Buchanan v. Pilgrim's Pride Corporation

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: both Defendant's 4 Request for Judicial Notice and 5 Motion to Dismiss are hereby GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims against Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A separate judgment will enter. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close the file in this case. Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 7/25/2011. (BJL)Copy Mailed to Attorney Heather Fox Vickles.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
at CHATTANOOGA
DAVID BUCHANAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:10-cv-242
Judge Mattice

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice [Court Doc. 4] and
Motion to Dismiss [Court Doc. 5], both filed August 30, 2010. In the former, Defendant asks
the Court to take judicial notice of filings in a related bankruptcy proceeding. On June 9,
2011, this Court warned Plaintiff that failure to respond to a motion may be deemed a
waiver of any opposition to the relief sought and that his failure to respond to Defendant’s
Request for Judicial Notice” [Court Doc. 4] and Motion to Dismiss [Court Doc. 5] on or
before June 30, 2011 would result in this Court construing the request and motion as
unopposed and deciding them without hearing from him. More than three weeks have
passed since that deadline without Plaintiff filing a response, and the motion is now more
than ripe for the Court’s consideration.
First, this Court clearly may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts,
including the related bankruptcy matter. Federal courts may take judicial notice of
proceedings in other courts of record.” Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d
736, 738 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing Granader v. Public Bank, 417 F.2d 75, 82-83 (6th Cir.
1969). Likewise, this Court may do so without converting the motion to dismiss into one for
summary judgment. J.P. Silverton Indus. L.P. v. Sohm, 243 F. App'x 82, 86-87 (6th Cir.

2007) (holding that courts may consider, without converting the motion to one for summary
judgment, "public records, matters of which a court may take judicial notice, and letter
decisions of governmental agencies.") (citing Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737
(6th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the Court will treat the motion presently before it as one to
dismiss without converting it to one for summary judgment. Accordingly, Defendant’s
Request for Judicial Notice [Court Doc. 4] will be GRANTED.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides an affirmative defense for a
party’s “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
This defense is typically asserted as a motion to dismiss, where the movant challenges the
sufficiency of claims set forth in a complaint. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court of the
United States expanded on the holding in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly by stating that “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.’” 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court clarified this statement by outlining the two
“working principles” governing a motion to dismiss. Id. First, “the tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.” Id. Instead, a court considering a motion to dismiss should only accept that
all factual allegations are true. Accordingly, “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 1950.
The second principle outlined in Iqbal is that “only a complaint that states a plausible
claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 1950. “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949 (citing
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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The reviewing court must determine not whether the plaintiff
will ultimately prevail but whether there is “more than the mere possibility of misconduct,”
which is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss
under 12(b)(6), plaintiff’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.”
Ass’n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir.
2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In this case, the record is clear that Pilgrim’s Pride filed a Chapter 11 petition in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas on December 1, 2008.
(Mot. to Dismiss at 2 & Ex. A, Case No. 08-45664, Findings of Fact, Concl. of Law, & Order
Confirming Debtors’ Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (as Modified), Dec. 10, 2009, at 4.) Defendant’s Amended Joint Chapter
11 Plan of Reorganization was confirmed by the bankruptcy court on December 10, 2009,
and became effective on December 28, 2009. (Id. & Ex. C, Notice of Entry of (A) an Order
Confirming the Debtors’ Joint Amended Plan of Reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (as Modified) and (B) Occurrence of the Effective Date.) Defendant
demonstrates, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that Plaintiff was served with a “Notice of
Deadline for Filing Proofs of Claim on June 1, 2009, at 5:00 p.m. PT” and an associated
Proof of Claim Form B10 on or before April 15, 2009. (Id., Ex. D, Certificate of Service.)
Further, on December 30, 2009, Plaintiff was served with the Notice of Effective Date. (Id.,
Ex. C & Ex. E, Certificate of Service.)

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As Defendant noted, the Plan and the Confirmation Order state that:
[U]pon the Effective Date, all existing Claims against and
Equity Interests in the Debtors shall be, and shall be deemed
to be, discharged, terminated, and cancelled, as applicable,
and all holders of Claims and Equity Interests shall be
precluded and enjoined from asserting against the
Reorganized Debtors, their successors or assignees, or any of
their assets or properties, any other or further Claim based
upon any act or omission, transaction, or other activity of any
kind or nature that occurred prior to the Effective Date, whether
or not such holder has filed a proof of Claim, and whether or
not the facts or legal bases therefore were known or existed
prior to the Effective Date.
(Id. citing Ex. A at 42; Ex. B, Debtors’ Am. Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Ch. 11 of
the Bankr. Code (as Modified), Dec. 8, 2009, at 30-31.) Further, the filing of a bankruptcy
petition generally stays the commencement of a proceeding against the debtor to recover
a claim that arose prior to the bankruptcy filing, and the confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan
discharges pre-petition debts except for those types recognized as nondischargeable
under 11 U.S.C. § 523. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1), 1141(d).
Plaintiff’s claims arose on or before July 23, 2009. (Court Doc. 1, Notice of Removal,
Ex. 1, Compl. at ¶ 3.) He filed the instant suit in the Circuit Court of Hamilton County,
Tennessee on July 22, 2010 – removed to this Court on August 26, 2010 – and has not
come forward with any proof or argument that his pre-petition claim is nondischargeable.
(Id.)
Accordingly, both Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice [Court Doc. 4] and Motion
to Dismiss [Court Doc. 5] are hereby GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
A separate judgment will enter. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close the file in this case.

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SO ORDERED this 25th day of July, 2011.
/s/Harry S. Mattice, Jr.
HARRY S. MATTICE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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