Ramsey v. Chattanooga Housing Authority et al

Filing 47

MEMORANDUM. An Order shall enter Signed by District Judge Curtis L Collier on 6/30/11. (JGK, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA

CRYSTAL RAMSEY,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CHATTANOOGA HOUSING AUTHORITY, )
ROBERT ZENDEJAS, JAMES AVERY, AND )
CITY POLICE OFFICER D. RAWSON AND )
CITY OF CHATTANOOGA
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. 1:09-CV-233

Chief Judge Curtis L. Collier

MEMORANDUM
Before the Court are motions for summary judgment filed by Defendant City of Chattanooga
(“City”) and D. Rawson (“Officer Rawson”) (Court File No. 32) and by Defendants James Avery
(“Officer Avery”) and Robert Zendejas (“Officer Zendejas”) (Court File No. 34). The defendants
argue there are no genuine disputes of material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Plaintiff Crystal Ramsey (“Ramsey”) late-filed a response to the motions (Court File No. 40),
and Officer Avery and Officer Zendejas filed a reply (Court File No. 43). For the reasons stated
below, the Court will GRANT the City’s and Officer’s Rawson’s motion for summary judgment
(Court File No. 32). All claims against the City and Officer Rawson will be DISMISSED. The
Court will GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART Officer Avery’s and Officer Zendejas’s motion
for summary judgment (Court File No. 34).

All claims against Officer Zendejas will be

DISMISSED. The Court will also DISMISS Ramsey’s claim for property damage in favor of
Officer Avery.

I.

RELEVANT FACTS
A.

Ramsey’s Version of Events

On or about 12:45 a.m. on August 2, 2008, Officer Avery arrived outside of Ramsey’s
residence at the Emma Wheeler Homes to respond to a call regarding a large crowd of juveniles
(Court File No. 20). There, Officer Avery began conducting a search and seizure of a minor suspect
(id.). Ramsey, who came outside of her home after hearing a loud noise, was frightened as she
observed the search and seizure take place (Court File No. 1-1).1 As a result, she attempted to
contact a 911 operator because she felt “the situation had gotten out of hand.” (id.).
When Officer Avery overheard Ramsey talking to the 911 operator, he ran up on to
Ramsey’s porch and slapped Ramsey on the side of her face (id.). According to Ramsey, this
happened a second time as she attempted to call 911 again (Court File No. 40-1). At some point,
the 911 dispatcher called Ramsey to ask why the call was interrupted (id.).
Around the same time, Officer Avery walked onto Ramsey’s porch with the minor suspect.
He told Ramsey and the minor suspect to sit on Ramsey’s front porch with their backs against her
home (id.). Officer Avery asked to see Ramsey’s identification, and at some point, Officer Zendejas
arrived (id.). When Ramsey asked Officer Avery if they were “done,” he responded “yes” (id. at
20). Ramsey then went back inside her home to call her father (id. at 21). Once inside, Ramsey only
shut her screen door. After being inside for only a few seconds, Ramsey heard the screen door open,
and Officer Avery grabbed Ramsey from behind (id.).
Officer Avery then forced Ramsey onto the concrete where he put his knee on her lower back
while handcuffing her (Court File No. 1-1). Both Officers Avery and Zendejas began hitting

1

It is also clear from the evidence Ramsey recognized the minor suspect.
2

Ramsey and telling her to stop resisting the officers (id.). Ramsey was then placed under arrest. She
did not know the nature of her charge at that time.
Once she was in Officer Avery’s car, Officer Rawson arrived on the scene (Court File No.
40-1 at 25). She called for him to come over to her where she explained that the other officers had
hit her (id.). Officer Rawson seemed unwilling to do anything about her allegations. When Officer
Avery got into his vehicle, he backed out of Ramsey’s yard into Ramsey’s father’s car, which
Ramsey used on a regular basis (id. at 26).
B.

