Ritchie v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Defendants motion to dismiss [Doc. 21] will be GRANTED, and this action will be DISMISSED as moot. Signed by District Judge Curtis L Collier on 10/13/2015. (AML, ) Copy of M/O served to Barry Ritchie via US Mail.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
at CHATTANOOGA

BARRY W. RITCHIE, # 99117,
Plaintiff,
v.
TENNESSEE BOARD of PROBATION
& PAROLE,
Defendant.

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No. 1:10-cv-203-CLC-WBC

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This pro se state prisoner’s civil rights case, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is before
the Court on Defendant’s unopposed motion to dismiss and supporting memorandum [Docs.
21–22]. This case was remanded for further proceedings as to whether the application of
Tennessee’s 2009 parole provisions in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b), rather than those in
the 1981 provisions when Plaintiff was convicted, violated Plaintiff’s right under the Ex Post
Facto Clause, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. Cl. 1 [Doc. 18]. Because Plaintiff made “very
limited, almost conclusory” allegations that the outcome of his parole hearing would have
been different under the 1981 provision, he was given the opportunity to offer evidence
showing that he would remain incarcerated longer if his eligibility for parole were reviewed
under the 2009 provisions than if his eligibility were reviewed under the 1981 parole
provisions.

The basis of Defendant Board of Probation and Parole’s motion to dismiss is that
Plaintiff was released on parole on April 20, 2015, and that his release on parole has rendered
this case moot. In support of its motion, Defendant has submitted the affidavit of Gayle S.
Barbee, the Director of Board Operations for the Tennessee Board of Parole and custodian of
the records, who avers that Plaintiff was released on parole supervision on that date and who
has attached to her affidavit Plaintiff’s Parole Certificate No. 158779 [Doc. 22-1].
The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to “cases and controversies.” U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2, cl.1. A case becomes moot “when the issues presented are no longer live or
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v.
City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 530 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting County of Los Angeles v. Davis,
440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)). The Court agrees that since this lawsuit concerned the proper
standards to apply to Plaintiff’s parole eligibility determination to avoid an ex post facto
violation and since Plaintiff has been released on supervised parole, this case is now moot.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss [Doc. 21] will be GRANTED, and this
action will be DISMISSED as moot.
AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.

/s/
CURTIS L. COLLIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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