Lundahl et al v. JP Morgan Chase Bank et al

Filing 98

ORDER granting 31 Motion to Dismiss; granting 34 Motion to Dismiss; granting 34 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 36 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; granting 36 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 41 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; denying as moot 45 Motion for Joinder; denying as moot 55 Motion for Joinder; denying as moot 63 Motion for Joinder; denying 88 Motion to Amend Original Complaint. Signed by U.S. District Judge Lawrence L. Piersol on 8/12/2019. (CLR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA,
WESTERN DIVISION

LOGAN LUNDAHL,HOLLI LUNDAHL,

5:17-CV-05069-LLP

Plaintiffs,
ORDER

vs.

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK,OLD REPUBLIC
INSURANCE CO., MEL HOFFMAN, LOS
ANGELES HOMEOWNERS AID, LILIA
CHAVARIN,
AMERICAN
MODERN
INSURANCE GROUP, FIRST AMERICAN

TITLE INSURANCE CO., DOES I-IO, HSBC,
SMITH COUNTY,TX, LOIS MOSLEY,PAUL
KELLEYJR., SANDRA COPELAND, DAVID
GILBERTSON,IN THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE
CAPACITIES; CRAIG PFEIFLE, IN THEIR
ADMINISTRATIVE
CAPACITIES; AND
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE CO.,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs,^Logan Lundahl and Holli Lundahl ("plaintiffs") filed a pro se action against

defendants and requested leave ofin forma pauperis, which was later granted. Dockets 1,2, 3, and

15. In their amen^d complaint the plaintiffs allege:
(1) Violations of the Federal Racketeering Act[;] . . . (2) Violations of the Fair Housing
Amendments Act . . . and its retaliation provisions[;] . . . (3) The Federal Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act[;] . . .(4) violat[ion] and conspiracy to violate the Federal Civil
Rights Act; .. . (5) Prospective Injunctive and declaratory relief under the Ex Parte
Young Doctrine;(6)for Supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims for
(a)false arrest/false imprisonment;(b)abuse ofprocess;(c) Malicious prosecution;(d)
slander and libel under South Dakota law;(e)Constructive fiaud and deceit;(f) Breach
of Unfair Trade Practices in Utah and South Dakota;(g) criminal and civil conspiracy
[;][and](h)tortious interference with Plaintiffs economic advantages[.]

Docket 27 at l-2.tjMotions pending before this Court are Dockets 31, 34, 36, 41, 45, 55, 63, and
88. Each of the motions in Dockets 31, 34, 36, and 41 include a motion to dismiss due to lack of

personal jurisdiction over the prospective defendant. This Court grants the motions to dismiss due
to lack of persona.1 jurisdiction in Dockets 31, 34, 36, and 41. Therefore, any remaining motions
in those dockets have become moot. Dockets 31, 34, 36, and 41. The Court grants the motions to

dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction because of the rationale set out below. Furthermore,
motions in Docket 45(Defendant Lilia Chavarin's motion to join... motions to dismiss). Docket
55(Defendant, American Modem Insurance Group's motion to join the motion in Docket 47)and
Docket 63 (First American Title Co.'s motion to join motion in Docket 47) haVe now become
moot. Plaintiffs motion to amend in Docket 88 was untimely filed and therefore the motion is
denied.
LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) regarding lack of personal jurisdiction "permits

the district court'to notice a jurisdictional challenge 'at any time during the pendency of the

proceedings.'" Waldner v. N. Am. Truck & Trailer, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 401, 411-12(D.S.D. 2011)
(quoting United States v. Patton, 309 F.3d 1093, 1094 (8th Cir. 2002)). "The party asserting
personal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case, and the burden does not
shift to the party challenging jurisdiction." Nichols v. MMIC Ins. Inc., 68 F.Supp.3d 1067, 1071
(D.S.D. 2014); see Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642,647(8th Cir. 2003).
.'i'.

Plaintiffs allege that this fomm has personal jurisdiction over the defendants under 18
U.S.C. § 1965 a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") statute. The Eighth
Circuit has not addressed the "bounds of personal jurisdiction under" 18 U.S.C. § 1965. Waldner,
277 F.R.D. at 412. However, this Court has adopted the narrower view of the Second Circuit

regarding 18 U.S.C. § 1965. Id.; PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 71
(2dCir. 1998).

;

The Second Circuit noted that 18 U.S.C. § 1965 must be read in its entirety. PT United,
138F.3dat71. S&tion 1965:

[D]oes not provide for nationwide personal jurisdiction over every defendant in every civil
RICO case, no matter where the defendant is found. First § 1965(a) grants personal
jurisdiction over an initial defendant in a civil RICO case to the district court for the district
in which that person resides, has an agent, or transacts his or her affairs. In other words, a
civil RICO action can only be brought in a district court where personal jurisdiction based
on minimum contacts is established to at least one defendant.

/J.
'Furthermore, to establish personal jurisdiction over the "other parties" there must be a showing
that the "ends ofjustice so require."Id.