Officer Avery’s Version of Events

Officer Avery responded to a call involving a crowd of juveniles at the Emma Wheeler
Homes (Court File No. 36-7). As a result, he ended up chasing one of the minor suspects, who was
in violation of curfew (id.). As he searched the minor suspect outside of Ramsey’s residence, she
came out of her home, began yelling at Officer Avery, and verbally interfered with his search (Court
File Nos. 20, 21-2).
Officer Avery advised Ramsey more than once he was a police officer, and he asked her to
go back inside her home (Court File No. 36-7). Although she initially complied with Officer
Avery’s instructions, Ramsey “reemerge[d] from her dwelling multiple times to interfere with [his]
investigation” (id. at 4). Subsequently, Officer Avery informed Ramsey if she continued to
“verbally interfere with [his] reasonable attempts to conduct an investigation,” she would be placed
under arrest for disorderly conduct (id. at 4). Indeed, Ramsey did not cease her actions, and Officer
Avery told her that she could not leave the scene because she was going to be placed under arrest
(id.).

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At some point after this, Ramsey called 911 (Court File No. 5).2 Ignoring Officer Avery’s
instruction that she could not leave, Ramsey walked inside her home (Court File No. 36-7).
Because Officer Avery believed Ramsey would attempt to lock the door behind her, and because
he believes “it is a potentially life threatening tactical mistake to allow a suspect . . . to return to .
. . her dwelling while . . . she is being investigated,” he followed (id. at 5). As Officer Avery opened
Ramsey’s screen door, she turned and shoved him in the chest (id.). In response, Officer Avery
grabbed Ramsey’s wrist (id.). Officer Zendejas, who had just arrived, witnessed the struggle and
grabbed Ramsey’s left wrist while Officer Avery attempted to employ an arm bar technique (id.).
During this time, Ramsey continued to resist arrest, and she attempted to kick Officer Avery
(id.). All three of the individuals ended up on the front lawn where “Officer Zendejas caught []
Ramsey to prevent her from sustaining any injury from falling” (id. at 6).
C.

Officer Zendejas’s Version of Events

Officer Zendejas arrived on the scene to assist Officer Avery in conducting his investigation
of the minor suspect (Court File No. 36-8). Shortly after he arrived, he heard Officer Avery
instructing Ramsey “not to go anywhere” because she was going to be placed under arrest for
disorderly conduct (id. at 3). She responded by threatening to call “the real police” (id.).
Officer Avery then walked over to Ramsey and attempted to grab her wrist. Ramsey pulled
away from him, and opened the screen door of her apartment (id.). Because Officer Zendejas was
concerned about the safety risks of allowing Ramsey to return to her home, he attempted to assist
Officer Avery in effectuating Ramsey’s arrest. Officer Zendejas grabbed her left wrist behind her
back while he waited for Officer Avery to gain control of Ramsey’s other wrist (id.). He also

2

Officer Avery denies slapping Ramsey (Court File No. 5).
4

managed to catch Ramsey as she stumbled because she was resisting arrest (id.).
D.

Officer Rawson’s Version of Events

When Officer Rawson arrived on the scene, Ramsey had already been arrested and placed
in Officer Avery’s vehicle. Ramsey called for Officer Rawson to come over to her (Court File No.
32-2). It was clear to him Ramsey was very angry; however, he does not recall her saying she had
been assaulted by anyone (id.). When Officer Rawson asked Ramsey why she had called 911, she
stated she wanted the assistance of the police (id.). In response, Officer Rawson explained the
Chattanooga Housing Authority officers were police officers (id.).
After determining he was not needed because Ramsey was already in custody, Officer
Rawson did not feel there was anything for him to do. Nonetheless, he did complete a Traffic Crash
Report after Officer Avery backed into the vehicle registered to Ramsey’s father (id.).

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
As a result of her arrest, Ramsey brought suit against the Chattanooga Housing Authority,

Officer Avery, Officer Zendejas, Officer Rawson, and the City of Chattanooga (Court File No. 1-1).
She alleges Defendants deprived her of her rights to due process of law and to be free from the use
of excessive force, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments (id.).
Ramsey also alleges Defendants are guilty of intentional infliction of emotional harm and negligent
infliction of emotional harm pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §
29-20-101 et seq. Finally, Ramsey sues Officer Avery and the Chattanooga Housing Authority for
property damage in the amount of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500.00) for damage to her
vehicle, and Officer Rawson for failure to report abuse (id.). This Court has granted summary

