little leave to proceed in forma pauperis and he paid the initial partial filing
fee. ((Dockets 9 & 11).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review a prisoner complaint and
identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This screening process
“applies to all civil complaints filed by [a] prisoner[], regardless of payment of
[the] filing fee.” Lewis v. Estes, 242 F.3d 375 at *1 (8th Cir. 2000) (unpublished)
(citing Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999)). During this initial
screening process, the court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety or in part
if the complaint is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The court may dismiss a complaint under
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim as “the statute

accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil
of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327
(1989).
Because Mr. Little is proceeding pro se, his pleading must be liberally
construed and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Mr. Little filed an amended complaint. (Docket 6). The amended complaint,
however, is a photocopy of his original complaint. For this opinion, the court
will cite to the original complaint. Mr. Little used a Civil Rights Complaint By A
Prisoner form. (Docket 1). Under Section A. Jurisdiction, Mr. Little checked
the boxes asserting jurisdiction under 1(a) 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; and 1(b) 28 U.S.C. § 1331.1 Id. at p. 1

¶ (A)(1)(a) and (b).

Mr. Little’s complaint contains three counts. Counts 1 and 2 raise
essentially the same claim. In Counts 1 and 2, Mr. Little alleges he was housed
in the Rapid City Regional Hospital Regional West Behavior Health Department
(“the hospital”) under the “medical privacy act of mental health behaviors.”
(Docket 1 at p. 4). He alleges the hospital wrongfully disclosed his confidential
information to the Pennington County Sheriff’s Office, which then seized Mr.
Mr. Little struck through the phrase “Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).” (Docket 1 at p. 1 ¶ A(1)(b)).
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Little and imprisoned him. Id. He alleges he had signed a “privacy act
agreement” which stated the hospital could not disclose his “confidential
behavior health securement.” Id.
In Count 3, Mr. Little alleges the defendants violated his Eighth
Amendment rights by interfering with and interrupting his behavior health
treatment. Id. at p. 6. He alleges he was arrested in the middle of a mental
health assessment and was unable to finish that evaluation. Id.
In the Request For Relief, Mr. Little asks that he be returned to the custody
of tribal authorities so he can finish mental health treatment. Id. at p. 7. He
seeks money damages of $500,000 from each defendant and that damages also
be paid to his children because they did not receive his support. Id. Finally, he
requests that his delinquent child support payments be quashed. Id.
Mr. Little fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Even
with a liberal construction, “a pro se complaint must contain specific facts
supporting its conclusions.” Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.
1985); Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, 518 F. App’x 502, 504 (8th Cir. 2013). A
complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations . . . [but] requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007).
Mr. Little’s complaint fails to meet this standard. He does not explain
which of his constitutional rights were violated. He mentions the Privileges and
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Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, but
does not explain how these clauses were violated.
Mr. Little also fails to explain how his constitutional rights were violated.
While there may be a situation in which disclosure of medical information
violates some constitutional right, Mr. Little does not explain how that happened
here. “Though pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, they still must
allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d
912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004). The court is not required to “supply additional facts,
nor will [it] construct a legal theory that assumes facts that have not been
pleaded.” Id. (citing Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989)).
Mr. Little’s claims are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and
1915A(b)(1).
The court finds plaintiff’s complaint is frivolous and fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Section 1915(g) states as follows:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment
in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has,
on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any
facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States
that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the
prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The court previously assessed a “first strike” against Mr.
Little in Little v. State of South Dakota, et. al, Civ. 14-5069-JLV (D.S.D.
November 17, 2014) (Docket 5 at p. 8). Accordingly, it is

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ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b)(1),
Mr. Little’s complaint (Docket 1) is dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and for
failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action constitutes a second strike
against Mr. Little for purposes of the three-strike rule under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Dated November 30, 2016.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Jeffrey L. Viken
JEFFREY L. VIKEN
CHIEF JUDGE

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