This Court had adopted the Second Circuit's test to determine whether personaljurisdiction
is found under 18 U.S.C. § 1965: "(1) [whether] the district court has traditional personal

jurisdiction basedjOn minimum contacts analysis over at least one defendant; and(2)[whether] the
district court has personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants who are alleged coconspirators ifthe 'ends ofjustice' require the court to have this jurisdiction." Waldner,277 F.R.D.
at 412;see PT United, 138 F.3d at 71-72;see also Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDCInv. Inc.,

788 F.2d 535, 53&(9th Cir. 1986).

In Waldner, this Court found that there was personal jurisdiction under both prongs set
\

forth by the adopted test. The first prong was suecessful because "a number of defendants. . .
/

[were] headquartered or incorporated in South Dakota, meet[ing] the minimum contacts analysis.
Under the second prong, the 'ends of justice' are met if the action is brought 'where suits are
normally expected to be brought." Waldner,277 F.R.D. at 412.;(quoting PT United Can, 138 F.3d
at 71-71.). Moreover, "Congress has expressed a preferenee in § 1965 to avoid, where possible,

haling defendantl'into far flung fora.'"Id. In Waldner, this Court reasoned that because many

defendants were domiciled in South Dakota and the majority were located in Iowa or Minnesota
then it was foreseeable they would be brought to suit in South Dakota. Waldner, 277 F.R.D. at
412.

DISCUSSION

Because plaintiffs have filed their claim pro se, it will be liberally construed. See Erickson
'» j

V. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Even with this construction,"a pro se complaint must contain

specific facts supporting its conclusions." Marrm v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337(8th Cir. 1985);
Ellis V. City ofMinneapolis, 518 F. App'x 502, 504(8th Cir. 2013).

The Eighth Circuit has held that "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must state

sufficient facts in the complaint to support a reasonable inference that defendants may be subjected

to jurisdiction imthe forum state." Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580, 585 (8th Cir. 2008); see
Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070,1072(8th Cir. 2004).

This Court must address whether plaintiffs have established the minimum contacts

standards for personal jurisdiction and whether justice requires suit in this forum. Traditional

"minimum contact" are required by due process and bringing the suit in the forum state cannot
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Steinbuch, 518 F.3d at 585-86;

World-Wide Vol^wagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 386, 291-92 (1980). When establishing
minimum contacts with the forum state the court will "focus[] on whether the defendant purposely
availed itselfofthe privilege ofconducting activities within the forum state and thereby invok[ing]
the benefits and protections of its laws." Steinbuch, 518 F.3d at 586; see Hanson v. Denckla, 357
!

U.S. 235, 253 (1958).

Personal jurisdiction and minimum contacts can be recognized through two theories:
general or specific jurisdiction. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408-

I
414-15 (1984). General jurisdiction may be exercised when the defendant has "carried on in the
forum state a continuous and systematic, even if limited, part of its general business; in such

circumstances the alleged injury need not have any connection with the forum state. Steinbuch,
518 F.3d at 586; Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984). Furthermore, the
plaintiff must make a prima facie case that the defendant's contacts were not "random,"
"fortuitous," or "attenuated." Keeton,465 U.S. at 774.

Specific jurisdiction arises when the injury occurs in the forum state or the injury that gave
rise to the claim had some connection with the forum state. The court will look at whether the

defendant "purposely directed its activities at the fomm state and the claim arose out of or relates
to those activities," Steinbuch, 518 F.3d at 586; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
472 (1985). The Eighth Circuit evaluates the defendant's contacts by considering five factors:
affording the first,three primary importance:

1) the nature and quality of the defendant's contacts with the forum state; 2) the quantity
ofsuch contacts; 3)the relation ofthe cause of action to the contacts [immaterial for general
jurisdiction]; 4)the interests of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and
5)the convenience ofthe parties.

Steinbuch, 518 F.3d at 586; Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Maples Industries, Inc., 97 F.3d 1100,

1102(8^^0^. 1996).
Even after being liberally construed, the only facts that plaintiffs have set forth regarding
personal jurisdictipn ill their amended complaint were:

[D]efenda|ts CHASE,OLD REPLUBLIC,AMERICAN MODERN,FIRST AMERICAN
Title,an^ HSBC all do general business in this state and maybe served Plaintiffs process
within this state. Under Waldner v. Northern American Truck and Trailer, CVl0-4056

(D.S.D. 2011) where one defendant meets minimum contacts under RICO, all defendants
may be brou[g]ht into the forum.).

Docket 27 at 3. Even with liberal construction, this is not enough to show minimum contacts for a
single defendant and plaintiffs do not show facts that justice so requires personal jurisdiction to be
5

found. Plaintiffs responded to the first motion to dismiss for laek of personal jurisdietion (Doeket
31), however they argued that"AMIG stood ready to testify for the state of South Dakota... and
motive to remains intaet." Docket 49 at 19. This contact with the forum is not sufficient to create

minimum contacts. In Docket 58,plaintiffs opposed Docket 36 with ease law describing 18 U.S.C.