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judgment in favor of the Chattanooga Housing Authority (Court File No. 38). The other Defendants
now move this Court for judgment as a matter of law (Court File Nos. 32, 34).
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, discovery, and any affidavits “show there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating no genuine issue
of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Leary v. Daeschner, 349
F.3d 888, 897 (6th Cir. 2003). The Court should view the evidence, including all reasonable
inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Nat’l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900,
907 (6th Cir. 2001).
To survive a motion for summary judgment, “the non-moving party must go beyond the
pleadings and come forward with specific facts to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). Indeed, a “[plaintiff] is not
entitled to a trial on the basis of mere allegations.” Smith v. City of Chattanooga, No. 1:08-cv-63,
2009 WL 3762961, at *2, 3 (E.D. Tenn. November 4, 2009) (explaining the Court must determine
whether “the record contains sufficient facts and admissible evidence from which a rational jury
could reasonably find in favor of [the] plaintiff”). In addition, should the non-moving party fail to
provide evidence to support an essential element of the case, the movant can meet its burden by
pointing out such failure to the Court. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.
1989).
At summary judgment, the Court’s role is limited to determining whether the case contains
sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-movant. Anderson v.

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Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). If the Court concludes a fair-minded jury could
not return a verdict in favor of the non-movant based on the record, the Court should enter summary
judgment. Id. at 251-52; Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994).
III.

ANALYSIS
A.

Section 1983 Claims

In her complaint, Ramsey asserts violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments (Court File No. 1-1). “Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action against state or
local officials who deprive a person of a federal right while acting under the color of state law.”
Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Engquist v. Oregon
Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 611 (2008). Construing Ramsey’s complaint in her favor, the only
civil rights violations alleged are that of excessive force and violation of substantive due process
rights.3
1.

Excessive Force

In order to bring a successful claim of excessive force, which is properly analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment, Ramsey must “demonstrate that a seizure occurred, and that the force used in
effecting the seizure was objectively unreasonable.” Rodriguez v. Passinault, 637 F.3d 675, 680
(6th Cir. 2011). Here, Ramsey alleges both Officer Avery and Officer Zendejas are liable for the
use of excessive force. To determine whether there was excessive force, the Court must view the
“facts and circumstances of the case” from the “perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene and
not with 20/20 hindsight.” Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 236 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Graham v.

3

It is unclear to what extent Ramsey asserts a Fifth Amendment or Eight Amendment
violation. Admittedly, in Ramsey’s response to the motions for summary judgment, she
characterizes this matter as an “excessive force” case (Court File No. 40 at 5).
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Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-96 (1989)). Indeed, “an officer making an . . . arrest has the right to use
some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
In other words, the Court must determine whether the officer’s use of force was “objectively
reasonable” under the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. To make such determination, the Court
should “pay particular attention to ‘the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [s]he is actively resisting arrest
or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see also Schreiber v. Moe, 596
F.3d 323, 332 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 639 (6th Cir. 2001)).
This is not an “exhaustive list,” and the inquiry ultimately turns on whether the seizure was
reasonable under the “totality of the circumstances.” Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 455 (6th Cir.
2008). In their motion for summary judgment (Court File No. 34), both Officer Avery and Officer
Zendejas argue there is no genuine dispute as to whether their actions were objectively reasonable.
In the alternative, both officers assert they are entitled to qualified immunity.
Considering their claims for qualified immunity, this Court will first determine whether
either officer violated Ramsey’s constitutional right against excessive force. Fox, 489 F.3d at 235
(citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001), receded from by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223 (2009) (holding “while the sequence set forth [in Saucier] is often appropriate, it should not
longer be regarded as mandatory”)). If Ramsey can establish such violation, then this Court will
decide whether such right was clearly established. Id.
a.