§ 1965 and restated the claim of defendants having "general business" as they argued in their
...1

'

"

amended complaint. Plaintiffs opposition to Doeket 41 is similar to their opposition set out in
,Vii

Doeket 58. See Ddcket 59.
i

In their amended eomplaint and any opposition to motions to dismiss plaintiffs do not
address the extent of each individual defendants' general business, nor the quantity of their
contacts. Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that any of the defendants' general business is

"continual and systematic", rather than "random," "fortuitous," or "attenuated." See Keeton, 465
U.S. at 774. Plaintiffs do not address the interests of the forum state or the convenience of this

lawsuit to all parties. Because plaintiffs have failed to show that one defendant has minimum
contacts with this forurn, all motions to dismiss due to lack ofpersonal jurisdiction are granted due

to 18 U.S.C. § 1965. Dockets 31, 34, 36, and 41. Moreover, any other issue brought up in these
motions is moofJibecause personal jurisdietion has not been established over the defendants.
Dockets 31, 34, 36, 41, and 45.
Dockets 63 and 55 are Moot

American Modem Insurance Group's motion for joinder to Lilia Chavarin's supplement
r

to the first amended complaint(Docket 55)is now moot, as plaintiffs have not established that

this fomm has personal jurisdiction over American Modem Insurance Group. Furthermore, First
American Title Insurance Company's motion for joinder in Lilia Chavarin's objection to

/i

plaintiffs' supplement to the first amended eomplaint(Docket 63)is now moot for the previously
t;

stated reason.

This Court Denies Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint(Docket 88)

This Court dismisses plaintiffs' motion to amend original complaint (Docket 88) due to

noneomplianee with this Court's orders. Plaintiffs xyere given "30 days to file a motion to amend
eomplaint. If plaintiff does not file amended complaint, the court will proceed with its screening
of plaintiffs' amefided eomplaint at Docket 27." Docket 79. This order was filed on December 21,
2018. Id. Because the Court stated a number in days the time shall be computed under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a)(l)(A-C). Fed. R. Crv. P.6(a)(1)(A-C). Under Rule 6 a time stated in
a number of days,is computed by excluding the day the time was entered (this order was entered

on December 21,,2018, making the beginning of the time computation December 22, 2018) each
day following is counted, including every Saturday, Sunday, and legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. P.
6(a)(1)(A-C); Docket 79. Therefore, the motion to amend was due on January 20, 2019, and
plaintiffs did not file their motion to amend with a proposed 286 page amended complaint until
February 1, 2019. Docket 88. Plaintiffs' motion to amend their eomplaint is untimely, therefore
rf

•

.

the motion is denied (Docket 88).
Notice to the Court and Plaintiffs

This Court would like to reiterate Chief Judge Viken's previous order in Noble\

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Holli Telford [also known as Holli Lundahl], both
individually and through a third person, and under any current or future aliases, is
permanently enjoined from filing any further civil lawsuits, motions to intervene, or other
pleadings'in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota unless:
A. At the time ofthe filing of any pleading Ms. Telford has prepaid in full the
applicable filing fee required by the Clerk of Court;

B.;The pleadings are signed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 by an attorney admitted
to the court; or

C. Ms. Telford provides the Clerk of Court with a complaint or pleading including
alliof the following:
'j

\

1. As exhibit A to the submission a copy of this permanent injunction; and

s

2. As exhibit B to the submission a declaration prepared pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1746 or a sworn affidavit certifying that the claim Ms. Telford
wishes to file is a new claim never before raised by her in any court in the
District of South Dakota; and

3. As exhibit C to the submission a listing by full caption of each and
every lawsuit previously filed by Ms. Telford in any federal or state court
against each and every defendant to the lawsuit she wishes to file; and
y

4. As exhibit D to the submission attach a copy of each such previous
complaint and a certified copy of its disposition; and.
5. As exhibit E to the submission a list of any judgments or monetary
sanctions previously imposed on Ms. Telford, or any person acting in
concert with her, and the status of payment on any such financial
obligation.

D.jf Ms. Telford provides a submission under Part C,the judge presiding over
the case shall review the submission and determine whether it will be approved
for filing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court for the District of South Dakota

shall not file any pleading on behalf of Ms. Telford or anyone acting in concert with her
unless the pleading complies with the directives prescribed above.
Dated Febniary 26, 2018.

Noble V. Am. NaflProp. & Cas. Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1013-14(D.S.D. 2018).
IT IS ORDEREDv

1. That defendants' motions to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction (Dockets 31,
34, 36, 41) are granted. Furthermore, any requisite argument within these motions

(Dockets 31, 34, 36, and 41) are moot.

2. That defendant's motion(Doeket 45)is moot.
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3. That defendants' motions(Dockets 55 and 63)to join are moot.

4. That plaintiffs' motion to anend their complaint (Docket 88) was untimely filed per
this Court's order and therefore denied.

5. That this case be dismissed without prejudice in its entirety as this Court does not have
personal jurisdiction over any of the stated defendants.

DATED August U ,2019.
BY THE COURT:

ATTEST:

MATTHEW W.THELENjCXERK

\(1UAUU_-

tSOU-.-—

lawrence L. Piersol

United States District Judge