Officer Avery

In her complaint, Ramsey asserts Officer Avery utilized excessive force when he (1) slapped
Ramsey twice for attempting to call 911 and (2) grabbed Ramsey from behind, threw her on the

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ground, and began beating her for the purpose of handcuffing her (Court File No. 1-1). In response,
Officer Avery argues Ramsey “was not ‘seized’ or under arrest during the two times she alleges .
. . Officer Avery slapped the phone from her hand” (Court File No. 35 at 11). While Ramsey does
seem to concede she was free to go inside her home at that time, “a seizure of the person within the
meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments occurs when, ‘taking into account all of the
circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have communicated to a
reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his
business.’” Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 629 (2003) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437
(1991)).
Therefore, considering both instances of force, the Court finds there is a genuine dispute
regarding whether Officer Avery employed excessive force. In particular, Ramsey contends she
came out of her home because she heard a “loud noise” (Court File No. 36-1 at 18). Because she
was concerned about the way Officer Avery was accosting the minor suspect, she decided to call 911
(id. at 22). She does not contend she was interfering with Officer Avery’s investigation as he
asserts. Rather, when she told Officer Avery she was calling the police, he allegedly “smacked” her
on the side of her face to prevent her from making a call (id. at 24). Applying the Graham factors
and viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Ramsey, there is no indication Ramsey posed an
immediate threat to Officer Avery while she was standing on her porch. Even if Ramsey were
yelling and screaming, this Court cannot find that no reasonable jury could find in her favor.
Later, when Ramsey attempted to go back inside her home, she alleges Officer Avery
“opened her screen door and grabbed her from behind using one hand on her arm and one hand on
the back of her neck forcing her to exit her house” (Court File No. 1-1 at 3). He then forced Ramsey

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onto the concrete where he put his knee on her lower back while handcuffing her (id.). Finally,
Ramsey contends Officer Avery, along with Officer Zendejas, “began hitting her and yelling” at her,
telling Ramsey to stop resisting them (id.). According to Ramsey, this “beating” lasted more than
two minutes (id.).4 Crediting Ramsey’s testimony, it is not clear whether Ramsey “was neither
belligerent nor violent in any of [her] dealings” with Officer Avery. Howard v. Wayne County
Sheriff’s Office, No. 09-2171, 2011 WL 1130395, at *7 (6th Cir. March 29, 2011). The fact she
admits the officers told her to stop resisting suggests she may not have been as passive as she
alleges. Nonetheless, Ramsey asserts the Officer Avery beat her for at least one minute, and the
Court finds this allegation creates a genuine issue with regards to the use of force on the part of
Officer Avery.
In regards to the issue of qualified immunity, the Court finds summary judgement is not
appropriate as well. A police officer may be entitled to qualified immunity unless his conduct
“violate[d] a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “The relevant, dispositive inquiry
in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Kijowski v. City of Niles, 372
F. App’x 595, 601 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). A plaintiff may show that a
right was clearly established by showing (1) the violation “was sufficiently obvious under the
general standard of constitutional care” or (2) the officer failed to “adhere to a particularized body
of precedent that squarely governs the case.” Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 579 (6th Cir.

4

In her deposition testimony, Ramsey alleges she was on the ground for approximately ninety
seconds (Court File No. 40-1 at 25).
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2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Indeed, “the right to be free from physical force
when one is not resisting the police is a clearly established right.” Wysong v. City of Heath, 260
F. App’x 848, 856 (6th Cir. 2008). Because the parties dispute whether Ramsey was resisting arrest,
the legal question of immunity is “completely dependent on which view of the facts the jury
believes.” See Rodriguez, 637 F.3d at 689. Therefore the Court will DENY Officer Avery’s motion
for summary judgment with respect to Ramsey’s claim of excessive force.
b.

Officer Zendejas

Ramsey asserts Officer Zendejas participated in the “beating” as Officer Avery tried to
handcuff her. However, during her deposition she testified the only thing she knew for a fact was
Officer Zendejas put his knee on her shoulder (Court File No. 36-1 at 42-43). In addition, she
testified she saw Officer Zendejas walking over as Officer Avery began to hit her (id.). Construing
these facts in Ramsey’s favor, she has failed to raise a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Officer
Zendejas used excessive force. Even if he placed his knee on her shoulder, it seems he did so to help
neutralize Ramsey and place her in handcuffs.

See e.g., Goodrich v. Everett, 193 F. App’x 551,

556 (6th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the Court will GRANT summary judgment in favor of Officer
Zendejas with respect to Ramsey’s excessive force claim.
2.

Substantive Due Process

The only federal civil rights violation Ramsey seems to allege against Officer Rawson is that
he failed to assist her or report any abuse on the part of the other officers (Court File No. 1-1 at 5).
Indeed, Ramsey does not assert Officer Rawson used excessive force against her or had any
involvement in her arrest. “The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process provision has a substantive
component that guarantees ‘protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.’”

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Jones v. Byrnes, 585 F.3d 971, 976 (6th Cir. 2009) (Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)).
This clause, however, generally does not guarantee individuals an “affirmative right to state
protection.” Culp v. Rutledge, 343 F. App’x 128, 133 (6th Cir. 2009); see also DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198 (1989); Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d
374, 376 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining “mere negligence on the part of governments and their agents
does not provide plaintiffs with a ticket to federal court to seek substantive dues process relief”).
To find Officer Rawson violated Ramsey’s substantive due process rights, Ramsey “must show [he]
possessed a purpose to cause harm, such that [his] actions were sufficiently arbitrary and reckless
that they shock the conscience.” Draw v. City of Lincoln Park, 491 F.3d 550, 555 (6th Cir. 2007).
Here, crediting Ramsey’s testimony, it is clear Officer Rawson did not witness the alleged
constitutional violations committed by Officer Avery and Officer Zendejas. In addition, Ramsey
does not indicate Officer Rawson caused her any harm or that he failed to investigate her claims “for
intentional, malicious or reckless reasons.” Mitchell, 487 F.3d at 378. More importantly, “there is
no statutory or common law right, much less a constitutional right, to an investigation.” Id.
Accordingly, the Court will GRANT summary judgment in favor of Officer Rawson as to this claim.
3.

Municipal Liability

The City of Chattanooga moves this Court for summary judgment in its favor on the ground
of municipal liability (Court File No. 32). Indeed, Ramsey has failed to allege the City has a custom
or policy which caused a violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
“Municipalities are liable for harms resulting from a constitutional violation only when the injury
resulted from an ‘implementation of [the municipality’s] official policies or established customs.’”
Spears v. Ruth, 589 F.3d 249, 256 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

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658, 708 (1978) (Powell, J. concurring)). In other words, to survive a summary judgment motion,
Ramsey must show “the alleged federal right violation[s] occurred because of a policy or custom”
adhered to by City of Chattanooga officers. Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th
Cir. 2005).
In other words, Ramsey must “offer[] proof of policymaking officials’ knowledge and
acquiescence to [an] established practice” leading to a constitutional violation. Spears, 589 F.3d at
256. Ramsey must also establish a “‘direct causal link’ between the policy and the alleged
constitutional violation in order to show that the municipality’s ‘deliberate conduct’ can be deemed
the ‘moving force’ behind the violation.” Graham ex. rel. Estate of Graham v. County of
Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 383 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Waters v. City of Morristown, 242 F.3d 353,
362 (6th Cir. 2001)). Here, Ramsey does not offer any evidence to raise a genuine issue of material
fact. In addition, because the Court finds no constitutional violation occurred on the part of Officer
Rawson, Ramsey’s § 1983 claim against the City must fail. Accordingly, the Court will GRANT
summary judgment in favor of the City as to this claim.
B.

State Law Claims
1.

Infliction of Emotional Harm

Ramsey also argues all of the defendants are guilty of intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional harm (Court File No. 1-1). In order to be held liable on a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, “(1) the conduct complained of must be intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct
must be so outrageous that it is not tolerated by civilized society; and (3) the conduct complained
of must result in serious mental injury.” Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). “A
negligence claim requires that a plaintiff establish: (1) a duty of care owed to plaintiff by defendant;

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(2) conduct falling below that standard of care resulting in a breach of duty by defendant; (3) an
injury or loss; (4) cause in fact; and (5) proximate or legal cause.” Doe v. Univ. of South, No. 4:09cv-62, 2011 WL 1258104, at 21 (E.D. Tenn. March 31, 2011). However, “when ‘all of the material
allegations involve the intentional, deliberate acts of the defendants,’ a claim of negligent infliction
of emotional distress does not exist.” Alexander v. Newman, 345 F. Supp. 2d 876, 887 (W.D. Tenn.
2004) (citing Tidman v. Salvation Army, No. 01-A-01-9708-CV00380, 1998 WL 391765, at *3
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 1998)).
a.

City of Chattanooga

The Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“TGTLA”) “removes immunity for
negligent actions of employees unless such actions were related to discretionary functions or certain
enumerated intentional torts, including infliction of mental anguish.”

Arbuckle v. City of

Chattanooga, 696 F.Supp.2d 907, 930 (E.D. Tenn. 2010). The TGTLA also creates immunity for
the City of Chattanooga for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Sallee v. Barrett, 171
S.W.3d 822, at 829 (Tenn. 2005); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205(2). Under Tenn. Code
Ann. § 29-20-205(2), a governmental entity is immune from suit, however, for the following acts:
“false imprisonment . . . false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process,
libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, invasion of right
of privacy, or civil rights.” Because Ramsey’s negligence infliction of emotional distress claim
arises out her civil rights action, the Court finds the City is immune for that claim as well.
Therefore, the Court will DISMISS these claims in favor of the City.
b.

Individual Officers

Because all of the officers were acting within the scope of their employment during the

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events giving rise to this case, the Court finds they are also immune under TGTLA with respect to
Ramsey’s claim for intentional emotional distress to the extent she brings suit against the officers
in their official capacities. Wilkerson v. Chattanooga, No. 1:09-CV-168, 2010 WL 2735689, at *11
(E.D. Tenn. July 12, 2010). With respect to Ramsey’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress against the officers in their individual capacities and her claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, Ramsey fails to make any specific allegations in her complaint.

Indeed, the

Court finds she has not created a genuine dispute as to whether Officers Zendejas or Officer Rawson
intentionally or negligently caused her emotional injury. The Court will DISMISS these claims
against Officer Zendejas and Officer Rawson.
On the other hand, the Court finds there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Officer Avery intentionally inflicted emotional harm on Ramsey in his individual capacity. In his
motion for summary judgment, Officer Avery argues Ramsey cannot prevail on her claim of
intentional emotional distress because she cannot show she suffered from a severe emotional injury
(Court File No. 35).
Where a plaintiff alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress, “the mental injury must
be ‘so severe that no reasonable person would be expected to endure it.” Launius v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., No. 3:09-CV-501, 2010 WL 3429666, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 27, 2010) (quoting Miller
v. Willbanks, 8 S.W.3d 607, 625 (Tenn. 1999)). Indeed, Ramsey did not seek a mental health
evaluation until a year after the events regarding this case occurred (Court File No. 40-1 at 4).
Although Ramsey was prescribed Prozac and Seroquel for post traumatic stress disorder, her
treatment at the Johnson Mental Health Center appeared to last only a few months (Court File No.
31, Affidavit of Bruce E. Dyer, Sr., APN). Specifically, Ramsey testified she only had two or three

15

appointments (Court File No. 40-1 at 51). Ramsey’s last appointment was on January 20,2010 and
she missed two appointments scheduled for March 2010 (Court File No. 31). Nonetheless, because
Ramsey was provided medication and diagnosed with a disorder, the Court finds this creates a
genuine dispute, and the Court will DENY Officer Avery’s motion for summary judgment with
respect to Ramsey’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In contrast, because
Ramsey only alleges Officer Avery exerted excessive force against her, the Court will DISMISS
her claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against Officer Avery as well.
2.

Property Damage

Finally, Officer Avery contends he also entitled to summary judgment regarding Ramsey’s
claim for property damage. Ramsey alleges Officer Avery crashed into her car that was “legally
parked on the street” (Court File No. 1-1 at 4). Nonetheless, Ramsey admits she is not the owner
of the vehicle that was damaged (Court File No. 21-4 at 6). Accordingly, Ramsey has failed to
allege any facts to show that she has standing regarding this cause of action. The Court will
DISMISS this claim as to Officer Avery.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will GRANT Officer Rawson and the City of

Chattanooga’s motion for summary judgment (Court File No. 32). All claims against Officer
Rawson and the City of Chattanooga will be DISMISSED. The Court will GRANT IN PART and
DENY IN PART Officer Avery and Officer Zendejas’s motion for summary judgment (Court File
No. 34). All claims against Officer Zendejas will be DISMISSED. The Court will DISMISS
Ramsey’s claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and property damage against Officer

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Avery.
An Order shall enter.

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